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This thesis is a history of the northern Cape frontier zone between the years 1700 and c.1815. It 
describes and analyses the interactions which occurred between the principal peoples of this 
spatio-temporal area as the Cape colony expanded into the arid heartland of South Africa. The 
study's geographical focus of attention moves, with the frontier zone itself, from the banks of the 
Berg River in the south-western Cape of 1700 to beyond the northern banks of the Orange River 
in the early nineteenth century. The western and eastern limits of this area are formed by the 
Atlantic Ocean on the one hand and the eastern frontier district of Graaff-Reinet on the otl1er. 
Within the frontier zone of this vast and hitherto neglected region, it is argued, there emerged, 
during the course of the eighteenth century, a set of practices and attitudes which, precisely 
because they were prototypical, exerted a profound influence on the subsequent colonial history 
of South Africa. Although developments within the northern Cape frontier zone are not seen as 
being more important than those which were taking place elsewhere in the colony (such as the 
south-western Cape or the eastern Cape frontier zone) they are seen as being equally important. 
Our picture of eighteenth century colonial society in South Africa has, until now, been a lopsided 
one in that the archival evidence for the largest part of the colony - the northern Cape frontier 
zone - has been under utilised. This thesis, based on extensive archival research, attempts to 
rectify this imbalance by discussing key themes in northern frontier history as they emerged and 
developed over a period of more than one hundred and ten years. 
A primary concern of this study is to provide an account of the dynamics of colonial expansion 
which is based on a consideration of both the principal productive activity of the frontier zone -
pastoral production - and the most important political and military institution of the frontier zone 
- the commando. In the course of this account the focus of attention falls on those colonists who 
took up the life of semi-nomadic pastoralists (trekboers) in the Cape interior. Related to this, and 
of equal importance, is an examination of the impact which colonial expansion had on the 
Khoisan societies of the Cape interior. The processes by which these societies were either 
conquered, annihilated or incorporated into colonial society are discussed. So too are the ways in 
which the Khoisan resisted colonial domination. Thus, a large part of this thesis deals with the 
various forms or practices which shaped intergroup relationships on the frontier, ranging from 
genocidal warfare, at one extreme, to symbiotic co-operation and collaboration at the other. 
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Particular attention is paid to the conditions under which many Khoisan became unfree labourers 
within the colonial economy. The many instances of primary resistance, guerrilla warfare, 
rebellion, flight and protest which are discussed in these pages serve as testimony to the fact that 
the subjugation of the Khoisan was neither quick nor easy. Indeed, the pervasive violence arising 
from the protracted struggle for dominance in the northern Cape frontier zone is, in itself, an 
important thematic concern of this study. 
Although the major protagonists of the frontier zone were the colonists and Khoisan there were 
other important frontier societies which are discussed here. New groups emerged as a result of 
the processes of interaction and acculturation taking place within the frontier zone. People of 
mixed racial or cultural origin (known in the parlance of the day as "Bastaards" or "Bastaard-
Hottentots") gradually acquired a new cultural and political identity. Some of them, in an attempt 
to escape the increasing discrimination which they experienced in the colony, removed themselves 
beyond the limits of colonial settlement altogether. These Oorlam groups, as they became known, 
played an important part in the history of the frontier zone and their contribution is given due 
consideration. Also important were a variety of other colonial fugitives - runaway slaves, 
Company deserters, bandits, murderers and assorted criminals - whose impact on both Khoisan 
societies and colonial fanners was frequently immense. The significance of such drosters 
(deserters) is acknowledged here. 
The thesis concludes with a consideration of those forces which tended towards promoting the 
social, economic and political closure of the frontier zone. In this respect the exertions of 
missionaries become particularly important since they first appear in the northern Cape in the last 
years of the eighteenth century and herald the arrival of a new era in frontier history. Missionary 
activity was, amongst other things, a symptom of the desire for greater state control over the 
turbulent regions of the colony's northern limits. The state-approved conversion of the leader of 
the most powerful Oorlam bandit group ( 1815) marked an important symbolic moment in the 
closure of the frontier zone. Even more important, however, was the promulgation of the 
Hottentot Proclamation of 1809 for this signalled that the new British government of the Cape 
intended to recognise and entrench the colonists' subjugation of their Khoisan and "Bastaard-
Hottentot" labourers. For the first time there was a government at the Cape powerful enough to 
impose its will on the frontier regions. Unfortunately, by backing the colonists, this government 
endorsed and ensured the outcome of the long process of struggle, decided in the northern frontier 
zone, for the land, labour and livestock resources of the Khoisan of the Cape interior. 
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Preface 
TIME BECOMES HUMAN TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS ARTICULATED 
THROUGH A NARRATIVE MODE.I 
When I first began work on this thesis the most important question in my mind was "What 
happened to the Khoisan societies of the Cape?" It was clear to me that the answer to this 
question was to be found in the crucial years of the eighteenth century, during which time Dutch 
colonists advanced into the Cape interior and confronted the Khoisan with a decisive challenge: 
submit, retreat or perish. I discovered that there was no detailed or satisfactory account of this 
seemingly most central episode in South African history: the colonial conquest of the Khoisan of 
the Cape interior.2 The majority of historians, if they noticed the process of conquest at all, were 
quick to anchor their narratives to the drama of the eastern frontier where, after 1770, the conflict 
between the Xhosa and the colonists seemed to be of overriding importance. The history of 
Khoisan-colonial contact between 1700 and 1770 was a virtual lacuna and, as a post-1770 
phenomenon, was treated largely as a side-show of the eastern frontier itself. Confronted with the 
task of rectifying this omission I decided to concentrate on the little known northern frontier zone 
and leave the better known eastern frontier to others. 
The paucity of historical commentary and secondary material forced me to start my enquiry 
virtually from scratch. I was particularly keen to consider both sides of the frontier and attempt to 
recover the hitherto neglected experience of the Khoisan as well as that of the better documented 
colonists. I realised that my starting point would therefore have to be a study of the pre-colonial 
Khoisan and the acquisition of a knowledge of the terrain and environment in which they had 
lived. Thanks to the generous enthusiasm of members of the Spatial Archaeology Research Unit 
at the University of Cape Town I was able to go some way towards realising these ambitions. 
Though I will never be more than an amateur archaeologist the experience gained in their 
company has served to introduce me to the practicalities and complexities of interpreting the 
archaeological record. I certainly have no qualms about including archaeological evidence 
amongst my sources - (stone, bone and rock paintings also tell stories to the skilled reader) - and 
much in this thesis concerning the Cape Khoisan has been learnt from my archaeological mentors 
during the course of numerous discussions and on a variety of field trips. But it was by enabling 
I. Paul Ricocur, Time a11d Narralive (Chicago, 1983), Vol. I, p.52. 
2. See introduction below for an account of the relevant historiography. 
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me to spend time in the outdoors that the archaeologists gave me access to the most valuable 
primary resource of all - the land itself. Thanks to them I have spent many days contemplating the 
various environments described in this thesis: the boiling sand of the Sandveld; the fragrant 
fynbos of the Cape Fold Mountains; the parched plains of the Tanqua Karoo; the sombre ridges 
of the Roggeveld escarpment; the flower-strewn semi-deserts of Namaqualand; the tragic 
melancholy of empty Bushmanland and the long, strong waters of the Orange River. Without 
such knowledge this thesis would have lacked an important dimension. 
It was clear, however, that if I wished to assess the impact of colonialism on the Khoisan societies 
of the interior I would have to immerse myself in the historical records of the eighteenth century 
Cape colony. Of particular relevance here were those records which dealt with the northern 
frontier zone, a region which, during the eighteenth century, fell under the jurisdiction of the 
landdrost of Stellenbosch) Since the records are in the archaic Dutch of that period it was 
necessary for me to learn how to understand them, a process including both translation of their 
language and interpretation of their content. My first task, that of translating or comprehending 
the Dutch, was achieved more by a process of osmosis and endurance than by linguistic skill. 
Whilst the Dutch penned by officials at Stellenbosch was usually similar to that of their educated 
colleagues in Cape Town, Batavia or Amsterdam, the Dutch of the frontier farmers was markedly 
different. Amongst the incoming letters of veldwagtmeesters and private individuals are barely 
legible specimens, composed by barely literate people (in conditions obviously not conducive to 
calligraphic refinement) whose language was neither Dutch nor Afrikaans (but something in 
between) and whose style was innocent of punctuation, orthography or grammar. The only way to 
understand such writing was to recreate it by copying it out in longhand, hoping that mimetic 
rhythm might clarify the obscurity of an illegible word or phrase. Photocopying was both useless 
and expensive. I thus copied hundreds of pages by hand and, after several years, could understand 
nearly all that I read. How, though, to interpret it? 
After so long an exposure to documents generated by colonists and colonial officials was there 
not a danger that I would end up with a distorted view of history, forgetting that I had originally 
planned to write about both sides of the frontier and fooling myself into believing that the 
documentary references to the Khoisan which I had found were adequate representations of their 
presence? Would I forget that recorded history is usually the record that dominant cultures leave 
3. Sec maps between pp.278-9 for the extent of the Stellenbosch district at various times <luring the eighteenth 
century. 
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behind them as they relegate the dominated to the shadowy status of "people without history"?4 I 
was acutely aware that I had now become deeply involved with the lives and stories of certain 
frontier colonists - because they were comparatively well-documented - and that it was going to 
be extremely difficult to acquire the same degree of knowledge about the less well-documented 
Khoisan. Those Khoisan who featured in the records did so primarily as victims, with whom it 
was possible to sympathise, but for whom it was almost impossible to speak. 
Such concerns were not, of course, original for they have preoccupied all historians who have 
tried to rescue the losers of history from the "enormous condescension of posterity".5 Many, 
indeed, are the distinguished historians who have taught us how to recover the voices of the 
marginalised and oppressed from the most unpromising or unlikely sources. It is the nature of 
historical records to present a partial (meaning both biased and incomplete) view of the past and 
it is the duty of historians to be aware of both the limitations and potentialities of the records in 
question. Inevitably, however, much is unrecoverable, and it is history itself which has made it 
unrecoverable. This is a paradox which should be especially obvious to those historians who deal 
with frontier zones, especially instances of the great, global frontier zone which accompanied the 
expansion of European power during modern times. Greg Dening, an historian of eighteenth 
century European expansion in the Pacific, has written of the beach as being the typical frontier 
zone of encounter between "Natives" and "Strangers". In his narrative of the encounter between 
the mutineers of HMS Bounty with the Tahitian islanders he writes words which underline the 
futility of any attempt to recreate a pristine, pre-colonial past: 
Until this moment the history of the Bounty has been "ours", the "Strangers". We 
understand the Ship and recognise its history because in some way it mirrors 
ourselves. We are joined to it by language, by a sense that the questions we ask about 
it are questions about ourselves. But now as we step onto a beach at Tahiti that part 
of the Bounty is also somebody else's. We will not altogether understand it. The 
Native in it will be partly irrecoverable, partly so other that we will understand it only 
dimly. But because the Bounty Strangers stepped onto a Native's beach then, we the 
Strangers are now bound together with the Native by that contact. There is now no 
Native past without the Stranger, no Stranger without the Native. No one can hope to 
be mediator or interlocutor in that opposition of Native and Stranger, because no one 
is gazing at it untouched by the power that is in it. Nor can anyone speak just for the 
one, just for the other. There is no escape from the politics of our knowledge, but that 
politics is not in the past. That politics is in the present. There are men and women 
4. See Eric Wolfs Europe and the People Without llisto,y (Berkley, 1982) for a discussion of this topic. 
5. 'I11e famous phrase of E.I'. Thompson in 71,e Making of the English Working Class (Hannon<lsworth, 1968), 
p.13. 
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killing themselves in the Pacific now because Strangers stepped onto the Native's 
beaches. We have to write our history of the Pacific as the history of Native and 
Stranger Bound Together because we are bound together by that past reaching into 
the present. Who can change what was done? Who can return life or punish the dead? 
The only world we can change is that of the present of which we are a part. That 
world now has been encompassed by Native and Stranger alike. That world 
encompassed, the ways in which Native and Stranger possessed and possess one 
another, is the object of our mutual and separate histories.6 
The world of the frontier zone, then, is the world in which Native and Stranger become bound 
together, and if our picture of that world is partly irrecoverable it is because in the process of that 
binding together some things were destroyed whilst others were created. Documentary evidence, 
with its distortions and selections, is itself an indicator of what was becoming lost in the past 
whilst the present was being made. Thus, even the aporias of a history based on documentary 
evidence can be revealing, gesturing mutely to that which vanished most pennanently, most 
decisively. The nature or character of the documents in question is, therefore, an important 
component in shaping our narratives about the past. 
Those documents of eighteenth century Dutch colonial rule at the Cape which are housed in the 
Cape Archives are official documents and, like official documents anywhere, tend to reflect 
official concerns. The stories which are preserved in government archives are therefore very often 
stories which one set of officials tells to another and are concerned with themes of state control, 
finance, law and order. Where private individuals enter the historical record it is usually in their 
capacity of subjects of the state, receiving or responding to instructions. Isolation and 
underpopulation combined to make the archival records relating to the northern Cape frontier 
zone sparser and less detailed than those of districts - such as Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet -
which were smaller, more densely populated and whose administrative centres were more 
centrally situated within their boundaries. The district of Stellenbosch was a vast, under-
administrated area whose drostdy lay hundreds of kilometres to the south of the expanding 
frontier regions. The white or Christian population of the region was an estimated 7 256 in 1798 
and most of these people were to be found in the well watered agricultural lands around the town 
of Stellenbosch in the south-western Cape.7 Further to the north colonial fanncrs were few and 
far between, many days journey beyond the reach of the landdrost or his deputies. In the northern 
frontier districts the authority of the landdrost (and behind him that of the governor of the Cape) 
6. Greg Dening, Afr Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre 011 the B01111ty (Cambridge, 1994 ), pp. I 78-
179. 
7. John Barrow, Travels Into the Interior of Sou them Africa, Part Two (London, 1804 ), p.361. 
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was supposed to be upheld by a handful of veldwagtmeesters or veldkorporaals, officials whose 
principal function became that of organising or leading commandos. The correspondence between 
the landdrost of Stellenbosch and his veldwagtmeesters is thus a major source of information 
about the northern Cape frontier zone even though much of it is concerned with Khoisan attacks 
against the colonists and the business of organising retaliatory commandos. 
Information of a more detailed and revealing nature is contained in the criminal records of the 
district of Stellenbosch. In these pages, recorded so as to provide evidence in criminal cases, we 
can catch glimpses of non-official lives caught up in official enquiries. Many of those who 
appeared before the Court of Stellenbosch (important cases were sometimes forwarded to the 
Council of Justice at Cape Town) were Khoikhoi. Sometimes they appeared as accused, 
sometimes as defendants, but, most significantly, they were regarded as being subjects of the 
colony and hence under the protection or punishment of its laws. Though the legal status of 
Khoikhoi was, in some respects, inferior to that of whites, and the courts frequently found in 
favour of whites at the expense of the Khoikhoi, there is evidence that some Khoikhoi did seek the 
protection of the courts against their masters.& This utilisation of, or participation in, the colony's 
legal system by the Khoikhoi has resulted in their "capture" by the records. Thanks to the 
operation of Roman-Dutch law at the Cape we can read, in the statements and summaries of 
court proceedings, detailed stories about people whose lives would nonnally have gone 
unrecorded. But there are, naturally, some problems of interpretation connected with the reading 
of such stories. 
The dramatis personae of court records often appear before the historian as they appeared before 
interrogators long ago - as criminals or supplicants before a court of law.9 In the theatre of the 
court room narrative fonns can be expected to adopt fairly conventional patterns, shaped by the 
structures of the legal system and the contemporary sense of what would constitute a "guilty" or 
"innocent" reading of the events in question. Thus the prosecution would emplot events to 
produce a guilty verdict and the defence, or defendant, would emplot them to produce an innocent 
verdict. Historical evidence which is based on the records of court proceedings should, therefore, 
take into account the social space in which the criminal, or civil records were produced as well as 
the larger narrative forms which might have influenced the presentation of the evidence. Such 
8. For further discussion on these points see chapter seven below. 
9. Carlo Ginzburg has given us several perceptive accounts of the historical use of criminal records in his 
"Witchcraft and Popular Piety: Noles on a Modcnesc Trial of 1519" in Clues, Jvfyths, and the Historical Method 
(Baltimore, 1989), pp.1-16 and in The Wo1111 and the Cheese (London, 1980). 
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forn1s might have been modelled on Biblical narratives, folk tales, traditional wisdom or legal 
knowledge. They were also tailored towards making a favourable impression on the court. IO Very 
often, however, the people who did the tailoring were not the accused nor the defendant but the 
court scribes and officials who wrote the evidence up in a documentary form so that the court 
could deliberate upon written, rather than spoken evidence. Such evidence was presented in Dutch 
which meant that the testimony of Khoikhoi frequently had to be translated. We very seldom hear, 
even in translation, the authentic voice of the Khoikhoi coming through the court proceedings. 
Nor do we get much sense of the stories or narrative forms which might have influenced the ways 
in which Khoikhoi presented their statements or conceived of matters such as justice, punishment 
and retribution. In this respect the subsumption and almost total suppression of the Khoikhoi 
voice within the legal discourse of the colony is itself indicative of the fate of the Khoikhoi. It is 
harder still to detect evidence of Khoikhoi mentality in other official documents and it is only in 
the work of missionaries or anthropologists that we still find traces of the systems of meaning that 
helped the Khoikhoi to interpret the world before the white man arrived. 
Surprisingly enough we are much better infonned about the mental world of the San of the 
northern Cape than we are about that of the Khoikhoi. Thanks to the labours of Wilhelm Bleek 
and Lucy Lloyd, who collected oral material from San infonnants in the 1870s, we have a large 
collection of the folk lore, myths and stories of the San. I I This is the material which has enabled 
us to understand, partially, the meaning of San rock art. Knowing their stories, or narratives, we 
are in a position to say something about the "reality" of the San and the way in which this reality 
was influenced by narrative forms. The San of the northern Cape were known to Bleek by the 
language which they spoke - /Xam - and it is appropriate to call them by this name. The /Xam 
used only one word for all narratives, namely kum (plural, kukummi). According to Hewitt: 
"There is no record of their making distinctions between kinds of narrative such as myth, legend 
or fable. All narratives were kukummi whether they related the activities of supernatural beings, 
humans or animals ... The same word, however, was also used to mean conversation and news."12 
It will be argued later in the thesis that this inability to distinguish myth from reality was an 
important contributory factor in the demise of the San. Looking through the material in the Bleek 
- Lloyd collection one is struck by the ahistoricity of the narratives. Despite nearly two centuries 
of colonial contact there is virtually no reference, in the kukummi of the /Xam, to the forces of 
10. See Natalie Zemon Davis' Fiction i11 the Archives (Cambridge, 1987) for a discussion of the way in which 
popular narrative fonns influenced the presentation oflcgal evidence in early modem France. 
11. Sec chapter six below. 
12. Roger L. Hewitt, St111ct11re, Alea11i11g and Uitual in the Narratives of the Southern San (Hamburg, 1986), pp.47-
48. 
XIII 
history which are destroying them. It is true that many of the stories involve violence and bodily 
dismemberment for the supernatural trickster hero, /Kaggen, who features in them. This may be 
seen as indicative of the world in which the /Xam lived, where hunter-gatherers were constantly 
having to outwit their hostile and violent neighbours.13 But the characters in the stories are 
animals. Human enemies are not named though certain animals probably represent different and 
menacing societies. Only in the genealogies of Bleck and Lloyd's informants may one see, in the 
violent deaths of recent ancestors and relatives, traces of the bloody history which was 
responsible for the extinction of the /Xam.14 
The extent to which the Khoikhoi shared the same narratives as the San is problematic. There 
were common features in both Khoikhoi and San religion.15 Some stories, like how death came 
into the world, were shared but in others different meanings, values and world views become 
apparent. In one /Xam story, for instance, /Kaggen attempts to steal the sheep of the Ticks, a 
group of "black people who we do not visit" which different commentators see as representing 
either Korana or Tswana herdsmen. It seems, however, that this refers to the Korana for as 
Hewitt explains: " ... a note relating to this narrative points out that the !Korana were thought of as 
black because they always seemed to be angry and violent".16 However one interprets the 
different versions of this story it seems clear that the /Xam drew a fundamental distinction 
between themselves, a hunter-gatherer group, and the Korana, a pastoralist group. There is a 
great deal more internal evidence in the /Xam narratives which points towards a unique, hunter-
gatherer consciousness - a point which contradicts those who argue that Khoikhoi and San arc 
basically interchangeable conccpts.17 What Khoikhoi and San did have in common though was 
that their narratives proved to be inadequate when it came to understanding the realities of 
colonial conquest and Khoisan narratives were soon replaced by Christian or colonial ones. The 
fact that Khoisan narratives were part of an oral culture also made them vulnerable to the 
onslaught of literacy, a powerful force which accompanied colonisation and superseded the 
unwritten stories of the indigenes. 
To argue that the narratives of the Khoisan were inadequate because they failed to discern 
13. See Hewitt, Stntcture, Meaning and Ritual, pp.145-171. See also unpublished research paper by Ralph Austen 
on "African Trickster Tales", written in Department of History, University of Cape Town, 1992. 
14. Jagger Library, University of Cape Town, W.H.I. Bleck and L. Lloyd, Unpublished Manuscripts, BC 151. 
15. See Alan Barnard, Hunters And llerde,:s Of Southem Africa: A Comparative Ethnography of the Khoisan 
Peoples (Cambridge, 1992 ), pp.251-264. 
16. Hewitt, S1111cture. Aleaning and Ritual, p.230. 
17. Sec chapter one for a discussion of this topic. 
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between myth and history is not to say that myth is not an extremely powerful, perhaps even 
necessary and inevitable, narrative form. Even in societies with a strong sense of history myth 
acts as a potent force, infonning and underlying that history. The colonists who were responsible 
for the destruction of Khoisan culture were also bearers and makers of their own myths. In fact, 
one of the most interesting debates in South African history centres on the myth-making power of 
the frontier experience itself, with generations of historians believing that it was on the frontier 
that a distinctive South African identity emerged. These are issues which await further 
discussion. For the moment it is important to say something more about myth and its relationship 
to history. 
Richard Slotkin, in his study of the mythology of the American frontier, defines mythology as: 
a complex of narratives that dramatises the world vision and historical sense of a 
people or culture, reducing centuries of experience into a constellation of compelling 
metaphors. The narrative action of the myth-tale recapitulates that people's experience 
in their land, rehearses their visions of that experience in its relation to their gods and 
the cosmos, and reduces both experience and vision to a paradigm.18 
"The mythology of a nation," he explains elsewhere, "is the intelligible mask of that enigma called 
the 'national character'." 19 What myths did the colonial frontiersmen of the Cape carry with 
them? What myths did they help to create in the frontier zone itself? It is best to begin answering 
these questions by discussing the inherited myths that Europeans took with them as they began to 
colonise certain non-European portions of the globe. 
Europeans had long believed in a fundamental dichotomy between civility and savagery. The 
European heartlands, i.e., the "known world", represented civilisation, where people looked like 
Europeans and practised the Christian religion. The further one went beyond the borders of 
civilization, however, the more likely one was to find wildness and savagery, the inverse, in other 
words, of civilisation. Such ideas rested on a number of sources: Biblical, classical and 
traditional. The Bible had taught that the world's centre was the Holy Land and the further from 
this centre one went the closer one drew to heathen savagery. Classical writers of Greece and 
Rome had also drawn a distinction between the civilised and the barbaric, the latter category of 
person being, obviously, people beyond the boundaries of Greece and Rome. The extremely 
influential Roman author, Pliny the Elder (d. AD 79) had written a book of natural history which 
was widely diffused during the Middle Ages. Pliny described how, the further one travelled from 
18. Richard Slotkin, Rege11eratio11 Through Violence: The A{vthology of the American Frontier 1600-1860 
(Middletown, 1973 ), p.6. 
19. Ibid., p.3. 
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the centres of Roman civilisation, the more likely one was to meet the monstrous human races: 
dog-headed people, cannibals, pygmies, cave dwellers who squeak like bats and live on snakes, 
amazons, necklcss Blemmyae with their eyes in their shoulders, and many, many more such 
freaks. This world view was reinforced by the fabulous travel accounts of Sir John Mandeville 
whose book circulated widely in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and was, alongside Marco 
Polo's Travels, one of the most important reference works consulted by Christopher Columbus.20 
European folk tales were full of wild-men, usually depicted as under-clothed forest dwellers or 
troglodytes. When Europeans sailed far south to the Cape - further south than any European had 
ever been - they therefore expected to encounter an inversion of the civilised order and were not 
slow to believe their expectations fulfilled in the persons and societies of the Khoikhoi of the 
Cape.21 
Early European representations of the Khoikhoi, both verbal and visual, were predominantly 
negative as authors and artists stressed those aspects of Khoikhoi culture which reinforced 
expectations of savagery and wildness. Thus the near nakedness of the Khoikhoi was emphasised, 
along with all those customs - eating of loathsome food, unfamiliar language - which signalled to 
European audiences that they were learning about a society that was as far removed from 
civilised humanity as the Cape was from Europe.22 Once Europeans became aware that some of 
the indigenous inhabitants of the Cape did not keep livestock but lived as hunters and gatherers 
and were despised even by the Khoikhoi they were more certain than ever that such "Bushmen" 
must be on the outennost margins of human society, lacking, it seemed, such essential tokens of 
civility as political structures and religious institutions. 
Buried deep within this myth of savagery was another entrenched tradition of European culture: 
the idea that, in certain circumstances, savages might be considered to be representatives of a lost 
state of innocence. Both Biblical and classical authority had taught that there had once been a 
20. For a discussion of these themes see Peter Mason, Deconstnicting America: Representations of the Other 
(London, 1990), pp.13-94. 
21. On the theme of European preconceptions about the Cape and its inhabitants see M. van Wyk Smith's 
introduction to his book Shades of Adamastor ( Grahamstown, 1988 ). 
22. There is a growing literature on this subject. See M. van Wyk Smith, "'The Most Wretched of the Human 
Race·: The Iconography of the Khoikhoin (Hottentots) 1500-1800", History and Anthropology, 1992, 5 (3-4), 
pp.285-320; AB. Smith, "Different Facets of the Crystal: Early European linages of the Khoikhoi at the Cape, 
South Africa", in M. Hall and A. Markell, (eds.), Historical Archaeology in the Westen, Cape: The S. A. 
Archaeological Society Goodwin Series, Vol. 7, June 1993; E. Bassani and L. Tedeschi, "The linage of the 
Hottentot in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: An Iconographic Investigation", Joumal of the Hist01y of 
Collectio11s, 2, no.2, 1990, pp.157-186. 
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state of paradise on earth, of perfect harmony between man and nature. Distant artists in Europe 
occasionally depicted the Khoikhoi in the guise of Adam and Eve, pure in their nakedness, 
enjoying a life of idyllic pastoralism. The colonists of the Cape, however, suffered from no such 
illusions and the myth of the "noble savage" died an early death on the Cape frontier, having to be 
re-imported into the colony by educated travellers, influenced by Enlightenment ideas, in the late 
eighteenth century.23 
Other myths which were inherited, along with that of the savagery of Africans, were those which 
were part of the mental baggage of most Dutchmen at this time. The myths of Calvinism, for 
instance, encouraged a belief in the predetermined division of souls into the Damned or the Elect -
a basic dichotomy which, in the colonies, was more easily understood as being one between 
Christian or heathen and comfortably placed alongside that of Civil or Savage. Myths associated 
with the rise of the Dutch nation state also played their part in creating influential narrative 
models. Just as the Netherlands had been won from the sea by the creation of strong dykes and 
canals (a process which involved the clear demarcation between nature and culture) so Dutch 
society found it necessary to erect strong barriers between itself and that which threatened its 
identity (Catholic Spain for instance) and individuals were urged to defend the sanctity of their 
soul by strict religious observance and irreproachable conduct. Prosperity, order and cleanliness 
were marks of the elect. Holland was the wealthiest nation on earth because it had been chosen by 
God. A rich man, therefore, was a good man.24 
If these, then, were some of the inherited myths of Dutch colonists at the Cape what were the 
myths that were made on the frontier? We should note that in the very act of exporting these 
myths to a colonial setting they underwent a transfonnation. In the first place, as Foucault has 
explained, colonies acted as heterotopias, that is special types of places in which specific values 
of the parent society were simultaneously "represented, contested and inverted" .25 Colonial 
frontiers, being even further removed from the parent society than the colony, were thus examples 
of an even more extreme fonn of hcterotopia. Whilst some colonists (usually of the official or 
respectable strata) strove to realise an ideal (and hence distorted) fonn of Dutch society in the 
strange setting of a new country others (usually of the more marginal and oppressed strata) 
sought to liberate themselves from the conventions which had disadvantaged them by giving a 
23. See for instance F. Le Vaillant, Travels Into the Interior Parts of Africa, 2 vols (London, 1790). 
24. Sec Simon Schama's The Embarrassment of Riches (London, 1987) for an account of cultural forces in Dutch 
society. 
25. Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces", Diacritics, spring 1986, p.24. 
XVII 
new interpretation to the meaning of Dutch identity. The frontier was thus the sight of a constant 
battle between different versions of what constituted Dutch identity and, in the ensuing struggle, 
new myths emerged. 
It is useful to approach this question via a comparison with the American frontier. The historian 
of early colonial South Africa is not blessed, as is the historian of early colonial America, with a 
great variety of non-official written sources in which to trace the development of a distinctive 
frontier mythology. There is no seventeenth or eighteenth century South African colonial 
literature. No novels or poetry, few private letters and even fewer private diaries were produced 
by Dutch colonists at the Cape. There were no newspapers in South Africa prior to the first 
British occupation and no tradition of private printing. New England, by contrast, possessed its 
own printing press as early as the 1670s and a constant flow of broadsheets, newspapers, 
sermons, histories, narratives, novels and poems were produced and circulated within the English 
colonies. A great deal of this literature was concerned with the nature of the relationship between 
the colonists and the Indians. It was also concerned with the creation of a distinctive American 
identity, aware that the expansion of the colony was creating a new class of frontiersman, closer, 
perhaps, to the Indian than to the Englishman. Whilst the early Puritan settlers of New England 
had regarded the Indians as the demonic personification of the American wilderness the great 
paradox of American history was that, if one wished to tame this wilderness, one had to become, 
like the Indian, savage oneself. According to Slotkin, by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
American frontier literature had come to recognise a central theme that it would enshrine in 
various mythic narratives which informed subsequent American history. The theme was basically 
that of regeneration through violence: that the civilised, in order to tame the wilderness and defeat 
the savage Indian, must themselves become wild and savage, and by doing so they would be 
spiritually regenerated.26 The life of Daniel Boone, first recorded as a written narrative in 1784, 
quickly assumed mythic proportions thanks to its ability to encapsulate "all the significant strands 
of thought and belief about the frontier that had been developed in the historical experience of the 
colonies, concentrate those experiences in the tale of a single hero, and present that hero's career 
in such a way that his audience could believe in and identify with him".27 Naturally violence and 
regeneration featured strongly in the Boone story - just as it had in pre-Boone frontier literature 
and just as it would in post-Boone literature. But it was Boone who became the archetypal 
American frontier hero because his story (as told by John Filson) was the story of the frontier. 
26. This is the argument of Slotkin's Rege11eratio11 711ro11gh Vio/e11ce. 
27. Slotkin, p.269. 
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This is not the appropriate place to indulge in further analysis of the life story of Daniel Boone. 
His story does, however, raise important questions for South African historians and not only 
because, as in America, violence was also pervasive on the South African frontier. If the Cape 
colonial frontier lacks the literary dimension of the American frontier how are we to identify or 
discover its frontier mythology? Slotkin can write of American frontiersmen that: "Their 
concerns, their hopes, their terrors, their violence, and their justification of themselves, as 
expressed in literature, are the foundation stones of the mythology that informs our history. "28 
But in what forms did Cape frontiersmen and women lay down the foundations of a frontier 
mythology? We have, perforce, to look at the stories contained in the sources already cited in this 
preface. In doing so, however, we should remember that, like all narratives, "True myths are 
generated on a sub-literary level by the historical experience of a people and thus constitute part 
of that inner reality which the work of artists draws on, illuminates and explains" .29 It is through 
the lives that they lived that people reveal their stories. It is the historian's task to reconfigure 
those lives and, by so doing, attempt to explicate their stories. 
Historical events possess a narrative structure. This is the argument of Paul Ricoeur and it is one 
with which I am in agreement. The thesis that follows is presented in the fom1 of a narrative and 
it will be important, at the outset, to justify this seemingly unscientific or "romantic" approach. I 
have deliberately indulged in telling stories, whereas to many getting the "story" out of history 
might seem the first step in the transformation of historical studies into a science. These stories 
have also, for the most part, been presented chronologically. Since it is possible to contest the 
adequacy of even such a basic structure of emplotment - of beginning, middle and end - as a 
representation of the reality of temporality, some introductory remarks will be necessary. 
One way of viewing historical narrative is as a type of story structure imposed on the chaos of 
reality by a historian as an ordering device but no more "true" than any other representation of the 
world and no more authoritative than myth or fiction. This viewpoint, associated with the 
influential writings of Hayden White, is difficult to refute and is certainly not answered by the 
claim that life imitates art or that the real world really does assume the form of a well made 
story.30 This is not, as it happens, what Ricoeur means when he argues that historical events have 
a narrative structure. Narrativity is neither imposed on events nor inherent in them. Rather, 
28. Ibid., p.4. 
29. Ibid. 
30. For Hayden White's thoughts on the subject of narrative discourse and historical representation see Hayden 
White, The Con/en/ of !he Fann (Baltimore, 1987). Sec also his Me1ahist01y: The Historical Imagination in 
Ni11e/ee11th - Centr11J1 Europe (Baltimore, 1973) and Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, 4th edition, 1990). 
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narrativity is the way in which temporality is apprehended by human consciousness. The enigma 
of being-in-time is comprehended narrativistically, not because time is narratavistic but because 
there is no other way for humans to understand time. This is because, for Ricoeur, time is 
aporetical: 
Speculation on time is an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity can 
alone respond. Not that this activity solves the aporias through substitution. If it 
does resolve them, it is in a poetical and not a theoretical sense of the word. 
Emplotment . . . replies to the speculative aporia with a poetic making of 
something capable, certainly, of clarifying the aporia ... but not of resolving it 
theoretically) I 
Narrative emplotment helps to clarify the aporias of time because, mimetically, it reflects our 
phenomenological experience of time as being, simultaneously, before, present, and after. 
Narrative is a way of dealing with the human sense of the duration of time. 
Thus far, it may be argued, Ricoeur has not succeeded in distancing himself sufficiently from 
those who claim that narrativity is imposed on events and that historical narrative is simply a 
species of chronology. But what makes historical discourse different from mere chronicle is that 
the sequence of events has been plotted into a story and thereby instilled with meaning, not just 
arranged in chronological order. Unlike fiction, however, the events are real rather than 
imaginary. As Hayden White puts it, for Ricoeur: "Historical discourse is a privileged 
instantiation of the human capacity to endow the experience of time with meaning because the 
inunediate referent (the Bedeutung) of this discourse is real, rather than imaginary, events."32 The 
belief that historical events actually happened separates Ricoeur from those who believe that 
history can be no more than a deconstruction of various texts about the past and who can argue 
that: "In Auschwitz, however, nothing real has happened; there is only what is said about it. "33 
Historical events did take place and were created by people whose own lives had the coherency of 
emplotted stories and whose actions were shaped by a narrative intention. 
This latter point, that lives are like narratives, needs elaboration. For Ricoeur: "A life is no more 
than a biological phenomenon as long as it has not been interpreted. "34 But humans do interpret 
th~ir lives, being possessed of the ability to discriminate between action and mere physical 
31. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, p.6. 
32. Hayden White, "TI1e Metaphysics of Narrativity: Time and Symbol in Ricoeur's Philosophy of History", in The 
Content of the Fon11, p.173. 
33. A statement made by Robert Faurisson and discussed by Ricoeur in "Discussion: Ricoeur on Narrative", in 
David Wood, (ed.), 011 Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and fllte171retatio11 (London, 1991 ), p.186. 
34. Paul Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of Narrative", in D. Wood, (ed.), 011 Paul Ricoeur, pp.27-28. 
xx 
movement, understanding what is signified by "project, means, circumstances, and so on" .35 
Humans are also aware of the symbolic meaning of their actions. The inherited cultural traditions 
of a society enable actions to be read against the signs, rules and norms of that society. There is a 
context of description in which human action occurs and which gives it its significance.36 There 
is also a third way of comprehending actions, distinct from familiarity with both the conceptual 
network of actions and their symbolic meaning. This third way is our knowledge that our lives are 
lived like stories we have heard and seem to need narration for their meaning to emerge. We are 
born into a world that is already full of our predecessors' narratives. Thus it is that Ricoeur 
speaks of life as "an activity and passion in search of a narrative" and asks whether we are not 
"inclined to see in our own life something like stories that have not yet been told, stories that offer 
points of anchorage for the narrative" .37 Individuals gain self-knowledge by recounting their lives 
and we can understand past actors not only by recognising the stories which they have made of 
their lives but also by emplotting their stories for thcm.38 It is not wrong for historians to see 
more than past agents did when emplotting their actions, nor to use the advantage of hindsight 
and techniques of analysis developed by modem social sciences. Indeed, it is the historian's duty 
to do so. As Hayden White explains: 
The creation of a historical narrative, then, is an action exactly like that by which 
historical events are created, but in the domain of "wording" rather than that of 
"working". By discovering the plots "prefigured" in historical actions by the 
agents that produced them and "configuring" them as sequences of events having 
the coherency of stories with a begi1ming, middle and end, historians make 
explicit the meaning implicit in historical events themselves.39 
Such an approach puts the emphasis in history back onto human agency and away from the type 
of history proposed by the Atmales school with its stress on impersonal, anonymous forces.40 It 
has been wannly embraced by philosophers like David Carr who has argued that it docs not do to 
make too much of a distinction between "reality" and human reality.41 In these circumstances 
narration should not be seen as a distortion, denial or escape from "reality" but as an extension, 
35. Ibid., p.28. 
36. When one engages in a reading, or interpretation, of an event that is sensitive to the cultural context of the 
event, one is engaging in what Clifford Geertz refers lo as ''lhick description". See Clifford Geertz, Tl,e 
Interpretation of Cultures (Princeton, 1973), pp.3-30. 
37. Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of Narrative", p.29 and Time and Narrative, Vol. I, pp.74-75. 
38. 1l1is is a point which David Carr develops in his article "Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for 
Continuity", in History and Tl,eo,y, 25, 1986, pp.117-131. 
39. Hayden White, "The Metaphysics ofNarrativity", p.174. 
40. Ricoeur criticises Braudel and the Annales school in Time and Narratil'e, Vol. l, pp. IO 1-111. 
41. David Carr, "Discussion", in D. Wood, ( ed.), 011 Paul Ricoeur, pp.160-174. 
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enrichment and confonnation of its primary features. As such, history is a human creation, 
shaped and comprehended in the temporality of narrative by people who present their own lives 
as stories for others to read. The fact that life often lacks the same formal coherence of a story is 
simply to admit that the individual does not have the same sort of control over his or her material 
as an author does. It does not mean that the individual does not strive to interpret himself, or be 
interpreted, within meaningful narrative structures, shaped by past models, present circumstances 
and expectations of the judgement of posterity. It is precisely in this attempt to configure events 
that humanity comes to grips with the experience of temporality and, in the process, aspires 
towards a redemption from history itself. 
This extremely sketchy summary of Ricoeur's work on time and narrative is not intended to do 
justice to the complexity of his thought and has come nowhere close to conveying the brilliant 
illuminations contained within his extensive meditations upon temporality. The purpose behind 
introducing some basic Ricoeurcan concepts in this preface is to demonstrate that historical 
narrative has a philosophical respectability and that some understanding of the relationship 
between narrative and life is essential to an understanding of both history and the writing of 
history. Narrative is, in fact, returning to favour amongst both philosophers of history and 
historians themselvcs.42 In the pages which follow I have tried to produce a historical narrative 
which encompasses a wide area of time and space, using the structuring devices of narrative 
(chronology and the emplotmcnt of events into a story) in order to highlight certain themes and 
interpret the meaning of certain events. This is, doubtless, an imposition on the past. I hope, 
however, that it will be clear that I have not unduly imposed a narrative structure on events but 
attempted to allow the stories of the historical agents themselves to emerge from the sources and 
records consulted. "We tell stories," says Ricoeur, "because in the last analysis human lives need 
and merit being narrated. "43 The historian is not the first, however, to narrate the lives of the 
dead. Whilst they lived they narrated their own lives and, after death, some of their story may 
have been emplotted in the records, however partial or inadequate, which survived them. The 
voices of the dead have thus already passed through the imperfect medium of historical sources 
before experiencing a reconfigured resonance through the medium of the historian. These multiple 
distortions arc, of course, inevitable and part of the fabric of history, for the historian can only 
42. For a recent example of a narrative history written in the spirit of Ricocur as interpreted by David Carr sec 
Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle Of 11,e French Revolution (London, 1989). For examples of other 
developments in narrative history sec Peter Burke, "The History of Events and the Revival of Narrative", in P. 
13urke (ed.), New Perspectives 011 I listorical Writing (Cambridge, 1991 ), pp.233-248 and L. Stone, "1l1e Revival of 
Narrative", Past and Present, 85, 1979, pp.3-24. 
43. Ricocur, Time and Narrative, Vol. I, p.75. 
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attempt to salvage scraps of the past from the experience of temporality. In presenting these 
scraps it may be that I have erred by including too much in the way of detail. If this is so, I 
remain unapologetic for, in the words of the greatest writer of the twentieth century, "In art as in 
science there is no delight without the detail".44 
44. · Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opi11io11s (New York, 1973 ), p.10. 
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Part I 
The Advance of the Colonial Frontier, 1700-c.1740 
For many farmers of the interior, the monthly struggle to meet the 
demands of a voracious Company for meat, grain, fruit, and vegetables 
for its East lndiamen, provisions which had to be carried to the Cape by 
ox-wagon over poor roads, had become too much. Such men turned 
their eyes to the naked plains of the interior, seeing themselves lords of 
their own lives. Stand at the very tip of the Cape and stare out to sea. 
What do you think of! The South: black seas, ice, whiteness. Leave 
the Cape, on horseback perhaps, and for miles you are still escaping the 
South. Then, click, at a distance from the coast variously specified you 
are free of the South. You enter a treacherous neutral zone free of the 
feeling of destiny. Then as you move further north, click, you are in a 






The best way to approach the northern Cape frontier zone is via an understanding of the 
significance of the frontier in South African history. The only way to do this, however, is to come 
to terms with the concept of the frontier itself, a concept "umbilically attached to Frederick 
Jackson Turner, a historian half a century dead, whose theories have been savaged and 
repudiated", and who is yet, according to Robert I. Bums, "a kind of vampire, killed on many a 
day with a stake through his Thesis, yet ever undead and stalking abroad". I What is the ghastly 
reality behind this horrible vision? 
In 1893 the American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, delivered a paper entitled "The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History" to the American Historical Association in 
Chicago.2 It quickly became one of the most influential papers in history. The Turner thesis was, 
basically, that the American frontier had given both Americans and American history their 
distinctive character. The frontier, for Turner, was not simply a place but also a condition or a 
process where the "unsettled" became the "settled" (land with less than two Europeans per square 
mile was Turner's definition of unsettled) by the physical movement of settlers onto the land. 
Since it was "a meeting place between savagery and civilisation" the frontier was a region of 
continuous transformation, whereby some protagonists became more savage whilst others 
became more civil. Ultimately, however, American institutions and the American personality 
emerged from this evolutionary process. "The frontier is the line of most rapid Americanization" 
and "the typical American region" .3 Democracy, individualism, self-reliance and nationalism 
were the fruits of the frontier. 
Whilst the above account may seem a simplistic travesty of a complex argument it has to be 
stated that part of Turner's appeal lay precisely in the ability of others to extract their own 
I. Robert I. Bums, "TI1e Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages", in Robert Bartlett and Angus Mackay 
(eds.), Medieval Frontier Societies (Oxford, 1992 ), p.307. 
2. The paper is included in Frederick Jackson Turner, 71,e Frontier in American Histo,y (New York, reprint 1962), 
pp.1-38. 
3. Turner, "111e Significance of the Frontier", pp.3, 4 and 28. 
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meaning from the tangle of his ideas.4 As Bums has noted: "When Turner's thinking did become 
clear, it was not very useful; when useful, it was not very clear" .5 Although Turner's thesis was 
specifically erected on the example of American history, non-American historians were quick to 
apply its precepts to the frontiers of other European colonies. One of the first to do so in South 
Africa was Leo Fouche who, in 1909, delivered a lecture which might have been entitled "The 
Significance of the Frontier in South African History" but which was, in fact, more modestly 
presented as "Die Evolutie van die Trekboer".6 In this lecture Fouche - who becan1e known as the 
Frederick Jackson Turner of South Africa for his pains? - focused on the first fifty years of the 
Dutch colony at the Cape, during which time there emerged a class of livestock farming, 
wandering freeburghers - the trekboers. He presented them as tl1e key to unlocking the character 
of South African history. He stressed how Company oppression, a limited market, labour 
shortages, land hunger, agricultural difficulties and the relative ease of acquiring Khoikhoi cattle 
had virtually forced the trekboers into existence. As early as the end of the seventeenth century 
these trekboers were already the spiritual fathers of the V oortrekkers, ready to achieve their 
historical mission, "om S. Afrika 'n witmensland te maak".8 Their peculiar character, marked by 
a passionate love of freedom, was about to blossom - as blossom it did in Fouche's racist 
panegync: 
die trekboer, - die man wat verreweg die grootse rol gespeel het in die uitbreiding 
van 'n blanke Suidafrika. Die trekboer is die, wat altyd die voorpost was van die 
blanke leger. Hij het dag en nag, jaar na jaar, ja - eeuw na euuw geworstel met berg 
en hos, met wilde diere en nog wilder mense - om die land schoon te maak v'r die 
witman wat achtema kom. Een vir een moes Hottentot en Boesman en Bantu vir 
hom wijk - totdat die land van Tafelberg tot aan die Krokodil skoon geveeg het. Die 
trekboer het die hele Kaapkolonie langsaam maar seker v'r die witman ontgin. Die 
trekboer was dit ook wat die groote Trek voorberei het, en mogelik gemaak het.9 
Such views were easily absorbed within the mainstream of Afrikaner historiography, preoccupied 
as it was with the search for Afrikaner identity and the belief that this identity had emerged 
4. Slotkin's idea of regeneration through violence, discussed in the preface, is a good example of the way in which 
Turner's thesis, with its emphasis on the centrality of the frontier experience in the fonnation of American character 
and history, has been used by a recent scholar. 
5. Bums, "Significance of the Frontier", pp.308-309. 
6. Leo Fouche, "Die Evolutie Van Die Trekboer". Lesing gehou voor die Christelike Jongelieden Vereniging, 
Pretoria, 22 November 1909. 11 pp. 
7. He was called this by H.M. Robertson. Sec Christopher Saunders, The Making of the South Aji-ica11 Past: 
Major Historians 011 Race a11d Class (Cape Town, 1988), p.114. 
8. Fouche, "Evolutie", p.1. 
9. Ibid., p.11. 
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through struggle. One of the few virtues of Fouche's lecture was to have drawn attention to the 
fact that the frontier thesis in South Africa was something that could be back-dated to the end of 
the seventeenth century and did not necessarily begin with the conflict between colonists and 
Xhosa on the eastern frontier or the Great Trek. This insight was rather lost on the majority of 
historians who were happy to remove Turner's ideas from Fouche's custody and apply them to, 
what seemed to them, the more significant drama of the Great Trek. The epic story of 
Voortrekker expansion henceforth received the theoretical boost of the Turner thesis and an 
enhanced mytho-poetic status. For the time being, the rather obscure early eighteenth century 
frontier of trekboer expansion was forgotten. 
A further adaptation of the frontier thesis occurred when English speaking liberal historians 
realised that Fouche's vision of the frontier's significance, when grafted onto the Great Trek, 
tended to valorise the white racism of modem South Africa. W.M. Macmillan was first to draw 
attention to the fundamentally illiberal nature of both the frontier and the Great Trek but it was 
Eric Walker, in 1930, who attempted, far more profoundly than Fouche, to apply Turner's thesis 
to the South African frontier. The result was highly original. IO What Walker did, explains 
Christopher Saunders, was to turn Turner on his head: 
whereas Turner argued that America owed its democracy to the frontier, Walker 
asserted that South Africa owed its racism to the frontier. In each case the frontier 
had bred what was seen to be most distinctive about the particular country, but 
while the frontier in America was responsible for what was best in American life, in 
South Africa it had created misery and conflict. So the trekboers and the trekkers 
were at the same time both those who had set out to "blaze a trail for civilisation far 
into the interior of Africa", and the source of South Africa's current problems, 
because of the archaic racist ideas, forged on the Cape frontier, which they had 
carried with them. I I 
Walker's critique, however, did not contest the central importance of the Great Trek - nor the 
perception that the eastern frontier, and not the northern, had been the real birth place of the 
frontier tradition. Thus Walker could write that Governor Van Plettenberg's trip to the eastern 
frontier in 1778 marked: 
the beginning of a most significant period in South African history, sixty years or 
so, say two generations, during which the frontier tradition was fully fanned. At the 
end of it the trekkers of the Great Trek carried that tradition with them into the 
10. Eric Walker, 1J1e Fronlier Tradition in S0111h Africa (Oxford, 1930). 
11. Saunders, South /Vi'ica11 Pas/, p.115. 
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wilderness. All that had gone before led up to that; most of what has happened since 
has been a commentary upon it.12 
However much Walker had altered the frontier thesis to meet South African requirements he still 
retained a typically Turneresque concept of a frontier - that it was something primarily affecting 
whites, and that it tended to exclude, rather than include or incorporate, those on the wrong side 
of the frontier. He did not see, as did subsequent liberal historians, that the frontier was also a 
place, or process, whereby both black and white became involved in a complex series of social, 
political and economic interactions that were not always antagonistic or military in character. 
Such advances lay in the future. Before surveying the further evolution of the frontier thesis in 
liberal historiography it would be advisable to consider the case of a most singular historian who 
stands out in the sparsely populated historiographical terrain of the northern frontier zone as a 
great pioneer. 
P.J. van der Merwe's work is, in some respects, like the northern Cape frontier zone itself -
expansive, important and neglected. During the course of the late 1930s and early 1940s he 
produced a series of thematically connected books which, though published separately, were 
conceived of as a tripartite whole - a "pioniersgeskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie" .13 His principal 
interest was in the trekboers of the period before the Great Trek. By trekboers he meant "die 
half-nomadiese grensboere wat die natuurlike uitbreiding van die Kolonie na die bi1meland gelei 
het" .14 Both in the use of the word "natuurlike" (natural) and in his vision of trekboer expansion 
as a prelude to the Great Trek, Van der Merwe revealed certain characteristic assumptions: the 
epic theme of South African history was the subjugation of the African wilderness by a people 
who would become known as Afrikaners and, at the heart of this myth (not a word he would have 
used himself), was the Great Trek. The real Voortrekkers, however, were those who had been 
trekkers even before the Great Trek, that is, the trekboers. Though the expansion of these 
pioneers was "natural" (or inevitable) it was not easy. Sometimes, indeed, it was tragic. But it 
was in triumphing over tragedy and natural hardship that a distinctive nation arose - the 
Afrikaner. 
12. Walker, Frontier Tradition, p.12. 
13. TI1e three books in question arc Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek 1770-1842 
(The Hague, 1937); Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolo11ie, 1657-1842 (Cape Town, 1938) and 
Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit w111 die Pio11iersbevolki11g aa11 die Kcwp (Cape Town, 1945 ). 
14. P.J. van der Merwe, Noordwaartse Bewegi11g, p.ix. 
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It is clear from a reading of Van der Merwe's work that he had found Fouche's lecture of 1909 
highly stimulating and that he had determined to replace that eleven page sketch with a major 
study of his own. Though Van der Merwe tended to avoid making any direct theoretical or 
historiographical statements he quietly borrowed Fouche's interpretation of Turner and applied 
this version of the frontier thesis to his own work. He also eschewed direct political commentary, 
but his political ideas were all too conventional and what one would expect of a Stellenbosch 
graduate of his day. What really set him apart from his colleagues, however, was a concern for 
social, economic and, above all, environmental issues, that was, in some respects, well ahead of 
his time. He was thoroughly convinced that the trekboers could only be understood through a 
deep knowledge of the natural environment of the Cape interior and his research in this respect is 
unequalled. In his pursuit of environmental knowledge, he travelled an estimated 24 000 
kilometres in his car, getting to know the landscape and interviewing hundreds of farmers.IS This 
grass-roots research was complemented by a similarly careful and thorough use of archival 
material. The end product of his labours was an impressively detailed account of the life of the 
trekboers, stressing the ways in which they adapted to a harsh natural environment where 
drought, locusts and trekbokke played as great a role as the Bushmen (San) in testing endurance. 
The San are indeed a major presence in Van der Merwe's work and, to his credit, he does not 
simply treat them as another natural phenomenon to be overcome. A large part of Noordwaartse 
Beweging is about the long struggle which took place between trekboer and San, especially after 
1770, on the colony's northern frontier. Although Van der Merwe's primary concern is with the 
trekboers his documentation of this protracted frontier war did serve to remind readers that San 
resistance was far from negligible and that the eastern frontier was not the only crucible of 
conflict in Cape history. True, he sometimes treats San attacks on trekboer cattle as being a 
hunting reflex rather than a tactic of resistance, but his pages are full of sympathy for the plight 
of the San and he docs not hesitate to document instances of trekboer cruelty. It was a harsh 
environment and in the struggle for survival the strongest, naturally, prevailed. 
The Khoikhoi, by contrast, are largely absent from Van der Merwe's history. Their relationship 
with the San is not discussed, nor are they assumed to have offered any significant resistance, or 
assistance, to the trekboers. There is very little about their incorporation into the trekboer 
economy and no discussion concerning their social, economic or political status. Their story, for 
all intents and purposes, is regarded as having been subsumed by that of the trekboers and the 
15. Sec Ken Smith's account of Van <lcr Mcrwc in The Changing Past: Trends in South African Historical Writing 
(Joham1csburg, 1988), pp.76-80. 
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process of colonial expansion prior to 1770 is depicted as having been achieved against the 
background of negligible Khoikhoi presence. 
The "Bastaards" of the frontier zone are equally unimportant in Van der Merwe's account and it 
is only after 1825, when the Griquas become a political factor, that they are treated as being in 
any way significant. The origins and status of these people are not amongst Van der Merwe's 
themes; nor does he seek to explore the similarities or differences between "Bastaard" and 
"Boer". For Van der Merwe the frontier was thus primarily a place of conflict between the 
primitive San and the trekboers. He did not see it as a zone of intercultural contact but rather as 
an area where the wilderness was won for white settlement and the trekboers adapted to the 
challenges of the environment. In this respect he showed himself to be, consciously or not, a 
student of Frederick Jackson Turner.16 
Even though this vers1011 of history was highly acceptable to Afrikaner nationalists, who 
particularly appreciated that the deeds of ordinary trekboers should receive such detailed 
consideration, Van der Merwe's influence was not as great as his labours merited. The fact that 
his work was published in Afrikaans may account for the lack of appreciation shown by English 
speaking historians but his marginal status amongst Afrikaners is harder to explain. Whilst it was 
readily acknowledged that he was a master of meticulous research and an authority on footnoting 
his work did not lead to a resurgence of interest in the northern frontier of the eighteenth century. 
It is possible that his massive trilogy became a stumbling-block, rather than a spring-board to 
further research, and that the weight of details stifled, rather than kindled academic debate.17 
Ultimately, the majority of historians became convinced that the activities of obscure trekboers 
and their soon to be extinct "Bushmen" foes in the arid wastes of the Karoo, were not central to 
an understanding of South African history. Researchers continued to believe that the great themes 
involved "Bantu, Boer and Briton" and that the best place to observe them was either on the 
eastern frontier or the highvcld or, alternatively, in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. The 
eighteenth century northern frontier sank back into the sands of time and the trekboer trilogy 
gathered dust on the shelves. IS 
16. Van der Merwe does not list Turner in his bibliographics although Turner is cited on p.58 of Noordwaartse 
Beweegi11g. 
17. Significantly Van dcr Mcrwc himself produced no major work a!lcr his thirty-fi!lh birthday. Ken Smith, 
Changing Past, p.76. 
18. It is only very recently that there has been a reprint of Noordwaarlse Bewegi11g. 
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Although the mainstream of historical research moved elsewhere, developments within South 
African historiography were helping to create a climate which would, in time, lead to a return to 
the northern Cape frontier. The work ofW.M. Macmillan and his protege C.W. de Kiewiet in the 
1920s and 1930s reflected the growing awareness that the influence of the frontier in South 
African history was not only strong and malign but complex in ways that Fouche and Walker had 
not appreciated. It was on the frontier that Africans had been incorporated into European society, 
incorporated not as equals but as subservient labourers. Sometimes this incorporation looked a 
lot like exclusion, as Africans were forced to remain in reserves from which they could only 
emerge as migrant labourers when and if required. Liberal historians were realising, however, 
that whatever the exact status of Africans, it was on the frontier that they were incorporated into 
the unitary economic system that becan1e South Africa. The penetrating insight and sweeping 
vision of Macmillan and De Kiewiet did not dispose them to write detailed studies of the frontier. 
They far preferred bold syntheses to case studies although De Kiewiet had, in fact, completed an 
Honours dissertation: "Government, Emigrants, Missionaries and Natives on the Northern 
Frontier l 832-1846" in 1924. Sadly, no copies of this survive, one having been destroyed in the 
fire in the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand in l 931.19 We do not know, therefore, 
the extent to which De Kiewiet's ideas were influenced by his knowledge of early nineteenth 
century frontier history but we can assume that his sensitivity to the complexity of frontier 
processes owed something to his early studies. 
The northern frontier next came under historical scrutiny in J.S. Marais' 1938 book, The Cape 
Coloured People 1652-1937.20 This book, as its title suggests, had as its subject the history of 
the Cape Coloured people. It was influenced by an earlier work of Macmillan's, The Cape 
Colour Question (1927)21 which had been concerned with John Philip's struggle to win equality 
for the Khoikhoi by championing the passing of Ordinance 50 in 1828. Marais sought to write a 
more wide ranging book whose purpose was to show how closely intertwined were the histories 
of Europeans and Coloureds. His rapid survey of the disintegration of Khoikhoi societies stressed 
the injustices which accompanied their absorption within colonial society though it tended to 
minimise the resistance that was offered to this process. Miscegenation between Europeans and 
Khoikhoi was dealt with frankly but briefly since Marais was more concerned with documenting 
the discriminatory actions from which Coloureds suffered than in dwelling on their origins. His 
book was a pica for justice and a condenmation of racism. The central period of time covered by 
19. Saunders, South Aji-ica11 Past, pp. 76-77. 
20. JS. Marais, The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937 (Johmmesburg, 1938). 
21. W.M. Macmillan, 11,e Cape Colour Question (London, 1927) 
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the book was the nineteenth century, particularly the years before and after Ordinance 50, but 
there were important chapters on the northern and north-western Cape frontier that contributed 
greatly towards an understanding of the history of these regions. Marais noted that the north-
western Cape was "the cradle of tl1e Bastard population" and paid considerable attention to the 
Griquas whom he called "the V oortrekkers of civilisation on the northern frontier" .22 By 
asserting that the Griquas "were in fact typical frontiersmen, more so than many of the Boers 
themselves, whom they nevertheless resembled in many ways", Marais was helping to blur some 
of the cherished distinctions of the frontier thesis. He noted elsewhere that "Bastard communities 
were essentially frontier societies which suffered from the additional disadvantage of being 
Coloured", implying that the frontier was not tl1e most desirable place to be and that, on the very 
margins of the frontier, one was likely to find those who suffered from racial persecution.23 
Certainly, after Marais work, it was clear tl1at the northern Cape frontier regions (the least 
desirable in South Africa) had been pioneered by non-white colonial frontiersmen largely because 
racial discrimination had forced them there. The challenge to historians was now to investigate, 
in greater detail, the origins of this racial discrimination and to decide the extent to which the 
frontier experience itself had contributed to racist perceptions. 
Marais decided that a detailed study of the eastern frontier was necessary and his next book, 
Maynier and the First Boer Republic, dealt with that district between the years 1778-1802. His 
intention was to rescue the reputation of Landdrost Maynier from the vilification of Theal. 
Maynier had attempted to keep the peace between frontier colonists, the Khoikhoi and the Xhosa 
during a particularly disturbed time and, in Theal's opinion, had been guilty of an unfair, anti-
colonial bias. Marais wished to demonstrate, by a detailed use of documentary evidence, that 
Theal was wrong and had himself been motivated by a wish to "tilt the balance in favour of the 
European colonists and against the non-Europeans as well as those Europeans who, like 
Maynier, were critical of the colonists' point of view and behaviour" .24 It might seem as though 
Marais' intention was to portray Maynier as a liberal hero, even though he disclaims such an 
intention and insists that the frontier is the real hero of the story. He did indeed succeed in 
presenting a richly detailed account of a fascinating frontier where human interactions were seen 
to be shaped by highly personal, local perceptions and not necessarily stereotypical racial 
22. Marais, Cape Coloured People, pp.12 and 43. 
23. Ibid. , p.107. 
24. J.S. Marais, Alay11ier and the First Boer Republic (Cape Town, 1944 ), p. vi. Interestingly, P.J. van der Merwe 
had also decided to write on the eastern frontier. Marais found his book, Die Kajferoorlog vcm 1793 (Cape Town, 
1940) to be in agreement with 'rheal's interpretation of events. 
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responses. He also proved beyond all doubt that the frontier colonists treated their Khoikhoi and 
"Bastaard" servants barbarously. Although the reason for this was uncertain, Maynier did 
provide a clue which would forn1 the basis of future research into this question. "It was," he said, 
"after all not unnatural that the Boer should have the slave owner's mentality. "25 
For the moment, however, it was not the connection between racism and slavery that interested 
historians but that which existed between racism and the frontier. Given the influence of Turner 
and Walker it was taken for granted that the frontier had contributed towards the creation of 
South African racism. The man who set out to make the connection more explicit was I.D. 
MacCrone, not an historian, but a psychology professor at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
His book, Race Attitudes in South Africa, appeared just before Marais' Cape Coloured People 
and contained a survey of race relations on the seventeenth and eighteenth century Cape 
frontier.26 MacCrone's starting point was to stress that, initially, the most important factor 
influencing colonial perceptions of non-whites was a religious one, and that the dichotomy 
between Christians and heathens was regarded as being more fundamental than that between 
black and white. The possibility therefore existed that blacks who became Christians would be 
accepted as equals within colonial society. What happened, however, was that in the process of 
frontier expansion racial prejudice became stronger than religious sensibilities and the 
fundan1ental dichotomy was now seen as being between white and non-white. Why this 
happened, according to MacCrone, was that the constant insecurity of the frontier encouraged a 
greater sense of group-consciousness. Birds of a feather flocked together. Since non-whites were 
usually hostile the colonists had to unite (typically in commando units) in order to protect 
themselves and in so doing fostered a sense of self identity that was essentially racial. 
MacCrone's ideas were basically a better detailed, psychologically more plausible, version of the 
Turner-Walker frontier thesis. He did not attempt to demonstrate how race attitudes acquired on 
the eighteenth century frontier manifested themselves in contemporary society beyond the 
assertion that "the attitudes themselves, as they existed towards the end of the eighteenth and at 
the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, are very similar to those which we find displayed on all 
sides at the present time. "27 These ideas were to suffer savage attack at a later date for having 
failed to consider that there might have been areas or processes other than Calvinism or the 
frontier which influenced the development of racial attitudes.28 His work also failed to reflect the 
25. Marais,Maynier, p.73. 
26. I.D. MacCrone, Race At1it11des in So111/, Aji"ica (Johannesburg, 1937). 
27. Ibid., pp.135-6 
28. See p.14 below. 
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growing awareness of liberal historians that it was important to describe developments on the 
other side of the frontier and to demonstrate the complexity of social, political and economic 
interactions effecting African society. This does not mean that MacCrone's insights were all 
incorrect for they anticipate present theories about the creation of ethnic or national identity. 
Peter Sahlins, for instance, has written that national identity "like ethnic or communal identity, is 
contingent and relational: it is defined by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish 
the collective self and its implicit negation of the other" .29 As we shall see, the frontier was as 
much a creator of new identities as it was a destroyer of old ones. 
After MacCrone it was a long time before any part of the frontier, or the frontier thesis, was 
revisited by South African historians. This was partly due to the success of the frontier thesis as 
an explanation and partly due to the fact that frontier research seemed a low priority during the 
1950s and 1960s. The liberal view of the frontier thesis was that it was useful. It explained that 
racism was an eighteenth century anachronism which would disappear in the process of pursuing 
rational economic development. What was the point in studying the frontier when its message 
was already learnt? In any event, the real challenge of the time was to write Africanist history 
about African societies. It is beyond the scope of this brief survey to recount or analyse the 
various stages by which liberal historians became liberal Africanist historians. Nor is it 
appropriate to describe how, in the gestation period of the 1960s, there occurred the growth of a 
radical or revisionist critique of both liberalism and Africanism.30 For the purposes of this 
enquiry we need only concern ourselves with those developments which have a direct relevance to 
an understanding of the South African frontier in general and the northern Cape frontier in 
particular. As it happens, all of these issues came to a head in 1970 with the presentation of a 
paradigm smashing seminar paper at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London. The 
paper was entitled "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography" and its author was 
Martin Legassick.31 
Legassick's paper was inspired by a predominantly Marxist view of history (the influence of 
Genovese was apparent) and became an important manifesto for a new, radical or revisionist 
approach to the South African past. Part of the paper's influence was due to the fact that 
Legassick sought to destroy the cornerstone of the work of some of South Africa's most respected 
29. Quoted by Linda Colley in Britons: Forging the Nation I 707-1837 (London, 1994), pp.5-6. 
30. 'Il1ese topics are well handled by Christopher Saunders in parts 4 and 5 of his South African Past. 
31. The paper was subsequently published in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, (eds.), Economy and Society in 
Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980). 
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and influential historians. This cornerstone was the frontier tradition and Legassick showed how 
it had been used by liberal historians to support rather shaky ideas about the origins and 
significance of race attitudes in South Africa. For a start, Legassick argued, quoting Genovese, 
that race could not be divorced from class since "race relations are at bottom a class question into 
which 'the race question intrudes and gives ... a special force and form but does not constitute its 
essence"' .32 South African historians had not applied the "complexity and subtlety" of such a 
class analysis to the problem of racism and tended to think that "by and large, slavery, 
Calvinism, and the frontier between them suffice to 'explain' present day race attitudes in South 
Africa" .33 The evidence from the frontier, however, was not as clear cut as might be supposed. 
There was, Legassick argued, a great deal of confusion surrounding the significance of the 
frontier in South African history. Confusion which had arisen from the initial acceptance of 
Turner's unsatisfactory concept of a frontier as an area of isolation from the parent society. 
Rather, a frontier was more correctly an area of contact and inclusion between two societies. 
This error in perception had occurred because the American and South African frontiers were so 
different. The American frontier was one of exclusion and near extern1ination of the Indian 
whereas the South African frontier was one of inclusion as well as exclusion. Where South 
African historians such as MacCrone had grasped the dual nature of the frontier it was usually 
only in so far as it effected the European society involved. Thus it was possible for MacCrone to 
regard trekboers as having been re-barbarised (by the isolationist, exclusionist aspects of the 
frontier) and Afrikanerised (by that which they absorbed from the frontier environment) 
simultaneously.34 The real point, however, was not simply to consider the effects of frontier 
exclusion or inclusion on white society but to consider how all societies in the frontier zone were 
effected. Historians like Macmillan and De Kiewiet, Legassick conceded, had recognised that the 
frontier was the stage where men of opposite races were doing more than quarrel with each other. 
32. Legassick, "Frontier Tradition", p.51. 
33. Ibid., p.52. Legassick was in fact overestimating the attention which had been paid to slavery. 
34. Confusions can and <lo arise at this point in Legassick's paper and some of them are of Legassick's making. 
Marks and Atmore castigate the luckless Harrison Wright for having misunderstood Legassick but it is not entirely 
Wright's fault. (See the editorial notes in Marks and Atmore, Economy and Society, pp.44, 49, 53, 59, and 61 ). 
Legassick has failed to clarify that MacCrone did not perceive that "exclusion" means more than simply the 
isolation of a fragment of the parent society and its subsequent barbarisation. It also means the rejection of the 
other society's culture by a society which fiercely protects and perpetuates its own culture. MacCrone, in effect, 
attributed the effects of inclusion to those of exclusion. 111is failure to make a clear distinction between inclusion 
and exclusion clearly encouraged Leonard Guelke to write an article on the dual nature of the South African 
frontier as though no one had ever noticed this phenomenon before. Sec L. Guclke, "The Making of Two Frontier 
Communities: Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century", Historical Rejlectio11s!Rejlexio11s Historique, xii, 1985. 
The exclusion/inclusion model comes from the geographer Marvin Mikesell and his article "Comparative Studies 
in Frontier History", A1111als of the American Society of Geographers, 50, 1960, pp.62-74. 
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De Kiewiet had written that: "Even though they did not know it they were engaged in the 
formation of a new society and the establisluuent of new economic and social bonds" .35 The 
Oxford History of South Africa, published in 1969, had also shown an awareness that the 
frontier was a place where different races co-operated or conflicted with each other with 
repercussions for all the societies involved - not just colonial society.36 But Legassick still 
believed that liberals were guilty of assuming that non-whites, typically, entered this new society 
as servants and that they did so because of the racist violence inflicted on them by white 
frontiersmen who had been predisposed to view non-whites as enemies by the conflictual nature 
of the frontier zone.37 
Whilst Legassick did not question that much violence and brutality had occurred on the frontier 
he questioned the assumption that this was specific to the frontier. A great deal of the violence 
directed against the Khoikhoi, he argued, arose from the fact that the colonists treated them as 
slaves and occurred within the colony rather than on the frontier. "In other respects, particularly 
the question of physical violence and assault, it would be hard to determine whether the frontier 
areas were in fact more violent than the western Cape rural areas. "38 This violence was not 
necessarily born of racism for whilst "White frontiersmen expected all their dependants (save 
their fan1ilies) to be non-white: they did not expect all non-whites to be their servants" .39 
Legassick argued that the race attitudes of the colonists were far more likely to have been 
brought with them from Europe or, alternatively, developed in the south-western Cape, than to 
have evolved on the frontier. The frontier, indeed, offered many examples of inter-racial co-
operation, where white and black engaged in trade or mutual support. It was also clear that the 
frontier provided much better opportunities for self-advancement to non-whites than did the more 
effectively colonised areas of the colony. MacCrone's idea that the frontier fostered white group-
consciousness, particularly through the institution of the commando, was also untenable. 
Trekboer families were isolated and disunited whilst conmmndos frequently had many "Bastaard" 
or Khoikhoi members within them.40 
At the heart of Legassick's paper was the argument that it was not "the frontier, seen as a social 
system distinct and isolated from a parent society, which produced a new, or even intensified an 
35. Quoted by Legassick, "Frontier Tradition", p.63. 
36. M. Wilson and L. Thompson, (eds.), 11,e Oxford Histo,y of South Africa, Vol. I (Oxford, 1969). 
37. Legassick, "Frontier Tradition", p.63. 
38. Ibid., p.67. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid., pp.60-68. 
14 
An Introduction 
old, pattern of racial relationships".41 Rather, it was the other way round. The Parent society 
produced the frontier. This perception, Legassick acknowledged, had come from Owen 
Lattimore. Just as Walker had turned Turner on his head in order to utilise his thesis, so had 
Lattimore turned Turner inside out in order to arrive at a better conception of the frontier: 
frontiers are of social, not geographic origin. Only after the concept of a frontier 
exists can it be attached by the community that has conceived it to a geographical 
configuration. The consciousness of belonging to a group, a group that includes 
certain people and excludes others, must precede the conscious claim for that group 
of the right to live or move about within a particular territory ... In large measure, 
when he [Turner] thought he saw what the frontier did to society, he was really 
seeing what society did to the frontier.42 
Lattimore was but one of many American scholars who had been subjecting the Turner thesis to 
a rigorous cross examination. Legassick, thanks to the years that he spent at the University of 
California, Los Angeles working under Leonard Thompson, had been exposed to a variety of 
neo-Turnerist debates and, consequently, had a far more sophisticated grasp of frontier concepts 
than other frontier historians. What had been happening in America was tl1at Turner's view of the 
frontier as an area where wilderness was won for civilisation was being replaced by an approach 
which saw frontiers as zones of intercultural contact. Historians, anthropologists and other social 
scientists in the 1960s were stressing that frontier zones were "contact zones of cultures", where 
people of different cultures struggled with each other for control of resources and political 
powcr.43 It was the idea of the frontier as a zone of cultural interaction that Legassick had 
applied and developed in the massive doctoral thesis on the northern Cape frontier zone which he 
had completed just before his seminal seminar paper of I 970. Research for this thesis had 
provided Legassick with much of the detailed knowledge and authority which so clearly lay 
behind his devastating attack on the frontier tradition. It is clearly important, therefore, to 
consider the thesis itself. 
41. Ibid., p.67. 
42. Quoted by Legassick, ibid., p.68. 
43. William Cronon, "Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson Turner", Westen, 
Historical Quarlerly, 18, 1987. Quoted by Bums in "The Significance of the Frontier", p.310. See also David J. 
Weber, "Turner, the I3ollonians, and the Borderlands", America11 llislorical Review, 91, 1986, for a discussion of 
transfonnations of the Turner thesis. We should also mention Louis Hartz's, The Fo1111di11g of New Societies (New 
York, 1964) which saw colonies and frontiers as being fragments of the original European societies. TI1e book 
included a chapter by Leonard Thompson on South Africa and obviously had a great influence on Leonard Guelke. 
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Legassick's thesis, as the title indicated, focused mainly on the Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the 
missionaries of the northern frontier zone between the years 1780 and 1840.44 Its geographical 
centre was, unsurprisingly, the area in which these different historical agents had interacted with 
each other during this period, i.e., the region north of tl1e Orange River best described as 
Transorania. His themes examined tl1e erosion of the political power of non-whites through 
absorption into plural conuuunities in a subordinate political status and traced the "integration of 
tl1e peoples of South Africa into a market economy linked ultimately with the industrialising 
capitalist economy of Europe".45 Or, to put it another way, considered how the establislunent of 
white supremacy had been achieved and what forms of acculturation had accompanied the 
creation of a "colonial situation". Some of the ideas discussed in the "Frontier Tradition" paper 
were already present in Legassick's introduction to the thesis, most notably the rejection of 
Turner's concept of a frontier and a re-examination of both the concept of the frontier and its 
significance in South African history. Legassick stressed that it made better sense to talk about a 
"frontier zone", a zone in which there was no single source of authority, in which "mutual 
acculturation" took place, and which was temporary, unstable, fluid and dynamic. 
It is possible that Legassick had been drawn to the northern frontier zone in the first place 
because he thought it would supply him with the necessary evidence with which to smash the 
frontier thesis. Alternatively he may have been attracted to the northern frontier because of its 
neglect and only whilst pursuing his research discovered that race relations here seemed to be 
very different from the eastern frontier. Perhaps, as with most research, hypothesis and evidence 
grew together. 
Through no fault of his own Legassick was unable to consult archival records within South 
Africa during the preparation of his thesis. The bulk of his primary research material was drawn 
from the records of the London Missionary Society in London and it is scarcely surprising that 
missionaries and their targets loom large in his account. Missionaries were seen as being vital 
catalysts of colonisation, promoting the processes of colonial dominance amongst the societies of 
the frontier zone in the interlinking spheres of social, political and economic life. Since 
missionary activity only began in the last years of the eighteenth century, Legassick's study was 
largely confined to the nineteenth century. He did, however, produce a brilliant survey of the 
44. Martin Legassick, "The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780-1840: The Politics of a Frontier 
Zone" (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1969). 
45. Ibid., pp.2-3. 
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eighteenth century origins of the "Bastaards" (from whom the Griqua emerged) in the opening 
chapters of his thesis. 
The Griquas were prime examples of frontier acculturation, having been born and bred in the 
frontier zone. Their history was the best possible case study through which to illustrate the twin 
themes of colonial subjugation and acculturation. Subjugation and acculturation were not only 
achieved by missionary influence but through warfare and trade - two sides of the same coin -
activities in which the Griqua were very involved. As pioneers of the northern frontier zone the 
Griquas were amongst the first to transmit the disturbing influence of the colony to the Sotho-
Tswana and Legassick was therefore concerned to describe Sotho-Tswana society in some detail. 
This aspect of his thesis probably owed a lot to the Africanist impulses of the day, and 
particularly, the influence of Leonard Thompson. Legassick's work on the Sotho-Tswana was a 
heroic pioneering effort and his thesis as a whole remains one of the most impressive, ambitious 
and wide ranging to have been written in the field of South African history. What was its impact 
and what effect did it have on the future studies of the northern frontier zone? 
It has to be admitted that far more people have read Legassick's "Frontier Tradition" paper than 
have read his thesis. This is unfortunate because the strongest message of the paper was a call to 
abandon the frontier and search elsewhere for the historical origins of modern South African 
racial segregation. Scores of scholars heeded the call and trekked onwards to the late nineteenth 
or early twentieth centuries so as to study the connection between the mineral revolution, 
industrialisation and apartheid. Others trekked backwards, away from the frontier, to pay more 
attention to the seventeenth and eighteenth century colonial heartland of the south-western Cape 
where slavery, inter-group relations and economic issues became prime topics. Everywhere, 
explorations into the inter-connectedness of race and class became the dominant issue. 
After 1970 Legassick himself moved into the field of twentieth century studies where his insights 
put him in the vanguard of the radical challenge. When next he visited the frontier, as he did 
when he contributed a chapter on the northern Cape frontier zone to the 1979 edition of The 
Shaping of South African Society, it was to rework his theoretical understanding of the processes 
involved rather than to indulge in further archival research.46 His application of Marxist 
concepts to a frontier zone situation was impressive and inspiring though many student readers 
found it difficult to follow an account where "the commodity" loomed larger than character or 
46. Marlin Lcgassick, "The Northern Frontier lo 1820: The emergence of the Griqua people", in R. Elphick an<l 
H. Giliomce, (cc.ls.), 11,e Shaping ofSorith Aji'ican Society 1652-1820 (Cape Town, Isl eel., 1979). 
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event. With hindsight it was perhaps a mistake to attempt to relate developments on the frontier 
zone so closely to either conunodity exchange or the concept of a transition from merchant 
capitalism to industrial capitalism in the metropolitan powers. This is not to deny that Marxist 
paradigms can generate revelatory explanations. It is simply to suggest that conunodity exchange 
was not necessarily the most important activity on the frontier and that the focus of analytical 
attention should fall on the activity that was, namely pastoral production. The fact that a cow or 
an ox can be regarded as a conunodity does not mean that this is the most important feature of 
the animal, nor that pastoralism should be regarded primarily as a type of conunodity production. 
What was needed was a paradigm that, in a sense, explained the grass-roots interactions of 
frontier societies, stressing the mixed nature of the modes of production involved in the frontier 
zone situation rather than a model which stressed the teleological design of capitalism in all 
things. 
Legassick's account of the northern frontier zone also left space for future researchers in a 
number of other areas. His stress upon "Bastaards" and commodity production led him to 
highlight trading and raiding at the expense of pastoral production. This emphasis was partly due 
to the nature of the records (which tended to dwell on the drama of banditry and illegal trading 
more than the mundanities of cattle herding) and partly due to the fact that the "Bastaards", 
occupying the more arid and lawless regions of the frontier zone, were indeed more active in 
trading and raiding than others. The consequences of this selective focus were to detract attention 
not only from pastoral production but also from the principal participants involved in pastoral 
production - the trekboers and the Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi were absorbed or integrated into the 
colony following the advance of the trekboers into the interior. Since trekboer expansion had 
largely ceased before 1780 (the starting date of Legassick's thesis) the processes of Khoikhoi 
subjugation and acculturation were not examined in any detail, a decision shaped, no doubt, by 
his lack of access to eighteenth century archival sources. This unavoidable concentration on the 
post 1780 northern frontier zone meant that the story of this frontier zone between 1700 and 
1780 still remained untold since even Van der Merwe had covered this ground rather rapidly. 
If the Khoikhoi were neglected, so too were the San. Despite having drawn attention to the 
significance of the conunando system and the importance of San resistance Legassick had not 
really integrated these themes into his thesis. The relationship between the Khoikhoi and the San 
required further exploration and so too did the topic of Khoisan resistance in general. Legassick 
saw Khoisan resistance as having been largely a phenomenon of the north-eastern frontier and 
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this tendency to sheer the eastern regions of the northern frontier zone from his study was 
unfortunate. The geographical focus of Legassick's northern frontier was very much on 
Namaqualand and Transorania with the consequence that the crucial regions of the interior 
escarpment (the Roggeveld, the Nieuweveld and the Bushmanland interior) were largely 
neglected. 
To point out these omissions is not to criticise Legassick, merely to indicate areas of research 
which, quite understandably, he did not wish to cover in his already massive thesis. He had 
succeeded, in both his thesis and his "Frontier Tradition" paper, in transforming the notion of a 
frontier zone and casting serious doubts on the conventional view of the frontier's significance. A 
large part of his argument depended on portraying the northern frontier zone in particular as 
having different characteristics to the stereotypical South African frontier (the eastern frontier) 
that historians had hitherto portrayed in their work. In drawing attention to the complexities and 
varieties of frontier zone interactions, however, it is possible that he might have left his readers 
with the impression that the frontier zone was not as violent a place as was once thought. This 
was not Legassick's intention but the evidence which will be presented in this thesis is that 
violence remains, even in the northern frontier zone, all pervasive. It will also become evident 
that ill treatment of Khoisan labourers was not more common in the highly colonised areas 
behind the frontier: it occurred with sickening regularity in the outermost frontier farms and, it is 
an incontrovertible fact, that commandos and Khoisan resistance in the frontier zone did lead to 
heightened levels of violence and cruelty directed towards virtually all non-white frontier 
societies. The frontier zone, in other words, is still a prime suspect when it comes to accounting 
for the development of a racially stratified, unequal and divided South Africa but Legassick's 
great virtue was to suggest that it was not the only suspect and that the evidence was far from 
unambiguous. 
Much of the research which was undertaken in the field of South African history in the 1970s 
and 1980s was an attempt to interrogate some of the other suspects which Legassick had nan1ed 
and to subject all available evidence to a far more subtle analysis than before. Legassick cannot, 
of course, be credited with having inspired all of this research but he had demonstrated that the 
time was right for a fresh approach to the South African past. For our purposes, some of the 
most significant research was that which explored the economic connections which existed 
between the eighteenth century Cape frontier zone and the colonial heartland of the south-western 
Cape. Of particular relevance here was the 1974 doctoral thesis of the historical geographer, 
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Leonard Guelke, on the early European settlement of South Africa.47 Guelke, in both his thesis 
and subsequent works, paid close attention to the economic circumstances of both trekboers and 
that class of wealthy, landed agriculturists closer to Cape Town whom he, and others such as 
Robert Shell and Robert Ross, would later describe as the Cape gentry.48 By doing so he revived 
an earlier debate, closely associated with the work of S.D. Neumark, on the extent to which 
colonial frontier expansion had been influenced by the pursuit of economic opportunities within 
the Cape interior.49 Legassick had noted Neumark's work with approval but Guelke's research 
suggested that it was not so much economic incentives that lured trekboers into the interior as it 
was economic imperatives that forced them thither.SO Robert Ross contributed a number of other 
important articles on the nature of Cape society, both within and outside of the frontier zone, 
which further explored the intercmmectedness of race, class, and capitalism.51 The culmination 
of this economic research into early Cape society was a book which Ross co-authored with Pieter 
van Duin on the eighteenth century Cape economy. The statistical evidence presented here 
showed that the Cape was not a stagnant, under-productive economy but one which was 
experiencing substantial economic growth, in all of the major productive sectors, throughout the 
eighteenth century.52 The implications of these conclusions seemed to be that economic forces 
were likely to have played a far greater role than imagined within the frontier zone. 
Major advances were also made in the study of intergroup relations amongst the societies of the 
Cape as historians explored the theme of the interconnectedness of race and class.53 A common 
47. Leonard Guelke, "The Early European Settlement of South Africa" (Ph.D., University of Toronto, 1974 ). 
48. L. Guelke and R. Shell, "An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony (1652-
1731)", Joumal of Historical Geography, ix, 1983. R. Ross, "111c Rise of the Cape Gentry", Joumal of Southem 
African Studies, II, 1983. 
49. S.D. Neumark, Economic Influences 011 the South African Frontier, 1652-1836 (Stanford, 1957). 
50. For a convenient discussion of the economic factors in the debate see L. Guelke, "Freehold farmers and frontier 
settlers, 1657-1870", in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, (eds.), Tire Shaping of South African Society 1652-1840 
(Cape Town, 2nd ed., 1989), pp. 66-108. 
51. See especially R. Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion, and Incorporation on tl1e Sou them African Frontier", in 
Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, (eds.), The Frontier in Histoty: North America and Southem Africa 
Compared (New Haven, 1981) and "The first Two Centuries of Colonial Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A 
Historiographical Review", Social Dynamics, 9, 1983. 
52. Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross, The Economy Of The Cape Colony /11 The Eighteenth Ce11twy (Leiden, 
1987). 
53. Amongst the important contributions in this respect sec R. Elphick and R. Shell, "Intergroup relations: 
Khoikhoi, settlers, slaves and free blacks, 1652-1795", and R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, "The origins and 
entrenchment of European dominance at the Cape, 1652-c.1840", in Elphick and Giliomee, Shaping of South 
African Society, 2nd edition; H. Giliomee, "Eighteenth Century Cape Society and its Historiography: Culture, Race 
and Class", Social Dynamics, 9, 1983, W.M. Freund, "Race in the Social Strncture of South Africa 1652-1836", 
Race And Class, XVll, 1976. 
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finding of these studies was that racial stratification in Cape society seemed to get worse as time 
went by. The convergence of economic status and racial status also became more apparent as the 
eighteenth century progressed. The crucial significance of slavery in Cape society was 
highlighted by the work of James Armstrong,54 Robert Ross,55 Nigel Worden56 and Robert 
ShelJ57 which demonstrated that the Cape was a slave society and that slavery influenced every 
aspect of the colony's social, political and economic life. An ambitious work of comparative 
history, by G. Fredrickson, compared South Africa with North America and, rather perversely, 
concluded that slavery had not played as crucial a role in shaping South African race attitudes.58 
Despite this opinion it seemed as though the lines of race and class converged most strongly in 
the institution of slavery and that the frontier was, after all of marginal significance in terms of 
exerting an influence on Cape society. It was, perhaps, more important to establish what 
influence the institution of slavery had exerted on the frontier than to ask how much the frontier 
experience had influenced the treatment of non-whites within the colony. 
A major contribution to the study of the Khoisan occurred in 1972 with the completion of Rick 
Elphick's doctoral thesis on the Khoikhoi and the seventeenth century Cape colony.59 Elphick's 
thesis proved that it was possible to use seventeenth and eighteenth century archival material in 
such a way so as to be able to provide a detailed and lively account of the greatly neglected 
Khoikhoi. He showed that racist perceptions of the Khoikhoi had pre-dated Van Riebeeck's 
arrival and that the frontier began at the beaches of Table Bay. His account ended with the 
devastating effects of the smallpox epidemic of 1713, which virtually removed the Khoikhoi 
presence from the south-western Cape and also from the written records of the Company 
officials. An extremely influential feature of Elphick's work was his explanation of the 
relationship between Khoikhoi pastoralists and San hunter-gatherers. He suggested that since the 
ancestors of the Khoikhoi had been hunter-gatherers there was no insuperable barrier to prevent 
either San from becoming Khoikhoi or Khoikhoi from becoming San. In presenting his theory as 
a cyclical process of upwards or downwards mobility Elphick was responsible both for blurring 
54. James Annstrong, "The Slaves, 1652-1795", in Elphick and Giliomee, Shaping of South African Society, !st 
ed., and, with Nigel Worden, "The Slaves, 1652-1834", in Elphick and Giliomee, Shaping of South Afiica11 
Society, 2nd ed. 
55. R. Ross, Cape of Tom1e11ts: Slave,y and Resistance in South Africa (London, 1983 ). 
56. N. Worden, Slave,y in Dutel, South Africa (Cambridge, 1985). 
57. R. Shell, "Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope", (Ph.D. thesis, 2 vols., Yale University, 1986). 
58. G. Fredrickson, Ir71ite Supremacy. A Comparative Study in American and South African Hist01y (New York, 
1981) 
59. R. Elphick, "The Cape Kl10i and the First Phase or South African Race Relations" (Ph.D thesis, Yale 
University, 1972). This was subsequently published as Kraal and Castle: Khoi/Jwi and the Founding of lVliite 
South Aji'ica (New Haven, 1977; new edition Johannesburg, 1985). 
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the distinction between Khoikhoi and San and provoking a debate - amongst historians, 
archaeologists and anthropologists - which shows no sign of abating. 60 Shula Marks was quick 
to point out that the reason why historians had underestimated Khoikhoi resistance to European 
colonisation in the eighteenth century was that they had failed to realise that it had merged with 
San resistance and that it would henceforth be more accurate to refer to Khoisan resistance.61 
Others, led by John Wright and Andy Smith, drew attention to the social and cultural difficulties 
which would have inhibited the easy transfonnation of San into Khoikhoi, or vice versa. 62 A 
positive by-product of this debate was to remove both Khoikhoi and San from the synchronic, 
ahistorical realm to which so many anthropologists had relegated them and place them within a 
diachronic, historical context. Jolm Wright went on to produce a study of the San of the 
nineteenth century Drakensberg, portraying them as active historical agents.63 Later studies by 
Robert Gordon and Edwin Wilmsen did the same for the San of Namibia and the Kalahari.64 
There was still, however, no comparable study of the Cape Khoisan during the most crucial years 
of their contact with the forces of colonisation - the eighteenth century. 
Historiographical debate concemmg the concept of frontiers did not cease with Legassick's 
"Frontier Tradition" paper and an important collection of essays, edited by Howard Lamar and 
Leonard Thompson, saw publication in 1981.65 The essays in question dealt with the frontier in 
both North America and South Africa and, as with Fredrickson's book, demonstrated that 
comparative studies generated particularly exciting ideas. Hemmnn Giliomee's contribution, 
"Processes in Development of the South African Frontier" introduced the useful concepts of an 
"open" and "closing" frontier which, when coupled with the concept of a frontier zone, 
significantly advanced the conceptual language of frontier historians.66 Giliomee applied these 
60. See pp.43-47 below for further discussion of this debate. 
61. Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", Joumal of 
African History, Xill, 1972. 
62. J.B. Wright, "Factors Inhibiting a shill lo a stock-keeping economy by South African Hunter-Gatherer 
Societies", (unpublished paper, Conference on the History of the Transkei and Ciskei, no date); AB. Smith, 
"Competition, conflict and clientship: Khoi and San relationships in the Western Cape", in Martin Hall and 
Andrew B. Smith, (eds.), Prehistoric Pastoralism in Southem Africa: The South African Archaeological Society 
Goodwin Series, Vol. 5, June 1986 and "On Becoming Herders: Khoikhoi and San Etlmicity in Southern Africa", 
African Studies, 49, 1990. 
63. J.B. Wright, Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg 1840-1870 (Pietennaritzburg, 1971 ). 
64. R.J. Gordon, I'l1e Bushman Mytl, (Boulder, 1992); E.W. Wilmsen, Land Filled Wit/, Flies: A Political 
Economy of tl,e Kalahari (Chicago, 1989). 
65. Lamar and Thompson, Frontier in 1 Ii story. 
66. H. Giliomee, "Processes in Development or the Southern African Frontier", in Lamar and 1l1ompson, (eds.), 
Frontier in Hist01y, pp.76-119. Legassick used the lenn "restabilization" of the frontier zone where Giliomee used 
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concepts to his own work on the eastern frontier zone and produced a skilful short synthesis of a 
highly complex and complicated region.67 
Other studies of the eastern frontier followed. Susan Newton-King and Candy Malherbe wrote on 
the 1799-1803 Khoikhoi rebellion of the eastern frontier and explained that the cause of the 
rebellion lay in the horrific treatment which Khoikhoi servants received at the hands of their 
colonial masters.68 The detailed, sensitive research of these two historians suggested that it was 
possible to reconstruct an account of the relationships which bound Khoisan labourers and 
colonial farmers together in the eighteenth century. In the meantime, Jeff Peires had succeeded 
admirably in writing a history of the Xhosa perceived from the "other side of the frontier" .69 A 
fine narrative history of the frontier wars, written by John Milton, demonstrated that the story of 
the eastern frontier, properly told, was one of the most exciting chapters of history anywhere.70 
After Legassick's thesis, research on the northern frontier zone seemed to be preoccupied with the 
northwards extension of the frontier during the nineteenth century. R. Moorsom and Brigitte Lau 
were concerned with analysing the political economy of the Oorlam groups in southern Nan1ibia. 
Like Legassick, their account stressed the trading and raiding activities of their subject rather 
than their pastoralism. The Oorlams were seen as bearers of merchant capital. The "conunando 
group" (Lau's tern1 for the institution of the commando) was acknowledged to have had a major 
influence on the structure of Oorlam society but its origins and functions within the dynamics of 
pastoral production were not sufficiently discusscd.71 A recent thesis by Tilman Dedering has 
paid far more attention to the pastoral economy of southern Namibia and examined the role of 
missionaries amongst the Khoikhoi and Oorlam societies of the region during the early nineteenth 
century.72 In 1976 Robert Ross published a history of Adam Kok's Griquas. Like Legassick he 
"closure". Legassick, "1l1e Griqua, The Sotho-Tswana, and the Missionaries", p.124. For a discussion of the 
"open" and "closed" frontier zone see pp.30-31 below. 
67. H. Giliomee, "1l1e Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812 ", in El phi ck and Giliomee, (eds.), The Shaping of South 
African Society, 2nd ed., pp.420-471. 
68. S. Newton-King and V. C. Malherbe, The Khoikhoi Rebel/io11 i11 the Eastem Cape, 1799-1803 (Cape Town, 
1984). 
69. J.B. Peires, The House of Plwlo: A Histo,y of the Xhosa People i11 the Days of their lndepe11de11ce 
( Johmmesburg, 1981 ). 
70. Jolm Millon, The Edges of War (Johannesburg, 1983). 
71. R. Moorsom, "The Political economy of Namibia until 1945" (M.A., Sussex University, 1973); B. Lau, "TI1e 
Emergence ofKonunando Politics in Namaland, Southern Namibia, 1800-1870" (M.A., University of Cape Town, 
1982 ). Lau has subsequently published a version of her thesis as Namibia i11 Jo11ker Afrikaner's Time (Windhoek, 
1987). See also Alvin Kienetz, "The Key Role of the Oorlam Migration in the Early Europeanization of South 
West Africa (Namibia)", /11tematio11al Joumal ofAJi'ica11 Jlistorical Studies, 10, (4), 1977, pp.553-73. 
72. Tilman Dedering, "Southern Namibia c.1780-c. l 840: Khoikhoi, Missionaries and the Advancing Frontier" 
(Ph.D., University of Cape Town, 1989). 
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realised that the fate of the Griqua was typically representative of the major themes of South 
African history and that by charting their changing status - social, political and economic - one 
could follow the progress of racial discrimination, economic impoverishment and political 
subjugation in a particularly revealing case study.73 Other studies which focused on nineteenth 
century northern frontier groups were those of Kallaway and Anderson on the Xhosa of the 
northern Cape and Ross and Strauss on the Korana.74 A noteworthy publication which made a 
substantial contribution to our knowledge of the eighteenth century history of Oorlam groups was 
a paper written by Johaimes du Bruyn. 75 For some reason this much referred to paper was never 
published and Du Bruyn, like so many other frontier historians, trekked further northwards to 
devote his attention to a study of the first missionaries ainongst the southern Tswana.76 The 
eighteenth century northern Cape frontier zone remained wide open for research. 
Whilst work on the present thesis was proceeding a number of important studies, which are of 
relcva11ce to the eighteenth century northern frontier, have been completed. The most significa11t 
of these is Susan Newton-King's doctoral thesis on the eastern frontier between the years 1760-
1799.77 A large part of Newton-King's thesis is devoted to an enquiry into the subjugation, 
resistance and incorporation of the Khoisan of the north-eastern frontier into the trekboer 
economy and her work reveals that, in so far as this theme is concerned, there are many 
similarities between the northern and eastern frontiers. Since the fate of the eighteenth century 
Khoisan is also of central importance to the present thesis some overlap of interests, and indeed 
of interpretations and approaches, has been inevitable. There are also, however, differences of 
opinion and interpretation, some of which have to do with the different nature of the frontier 
zones under consideration and the different periods of time discussed. Some of the points of 
divergence and convergence will be raised during the course of the present thesis but it is of 
releva11ce at this stage to point out that although Newton-King's work is an exciting new 
exploration of the neglected field of eighteenth century Khoisan studies it is, simultaneously, a 
73. R. Ross, Adam Kok's Griquas: A Study in the Development of Stratification i11 South Aji-ica (London, 1976). 
74. Peter Kallaway, "Dauster and the Xhosa of the Gariep: Towards a Political Economy of the Cape Frontier 
1790-1820", African Studies, 41, I, 1982, pp. 143-160; Elizabeth Anderson, A !Jisto,y of the Xhosa of the 
Northem Cape 1795-1879 (Cape Town, 1985); R. Ross, "The !Kora Wars on the Orange River, 1830-1880", 
Joumal of African Histo,y, 16, 1975, pp.561-576; Teresa Strauss, War Along the Orange: The Korcma and the 
border wars of 1868-9 and 1878-9 (Cape Town, 1979). 
75. J.T. du Brnyn, "The Oorlam Afrikaners: from dependence to dominance, c.1760-1823 (Paper delivered to the 
S.A. Historical Society Conference, Durban, July 1981 ). 
76. J.T. du Bruyn, "Die Aanvangsjare van die Christelike Sending onder die Tlhaping, 1800-1825", Argiefjaarboek 
vir Suid-Afrikacmse Geskiedenis, 1989, II. 
77. Susan Newton-King, "The Enemy Within: The Strnggle for Ascendancy on the Cape Eastern Frontier 1760-
1799" (Ph.D., University of London, 1992). 
24 
An Introduction 
reaffirn1ation of the traditional view that, ultimately, it is the eastern frontier that is the frontier in 
South African history. This viewpoint needs some qualification. 
Newton-King has documented and analysed the great cruelties which were inflicted upon Khoisan 
labourers by their Boer masters. Her work seems to reinforce an earlier observation of Legassick: 
It would appear, from an overview of the evidence, that the main oppression of the 
Khoi occurred in the eastern parts of the frontier zone. It was here that white 
settlement was most dense and it could be argued that the establishment of rigidly 
hierarchical relations between white and Khoi was the consequence of 
restabilization of the frontier society rather than its evolution. Further, it was in the 
eastern area, for the most part, that the descendants of those who had moved 
overbergh as pastoralists once again began to supplement or supplant their cattle 
herding by agriculture. Agriculture requires increased, and more disciplined labour, 
than herding cattle and requires it seasonally: this might be an added factor in the 
seemingly worse treatment accorded to the Khoikhoi in this area. 78 
Russel Viljoen's recent study of the treatment of Khoikhoi labourers in the Overberg district also 
supports this interpretation and we now have a welter of evidence concerning the sufferings of the 
Khoisan in the districts of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet.79 
In attempting to interpret and explain the high level of violence and brutality directed against the 
Khoisan of the eastern frontier districts Newton-King has attached great significance to the 
economic motivations which might have encouraged such harsh exploitation of the indigenous 
labourers. Following Legassick's suggestion that the starting point for a study of social 
relationships in the Cape colony should be a concentration on commodity exchange, Newton-
King has gone to exemplary lengths to document the movement and accumulation of cash and 
commodities amongst the frontier fanners of the eastern Cape. 80 The results of her research have 
been to demonstrate that the colonists of these regions were not economically self-sufficient and 
that they were so closely tied to the market by the cash and conunodities nexus that they were 
vulnerable to the exigencies of market fluctuations. The brutal treatment of Khoisan labour was 
thus, in part, an attempt to produce more conunodities and sell them on the market. 
78. Legassick, "The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana an<l the Missionaries", pp. I 00-10 I. 
79. Russel S. Viljoen, "Khoisan Labour Relations in the ,Overbcrg Districts during the latter half of the 18th 
Century, c.1755-1795" (M.A., University of the Western Cape, 1993). 
80. See an earlier paper of Newton-King's on this subject, "Conunerce an<l material culture on the Eastern Cape 
frontier 1764-1812 ", Collected Seminar Papers: Societies ofS011tlie111 A.fi"ica, Institute of Conunonwealth Studies, 
University of London, Vol. 14 1985, and "Some Thoughts on the Political Economy of GraatT-Reinet" 
(unpublished seminar paper, 1984 ). 
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Though Newton-King realises that market forces are not the only reasons for the mistreatment of 
the Khoisan it is important, once again, to note how the context and character of the late 
eighteenth century eastern frontier differs from the northern frontier zone. Firstly, as both 
Legassick and Newton-King stress, the eastern frontier was of greater economic importance to 
the colony than the northern frontier, both by virtue of its agricultural potential and because of 
the fact that, especially after 1770, the livestock rearing potential of the eastern frontier began to 
be developed in a manner which far overshadowed the capabilities of the arid northern frontier 
districts. The northern frontier was not as closely bound to the Cape market and the implications 
of this will be developed in this thesis. The fact that equally brutal treatment of Khoisan 
labourers occurred on the northern frontier caimot therefore be attributed, or at least not to the 
same degree as it is in the eastern Cape, to the influence of market forces. Violent racism was not 
determined by economic factors. It is, in fact, arguable that the greater incidence of brutality in 
the eastern Cape is not due to the baleful influence of the circulation of conunodities but 1s 
simply due to the fact that there were more people in the region. 
The superior enviro1m1ent of the eastern regions resulted in a higher population density - of both 
Khoisa11 and colonists - and hence a greater likelihood of contact between these groups. Once the 
drostdies of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet had been established there was more chance of these 
contacts being documented by the colonial authorities and, eventually, more evidence of violence 
for historians of the eastern Cape to discover. The superior economic potential of the eastern 
Cape, and its higher population density, point towards the second major difference between the 
northern frontier zone and the eastern frontier. Whereas the northern frontier zone opened at the 
begi1ming of the eighteenth century and remained open, in parts, until the nineteenth century, the 
eastern frontier began to close almost as soon as it opened. 81 There is virtually no time span 
between the entry of trekboers into the Sneeuberg/Fish River districts of the eastern Cape in the 
1770s and the conunencement of a chronic struggle - between colonists, Xhosa and Khoisan - for 
the already scarce supplies of land. Effective closure of the eastern frontier may be said to date 
81. It is not too far fetched to see South Africa's border war in Angola as having been a continuation, at least 
psychologically, of the northern frontier zone. One can argue that by the twentieth century the frontier, or "the 
border" as it became known to many South Africans, had become a necessary myth, a place where the inchoate 
dangers of the "total onslaught" could be identified and confronted in military combat. TI1e conunando system, now 
evolved into the SADF military machine, perfonned some of the functions it had always fulfilled, such as instilling 
group-consciousness amongst white conscripts whilst simultaneously disciplining and acculturating non-white 
auxiliaries (including, ironically enough, "Bushmen" trackers). It also, of course, sought to impose colonial rnle on 
the w1subjugated Africans beyond the frontier. Though the continuities in frontier history need much further 
development we should note, in passing, that the design of the Casspir is far too close to that of an ox wagon to be 
completely, functionally efficient. Cultural factors and historical traditions played a part in its design. 
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from the expulsion of the Xhosa beyond the Fish River in 1811 and it may thus be seen that the 
eastern frontier did not enjoy anything like the same period of "openness" as the northern frontier. 
Nor did it ever have the same safety valves available, in the form of marginal land, for those 
groups which preferred to opt out of the murderous competition for resources. After 1811 the 
frontier societies of the eastern Cape settled into a dour struggle for survival where there could 
only be one winner and where the losers were either ruthlessly incorporated into the dominant 
society as inferiors or forced to live outside it in marginal and disadvantaged dependence. And, as 
so many conunentators on the frontier tradition have reminded us, all subsequent South African 
history seemed to be shaped by the type of closure experienced on the eastern frontier. 
Since 1994, however, there is no longer a convincing reason why a closed frontier model, based 
on the eastern Cape frontier, should be regarded as the pre-ordained blue print of South African 
history. The widespread acceptance of the election results of 1994 has begun a process of the 
rolling back, or opening, of frontiers everywhere. With black premiers in the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State the Great Trek must now be seen as having achieved quite different results to 
those with which historians once credited it. The Xhosa of the eastern Cape have not only 
recrossed the Fish River but, for the first time, crossed the Liesbeeck River as well. It is possible 
that an "open" frontier situation, as existed in the northern frontier zone for so long, will be seen 
as being the more typical South African scenario after all. Unfortunately, however, violence 
remains, a constant of all frontiers and of all times. 
Two recent books on the eastern frontier, though very different in their approach, reiterate the 
primacy of the eastern frontier in South African history and develop a new version of the frontier 
thesis.82 Mostert and Crais arc no longer content to argue, as did Walker, that it was the frontier 
tradition which developed on the eastern Cape frontier, in the two generations before the Great 
Trek, which had such a profound influence on South African history. Instead, whilst keeping the 
geographical focus the same, they seek to shift the crucial period to a later date. The eastern 
frontier is still seen as the region where whites and non-whites learn to hate each other, where 
racist ideology becomes institutionalised, and where non-whites are forced to adopt a subordinate 
political, social and economic status. The difference, however, is that the crucial period is now 
identified as that which began after the Fifth Frontier War of 1834 and the villains of the piece 
arc no longer the Afrikaners but the British colonial government, the British eastern Cape settlers 
82. Noel Mostert, Frontiers: The /<..pie of South Afi"ica's Creation a11d the Tragedy of the Xhosa People (London, 
1992); Clillon Crais, 71,e Making of the Colo11ial Order: White Supremacy and Black Resistance i11 the Eastem 
Cape, 1770-1865 (Johannesburg, 1992). 
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and the British army. The details of this interpretation need not concern us here.83 By changing 
our perspective of the eastern frontier both authors have performed an invaluable service and 
Mostert's superb narrative history must hearten all who enjoy reading history. It should be noted, 
however, that the arguments of Mostert and Crais are, basically, updated versions of the frontier 
tradition. Though their emphasis on the eastern frontier is to be expected it is regrettable that, in 
seeking to portray developments within the nineteenth century British eastern Cape as being the 
key to subsequent South African history, Crais, in particular, under-values the influence of the 
Dutch period of rule in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
A great deal of the post-Legassick research on frontiers has therefore, one way or another, 
reconfirmed the power of the frontier tradition and stressed the significance of the frontier 
experience. This is, perhaps, inevitable. No one who writes about frontiers is likely to claim that 
the influence of the frontier is negligible. After Legassick, however, no one has been quite so bold 
as to give primacy to the frontier experience when analysing the nature of South African society 
or the peculiarities of the South African character (if such a thing exists). Despite Legassick's 
cautionary advice it remains easy to overestimate the significance of the frontier in South African 
history. After all, it was on the frontier that the truly vital issues were decided in a short space of 
time: issues such as who should own the land and under what conditions, and who should work 
for whom and under what conditions. 
If the frontier, then, remains significant its significance should not only be sought in the much 
disputed territories of the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century eastern Cape. The frontier of 
the frontier tradition first began on the northern fringes of the colony in the early eighteenth 
century. The northern frontier came first, and simply by virtue of this priority it can claim to 
have exerted the influence of a prototype over subsequent developments. The trekboer economy 
first evolved in the hinterland of Stellenbosch and the first Khoikhoi entered colonial service as 
pastoralist labourers at the same time. The first Khoisan resistance to the expansion of the colony 
beyond the Cape Peninsula took place when white farmers entered the Tulbagh basin at the 
begi1ming of the century and the conunando system evolved as a means to combat this 
opposition. A pattern of nearly two centuries of violence had been set. It was in the sand dunes of 
the Sandveld and the mountains of Drakenstein that the first drosters and proto-Oorlams 
assembled, ancestors of the societies that would one day rule vast territories north of the Orange 
83. Sec Legassick's review of these books in "The stale, racism and the rise of capitalism in the nineteenth-century 
Cape colony", South Afi"ica11 /-lislorica/ Jouma/, 28, 1993, pp.329-368. 
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River. The first white settlers to trek into the Sneeuberg and Agter Bruintjes Hoogte districts of 
the eastern Cape in the 1770s had been taught in the hard school of the northern frontier's 
Roggeveld and Nieuweveld districts long before this. The eastern frontier, in other words, was an 
off-shoot of the northern frontier and its origins are to be sought in the seventy years of frontier 
history before 1770. Only once the full story of the northern Cape frontier zone has been 
incorporated into South African frontier history will it be possible to make a truthful 
reassessment of the frontier tradition as a whole. Although the present thesis does not claim to be 
the definitive or final account alluded to above its intention is to go some way towards rectifying 
the omissions and neglect which this, in many ways foremost frontier, has suffered in the past. 
PASTORALISM: A THEMATIC APPROACH 
This thesis is, in many respects, a response to the historical works which have been discussed 
above. In some cases it develops the ideas and insights of certain historians whilst in other 
instances it disagrees with existing interpretations and proposes new ones. Above all, however, 
this thesis is an attempt to fill in some of the inunense gaps which exist in our knowledge of the 
history of the northern Cape frontier zone in the eighteenth century. One of the most obvious of 
these gaps is that we simply do not have a historical narrative which describes and analyses the 
expansion of the colonial frontier into the Cape interior during the eighteenth century and which, 
simultaneously, considers what impact this had on the Khoisan societies of the interior. It is no 
exaggeration to state that the history of the conquest, extern1ination or incorporation of the 
Khoisan societies of the northern frontier zone in the eighteenth century has not been told. Nor 
has the strength, scale or diversity of Khoisan resistance been adequately described. This thesis 
is, therefore, first and foremost, an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of eighteenth 
century colonial expansion and a discussion of its impact on the Khoisan societies of the Cape 
interior. 
It should be noted that the geographical focus of this study's attention moves, with the frontier 
zone itself, from the banks of the Berg River in the south-western Cape of 1700 to beyond the 
northern banks of the Orange River in the early nineteenth century. The western and eastern 
limits of this area are fanned by the Atlantic ocean on the one hand and the eastern frontier 
districts of Graaff-Rcinct on the other. This is, in other words, an expansive and dynamic view of 
the northern frontier zone and not one which secs the frontier as having come into existence in the 
1770s. The Snccubcrg districts of the north-eastern frontier arc seen as having been integral to 
the northern frontier zone as a whole until the year 1785 when they fell under the jurisdiction of 
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the new drostdy of Graaff-Reinet. After this date they became far more closely attached to the 
history of the eastern frontier zone and do not, therefore, feature as strongly as before in the 
present study. 
The concept of a "frontier zone" which infonns this thesis is similar to that which was proposed 
by Legassick but it has undergone certain refinements. For our purposes a frontier zone may best 
be described as a spatio-temporal area of interaction "between people either subject to different 
political authorities and/or engaged in different modes of production, or indeed recognising no 
formal authority at all, and therefore perhaps as individuals marking the precise point of 
articulation and change between different modes".84 The use of Marxist terminology and Marxist 
paradigms will not, hopefully, be seen as being too anachronistic in the changed circumstances of 
the 1990s for the fact remains that the mode of production paradigm is an extremely useful model 
for dealing with the complex interdigitation of previously distinct social formations occupying 
very different stages of development. It should be stressed, however, that the concept of a mode 
of production includes within it the cultural or social domain. 
Where Legassick and others writing within a Marxist paradigm chose to use the concept of 
merchant capital and conunodity exchange to explain frontier dynamics, it is probably clearer to 
employ a different approach. The northern Cape frontier provides an excellent example of a 
process that was taking place throughout the world concomitant with the expansion of the 
European world economy; 85 it was an incident in a particular phase of the capitalist mode of 
production, that of primitive accumulation. Marx has described primitive accumulation as being 
"nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production" 
and calls it "primitive" because it fonns the pre-history of capitalism or its point of departure.86 
Another feature of primitive accumulation is that it is basically an extractive process: surplus 
value is extracted from the producers without them receiving an equal value in return. The capital 
acquired in this way (the surplus value is converted into capital) is then removed from the 
societies of the producers and the effect is to undennine their social structures.87 This, basically, 
was what occurred in the northern Cape frontier zone. Needless to say the process was neither 
84. Marks and Atmore, "Introduction", Economy and Society, p.9. 
85. See for example I. Wallerstein, The Modem World System, Vol. 1. Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the 
E11ropea11 world-economy i11 the sixteenth ce11t111y (New York, 1974 ); A.G. Frank, World Acc11mulatio11, 1492-
1789 (London, 1978). 
86. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Ilarmon<lsworlh, 1976), pp.873-875. 
87. Frank, World Accumulation, pp.238-248. 
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instantaneous nor simple and in order to identify different stages in this process the concept of the 
frontier zone needs a further refinement. 
Giliomee has suggested that two major phases within a frontier zone be recognised, the "open" 
and the "closed" stage.88 According to Giliomee an "open" frontier zone is one where there is a 
rough balance of power between two or more societies competing for land or resources whereas a 
"closing" frontier is one in which the balance of power has tipped in favour of one of the societies 
rather than another. Processes of closure occur in the economic, social and political spheres and 
insofar as the South African frontier is concerned assume the following aspects: 
( 1) economic closure, manifested in growing scarcity of land and resources, a shift 
from subsistence to commercial farming and increasing control of the means of 
production by a specific class; 
(2) growing social stratification as discreet- "races" or ethnic groups merge into a 
plural society with a given set of caste or class relationships, and 
(3) political closure, in the imposition of a single source of authority. 89 
Having made the above distinctions it may be stated that, in a frontier zone, primitive 
accumulation is carried out through a process of closure as one society becomes dominant at the 
expense of others. A problem which arises, however, is that it is not always possible to regard the 
societies within a frontier zone as though they are distinct and isolated entities for the hallmark of 
such a zone is interaction and change. Only as a frontier closes do identities and categories 
crystallise. Similarly the political and economic relationships which underlie the interactions of 
the frontier societies are themselves in a constant process of change. In the northern Cape frontier 
zone different societies were predicated on different modes of production and existed, albeit 
unequally, side by side. In such circumstances these societies had political and economic features 
derived from different modes of production and it will be useful to state what these modes of 
production were. 
The dominant mode of production within the frontier zone was, as mentioned above, the capitalist 
mode in a particular phase of its historical development, namely, that of primitive accumulation. 
The expansion of the Cape colony had, however, brought the European colonists into contact 
with societies whose modes of production may be described as being either kin-ordered or 
tributary modes. Following the definitions of Wolf, a kin-ordered mode of production may be 
described as one in which "kinship can ... be understood as a way of committing social labour to 
88. Giliomce, "Processes in <lcvelopment of the southern African frontier". 
89. lbi<l , p. 79. 
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the transfonnation of nature through appeals to filiation and marriage and to consanguinity and 
affinity",90 whereas a tributary mode is a mode of production "in which the primary producer, 
whether cultivator or herdsman, is allowed access to the means of production, while tribute is 
extracted from him by political or military means".91 As shall be seen, all societies in the 
northern Cape frontier zone had features derived from each of these principal modes. The best 
way to describe the dynamics of interaction between these different societies is to use a model 
which allows us to account for the specific economic and political fonns which such interaction 
took at the local level. Such a model should be based on the principal productive activity of the 
frontier zone and this activity was pastoral production. 92 
The great virtue of focusing on pastoral production was that it was the major occupation of all of 
the societies of the frontier zone with the exception of the hunter-gatherer San. The trekboers, 
"Bastaards" and Khoikhoi were all pastoralist societies and it was principally through the 
dynamics of pastoralism that they absorbed or transfonned each other's culture whilst exploiting, 
serving or co-operating with each other. Pastoralist societies are those societies whose mode of 
subsistence is based primarily on "the exploitation of a set of spatially dispersed vegetal 
resources, water etc., by mobile herbivorous herds in search of their food". 93 This does not in 
itself constitute a mode of production. As Claude Lefebure explains: 
In our view, the nature of pastoral productive forces, however exclusive they may 
be (and they are never entirely so), is not the detennining factor in establishing the 
originality of the forn1s of economic and social organisation developed by the 
pastoralists. In themselves, to be sure, these productive forces entail varying degrees 
of constraints, some of which are, from time to time, extremely harsh, and these do 
delimit a detenninative field that is well worth exploring. But it is necessary to study 
as well the conditions in which the processes and the products of pastoral labour are 
appropriated at the different levels of social integration (whose internal structure 
and functioning arc themselves factors of production).94 
In other words, not just the forces but also the relations of production must be considered, and 
the social fonn of production may be structured by either capitalist, kin-ordered or tributary 
90. Wolf, Europe and tl,e People Witl,0111 Hist01y, p.91. 
91. Ibid., pp.79-80. 
92. See N.G. Pe1m, "Pastoralists and Pastoralism in the Northern Cape Frontier Zone during the Eighteenth 
Century", in M. Hall and AB. Smith (eds.), Prel,istoric Pastoralism in Soutl,em Africa, pp.62-68. 
93. P. Bonte, "Marxist theory and anthropological analysis: the study of nomadic pastoralist societies", in J.S. 
Kahn and J.R. Llobcra (eds.), The Antl,ropology of Pre-Capitalist Societies (London, 1981 ). 
94. Claude Lefebure, "Introduction: The specificity of nomadic pastoralist societies", in L'equipc ecologic ct 
anthropologie de societcs pastoralc (eds.), Pastoral Prod11ctio11 and Society (Cambridge, 1979), pp.1-2. 
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modes of production. An example of this is that modem ranchers may be considered to be 
nomadic pastoralists: 
but they are structurally in the same category as fam1ers who employ wage labour 
and produce commodities for the market. On the san1e principal, free peasants 
applying family labour to land primarily for subsistence, selling only a small portion 
of their produce in order to buy consumption goods, and yielding up another portion 
to the state in the fonn of tax, arc in the same category as pastoral nomads who do 
the samc.95 
With the above reservations in mind it remams necessary and desirable to delineate certain 
features that are characteristic of nomadic pastoralist societies and demonstrate how these 
features influenced the interactions of frontier societies in the northern Cape. 
Perhaps the most important economic point to make about nomadic pastoralists is that made by 
Asad: their political and economic organisation is based primarily on production for 
subsistence. 96 This was certainly true of the pastoralist societies in the northern Cape frontier 
zone for most of the eighteenth century though here again one must distinguish between the 
"open" and "closed" phase of the frontier, between different sections of the frontier, and between 
different operators within the frontier zone. As we have noted, there has been considerable debate 
concerning the influence of market forces on frontier pastoralists.97 Van Duin and Ross have 
noted that the meat requirements of the VOC were in the region of a quarter of a million pounds 
of meat a year in the 1720s and three quarters of a million pounds by the I 770s.98 Obviously a 
large part of this demand was supplied by frontier pastoralists. Even before the advent of the 
trekboers there is evidence that Khoikhoi pastoralists engaged in trade and exchanged livestock 
so it is clearly not the case that the pastoralists of the northern frontier were immune to market 
forces.99 No one, in fact, has ever claimed that the trekboers were not dependent on the south-
western Cape for certain conunodities - such as gunpowder and fiream1s. But in an attempt to 
rectify earlier, somewhat simplistic depictions of the trekboers - which sought to characterise 
them as isolated, independent and self-sufficient wanderers with few social, political or economic 
links with the south-western Cape - historians have, perhaps, overemphasised the influence of the 
market. It is the contention of this thesis that the dynamics of the trekboer economy were not 
95. T. Asa<l, "Equality in nollla<lic social systellls? Notes towards the dissolution of an anthropological category" in 
L' equipe ecologie et anthropologie <le societes pastorate ( e<ls. ), Pastoml Prod11ctio11 and Socie~v, p.42. 
96. Ibid. 
97. See p.20 above. 
98. Van Duin an<l Ross, lico11omy of the Cape Colony, p.66. 
99. Elphick, Kmal and Castle (New Haven, 1977), pp.62-67. 
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simply, or even fundamentally, market driven. Reasons for the adoption of pastoralism by certain 
frontier colonists in the early years of the eighteenth century will be discussed,100 but the heart of 
pastoralism's attractiveness was that it provided a means of subsistence. IO 1 
It is, understandably, harder to find concrete evidence that pastoralism in the frontier zone was 
primarily subsistence related than it is to find evidence for involvement in the market economy. 
Non-market oriented pastoralism leaves no documentation whereas the sale of commodities does. 
But this should not blind us to the fact that, for frontier pastoralists, ownership of livestock had 
an importance that far exceeded the market value of their flocks and herds. For frontier farmers 
the very basis of their existence depended on livestock and this should be the starting point of a 
consideration of the trekboer economy. 
The advantage which pastoralism offers to its practitioners is that sheep and cattle usually 
reproduce themselves at a greater rate than humans. If all goes well a farmer with a flock or herd 
may expect to attain a degree of self-sufficiency since he can derive meat, milk and clothing from 
his animals without decreasing the numbers of his breeding stock to dangerously low levels. 
Furthennore, surplus sheep or cattle can be given to the fanner's sons to provide the nucleus of 
their own flock or herd. In most pastoralist societies it is only once basic breeding stocks have 
been secured that fanners regard their animals as being surplus to their requirements and think of 
selling them. Even then, however, since wealth in a pastoralist society is signified by the 
possession of large flocks or herds, there may be considerable reluctance to sell or exchange 
livestock for commodities of inferior status value. The overwhelming priority of the trekboers of 
the northern Cape frontier zone was not to accumulate money but to accumulate a basic breeding 
stock. So rapid was the advance of the frontier, and so great was the increase in the number of 
trekboe rs, l 02 that for much of the eighteenth century the acquisition or maintenance of 
subsistence level herds was of greater importance than the sale of meat to the Company's 
100. See pp.49-54 below. 
101. Ross is surely correct to state that: "Still, to establish on the one hand that the frontiersmen were very largely, 
if never entirely, self-sufficient and that on the other that they were responsive to market opportunities - that, each 
in his own way, both Guelke and Newnark are correct - does not provide any deep insight into the dynamics behind 
the rapid spread of colonial structure throughout what was to become South Africa". Ross, "Economics of the 
South African Frontier", p.217. Ross chooses to analyse the dynamics of colonial population expansion, believing 
that it provides the key to understanding frontier expansion. White demographic and territorial expansion was, 
however, based on the dynamics of pastoral production and pastoral production should, therefore, remain the 
starting point for an analysis of frontier dynamics. 
102. R. Ross, "The 'White' Population of the Cape Colony [South Africa] in the Eighteenth Century", Pop11latio11 
Studies, XXIX, 1975. 
34 
An Introduction 
butchers or the accumulation of capital. Once the frontier began to close, vital natural resources, 
such as land, grazing and water, became scarcer whilst San attacks on colonial livestock became 
fiercer. In this hostile environment the rising generation of aspirant trekboers spent most of their 
time attempting to carve out a niche for the flocks and herds of their own family. The constant 
necessity for commando duty did not create conditions which were favourable for the 
accumulation of a disposable surplus in livestock. Thus it was that in the Hantam during the 
1780s many young colonists could not even muster a basic breeding stock of 300 sheep and in 
bad years in the Roggeveld the Company butchers could not buy any livestock at all from the 
embattled farmers.103 
It is significant that those who have presented the most evidence for the market orientation of the 
trekboers have based their conclusions on a study of the eastern frontier. The frontier regions of 
the eastern Cape did indeed become the principal source of Company meat after the 1770s -
largely because of their favourable natural environment. It should be noted, however, that in the 
vast regions of the northern Cape frontier zone the environment was often so harsh that 
pastoralists were not able to rise significantly above the level of subsistence. Even in the eastern 
frontier zone Newton-King's research has shown that, implicated in the market though they were, 
the majority of farmers died in poverty or in debt.I 04 Such evidence suggests that it makes sense 
to view the trekboers, particularly those of the northern Cape, as pastoralists whose principal 
concern was with the struggle for subsistence. 
There is another respect in which the trekboers of the northern Cape may be regarded as being 
semi-nomadic pastoralists and that is that movement or mobility was absolutely essential for their 
survival. It may be argued that it is inappropriate to describe the trekboers, with their· system of 
individually registered loan-farms, as "nomadic" or even "semi-nomadic" pastoralists. Whilst it 
cannot be denied that the rapid expansion of the colonial frontier was caused by trekboers in 
search of better land, water and grazing for their livestock, this expansive drive did not, in itself, 
constitute nomadism and was not, in any event, indefinite. The advance of the colonial frontier 
stalled in the 1770s and, it may be objected, after that date the trekboers became more like 
ranchers, inhabiting fixed areas of land and producing a surplus for sale on the market. But 
nomadic pastoralists arc not called nomadic simply because their societies are characterised by 
restless demographic expansion or an endless process of trekking beyond the horizon. Even 
during periods of zero population growth or population contraction, pastoralists have to be 
103. Sec pp.3 IO, 193 below. 
104. Newton-King, "Enemy Within", chapter 7. 
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mobile. Strictly speaking they arc nomadic because they adopt a transhumant lifestyle. This 
means tliat they seek to maximise production by a seasonal exploitation of natural resources and 
their movements are thus related to seasonal cycles. For pastoralist societies this necessity arises 
from the fact that pastoralism usually occurs in areas where the annual rainfall is insufficient to 
support agriculture. Grasslands within such an area are marginal, their utility being restricted by 
the occurrence of seasonal rainfall and surface water. 
Such conditions were certainly true of the northern Cape and the movements of all pastoralists 
within the area were organised to respond to the seasonal variations in grazing and water 
resources. The best strategy for a pastoralist society to adopt was to control an area containing 
diverse natural resources and subject to different seasonal characteristics. This would ensure that 
the society would have access to grazing and water all the year round. Within such an area the 
transhumant orbit of humans and animals would be fairly predictable though subject to 
alterations by seasonal irregularities, such as drought, or non-natural influences, such as warfare, 
and the internal dynamics of the society itself.105 Several such areas, capable of supporting a 
cycle of transhumance, fell within the northern Cape frontier zone during the eighteenth century. 
Full control of such an area was absolutely crucial for the pastoralists within it for if access to 
any one seasonal resource within the area was denied the cycle would be disturbed and survival 
jeopardised. It is possible to identify the areas and describe the transhumant strategies adopted by 
the societies living within them but some cautionary remarks have to be made. 
Firstly, tl1ese areas should not be regarded as being isolated and clearly outlined units but ratl1er 
as focal points of transhumance cycles. Their boundaries overlapped and shifted with some 
resources being conm1on to two or more regions. Secondly, these areas were most truly focal 
points of transhumance cycles during the open frontier stage, that is before the practice of 
regarding certain favoured places within the area as being private property for the exclusive use 
of a trekboer domestic unit became conunon. The pre-colonial societies regarded the resource 
area as being the conunon property of the conununity as a whole.106 The initial entry of the 
trekboers into such an area however did not mean the instant disappearance of the cycles of 
transhumance, for the trekboers were forced to adopt them themselves. This practice could be 
reconciled to ideas of private ownership by claiming different loan fanns at strategic points 
within the cycle. It was not necessary to own the grazing land between two watering points. It 
105. A.B. Smith, "Prehistoric pastoralism in the southwestern Cape, South Africa", World Archaeology, 15, 1983. 
I 06. I. Schapera, The Khoisan Peoples ofSoulh Afi·ica (London, 1930), pp. 286-291. 
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was sufficient merely to own the two watering points and the grazing land between would 
become useless to anyone else. During the open phase of the frontier zone there was undoubtedly 
a great deal more reciprocal or community sharing of resources amongst the trekboers than is 
reflected by reading the Oude Wildschut Boeke (the books in which loan-fam1 allocations were 
recorded). The fact that a loan farm was registered in the name of one man only (though 
sometimes they were registered under two names) does not necessarily mean that only one 
domestic unit used that fann. Other sources suggest that groups of trekboers grazed their herds 
together for mutual protection and pooled their grazing or water resources.107 Naturally such 
arrangements lasted only as long as danger threatened or the resources and carrying capacity of 
the veld allowed. As the population grew and the frontier closed, as overgrazing occurred and 
vleis dried up, competition for property became more intense and ideas about ownership more 
exclusive. The records indicate that boundary disputes and litigation over land increased 
dramatically as the century progressed. Some areas of Bushmanland, however, were not claimed 
for individual ownership until the twentieth century and by common consent were used as 
conununal trekveld as the lack of water made pemmnent possession a costly superfluity .108 
A further caution about conceptualising an area which served as the focal point for a cycle of 
transhumance is that it was not necessarily the exclusive property or territory of one particular 
society prior to the arrival of the trekboers. There was some idea of territoriality amongst the 
pre-colonial societies but this did not exclude other groups from entering the area. I 09 Such visits 
were usually temporary and it was expected that the intrusive group should recognise the 
superior rights of the original inhabitants by the payment of some small, symbolic tribute. A 
group might be forced to leave their accustomed round by war or drought but such inter-regional 
movements in pre-colonial times, were usually tolerated (provided that they did not jeopardise the 
resources of the society already present) since they enabled the host society to make reciprocal 
demands on their visitors in the future.110 Pastoralists were not the only occupants of such 
regions for hunter-gatherers or San societies sometimes lived within them. They too relied on a 
107. See pp.101-102, n.51 below. 
I 08. P. J. van der Merwe, Pio11iers vcm die Dorsla11d (Cape Town, 1941 ). 
109. Schapera, Khoisan, pp.286-289; J. Deacon, "'My Place is the Bitterpits': The home territory of l3leek and 
Lloyd's /Xam San infonnants", Aji'ica11 Studies, 45, 1986, pp.135-155; J. Deacon, "The power of place in 
understanding southern San rock engravings", World Archaeology, 20, 1988, pp. 129-40; A.13. Smith, "Metaphors 
of Space: Rock Art and Territoriality in South Africa", in T.A. Dowson and D. Lewis-Williams (eds.), Contested 
Images: Diversity i11 So11the111 Aji"icwt Rock Art Research (Johannesburg, 1994 ), pp. 373-384. 
110. See Jeremy Keenan's "The Concept of the Mode of Production in Hunter-Gatherer Societies", in Kahn and 
Llobera (eds.), The Anthropology of Pre-Capitalist Societies, pp. 2-21 for an account of how San groups ensured 
access to the territory of other San groups in limes of hardship by using name connections. 
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seasonal exploitation of natural resources. I I I The game which they hunted frequently followed 
the same seasonal movements as the flocks and herds of the pastoralists in search of water and 
grazing. This resulted in competition for resources and necessitated some form of 
accommodation or agreement between pastoralists and hunter-gatherers. For the most part, even 
in pre-colonial times, the terms of co-existence favoured the pastoralists. Where hunter-gatherers 
lived in the same area as pastoralists it was usually in the more mountainous parts or those which 
were less suitable for pastoralism. In addition they had come to rely rather more on the gathering 
of veldkos and less on hunting for their subsistence.112 Even so, until the arrival of the trekboers 
(and for some time after it) they held their own and relationships of clientage between the San 
and the Khoikhoi have been described.113 Their independence was, however, threatened by the 
trekboers because the latter had the military strength sufficient to dispense with the tradition of 
co-existence between pastoralist and hunter-gatherer. At the same time the efficiency of the 
trekboers in exterminating game threatened the basic structure of San existence and left them no 
choice but to hunt cattle and sheep - an expedient fraught with fatal consequences. 
The key to identifying areas in which cycles of transhumance existed is found by considering the 
environmental constraints influencing pastoral production. The most important of these are 
rainfall and the availability of surface water: the first because it determines the quality of the 
pasturage and the second because livestock has to drink regularly. In general, rainfall in the 
north-western Cape area is highest in the south and west and lowest in the north and east, though 
the lowest annual rainfall of the entire region occurs on the north-west coast of Namaqualand. 
West of the Roggeveld mountains, which fonn the escarpment of the interior plateau, rainfall 
occurs mainly in the winter months whereas the north-eastern interior is a summer rainfall area. 
Throughout the region, especially to the north and east of the Olifants and Doorn Rivers, rainfall 
is very low and rivers arc scarce and seldom perennial. In areas of higher altitude, like the 
Kamiesberg, the cooler temperatures result in greater rainfall whilst springs are most conunon 
near mountains and escarpments. 
These basic hydrographic features of the northern and western Cape enable us to distinguish five 
major regions which came within the northern frontier zone at some stage or other during the 
111. See for instance Jolm Parkington, "Follow the San" (Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 1977), for an account of 
the seasonal cycles of the San of the western Cape. 
112. J. Parkington, "Soaqua: Hunter-fisher-gatherers of the Olifants River Valley, western Cape", South African 
Archaeology B11lleti11, 32, 1977, pp.150-57. 
113. Sec pp.81 below. Sec also AB. Smith, "Competition, Conl1icl and Clicntship: Kl10i and San Relationships in 
the Western Cape", in Hall and Smith (eds.), Prehistoric Pastoralism, pp.36-41. 
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eighteenth century and which had the resources necessary to support cycles of transhumance 
within them. These were (1) the south-western Cape; (2) the west coast and Bokkeveld (including 
the Sandveld, Olifants and Doorn Rivers); (3) the escarpment of the interior plateau (the Hantam, 
Roggeveld and Nieuweveld mountains; (4) Namaqualand; and (5) the Orange River. The order in 
which these areas are listed corresponds to the chronological sequence in which they were settled 
by the trekboers, and the movements of trekboers from one such region to another are important 
milestones in the history of the expansion of the colonial frontier. Not only do these movements 
mark the stage at which the resources of one region become insufficient to support the trekboer 
society, they also mark the stages at which a new struggle for the control of a new area of 
pastoralist production commenced. It is thus no coincidence that the most intense fighting 
between the trekboers and the Khoisan occurred during periods of transition from one resource 
area to another. 
The chronological development of this thesis closely follows the sequential intrusion of trekboers 
into each of these environmentally crucial areas. Thus, chapter two is largely concerned with the 
initial expansion of colonists from the locality of the Cape Peninsula into the hinterland of the 
south-western Cape at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Fighting between the local 
Khoisan and the trekboers broke out immediately. Andy Smith has reconstructed the 
transhumance orbit of the Cochoqua Khoikhoi of the area, an orbit which was imperilled from 
the moment that the colonists arrived.114 Unlike much of the country to the north, the south-
western Cape received sufficient rain to grow winter crops - crops which were not indigenous to 
the Cape but which the colonists could grow. The south-western Cape therefore ceased to be 
important as an area of pastoral production very early in the century. By this stage, however, the 
independence of the local Khoisan had been destroyed by a combination of military defeat, 
livestock loss and smallpox. The colonial frontier moved on, incorporating some Khoisan within 
the colony and chasing others further into the interior. 
Chapters three and four deal with the colonial conquest of the second environmentally distinct 
region: the west coast and Bokkeveld. Major conflict between Khoisan and colonists occurred as 
the colonists, now more correctly called trekboers, crossed the Berg River and entered the west 
eoast/Olifants River region in about 1712. Pastoralism was essential as a means of subsistence in 
this area, both because the rainfall was less than further south and because the increased distance 
from Cape Town made transportation of any agricultural produce that might be grown too costly 
114. A.B. Smith, "The Disruption of Kl10i society in the 17th century", Unpublished paper presented to the Centre 
for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Feb. 1983; sec also Smith, "Competition, Conflict and Clientship". 
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to be profitable. Pastoralist strategy here lay in seizing control of the vleis, river valleys and 
springs for the area was fortunate in having pere1mial water, albeit not plentiful. It was 
important, however, to move cattle and sheep away from the rivers during the winter rains for the 
young grass gave them diarrhoea and sometimes caused death.115 The conquest of the area was 
not completed until 1739 when substantial Khoisan resistance to the trekboers was decisively 
crushed in a series of major conm1andos. The degree of incorporation of the local Khoisan into 
the trekboer economy was already apparent in the fact that many of the Khoisan resisters were 
ex-colonial servants. It is also significant to note that the war of 1739 coincided with a frontier 
rebellion of colonists against the government at the Cape - the first indication that a common 
group consciousness, based largely on perceived economic grievances, was emerging an1ongst 
frontier farmers who distinguished themselves from the wealthier gentry of the south-western 
Cape. For the moment, however, white, colonial, anti-Khoisan unity was necessary in order to 
defeat the military resistance of the Khoisan. At the same time, miscegenation and growing 
numbers of frontier fugitives were helping to create a new group which came into existence 
alongside other frontier societies. These "Bastaards", "Bastaard-Hottentots" and drosters - the 
proto-Oorlan1s of the northern frontier zone - were to grow in importance as time, and the 
frontier, advanced. 
The most detern1ined resistance of all occurred when the trekboers entered the third maJor 
environmental region: the escarpment of the interior plateau (the Hantam, Roggeveld and 
Nieuweveld mountains). Chapters five, six and seven detail the cause, course and consequences 
of the struggle for the resources of this harsh environment. Beyond this point there was no further 
region that could serve as the focal point for a cycle of transhumance. Buslunanland and the 
Great Karoo had too little pennanent water. Beyond the Orange River lay the Sotho-Tswana and 
beyond the Nieuweveld were the Xhosa and the eastern frontier. To retreat in either of these 
directions was not feasible for the Khoikhoi and San thus only the retention of the escarpment 
could have preserved them. The escarpment coincided, roughly, with the division between the 
sununer and winter rainfall areas so that it was possible, from this vicinity, for the mobile to 
enjoy access to year round grazing and water. The escarpment was also where most of the 
springs were to be found and from these favoured locations pastoralists (and hunter-gatherers) 
were well suited to exploit the spring vegetation in the Onder Karoo (between the Bokkeveld and 
Roggeveld) and the good grazing following summer thundershowers beyond the Sak River. 
115. Peter E. Raper an<l Maurice Boucher ( e<ls. ), Robert Jacob Gord 011: Cape Travels. 1777 to 1786 
(Johannesburg, 1988), Vol. 2, 11 July 1779, p.241. 
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Water was nearly always scarce, however, and the area subject to droughts. It is clear that the 
escarpment was a somewhat delicate and marginal resource base for pastoralists from the outset, 
quite unable to provide adequate grazing or water for large numbers of animals for any length of 
time. 
In these circumstances pastoralists had to be highly mobile. Each trekboer had a farm in the 
Karoo called a legplaats for which he did not have to pay rental. Throughout the Roggeveld the 
winters were very cold and the inhabitants had to trek regularly; in summer to seek the thunder 
showers and water of the Riet and Sak Rivers of the Great Karoo, and in winter to escape the 
cold of the mountains. The Nieuweveld was, if anything, even less favoured than the Roggeveld 
and there are increasing references in the records, as the century went on, to the growing 
impoverishment of the trekboers of this area of the escarpment. Many farms had to be abandoned 
not so much because of the hostility of the San but because of drought and poor grazing. 
Disputes over fann boundaries were intense in this area and it was only beyond the Sak River 
that the veld was regarded as being communal trekveld for there the lack of standing water and 
the strong presence of the San made private ownership extremely unattractive to the trekboers. 
Without access to the resources on both sides of the escarpment and the water of the escarpment 
itself both pastoralists and hunter-gatherers were doomed, hence the desperate fighting of the 
1770s, 1780s and 1790s. These were years of intense conunando activity and Khoisan resistance. 
The institution of the conunando was very much influenced by the dynamics of pastoral 
production and these c01mections arc explored in chapters six and seven. The typical unit of 
pastoral production - the domestic unit - also influenced the way in which Khoisan were absorbed 
within (or forced out of) the trekboer economy and this is another theme which is explored in 
chapters five, six and seven. The ever present and pervasive theme of violence is also discussed. 
Chapters eight, nine and ten describe the advance of the colonial frontier into the environmental 
regions of Namaqualand and the Orange River. The Kamiesberg of Namaqualand provided the 
centre for another cycle of transhumance. The higher ground of this region was better watered 
and pastured but pastoralists had to be able to exploit the seasonal grazing of the coast and 
Buslunanland which, if it received rain in the sununer, was a sea of grass. Until at least the 1790s 
Namaqualand was fairly "open" as the trekboers did not have sufficient numbers to evict the 
Khoikhoi or impose their will on the large numbers of Oorlam frontiersmen in the region. By the 
end of the 1790s the growing pressures within the region resulted in a combined "Bastaard" and 
Khoisan revolt against white oppression. Another symptom of the increasing difficulties faced by 
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the frontier pastoralists of the north-western Cape was that both trekboers and Oorlams began to 
raid the Khoisan societies of the Orange River, disrupting a way of life based on the exploitation 
of the perennial resources of the river and replacing it with the insecurity of one based on 
banditry and raiding. The Oorlam groups which had emerged by this time - hardy hybrids of the 
frontier zone - had acquired the means and techniques to forn1 their own commando groups. This 
enabled them to escape the political control of the trekboers and prey on the societies of 
Bushmanland, the Orange River and Great Nan1aqualand. These groups, whose composition 
reflected elements of all the different social groups within the frontier zone, seem to symbolise all 
the processes that were in operation within that zone. Partly because they were groups whose 
structure was based on the conunando system and partly because the areas in which they existed 
were unsuitable for the development and maintenance of a transhumance cycle, they became very 
active in raiding and trading. It seemed, indeed, that they were not pastoralist societies so much 
as parasitic societies which preyed on other pastoralist societies and were a threat to both 
trekboers and Khoisan. This should not, however, disguise the fact that the security and cohesion 
of each of these groups required, at its core, a stock of cattle and sheep to provide the basic 
subsistence of the group and to serve as a demonstration of wealth and power which attracted 
followers and overawed the weaker. It should also be noted that livestock raiding is considered to 
be a structural necessity for pastoralist societies and is thus explicable within the dynamics of 
pastoralism.116 
The thesis concludes with a consideration of those forces which tended towards promoting the 
social, economic and political closure of the frontier zone. As the eighteenth century drew 
towards its end the government of the first British administration at the Cape attempted to 
implement policies which would bring peace and political closure - a task manifestly beyond the 
resources of the VOC - to the entire frontier, including the northern frontier. In this respect the 
exertions of missionaries become particularly important and chapters eleven to fourteen discuss 
their efforts, alongside those of the British government, to "civilise" the frontier zone. 
Missionaries first appeared in the northern Cape in the last years of the century and heralded the 
arrival of a new era in frontier history. Part of their contribution was to accelerate the social and 
economic transfonnation of the Khoisan and Oorlam groups, making them more dependent on the 
culture and conm10dities of the colony. They also had a political role to play, seeking to enhance 
the state's control over the turbulent frontier regions. The state approved conversion of the leader 
116. Sec Bonte, "Non-stratified social fonnations among pastoral nomads", p.191. 
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of the most powerful Oorlam bandit group marked an important symbolic moment in the closure 
of the frontier zone. Even more important, however, was the promulgation of the Hottentot 
Proclamation of 1809 for this signalled that the new British government of the Cape intended to 
recognise and entrench the colonists' subjugation of their Khoisan and "Bastaard-Hottentot" 
labourers. For the first time at the Cape there was a government powerful enough to impose its 
will on the frontier regions. Unfortunately, by backing the colonists, this government endorsed 
and ensured the outcome of the long process of struggle, decided in the northern frontier zone, for 
the land, labour and livestock resources of the Khoisan of the Cape interior. 
A NOTE ON KHOISAN TERMINOLOGY 
Since a large part of this thesis deals with the Khoisan of the Cape interior it will be necessary 
and desirable to discuss the correct usage of the terms "Khoikhoi", "San" and "Khoisan". In any 
debate concerning terminology one should never lose sight of the reality behind the terminology, 
that is with the real people and the real processes involved. As Eric Wolf puts it: 
The habit of treating nan1ed entities such as Iroquois, Greece, Persia or the United 
States as fixed entities opposed to one another by stable internal architecture and 
external boundaries interferes with our ability to understand their mutual encounter 
and confrontation.117 
We should indeed remember that words ~ike "Khoikhoi" and "San" are not timeless ahistorical 
categories but historical categories and social constructions. It is precisely the dynamic realities 
that lie behind Khoisan terminology that cause so many of the problems associated with the use 
of the words. Leaving aside, for a moment, the question as to whether "Khoikhoi" is a better 
word than "Hottentot", or "San" a better word than "Buslunan", one still has to unravel that 
"Gordian knot of South African ethnography" - the relationship between Khoikhoi and San.118 
Many skilful fingers have picked at this knot, some tightening it, others loosening it, but whatever 
the nature of the relationship it obviously differs according to its historical context.119 The word 
"Khoisan", for instance, which has become the convenient generic name for both the Khoikhoi 
and San peoples, implies that there is a relationship between them.120 But it means one thing 
117. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, p.7. 
118. ·nie expression is Elphick's. See Elphick, Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa, p.4. 
119. See M.L. Wilson's review of the debate in "Khoisanosis: The Question of Separate Identities for Khoi and 
San", in R. Singer and J.K. Lundy (eds.), Variation, Culture and Evolution in African Population (Johairnesburg, 
1986 ), pp.13-25. 111e historical usage of the various tenns is presented and discussed in G.S. Nienaber, 
Khoekl10e11se Stanmame: '11 Voorlopige verke1111i11g (Pretoria, 1989), pp.616-626 and 830-838. 
120. The Lenn "Khoisan" was first used by Leonard Schultze in 1928 but gained wide currency with Schapera's 
book I11e Khoisan Peoples of South Aji"ica in 1930. Nienaber, Khoekhoense Stamname, pp.625-626. 
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when used in the pre-colonial context and another thing in the colonial context. In the former 
context the processes the word implies are those which relate to the transition of societies or 
individuals from a predominantly hunting and gatl1ering mode of existence to a predominantly 
pastoralist mode of existence - and vice versa. In the colonial context, however, the dynamics of 
Khoikhoi and San interaction were fundamentally altered by the presence of Europeans who first 
exerted an influence through trade and later by direct settlement and conquest. As far as the 
realities behind the word "Khoisan" are concerned the question then becomes not: "What is the 
relationship between Khoikhoi and San?" but: "What is the relationship between Khoikhoi and 
San and how is this related to the processes of colonisation?" 
Elphick attempted to explain how San became Khoikhoi and how Khoikhoi became San in the 
pre-colonial context by using a model of downward and upward ecological cycles. When a 
Khoikhoi fell on hard times and lost his livestock to drought, disease or theft he could revert to 
hunting and gatl1ering until such time as he acquired new stock, usually by stealing some for 
himself or working as a client for wealthier pastoralists. A hunter-gatherer, on the other hand, 
could also rise to the status of pastoralist by theft or clientship, acquiring livestock and assuming 
the identity, in time, of a Khoikhoi. Though Elphick's was not the first explanation it became very 
influential.121 It can, and has, been criticised for minimising the social, political, economic and 
cultural differences between pastoralist and hunter-gatherer societies.122 The point to make here, 
however, is one that Elphick himself made: although some of the Khoikhoi responses to 
colonialism were shaped by traditional responses to fluctuations in the ecological cycle - for 
example the recourse to clientship or robbery - the arrival of the Europeans fundamentally 
changed the cycle itself. It was no longer possible for either Khoikhoi or San to experience 
upward mobility, only downward mobility or permanent clientship under colonial rule. In these 
circumstances the relationship between Khoikhoi and San itself was changed. The realities behind 
the word "Khoisan" are therefore very different in the eighteenth century to what they were in the 
sixteenth century. 
Shula Marks took care to stress how the historical context of colonialism had contributed to the 
blurring of the lines between Khoikhoi and San in her 1972 article on Khoisan resistance. She 
noted that tl1e expansion of the colony had resulted in many Khoikhoi losing their livestock. 
121. See for instance M. Wilson's chapter, "The hunters and herders", The Oxford Histo,y of South Afi-ica, Vol. I. 
Elphick's thesis first appeared in l 972. 
122. Sec footnote 62 above. Sec also A 13. Smith's review essay of Elphick's K/10ik/10i and the founding of IVl,ite 
South Afi-ica, in Social Dynamics, l l, ( l ), l 985, pp.88-90. 
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When such people, filled with justifiable resentment, resisted further white encroachment, the 
colonists tended to call them "Bushmen" (or "Bosjesmans"), the name they gave to all cattleless 
indigenes, whether they were hunter-gatherers or cx-pastoralists. Her response to this situation 
was to offer the following practical advice: 
... the tenn Khoisan appears best suited to refer to the Late Stone Age peoples of the 
Cape whom the Dutch encountered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
unless their precise tribal groupings are made clear from the documents.123 
The documents, however, very seldom contain the precise name of the Khoisan groups they refer 
to, though it has to be acknowledged that the seventeenth century documents are much more 
detailed in this respect than those of the eighteenth century. There are a number of reasons for 
this. In the seventeenth century the frontier between Khoisan and colonists was close to Cape 
Town. Literate and curious Company officials, like Van Riebeeck, had direct access to 
information pertaining to the names of Khoisan groupings. In the eighteenth century, with the 
expansion of the frontier away from Cape Town, the infonnation about Khoisan groups 
decreased and was frequently recorded by semi-literate frontiersmen on commando. Thus a more 
hostile colonial perception of the Khoisan coincided with a decrease in recorded infonnation. A 
further factor contributing to the obscurity of Khoisan identity was that by the eighteenth century 
many Khoisan societies had been so disrupted by the impact of colonialism that they had either 
ceased to exist or lost their identity altogether. 
Docs this mean that one should shun the use of the words "Khoikhoi" and "San" and use the tenn 
"Khoisan" in its place? Given the fact that both Elphick and Marks have stressed the 
interchangeability of the activities of pastoralism and hunter-gathering, and that the historical 
context of the eighteenth century blurred these distinctions even more, is it not wiser to use the 
portmanteau word "Khoisan" in all cases? There are a great many scholars who would approve 
of such a step for the tendency of much recent research has been to portray the San as a people 
who have been forced by the exigencies of history into the unwanted position of a sort of 
pastoralist under-class. "Bushmen", they argue in effect, are a historical creation and did not 
choose to become hunter-gatherers. They became hunters and gatherers by having their livestock 
stripped from them or by being prevented from ever acquiring them in the first place. Stronger 
groups forced them to occupy marginal land and ensured that they would never be able to escape 
from the poverty of subsistence. In an ideal world of affirmative action, it is argued, instead of 
racist exploitation, they would be able to fulfil their aspirations and leave the demeaning status of 
hunter-gatherer for that of pastoralist - or any other more rewarding occupation. The very name 
123. S. Marks, "Khoisan Resistance", pp.57-58. 
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"Bushman" (and even the supposedly politically correct "San"), it is explained, is pejorative, 
foisted upon the people to whom it applies and implying an innate disposition to thieving 
savagery.124 
The debate is older than many of the protagonists realise for Donald Moodie had found it 
necessary to write a paper against the idea that colonisation had created the "Bushmen" as early 
as the l 850s.125 A significant feature of much of the evidence presented in the modem debate, 
however, is that it is drawn from nineteenth or twentieth century material about hunter-gatherer 
societies, a period where, even in the Kalahari desert, the disruptive effects of colonialism in 
southern Africa were marked. A careful inspection of the historical records of the eighteenth 
century suggests that there were indeed real differences between Khoikhoi and San and that even 
though the colonists did not often give the tribal names of the groups in question they were 
certainly not as vague in their usage as might be supposed. The eighteenth century records are 
full of references to "Bosjesmans-Hottentotten" and it is tempting to think that by this term Dutch 
colonists meant "Khoisan". They did not. They meant "Bushmen". As the century progressed the 
tendency was to drop the "Hottentot" part of the word and retain the "Bosjesman". Nor should we 
assume that this was simply part of a crude frontier mentality which labelled all resisters 
"Bushmen" and all collaborators "Hottentot". It was often crucial for a frontier farmer to be able 
to make a distinction between Khoikhoi and San. Sometimes, indeed, Khoikhoi servants did run 
away and join San resisters but this did not confuse the colonists so much as infuriate them. 
Khoikhoi and San could, and did, form alliances but this should not imply that there were no 
significant distinctions between them. 
The approach of this thesis is a pragmatic one. Following Shula Marks' advice Khoisan is used 
when the identity of the indigenous societies is uncertain or when it is clear that both Khoikhoi 
and San are involved together. But that there were distinct hunter-gatherer societies, distinct that 
is from pastoralist societies, is taken as given. The archival documents, the archaeological record 
and the Bleek-Lloyd manuscripts point towards a distinctive historical presence. Eighteenth 
124. For proponents of this view see the works of Robert Gordon and Edwin Wilmsen cited above, footnote 64. 
See also C. Schrire, "An enquiry into the evolutionary status and apparent identity of San hunter-gatherers", Human 
Ecology, 8, 1980, pp.9-32 and "Wild sunnises on savage thoughts", in C. Schrire, (ed.), Past and Present in 
Hunter-Gatherer Studies (New York, 1984), pp.1-25. See also the contributions of various authors following the 
article by J.S. Solway and R.B. Lee, "Foragers, Genuine or Spurious? Situating the Kalahari San in History", 
Current Anthropology, Vol. 31, 2, 1990, pp.109-146. 




century colonists became more aware of this presence as the frontier moved into regions where 
hunter-gatherers were more conuuonly found than Khoikhoi. In moving from the south-western 
Cape to the Cape interior the colonists were moving from an area highly suited to pastoralism to 
one less suited to pastoralism; from an area of at least 1 500 years of co-existence between 
hunter-gatherers and pastoralists to an area where such co-existence had been of much shorter 
duration; from an area where pastoralism was the dominant economic activity to an area where 
hunting and gathering were dominant; from an area where Khoikhoi and San really were bound 
together by a long history of interaction to one in which San societies predominated. It was this 
perception of confronting a society that was even more "other" and primitive than the Khoikhoi 
that encouraged the colonists to conduct a style of frontier fighting that approached the genocidal 
after 1770. This is not to say that the colonists did not exaggerate San differences and even 
equate hostile Khoikhoi with the San when it suited them to do so. It is merely to caution that if 
we pretend that all societies are simply different versions of each other, and that the San were 
really just proto- or post-Khoikhoi, then we will not feel, as we should, the tragedy that is 




Colonial Expansion and Khoisan Resistance 
1700-1726 
COLONIAL EXPANSION PRIOR TO 1700 
The beginning of the eighteenth century coincided with a transformation in the nature of the 
colony at the Cape. Under the guidance of the newly appointed governor, Willem Adriaan van der 
Stel, ( 1699-1707) 1 a process of territorial expansion was initiated which differed, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, from that which had gone before. The inauguration of this new 
policy, in itself a response to the growing crisis within the colony, led to the creation of the 
northern Cape frontier zone. Since the particular characteristics of this frontier zone were, to a 
remarkable degree, prefigured in its fonnative years, it is important to give some attention to the 
nature of colonial society around the year 1700.2 
By the end of the seventeenth century the refreshment station at Cape Town was at last beginning 
to fulfil its founders' intentions by providing the ships of the VOC with adequate supplies of 
meat, wheat, vegetables and fresh water. The last of these items had never presented a problem, 
thanks to the abundant streams and rivers around Table Mountain, but food was a different 
matter. In order to produce sufficient wheat and vegetables, the Company had been obliged to 
create a class of independent farmers - the freeburghers - and grant them land enough on which to 
grow their crops. A variety of enviromnental and economic factors had dictated that extensive, 
rather than intensive, methods of fanning had to be adopted.3 TI1e result was that during the 
governorship of Willem Adriaan's father, Simon van dcr Stel (1679-1699),4 the colony spread to 
the Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Paarl, Franschock, Tijgerberg and Wagenmaakers Valley areas.5 
I. For Willem Adriaan van der Ste! and his family see A.J. Boeseken, Simon Van Der Ste/ en sy Kinders (Cape 
Town, 1964). See also Leo Fouche, (ed.), The Dimy of Adam Tas, 1705-1706 (London, 1914), pp.157-363. 
2. Throughout this thesis the word "Cape" (unless it is qualified) refers to the south-western districts of the present 
Cape Province. In the eighteenth century "De Kaap" referred to the area within a day's journey of Cape Town. 
3. For a succinct account of the failure of intensive agriculture see Leonard Guelke, "Freehold fanners and frontier 
settlers, 1657-1780", in R. El phi ck and H. Giliomee, (eds.), The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd 
edition (Cape Town, 1989), pp.66-73. 
4. For Simon van der Stcl sec I3oesekcn, Simon Van Der Ste/ en sy Kinders. 
5. All of these areas were, of course, named with Dutch uamcs during this period, an important part of tl1e process 
of colonisation. As Paul Carter says in his discussion of the spatial history of Australia: "The historical space of 
the white settlers emerged through the medium of language. But tl1e language that brought it into cultural 
circulation was not the language of the dictionary: on the contrarv it was the language of naming, the language of 
travelling ... Naming words were fonns of spatial punctuation, transfonning space into an object of knowledge, 
something that could be explored and read." Sec Paul Carter, The Road To Bo/any Bay: An Exploration of 
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To Simon van der Stel this initial burst of expansion beyond the skirts of Table Mountain was a 
necessary evil which made governmental supervision of the colonists more difficult. He was 
anxious to keep the freeburghers as close to Cape Town as possible in order to protect the most 
vulnerable of the Company's food supplies - meat. 
The VOC had always obtained the bulk of its supplies of cattle and sheep from the Khoikhoi. 
This was because originally the Khoikhoi had been rich in livestock and could be persuaded to 
part with their animals in exchange for trifling quantities of tobacco, arrack or cheap trinkets.6 
The tenns of this trade favoured the Company greatly and it was determined to preserve the 
situation by prohibiting freeburghers from engaging in any livestock trade of their own. A 
plakkaat to this effect had been issued as early as 1652 and had, thereafter, been periodically 
renewed. 7 It was feared that if the colonists were allowed untrammelled access to Khoikhoi flocks 
and herds not only might they push the prices up but they might also strip the Khoikhoi of their 
livestock altogether and destroy the source of supply. A further undesirable consequence of 
pem1itting freeburghers to enter the livestock trade would be that it would encourage private 
expeditions to journey into the interior where, beyond the Company's surveillance, they would 
doubtless indulge in acts of lawlessness. Even if the colonists did not prove to be a disruptive 
force (an eventuality which the authorities rightly dismissed) too great an emphasis on pastoral 
pursuits would jeopardise the entire settlement for, in place of a class of sedentary agriculturists, 
there would be created a class of roving herders, continually in search of better nourishment for 
their animals.& 
La11dscape and History (New York, 1988), p.67. Stellenbosch was named by Simon van der Ste!, after himself, in 
1679. Drakenstein was named in 1687, after the High Conunissioner Hendrik Adriaan van Rheede tot Drakenstein, 
and Franschhoek (part of the same district) after the French Huguenot refugees settled there in 1688. Paarl, 
founded in 1690, was named by Abraham Gabbema in 1657, for the great granite boulders reminded him of pearls 
(Dutch "paarl" = pearl). Wagenmaakers Vallei (Wagon-makers Valley) was opened to white settlers in 1698 and 
Tijgerberg, north of the Cape Flats, was named in 1657 after the dark, patchy vegetation on the slopes which 
reminded the Dutch of a leopard's spots (leopard in Dutch = "tijger"). See P.E. Raper, A Dictiona,y of Southem 
Africa11 Place Names (Johmmesburg, 1987), pp.515, 126, 166, 430, 536; E.A. Walker, A History of Southem 
Africa, 3rd edition (London, 1972), p.52. 
6. The best account of this process is in Richard Elphick, Klwiklwi and the Founding of White South Africa 
(Johmmesburg, 1985), pp.71-174. 
7. M.K. Jeffreys, (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Part 1, 1652-1707 (Cape Town, 1944), 9 April 1652, p.4. See also 
pp.34, 39,43,44,45, 100,105,143,167,168,228,282,300,302,308,326,340. 
8. See for exmnple plakkaat of 19 Oct. 1691-22 Jan. 1692 in Jeffreys, (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Part 1, pp.262-
264. For the gradual expansion of colonial stock-fanners into the Cape interior and Simon van der Stet's inability to 
prevent this see 1'.J. van der Merwe, Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis vcm die Kaapkolonie (Cape Town, 1938), 
pp.1-54. 
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True to Simon van der Stel's forebodings a group of colonists was reported to have forced one of 
the Company's regular suppliers of livestock, Captain Dorha of the Chainoukwa, to trade some of 
his cattle in 1693.9 Similar incidents of illegal trade with the Khoikhoi came to light in 1696 and 
1697 prompting the governor to threaten transgressors with beatings, branding and banishment. I 0 
He had already decreed that freeburghers should not graze their own livestock more than a day's 
journey from their farms and, in an earlier attempt to curb the expansion of the frontier, 
attempted to tighten up the laws regulating the granting of hunting licences. I I All of these 
measures are an indication that even under Simon van der Ste! the colony was close to bursting 
its borders. There is, indeed, more than a trace of bitterness in the advice which the outgoing 
governor gave to his son and successor in March 1699. The freeburghers, he cautioned, were 
nothing but lazy idlers who would indulge in illicit trade with the Khoikhoi and make insatiable 
demands for land unless they were closely controlled. He also warned Willem not to pay too 
much attention to the instructions of visiting Commissioners since they were not as well informed 
as the local authorities.12 Having delivered himself of these parting shots the ex-governor retired 
to his farm at Constantia to observe, with impotent disapproval, the erosion of his policies. 
Part of Simon van der Stel's resentment was no doubt caused by the recent visit of Conunissioner 
Daniel Heins who, in January 1699, briefed the newly appointed governor, Willem Adriaan van 
der Stel, on the Heren XVII's views on the future of the colony.13 The Heren had been somewhat 
alarmed to learn of the harsh punishments which Willem's father had proposed for those found 
guilty of obtaining livestock from the Khoikhoi and drew the new governor's attention to their 
letter of 14 July 1695 wherein it was stated that the development of agriculture and livestock 
should be entrusted to the freeburghers rather than to the Company.14 The VOC's intention at this 
time was to attempt to strengthen the Cape both economically and strategically. In order to 
9. A.J. Boescken, (ed.), Resolusies w111 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 1681-1707 (Cape Town 1961), 20 July 1693, 
pp.270-273. For the Chainouqua and Dorha, who was known to the Dutch as Claas, see Elphick, Khoikhoi, pp.141-
148. 
I 0. See plakkaat of 19 Oct.-5 Nov. 1697 and appendix V of this plakkaat in Jeffreys, (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, 
Part I, pp.300-302; Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 4 Feb. 1696, pp.299-301; 9 Feb. 
1696, p.301; 19 Oct. 1697, pp.319-320. 
11. For grazing regulations see plakkaat of 19 Oct. 1691-22 Jan. 1692 in Jeffreys, (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Part 
I, pp.262-264. For hunting regulations, which stipulated that game could only be hunted under licence between 
January and July see plakkaat of20 July-23 Aug. 1690 in Jeffreys, (ed.), Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Part I, pp.256-257. 
12. A.J. Boescken, (ed.), S11id-Afrikaa11se Argiefstukke: Bela11grike Kaapse Dok11me11te, Memorie11 en lnstructien, 
Vol. I, 1657-1699 (Cape Town, 1966), I March 1699, pp.229-257. 
13. Anna Boeseken and Margaret Cairns, 711e Secluded Valley: Tulbagh: 't land 1cm Waveren, 1700-1804 (Cape 
Town, 1989), p.18. 
14. Dan Sleigh, "Die I3uiteposle Van Die VOC Aan Die Grens Van Die Kaapse Nederselting (1652-1707)" 
(unpublished MA, Stellenbosch University, 1982), p.24. 
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achieve this goal there had to be an increase in the population of colonial cultivators and the 
Company was therefore offering immigrants free transportation to the Cape and free land once 
they arrived there. If production could be stimulated supplies of food could be guaranteed. The 
meat supply in particular had been a cause of concern since it was, to a large degree, dependent 
on Khoikhoi producers. Ultimately, it was hoped, the colonists themselves would be able to 
supply the Company's meat requirements and, as an incentive, the freeburghers were to be 
allowed to participate in the livestock trade.15 
This latter concession was to have disastrous consequences for the Khoikhoi although, to an 
extent, they were granted a temporary reprieve by Willem Adriaan's refusal to implement the 
instructions immediately.16 Even without the opening of the livestock trade, however, the 
Khoikhoi groups closest to the colonial settlement had been severely disrupted by their exposure 
to Company, as well as illegal, trading parties. Simon van der Stel had despatched over forty 
livestock trading expeditions during his period of office and the increasing unwillingness and 
inability of the Khoikhoi to furnish such parties with livestock was an indication that they had 
already been over exploited.17 As early as the 1680s Simon van der Stel was finding it difficult to 
meet the Company's annual consumption requirement of between 3 000 and 4 000 sheep. His 
response to this challenge had been threefold. Firstly he concentrated on building up the 
Company's own holdings of cattle and sheep in an attempt to make the Company self-sufficient. 
These ranching activities were carried out at a variety of Company posts scattered throughout the 
colony on the best available land. Secondly, as we have seen, he clamped down hard on illegal 
competitors who were jeopardising the livestock trade with the Khoikhoi. Thirdly, he redoubled 
his efforts to obtain cattle and sheep from indigenous suppliers, applying methods of procurement 
which were as destructive as any employed by the freeburghers. In 1693 for instance, when 
Captain Dorha refused to supply the Company with any more of his livestock, the governor 
authorised an attack on his kraal by a combined force of 200 soldiers and freeburghcrs. Dorha 
was captured, some of his followers killed and virtually all of his cattle and sheep stolen.18 
15. Ibid. Also M.F. Katzen, "White Settlers And The Origin Of A New Society, 1652-1778", in Monica Wilson 
and Leonard Thompson,(eds.), The Oxford llistoty Of South Africa, Vol. I (Oxford, 1969), pp.192-198. 
16. Willem Adriaan van der Ste! only obeyed these orders tl1irteen months later. 
17. See Sleigh, "Die Buiteposte Van Die VOC", pp.43-46 for a list of Company livestock trading expeditions 
between 1679-1705. 
18. For the Company's efforts to ensure the meal supply sec Sleigh, "Die Buiteposte Van Die VOC" pp.17-72. See 
also Dan Sleigh, "Die 13uiteposte In Die Ekonomie Van Die Kaapse Vcrvcrsingstasie, 1652-1795" (unpublished 
Ph.D., Stellenbosch University, 1987). The fate of Dorha is dealt with by Sleigh in "Die Buiteposlc Van Die 
VOC", pp.53-65 and by Elphick in Kl10ikl10i, pp. !4 l-148. 
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Willem Adriaan van der Stel's reluctance to open the cattle trade may thus partially be explained 
by his belief that his father's methods of procurement were the best. His behaviour was probably 
also influenced by the growing realisation that he was extraordinarily well placed to benefit from 
his position as governor of the Cape. Thanks to the labours of his father he inherited a ready-
made network of power and influence, including valuable information about local conditions. 
Simon van der Ste! had demonstrated, albeit on a public scale, that farming at the Cape could be 
a productive business. His son was to demonstrate that similar success need not be beyond the 
reach of individuals acting in a private capacity. 
It is not the intention of this study to reconvene the trial of Willem Adriaan van der Ste! but it is 
necessary to examine such evidence as has a bearing on the development of the northern Cape 
frontier zone.19 Company servants were not supposed to be private farmers but this was a 
regulation which had never been strictly observed. By 1700 Willem Adriaan had acquired 
Vergeleegen, a 613 morgen fann in Hottentots Holland, whilst his father farmed 891 morgen at 
Constantia. With brother Frans fanning a further 240 morgen the Van der Stels were the greatest 
landholders in the colony. The governor's cronies were also rewarded with grants of land so that 
by 1705 the Van der Stels and the seven or eight chief officials at the Cape owned enough 
cultivated land to supply the Cape market with all its agricultural requirements. Nor did they 
forbear from so doing. Abusing his authority as governor, Willem Adriaan van der Ste! enforced 
the Company's exclusive right to buy and sell produce to passing ships in such a way as to benefit 
favoured suppliers, like himself. He was also able to utilise a workforce of 60 Company servants 
and 300 slaves (100 of whom belonged to the Company) for his own purposes. Beyond the 
Hottentots Holland Mountains, in the present district of Caledon, the governor had exclusive 
grazing rights and pastured some l 800 sheep and l 000 cattle at eighteen out-stations which, 
nominally belonged to the Company. In 1705-1706, when the gross yield of wheat for the colony 
was 4 331 muids, the governor alone was reaping over l l 00 muids. He also had over half a 
million wine-stocks under cultivation which, at that time, represented about one quarter of the 
total figure for the colony.20 
Clearly, the governor was doing a great deal to stimulate agriculture, but nothing to encourage 
the productive potential of the frecburghers since he was depriving them of a market. A 
paradoxical result of this policy was that the colony now began to expand at an irreversible and 
19. The best account of this debate is in Fouche, 71ie Diwy of Adam Tas, pp.156-185. See also Gerrit Schutte, 
"Company and colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795, in Elphick and Giliomee, (eds.), Tl,e S'1aping of Soutl, Afi'iccm 
Society, pp.303-307. 
20. ll1cse details arc from Fouche, Tl,e Diwy of Adam Tas, and from Schutte, "Company and colonists". 
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unprecedented rate and a class of semi-nomadic colonial pastoralists - the trekboers -
developed.21 The traditional explanation for this has been that the eighteenth century Cape 
economy was so backward and impoverished, crippled by a combination of mercantilism, 
monopolistic restrictions, over-production, corruption and a limited market that colonial farmers 
were, by necessity, forced into becoming trekboers in the interior.22 Despite the challenge which 
this interpretation has received (following Neumark's contention that the trekboers were drawn 
deeper into the interior by commercial opportunities)23 and a great deal of subsequent research on 
the Cape economy24 the traditional interpretation remains an accurate description of the crucially 
formative period of Willem Adriaan van der Stet's rule and the influence which these 
unfavourable economic circumstances had on frontier expansion should not be underestimated. 
But Willem Adriaan van der Stel also took more positive measures to promote frontier expansion 
for, on 31 July 1700, the first steps were taken to settle colonists in the Land van Waveren (the 
Tulbagh basin).25 By granting fanns and issuing grazing licences beyond the Berg River the 
21. See S.D. Neumark, Economic !11jlue11ces 011 The South African Frolltier, 1652-1836 (Stanford, 1957); L.T. 
Guelke, "The Early European Settlement of Soutl1 Africa" (unpublished Ph.D., University of Toronto, 1974); L. 
Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
March, 1976, Vol. 66, No.2, pp.25-42; L. Guelke, "Freehold fanners and frontier settlers"; Robert Ross, 
"Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation on tl1e Southern African Frontier", in H. Lamar and L. Thompson (eds.), 
The Frontier in Histo,y: North America and Southem Africa Compared (Yale, 1981); P. van Duin and R. Ross, 
The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Centwy (Leiden, 1987), pp.58-80. 
22. A useful survey of the traditional interpretation of tl1e eighteenth century Cape economy is to be found in Van 
Duin and Ross, Economy of the Cape, pp.1-7. TI1e clearest sununaries of tl1e traditional interpretation are to be 
found in C.W. de Kiewiet, A Histo,y Of South Africa; Social And Economic (Oxford, 1941) and in T.R.H. 
Davenport, "TI1e Consolidation of a New Society: The Cape Colony", in M. Wilson and L. Thompson, The Oxford 
History of South Africa, Vol. I. Those historians who first linked trekboer expansion to the limited economic 
opportunities provided by the Cape market were A.J.H. van der Walt, Die Ausdel111u11g de Kolonie am Kaap der 
Guten Hofl111111g (1700-1799) (Berlin, 1928); L. Fouche, Die Evolutie van die Trekboer (Pretoria, 1909); and P. J. 
van der Merwe in his great trekboer trilogy, Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-
1842) (1l1e Hague, 1937); Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie, 1657-1842 (Cape Town 1938) 
and Trek: Studies Oar die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap (Cape Town, 1945). 
23. Neumark, Economic Influences. 
24. Other important reassessments of the eighteenth century Cape economy, apart from those cited in note 21 
above, are L. Guelke and R. Shell, "An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in tl1e Cape Colony (1652-
1731 )", Joumal of Historical Geography, IX, 1983; and R. Ross, "TI1e Rise of the Cape Gentry", Joumal of 
Southem African Studies, 2, 1983. 
25. Cape Archives (hercailcr CA), Verbatim Copy (hcrcailer VC) 15, Journal, 1699-170 I, 31 July 1700, p. 764; 
CA Leibbrandt's Precis (hereailer LM) IO, Council of Policy, Letters Despatched, 16 Oct. 1700, pp. I066-I067. TI1e 
"Land van Waveren" was named ailer an estate along the banks of the River Waver, south of Amsterdam, which 
belonged to relatives of Willem Adriaan van dcr Stcl's mother. Sec Boeseken and Cairns, The Secluded Valley, 
pp.17-24 for the naming ofthe valley. TI1c area was also known by its earlier name, "Roodezand", (red sand), from 
tl1c red sandstone of the mountain pass into the valley. The modem pass is to the south of the old one. In 1804 the 
Batavian government proclaimed a new magisterial district centred on the area and renamed it Tulbagh ailer the 
popular governor ofthe Cape between l 751 and 177 l, Ryk Tulbagh. 
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governor was virtually ensuring that the settlers of these regions would occupy themselves 
primarily with pastoral production instead of the mixed agricultural production of the south-
western Cape. This was partly due to climatic reasons, since the south-western Cape was better 
watered, but also due to the distance of Waveren from the Cape Town market. Limited though 
this market was it was still the only outlet for agricultural produce and the focal point of the 
settlement. It has been estimated that in the first decade of the eighteenth century there were 1 000 
people living in Cape Town, and that they, at least, constituted a significant internal market.26 
The further away from Cape Town a farn1er was, however, the more difficult and uneconomical 
it became to transport agricultural produce to market. Meat, though, could walk to the market 
and pastoral production had the additional advantage of proffering a high degree of self-
sufficiency for an initially low capital outlay.27 A further incentive for stock-farmers was that 
Willem Adriaan van der Ste! eventually heeded the Heren XVII's instructions and in February 
1700 opened the cattle trade with the Khoikhoi to the colonists.28 This had an immediate impact 
on the Khoisan. Faced by significant new land losses and the intensified appropriation of their 
livestock the Khoisan groups of the western Cape fought back. 
KHOISAN RESISTANCE, 1700-1708 
The Khoisan resistance sparked off by the invasion of Waveren and the opening of the livestock 
trade was as extensive as the two Khoikhoi-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century. Indeed 
Elphick argues that had the Dutch been able to establish the identity of their adversaries they 
would have called the hostilities a war.29 Who were the resisters? When Willem Adriaan van der 
Ste! had first surveyed the valley to which he gave the name '"t Land van Waveren" he reported 
that, "in this entire region, so far as we have been able to notice, there are few or no Hottentots to 
be found" .30 The seemingly fortuitous absence of Khoikhoi from a region eminently suitable for 
pastoralism has to be explained, for the governor's observation cannot simply be dismissed as 
wishful thinking. One possibility is that the Khoikhoi residents of the Land van Waveren might 
have hidden themselves from the governor's expedition, fearing that it was yet another trading or 
26. Van Duin an<l Ross, Economy of the Cape, p. I 0. 
27. See Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion an<l Incorporation" and N.G. Pe1m, "Pastoralists and Pastoralism in the 
Northern Cape Frontier Zone During the Eighteenth Century", in Martin Hall and Andrew B. Smith (eds.), 
Prehistoric Pastoralism in So11them Aji'ica: The So11th African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series, Vol. 5, 
June 1986, p.63. 
28. I3ocseken, (e<l.), Reso/11sies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 17 Feb. 1700, pp.364-365; CA, VC 15, 17 Feb. 
1700, pp.609-610. 
29. Elphick, Khoiklwi, p.225. 
30. I3oesckcn an<l Cairns, 71,e Secl11ded Valley, p.19. 
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raiding party. But this mysterious scarcity of Khoikhoi in the Tulbagh basin in November 1699 
may have other, more fundamental explanations. 
During the seventeenth century the most significant northerly group of Khoikhoi, contiguous to 
the colony, were the Cochoqua. They occupied an area roughly north of the Cape Flats and south 
and west of the Berg River.31 On occasions, however, they were to be found as far north as the 
Olifants River. If any Khoikhoi were accustomed to living in the Tulbagh basin they were likely 
to be the Cochoqua. Being pastoralists they were obliged to move their flocks and herds on a 
seasonal basis so as to maximise the exploitation of available environmental resources. Of prime 
importance here were the resources of grazing and water, both of which varied in quality and 
quantity according to the time of the year. The central point in the Cochoqua's orbit of 
transhumance was probably the area around present day Mamre, where the Malmesbury shale 
soils and well watered hills combined to create good, all-year-round grazing conditions. A.B. 
Smith has speculated that in the hot, dry Cape sununers the Cochoqua moved south to exploit the 
occasional sunm1er rainfall and better pastures of the Malmesbury, Tijgerberg and Table Bay 
areas.32 If these proved to be inadequate (or too keenly contested by the Peninsular Khoikhoi) the 
Cochoqua could always rely on the constant waters of the Berg River, along whose banks they 
could roan1 whilst grazing their stock on the choice pasture of the Swartland (also underlain by 
Malmesbury shale soil). By the onset of winter, between April and September, the Cochoqua 
were often to be found on the Vredenberg Peninsular or in the hinterland of Saldanha Bay. It is 
thus quite clear that the absence of Khoikhoi in the Tulbagh basin in November 1699 might have 
been c01mectcd to the cycle of transhumance favoured by the Cochoqua. According to Smith the 
Cochoqua were most likely to have been in the vicinity between January and April. 33 More 
important than the exact timing of such an occurrence, however, is the broader point: that the 
absence of figures in a landscape did not signify that the area was unoccupied or unutilised. 
31. For details concerning the Cochoqua see I. Shapera, The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa (London, 1930 ), 
p.45:, H.J. le Roux, "Die Toestand, Verspreiding en Verbrokkeling van die Hottentot stanune in Suid-Afrika, 1653-
1713" (unpublished M.A., Stellenbosch University, 1945) and R. Elphick, Khoikhoi, pp.117-137. The Dutch 
sometimes referred to them as the "Gmmemans" (after one of their leaders, Gonnema) or the "Koekemans" and 
"Kogmans". Nienaber speculates that in Simon van der Stel's time they began to trek to the present day Montagu 
area (where Cogmanskloof and Cogmans River are to be found) and eventually ended up as Great Koranas of the 
"Nouwange" or "Smalwange" sub-group (their name means "narrow cheeked") at the Orange River in the 1770s. 
See G.S. Nienaber, Klweklwense Stanmame (Pretoria, 1989), pp.265-274. See chapter 8 in this thesis for a 
discussion of Korana origins. 
32. AB. Smith, "Prehistoric pastoralism in the South-western Cape, South Africa", World Archaeology, Vol. 15, 
No.l, June 1983, pp.79-89. 
33. Ibid., pp.84-5. 
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But other reasons for the apparently uninhabited state of the Land van Waveren on the eve of its 
colonisation also have to be considered. By 1700 the Khoikhoi groups of the south-western Cape 
had already been seriously disrupted by their exposure to nearly half a century of colonial 
settlement and over two centuries of contact with Europeans. The disastrous effects of this 
interaction were first experienced by the Peninsular Khoikhoi (the Goringhaiqua and the 
Gorachoqua) but, after the first Khoikhoi-Dutch war (1659-1660), the Cochoqua found 
themselves to be in the direct path of colonial expansion.34 At first the Cochoqua benefited from 
the demise of their ancient rivals, the Peninsulars, and enjoyed the opportunities which they now 
had to trade directly with the Company. By 1670, however, there were signs that the relationship 
between the Cochoqua and the Dutch was deteriorating. The breaking point occurred in 1673 
when a group of Dutch hippopotamus hunters was killed by some San who were allegedly under 
the autl1ority of Gonnema, a Cochoqua leader. 1l1e massive campaign of retaliation, launched by 
the Dutch and abetted by Gonnema's Khoisan enemies, became known as the second Khoikhoi-
Dutch war (1673-1677). Its upshot was that the Cochoqua lost at least 1 765 cattle and 4 930 
sheep. 1l1is economic disaster was accompanied by political and social disintegration as the 
Cochoqua, shattered by defeat, became subservient underlings of the Dutch. Gonnema died in 
1685 and Oedasoa, leader of another section of the Cochoqua, died in 1689. Their deaths left 
their people disunited and accelerated the fragmentation of the Cochoqua into enfeebled sub-
groupings at the mercy, alike, of the Company, colonists and antagonistic Khoisan.35 It should 
not, therefore, be surprising that by 1700 the Cochoqua were quite thin on the ground in the 
Tulbagh district. 
Despite this fact Willem Adriaan van der Stel took the precaution of despatching one corporal 
and seven soldiers to protect the first settlers in the Land van Wavercn36 for even though the 
Cochoqua were no longer a threat they were not the only Khoisan in the area. It was well known 
that the high mountains to the east of the Berg River were the home of a troublesome people 
known as the Ubiqua.37 The Ubiqua were a specific group of hunter-gatherers who had earned a 
fearsome reputation as stealcrs of livestock amongst the Khoikhoi pastoralists long before the 
Dutch arrived at the Cape. It seems that they had perfected the art of driving off the cattle of their 
neighbours, making the eminently practical transition from being hunters of game to hunters of 
34. For details see Elphick, Klwikhoi, pp. I 10-116. 
35. ·n1ese events arc described in Elphick, Klwiklwi, pp.117-137. 
36. CA, VC 15, 31 July 1700, p.764. Sec also Bocsckcn and Cairns, Secluded Valley, pp.22-24. 
37. Sec Nienaber, Khoekhoe11se Stanmame, pp.759-767 for a discussion of the meaning of the word "Ubiqua" 




livestock and enjoying near invulnerability in their mountain retreats. Encircled as it was by 
mountains the Land van Waveren was pre-eminently Ubiqua territory - another reason for the 
scarcity of Cochoqua in the area - and was indeed referred to by tl1e colonists (though not, 
presumably, in the governor's hearing) as Ubiqualand.38 It was thus hardly surprising that the 
first Khoisan response to the colonial settlement of the area came from the Ubiqua. 
On 13 March 1701 Michiel Ditmar, the landdrost of Stellenbosch, reported that the "Ubiquase 
Hottentots" had come over the "Land van Waveren" and Roodezand to Riebeek-Kasteel and 
attacked the post of a certain freeburgher called Gerrit Cloeten.39 They stole forty of his cattle 
and threatened, firstly, to impoverish tl1e fam1ers and, secondly, to attack the Company's post. 
Cloeten's sheep were driven away by tl1e robbers who wounded the shepherd with four or five 
arrows. Fortunately Cloeten's son and his knecht had managed to recover the sheep but prospects 
for tl1e future did not look promising. For some reason tl1e governor and the Council of Policy 
were amazed at these developments and thought that the aggressors were more likely to be the 
"Grigriquase" (Guriqua) or those under Captain "Portugies". They immediately ordered the 
despatch often Company soldiers with reinforcements, to the number of thirty, to be drawn from 
the ranks of the freeburghers. Their instructions were to proceed to Roodezand and, under the 
leadership of the landdrost, capture the robbers and recover the cattle. If they met with any 
resistance they were authorised to kill. In the meantime Cloeten's son and his knecht were ordered 
to appear before the governor to answer some questions.40 
None of these measures appears to have clarified matters or contributed towards preventing 
further attacks for, on 7 April, the colonists at Wavcren reported that the "Hottentots genaamt de 
Grigriquase en Namacquase" had stolen eight of the Company's cattle.41 A few days later the 
san1e group (or so it was thought) stoic 100 sheep from the old post of Gerrit Cloeten and the 
governor once more ordered a large contingent of soldiers and frecburghers to Waveren.42 
38. 1l1e mountains above Wellington are called the Ubiqua Mountains to this day. 
39. CA, VC 15, 13 March 1701, pp.895-902; CA, LM 10, 13 March 1701, pp.56-57. 
40. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 3, 13 March 1701, pp.380-381. This was not the first 
time that Cloeten had fought with the Ubiqua over cattle. In 1686 he and some other freeburghers had captured 
thirty oxen from them which they regarded as spoils of war citing the Ubiqua's aggression in 1673, 1676, 1679 and 
1684 as justification for keeping the booty. Ibid., 2 Nov. 1686, p.148. See also "Extracts from Journal", 2 Nov. 
1686, in D. Moodie, (ed.), The Record: or a series of official papers relative to the conditions and treatment of the 
native tribes of South Africa (Cape Town, 1838, 1842; Amsterdam and Cape Town, 1960, 1966), Part !, pp.413-
414. "Captain Portugics" was the name the Dutch gave to the "Chief' of the Grigriqua. Sec "Extracts from 
Journal", 18 Feb. and I March 1687, in Moodie, 711e Record, Part I, p.415. 
41. "Hottentots named the Grigriqua and Namaqua", CA, VC 15, 7 April 170 I, p. 924. 
42. CA, VC 15, 10 April 1701, p.925·, 14 April 1701, pp.927-28. 
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Shortly before their arrival, however, the Company's post at Waveren was attacked for a second 
time and eleven cattle were stolen.43 Once the commando arrived it was unable to make contact 
with the robbers and, after a fruitless search for the captured livestock, disbanded.44 Only five 
days after the soldiers had returned to the Castle, on 16 May, a "diverse unknown nation of 
Hottentots" struck again, this time at tl1e Company's post at the Berg River. The cowherd, Casper 
Multingh, had been driving the cattle back to the post in the evening when a group of Khoikhoi 
sprang out of the long grass where they had been hiding and proceeded to drive off the herd with 
great fury. Multingh fired his musket and thereby provoked eight Khoikhoi, armed with assegais, 
into confronting him. Fortunately for the Dutchman his companions from the post came to tlle 
rescue but the assailants made off with 145 cattle. Despite the fact that they were pursued nearly 
all night they got away with all but eight of the animals, thanks to the arrival of reinforcements 
from a second group of Khoikhoi.45 
Governor Van der Ste! was still frustrated by his inability to identify the people responsible for 
these attacks. It was clear, however, that if they were allowed to continue their robberies witll 
impunity the far flung settlers of the northern frontier would be at risk. He therefore resolved to 
reinforce the posts of Waveren and the Berg river with additional soldiers and to create a new 
post nearby or in between the others. The posts were to be well provided with horses so that, 
whoever the marauders were, they could be pursued more successfully in the future. Though the 
governor was fairly sure that the Peninsular and Cochoqua Khoikhoi were not involved in the 
attacks (the "Caabse en Go1memanse Hottentots") he sunm10ned their captains to the Castle in 
order to try to establish who the "evilly disposed Hottentots" were.46 Their answer deserves a 
careful consideration for it does more than help us to identify the resisters of 170 l. It also 
provides us with a clue as to the nature of those people whom the colonists were, increasingly, to 
call "Bosjesmans". According to Van der Stel's informants the attackers were: 
Bosjesma.ns of struikroovers, bestaande meest uijt de voorsz Grigriquase en 
Namaquase, syndc natien dewelke van de roov gewoon syn te leeven, en haar op de 
gebergtens onthouden, en met dewelke d' E' Compagnie nooijt eenige vriendschap of 
handclinge hccft gchad.47 
43. CA, VC 15, 29 April 1701, p.933. 
44. CA, VC 15, 16 May 1701, p.938. 
45. CA, VC 15, 26 May 1701, pp.941-943; Boeseken, (ed.), Reso/usies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 26 May 
1701, pp.382-83. 
46. CA, VC 15, 26 May 170 I, pp. 944-45. 
47. "Busluncn or highwaymen, consisting mainly of the aforesaid Grigriqua and Namaqua, which nations are 
accustomed lo living from robbery, and live in the mountains, and with whom the honourable Company has never 
had any business or friendship ... " CA, VC 15, 16 June 1701, p.952. 
59 
Chapter Two 
The Ubiqua were not named but this does not mean that they were innocent. The evidence 
suggests that there was a widespread attack on the colonists by several of the groups of the 
northern borderlands, and that the Cochoqua and Peninsulars, for reasons of their own, sought to 
emphasise the role of certain participants rather than others. By singling out Grigriqua and 
Namaqua "Bushmen" the Cochoqua were probably identifying enemies who had caused them a 
great deal of harn1 in the recent past. The Grigriqua48 were the Khoikhoi group who lived north 
of the northern loop of the Berg River and south of the Knersvlakte.49 To the west they occupied 
the Sandveld50 and Piketberg5 I regions and to the east were found in the vicinity of the Koue 
Bokkeveld52 and the Cedarberg.53 In the seventeenth century a minor off-shoot of the Grigriqua -
the Chariguriqua54 - had lived south of the Berg River in the vicinity of Saldanha Bay and in 
close proximity to the Cochoqua. By 1700, however, the Chariguriqua had largely disappeared 
and the Grigriqua were themselves under intense pressure. They had, it is true, never been a 
particularly strong or impressive group. Sandwiched between the powerful Namaqua to the north 
and the Cochoqua to the south they had been obliged to accept the suzerainty of first one and then 
the other of their neighbours. Their territory was, for the most part, arid and mountainous which 
48. Elphick refers to the Grigriqua as the Guriqua (see Klwikhoi, pp.44-45) but I have preferred to follow 
Nienaber's usage following his discussion of the name in Khoek/10e11se Stanmame, pp.443-448. 
49. TI1e Knersvlaktc (Afrikaans for "gnashing flats") is the arid region between the Olifants River in the south and 
the Kamiesberg in the north. Its name evokes the hardship experienced by travellers and their animals crossing the 
waterless landscape. See Raper, Place Names, p.266. The region was sometimes referred to as the 
"Kncchtsvlakte" in the eighteenth century, perhaps because its unattractive features made it undesirable to a more 
exalted class of colonists. 
50. TI1c Sandveld is the dry, sandy region bounded by the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the Berg River in the soutl1, 
tl1e Olifants River in the north and the Olifants River Mountains in the east. 
51. The Piketberg is 135 kilometres north-northeast of Cape Town. "So called, because at the time when Mr. 
Gotskc was at war with the Gongemans they set up pickets there, and made merry." TI1is is tl1e explanation of the 
journal-keeper of Simon van der Ste! in 1685. Isbrand Gotske was governor from 1672 to 1676, i.e., during the 
second Khoikhoi-Dutch war. 111e "Gongemans" were the Khoikhoi of Go1mema, i.e., the Cochoqua. Sec Moodie, 
The Record, Part I, p.40 I. 
52. In the eighteenth century the name "Bokkcveld" was given to the entire mountainous district extending to the 
present day Ceres Valley in the south (the Wann Bokkcveld) to the high escarpment between the Knersvlakte and 
tl1e Hantam in the north (the Onder Bokkevcld). The name derived from the scattered herds of springbok ( capra 
pyga111s) which were found there and, in certain years, migrated tl1itl1er "from the more remote tracts of tl1e 
continent in astonishing numbers". Sec V.S. Forbes, (ed.), Carl Peter Thunberg Travels At The Cape Of Good 
Hope 1772-1775 (Cape Town, 1986), p.197. The Koue Bokkevcld is the cold high-lying district above Ceres and 
south of Elandskloof. 
53. "111e Cedarberg fonn the central and highest ranges of the Bokkeveld Mountains, north of the Koue Bokkeveld 
and south of the Onder Bokkeveld. They are named after the tree widdri11gto11ia cedarbergensis, once abundant in 
tl1e mountains, and highly prized as a source of timber. For an indication that some of the under-classes of the 
eighteenth century Cape called the mountains "Suurberg" see my article "Droster Gangs of the Bokkeveld and 
Roggcveld, 1770-1800", South AJ;"ica11 Historical Joumal, 1990, No.23, p.21. 
54. TI1c name "Chariguriqua" means "Little Guriqua" or "Little Grigriqua". Sec Nienaber, Klioekhoe11se Stam11ame, 
pp.242-248 and pp.xxviii-xxix. 
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made the accumulation of livestock difficult. It has even been suggested that the original 
Grigriqua were Strandloopers or San who had acquired livestock but, in the eyes of their 
neighbours, retained their status as hunter-gatherers.55 If this is true it would help to explain why 
the Cochoqua referred to the Grigriqua as "Bosjesmans" but it is far more likely that the 
Grigriqua, like the Nan1aqua, were Khoikhoi who had San clients.56 In fact, the Grigriqua were 
themselves clients (or second class allies) of the Namaqua.57 It was this alliance, together with its 
San auxiliaries, which had attacked the Cochoqua in 1686.58 No doubt the increasing disruption 
of these frontier societies, especially following the burst of colonial expansion in 1700, had re-
kindled the old enmities. 
The military leader of the Cochoqua in 170 l was a certain Captain Kees whose kraal was at the 
Groene Kloof. Some of his followers had already had their livestock stolen by Khoisan raiders 
and Van der Stel therefore sought to encourage the Cochoqua to repel the robbers. Gifts of 
tobacco, arrack and rice were dispensed to Kees and his under-captains in an attempt to stiffen 
their resolve whilst a punitive expedition, including both Company men and Khoikhoi, was 
planned against the conunon enemy. A new post was also to be established between Riebeek-
Kasteel and the Heuningberg and it was hoped that both the Cochoqua and the Peninsular 
Khoikhoi would establish their kraals nearby in order that all might benefit from mutual 
protection. 59 
Unfortunately neither Captain Kees nor Gerrit Cloeten could wait to avenge themselves and on 20 
June word reached the governor that the two men had joined forces and gone in search of their 
foes. Since Cloeten had acted without pennission the landdrost of Stellenbosch was ordered to 
arrest him.60 Though no prosecution resulted from this incident the authorities clearly 
55. Elphick notes that: "The Guriqua differed from most other K.110ikhoi groups in that the Dutch found no chief 
among them who exercised any authority, even nominal, beyond his O\Vll kraal ... it is probable that the Guriqua 
were once a united tribe, which later split into Greater and Lesser segments ... Dr. Shula Marks has plausibly 
suggested that the original Guriqua may have been a Strandlooper group which acquired livestock: this theory 
would explain their name (Sea People), their comparative poverty, their political decentralisation, and the fact that 
other K.11oikhoi occasionally identified them as 'San'." Elphick, Klwiklwi, p.135. See also Nienaber, Khoekl10e11se 
Stanmame, pp.443-448, 242-248, 432-443. 
56. See Elphick, Khoikhoi, pp.32-37 for evidence that K.11oikhoi groups had San auxiliaries. 
57. Elphick, Khoiklwi, pp.119-121. For the Namaqua see pp.281-288 below. 
58. See "Extracts from Journal", 27 May 1686 and 13 July 1686, in Moodie, The Record, Part I, p.413; Nienaber, 
Khoekhoe11se Stanmame, pp.447-448; Elphick, Khoikhoi, p.135, 137. 
59. CA, VC 15, 16 June 1701, pp.951-953. Riebeek-Kasteel lies twenty-one kilometres north-east of present day 
Malmesbury and is 914 metres high. It was named in honour of Jan van Riebeek on 3 Febmary 1661 by Pieter 
Crnythoff. Raper, Place Names, p.466. The Heuningberg lies thirty kilometres north of the Berg River. 
60. CA, VC 15, 20 June 170 I, p. 955; CA, LM IO, 20 June 170 I. On this occasion Captain Kees was described as 
living al or behind the Paardcbcrg. This mountain (now called Pcrdcberg) is sixteen kilometres south-cast of 
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disapproved of colonists taking the law into their own hands and abrogating the Company's 
monopoly of violence. Cloeten's actions may, however, be regarded as the precursor of many 
hundreds of similar responses, occurring throughout the eighteenth century, when individual 
trekboers would organise unofficial commandos. What probably saved Cloeten from punishment 
in 1701 was the government's greater concern to strike back at the Khoisan raiders and on 26 
August there was some heartening news. 
Daniel Taus, the corporal of the post at Riebeek-Kasteel, reported that he and his men had 
intercepted a group of "Sanquase Hottentots"61 four days before whilst they had been engaged in 
driving away a herd of 120 cattle belonging to the Khoikhoi captains "Doggesmeester" and 
"Chineesje". There had also been some cattle of the freeburgher Pieter van der Heijsen amongst 
them. The Company men gave chase on their horses and succeeded in recovering the livestock. 
They also killed four or five of the robbers and continued their pursuit of the survivors the next 
day. Though no further casualties were inflicted the governor hoped that this would teach the "soo 
genaan1de bosjesmans" a salutary lesson and that in future the colonists would be left in peace 
and quiet. 62 
This minor colonial success did not mean that the earlier plans of retaliation against the Grigriqua 
were abandoned. On 20 September a force of at least thirty-five men, under the command of 
Ambrosius Sasse, set off for the Olifants River63 with the intention of trying to recover the cattle 
present day Malmesbury and named after the zebras and quaggas that used to graze there. Timnberg reports that 
the govenunent was attempting to protect zebras at Paardeberg as late as the 1770s. Forbes, Tl11111berg, p.276. It is 
interesting to speculate whether Captain Kees was the same person whom the Khoikhoi of Langevlei knew as Kees 
Oorlam. Someone of that name was described by Starrenburg as having been with the freemen Pieter Janszoon, 
Potje and Karos op Zy on an ivory bartering expedition to the Verlorevlei district in the smmner of 1704-1705. 
Since "Oorlam", "Potje" and "Karos op Zy" are not typical freeburgher names they might have been Khoikhoi 
members of a colonial hunting party, the name "Oorlam" here signifying that Kees had acquired many of the 
trappings of colonial culture. E.H. Raidt, (ed.), Francois Vale11ty11: Description of the Cape of Good Hope with the 
matters co11cemi11g it (Amsterdam, 1726; Cape Town, 1973), Part 2, pp.26-27. 
61. CA, VC 15, 26 Aug. 1701, p.979. The "Sanquase" were obviously San for this was one of the variants of the 
name by which the hunter-gatherers of the south-western Cape were known. "Soaqua" and "Sonqua" were others. 
Sec Nienaber, Khoekl10e11se Stam11ame, pp.842-852. See also J.E. Parkington, "Soaqua: hunter-fisher-gatherers of 
the Olifants River, Western Cape", South Afi·ica11 Archaeological Bulletin, 32, 1977. 
62. CA, VC 15, 26 Aug. 1701, p.979. 
63. TI1e Olifants River was known to the Khoikhoi as the Tiiarakkama (meaning rough or bushy banked river) and 
was given its Dutch name by Jan Danckert in 1660. Danckert was on ru1 expedition (or so he thought) to 
Monomotopa when he and his companions reached the river a month after leaving Cape Town. TI1cy saw 200 to 
300 elephants together here, hence its name. G.S. Nienaber and P.E. Raper, Topo11ymica Hotte11totica, A** 
(Pretoria, 1977), pp.1024-1025; "Extracts or a Journal or the last expedition to Monomotopa", 8 Nov. 1660, in 
Moodie, 111e Record, Part 1, p.228. 
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which had been stolen from the Company's Berg River post in May. The soldiers were also on the 
lookout for Captain Portugies, who was still suspected of being involved in the robberies.64 
Sasse's expedition did not get as far as the Olifants River for it came across the tracks of some 
"quade g'intentioneerde Hottentots"65 near the Bokkenberg.66 The Dutch followed the spoor to 
behind the Piketberg and over the Zeekoeijvalley67 until the entrance to a big kloof. Only one man 
at a time could enter the narrow opening of the kloof but since the hostile Khoisan were disputing 
access to the passage, by shooting arrows and hurling assegais from behind the surrounding 
rocks, nobody was inclined to try. Sasse ordered some of his men to provide a covering fire whilst 
others attempted to outflank the enemy by climbing above them. During this manoeuvre the 
commander received an arrow through his hat whilst the Khoisan simply retreated to another 
height and the protection of some huge rocks. Night fell on a situation of stalemate. Next morning 
Sasse attempted to parley with the Khoisan but to no avail. Given the difficulty of the terrain and 
the need to preserve his own forces he decided to return to the Cape with a meagre booty of eight 
cattle, only one of which belonged to the Company.68 
The expedition against the Grigriqua had not therefore been an unqualified success. To make 
matters worse, whilst Sasse and his men had been trudging across the Swartland, there had been 
another Khoisan raid, this time a mere fourteen or fifteen hours journey from the Castle. On 7 
October a group of about 300 Khoisan had swooped on the herds of Henning Huising at 
Groenekloof and made off with 200 cattle. Huising and his servants had given chase and shot 
three of the robbers without, however, recovering any livestock.69 This was a serious matter 
. because, on 17 February 1700, Huising had been awarded the contract to supply the Company 
with meat for the next ten years.70 Huising, the wealthiest freeburgher at the Cape, had been 
granted this privilege as part of the Heren XVII's plan to encourage the settlers to provision the 
Company. Since W.A. van der Stcl and Huising were, at this stage, close friends this arrangement 
did not conflict with the governor's interests.71 Huising had been granted a massive tract of land 
64. CA, VC 15, 20 Sept. 1701, pp.997-998. 
65. CA, VC 15, 25 Oct. 1701, pp.1017-1019. "Quade g'intentioneerde Hottentots" is usually translated as "evilly 
disposed Hottentots". It is remarkable that the disposition of the people concerned could be ascertained from their 
tracks alone. 
66. The exact locality of the I3okkenberg is unknown. 
67. The Zeekoeijvalleij (hippopotamus valley) was an earlier name for the Verlore Valleij or Verlore Vlei (lost or 
desolate vlei). The latter 1iame came into usage about 1724. Before this the Khoikhoi knew the Vlei as the 
Quaecoma which, possibly, means "Seekoeirivier". Nienaber and Raper, Topo11ymica Hotte11totica, A**, p. 991. 
68. CA, VC 15,250ct.1701,pp.1017-IOII. 
69. CA,VC 15,70ct.1701,pp.lOI0-1011. 
70. CA, VC 15, 17 Feb. 1700, pp.605-608; l3oeseken, (ed.), Reso/11sies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 17 Feb. 
1700, p.364. 
71. Fouche, (ed.), Diary a/Adam Tas, pp.104-105, 11. I; p.201. 
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at Groenekloof (from Driefontein in the south, the sea in the west, Saldanha Bay in the north and 
Dassenberg in the east) to enable him to fulfil his obligations and he had also been promised 
Company assistance if he were ever attacked by Khoisan. On 8 November the governor - who 
expected repayment for his favours - therefore established a new post at Groenekloof with ten 
Company men in attendance to protect Huising.72 
Two weeks later there was another Khoisan raid on the livestock of the Company and colonists at 
Waveren. The post holder, Sergeant Godfried Donderstad, identified the attackers as members of 
the "Koekemanse natie" i.e., the Cochoqua.73 This meant that virtually every Khoisan group in 
the frontier zone was implicated in the attacks of 170 l and it is an indication of the extent of the 
repercussions of colonial expansion. In this particular raid forty cattle were driven away by 
twelve Khoikhoi after they had forced the herder to retreat. The sergeant, with various Company 
men and freeburghers, hurried to the rescue but, for some reason, could only muster one suitable 
horse. This horse, ridden by a certain Jurgen Arend, soon became exhausted in attempts to drive 
the cattle back and it became evident that the Khoikhoi would escape with the cattle. A French 
freeburgher, Etienne Terblanche, who had twenty of his cattle amongst the stolen herd, urged 
Arend to keep on trying. Encouraged by the fact that one of the Khoikhoi had been killed, the two 
colonists pursued the robbers into the mountains. There, however, Arend was stabbed in the chest 
with an assegai and beaten to death with kierrics. Fearful for his own life Terblanche retreated, 
leaving his cattle and his companion to the Khoikhoi.74 
Only two days later, on 25 November,, "de rebelligc Hottentots of soo genaamde bosjesmans"75 
launched a massive raid on the herds of those Khoikhoi who had taken up the Company's offer to 
graze their cattle close to the protection of the Ricbcck-Kastccl post. These Khoikhoi, mainly 
Cochoqua, included Captains Kees, Koopman and "de Klijne capitein", proof that not all of the 
Cochoqua had joined the raiders. Some 274 of their cattle were stolen by over 100 San but, 
thanks to the exemplary action of Corporal Daniel Dede the post holder, all but one animal was 
recovered. Dede and his men had pursued the robbers as far as Vier en Twintig Rivieren and 
until eleven o'clock at night. Unlike the post at Wavcrcn they had good horses and this seems to 
have made the difference. The San escaped over the high mountains behind the Land van 
72. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies va11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 17 Feb. 1700, pp.365-366; CA, VC 15, 8 Nov. 
1701, p.133. 
73. CA, VC 15,27Nov. 1701,p.1033. 
74. CA, VC 15, 27 Nov. 1701, pp. I 033-1036. 
75. "rebellious Hottentots or so-called bushmen". 
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Waveren but Captain Kees and his followers were reunited with their stock.76 It may have been 
that they had been singled out as a target because they were collaborating with the Dutch; but 
equally they may have been robbed simply because they had cattle. Whatever the reasons were, 
however, raids on Khoikhoi groups under colonial protection continued in the new year for on 17 
January 1702 the "Caapse Hottentotse Capitains Jan Pietersz en Griego" were robbed of eighty-
nine of their cattle by the "Sounquase Hottentots". Corporal Dede, who had been transferred to 
the Company's post at Vogel Valleij,77 was once again called on to respond. With six men on 
horseback he pursued the robbers to the Heuningberg and, after a three hour fight, recovered 
some of the stock.78 
No sooner had he returned the cattle to Captains Pietersz and Griego when, on 18 January, word 
came that they had been attacked again, this time by the "Kookemans". The robbers were driving 
the cattle up the Elandskloof79 when Dede and his men caught up with them. Fighting on foot the 
colonists killed or wounded twenty of these "Bosjesmans" before the remainder fled, leaving 
behind them forty-three cattle and many abandoned weapons.80 This was not the end of Dede's 
trials for soon afterwards another "Caapse capitein", Kuyper, complained that his kraal, which 
was over the Berg River, had been plundered by "Bosjesmans". Five of his wives and all of his 
children were killed and his cattle were driven away. The indefatigable Dede managed to kill three 
of the San attackers and recover some of the livestock to return to the bereaved Kuyper.81 In 
March it was the tum of Sergeant Donderstad and the soldiers of the Waveren post who were 
called on to rescue the livestock of Captain Pieter Passagie. The "Bosjesmans" had stolen 150 of 
his cattle but 149 of these were recovered after a three hour fight in a wood. Two of the robbers 
were killed.82 
In an attempt to block some of the gaps in the chain of military posts now strung across the 
northern frontier a new post was established at Elandskloof. By February 1704 there were six 
such posts: Groenekloof, the Land van Waveren, Elandskloof, Riebeek-Kasteel, Soaquasdrift 
and Vogel Valleij.83 They seem to have had the desired effect because after one more 
76. CA, VC 15,29Nov.170l,p.1037. 
77. Vogel Vallcij or Vlei was the post which had been established between Riebeck-Kastcel and Waveren. 
78. CA, VC 16, Journal, 1702-1704, 22 Jan. 1702, p.10. 
79. The Elandskloolbcrgc lie just to the cast of Vogel Valleij. 
80. CA, VC 16, 22 Jan. 1702, p. JO. 
81. Ibid. 
82. CA, VC 16, 14 March 1702, pp.39-40. 
83. Soaquasdritl (also known as Sonquas or Sonkwasdrifl) is on the Berg River about nine kilometres north-east of 
Riebeek-Kasteel and five kilometres west of Vogel Valleij. Its name suggests that it was the drill over which the 
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unsuccessful raid in April 1703 (by the"Ubiquaze natie" on Captain Koopman) the attacks 
ceased.84 By June 1705 the government was trying to orgamse a meeting with the 
"Bosjesmans".85 In November 1705 some of the Khoisan who had been responsible for the 
attacks came to the Castle in the company of Captain Koopman to make peace, or "sam sam", 
with the governor.86 The peace makers were described as "een gezandschap uyt de zoogenaamde 
Bosjensmans off struijkrovers, zynde deze eenige der Hottentots die het vee van de verre af 
buyten afgelegene vrijluiden hebben geroofd".87 Their identity, therefore, remained unclear, but 
the Company required them to promise to refrain from further attacks on colonial livestock. They 
were sent on their way with gifts of beads and tobacco whilst, in a further attempt to stabilize the 
frontier, tl1e governor appointed or recognised various new Khoikhoi captains. These included 
three Klein Namaqua by the names of Plato, Jason and Vulkaan.88 A similar ceremony was 
observed in May 1708 when various captains or representatives of the "50, 60 en 100 mylen 
verre afgelegene Hottentotse natien"89 were summoned to the Castle in order to pay their 
compliments to the new governor, Louis van Assenburgh. Copper-headed canes were distributed, 
signifying that the recipient ruled under the Company's authority. Other gifts were also dispensed 
in an attempt to ensure that the Khoisan of the frontier remained in "die vrede, <lat die natie Sam 
Sam noemd". 90 Time would tell how lasting this peace would be. 
San would drive the stolen cattle. In February 1704 Nicolaas van deen Heuwel was appointed sergeant of all six 
b11ite11poste11. CA, VC 16, 28 Feb. 1704, pp.421-422. 
84. On this occasion Sergeant Louw and a commando succeeded in shooting dead some of the robbers and 
capturing two others alive. CA, VC 16, 24 April 1703. On 29 March 1703 the post-holder at Elandskloof, J. 
Rouws, had complained that the post-holder of Vogel Valleij (presumably Corporal Dede), had sought to 
conunandeer his men, even though it was well known that Elandskloof ( or "Eliphantskloof' as Rouws calls it) was 
the most perilous post in the land. In the event the Company gardens in Cape Town proved to be more dangerous 
for it was here that Rouws lost his life a year later in a dmnken brawl. CA, VC 16, 29 March 1703, pp.239-241; 
pp.473-476. 
85. CA, LM 10, 3 June 1705, pp.732-733. It should be noted that the years 1700 to 1704 were years of poor 
rainfall. The drought would have exacerbated colonial-K110isan conflict whereas the return or more nonnal rainfall 
in 1705 might have cased some or the competition for resources and facilitated peace. For the decreased rainfall 
see A.J.H. van dcr Walt, Das A11sdel1111111g der kolo11ie am Kap der G11te11 f-lojji11111g, 1700-1779, (Berlin, 1928), 
p.32. 
86. CA, VC 17, Journal 1705-1706, 2 Nov. 1705, pp.270-271. 
87. "a group of the so-called Busluncn or highwaymen, they arc some of the Hottentots who stoic the stock of the 
outlying freemen". Ibid. 
88. CA, VC 17, 26 Sept. 1705, p.225; 13 Oct. 1705, p.249. 
89. "50, 60 and 100 [Dutch] mile distant Hottentot nations". CA, VC 18, Journal 1707-1708, 1 May 1708, p.605. 
90. "the peace, which that nation calls Sam Sam". CA, VC 18, 1 May 1708, p.605. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE OPENING OF THE LIVESTOCK TRADE 
As far as the Cape authorities were concerned the violent convulsions which had racked the 
northern frontier were due to one major cause: the opening of the livestock trade to colonists. 
Disregarding the upheaval caused by the colonisation of the Land van Waveren, and discounting 
the effects of its own trade with the Khoikhoi, the Company blamed the excesses of the 
freeburghers for the widespread Khoisan resistance.91 In fairness, there was a lot of evidence to 
support this point of view. Only four months after Willem Adriaan van der Stel's reluctant 
opening of the livestock trade he received the first Khoikhoi complaint. Captain Koopman 
informed him that certain freeburghers of Drakenstein had forced him to barter some of his 
cattle.92 Then, in October 1702, the governor was presented with such a shocking report of 
freeburgher abuses that he suspended the trade in livestock at once, pending further instructions 
from the Heren XVII.93 
According to the minutes of the Council of Policy, gangs of colonists, forty, fifty or more in 
number, had been journeying up to one hundred (Dutch) miles inland to the distant Khoikhoi. 
These men were not equipped for nornml trading activities but had been provisioned, frequently 
by sponsors who stayed behind, with the necessary items for waging war. They had attacked the 
Khoikhoi and with "violence, murder and death" stolen their livestock. Because these Khoikhoi 
lived so far away and were ignorant of the Company's laws they had not come to the governor to 
complain. A group of forty-five freeburghers of "the worst sort" had returned with over 2 000 
cattle which they had taken from the "Horisons ende Genocquas" some fifteen days journey from 
the Cape.94 This band of rogues had made a covenant not to betray each other which they had 
written into the blank pages of a book whose title was, ironically enough, "De Christelijke 
Zeevaart" (The Christian Voyage). The governor was convinced that similar attacks had been 
perpetrated on those Khoisan who were currently raiding the livestock of more respectable 
colonists and the Company. It was undoubtedly because they had had so much of their livestock 
stolen, he argued, that the "Namaquaas, Ubiquaas ende Koekemans, met haar Bosjesmans" had 
joined together to seek redress.95 In consequence it was now too dangerous for anyone to venture 
91. CA, VC 16,270ct. 1702,pp.165-169. 
92. CA, VC 15, 10 June 1700, p.736. 
93. CA, VC 16,270ct. 1702,pp.165-169; CA,LM 10,25Nov.1702,pp.777-778. 
94. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies vG11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 27 Oct. 1702, pp.389-391. The "Horisons" were 
probably a San or Strandlooper group ("Huri-san", according to Nienaber, means "Sea Buslunen") and the 
"Gcnocquas" were the Gonaquas, Khoikhoi of the Algoa Bay hinterland. Nienaber, Klzoeklzoe11se StGnmGme, 
pp.556-557, 384-393. Apparently the group had also attacked some of the Xhosa and the Inqua Khoikhoi. See 
Elphick, K/10ik/10i, pp.227-228. 
95. Uocsckcn, ( ed.), Reso/11sies VG/I die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 3, 27 Oct. 1702, p.391. 
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inland, whilst remote freeburghers ran the risk of being massacred. For these reasons Van der 
Stel decided to close the trade until further notice and initiate an investigation into the crimes 
which had been cmmnitted.96 
In the event nothing came of this enquiry as: "So many of the settlers were implicated in the affair 
that half of the colony would have been ruined".97 Nor did the livestock trade remain closed for 
very long for the Heren XVII ordered it re-opened in July 1704.98 It is, however, not 
inconceivable that this temporary cessation of the open trade helped to dan1pen the flames of 
Khoisan resentment between 1702 and 1705. Van der Stel was later to be accused of hypocrisy 
and self-interest for having closed the livestock trade during this period.99 Irrespective of the truth 
of this accusation a glance at the figures for the increase in the livestock holdings of the colonists 
during this time are instructive. In the eight years before the opening of the trade their herds had 
grown by 3 712 units of stock and their flocks by 5 449. In the first eight years of free trade the 
corresponding figures for growth were 8 871 and 3 5562.100 
The first opportunity which the government had to observe at first hand the devastation which 
had been caused by the opening of the livestock trade came in October 1705 when Johannes 
Starrenberg, the new landdrost of Stellenbosch, was sent on an expedition to try to obtain trek 
oxen from the nearby Khoikhoi.10 I Starrenburg's instructions were that he should confine his 
operations to Khoikhoi groups adjacent to the colony since those further away were bound to be 
96. Ibid.; CA, VC 16, 27 Oct. 1702, pp.165-169. Instructions were also sent to the landdrost of Stellenbosch asking 
him to ascertain how many trading parties had gone out since the opening of the cattle trade with the Khoikhoi in 
1700. CA, LM 10, 25 Nov. 1702, pp.777-778. 
97. Fouche, Diaty of Adam Tas, p.334-335. Fouche is quoting Van der Stel's sununary of his examination of the 
forty-five men who were arrested for their part in tl1e expedition. Fouche disagrees with tl1is conclusion, believing 
that "the Governor was afraid to punish the reivers, because he had so frequently been guilty himself of similar 
outrages upon the Hottentots, that had he punished the settlers, his own doings would have come to light". Ibid., 
p.337. 
98. "CT1e livestock trade was re-opened by the Heren XVII on 24 July 1704 with the futile proviso that no violence 
should be employed. See "Extract from the Memorial of Commissioner C.J. Simons" in Raidt, (ed.), Valentyn, Vol. 
2, p.227 and n.276. 
99. See Fouche, Diary of Adam Tas, pp.333-343. "To represent Van der Ste! as the champion of the natives against 
the greed of the settlers and the indifference of the Directors, is nothing short of ridiculous. He placed an interdict 
upon the cattle traffic, not to protect the Hottentots against the colonists, but to rid himself of all interference on the 
part of the latter, and so keep the Hottentots to himself to plunder at his ease." Ibid., p.343. 
100. R. Elphick and V.C. Malherbe, "The Khoisan to 1828" in R. Elphick and H. Giliomce, (eds.), The Shaping of 
South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd edition (Cape Town, 1989), p.21. 
10 I. Starrenburg's instructions and the diary of his journey arc reproduced in Raidt (ed.), Valentyn, pp.2-57. See 
also CA, VC 17, 16 Oct. 1705, pp.257-269 for his instructions. StaITcnlmrg was appointed landdrost in July 1705 
and was a loyal supporter of W.A. van der Stcl. He was dismissed, along with the governor, in 1707. 
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hostile as a result of their treatment at the hands of unscrupulous freeburghers. He was, 
moreover, expected to trade in the most gentle and inoffensive manner so as to ensure an enduring 
relationship of mutual goodwill. Naturally, if he met with any violence from anyone, he was "to 
be sure to pay them with the same coin". He was also expected to note the situation, suitability 
and fertility of the land he traversed, obviously with a view to future colonisation. In order to help 
him in these assessments he was accompanied by the experienced and widely travelled chief 
gardener of the Company, Jan Hartogh.102 
Starrenburg's journal and his Ietters103 from the frontier zone provide us with an invaluable 
glimpse of that region after a period of unprecedented upheaval. As one of Van der Stel's 
henchmen he was, no doubt, inclined to emphasise the evils of the open trade in livestock but 
there is no reason to suppose that he was an inaccurate observer. Travelling north of the 
Piketberg, to the Verlorevlei, Starrenburg encountered some of the Grigriqua who seemed to be 
so poorly supplied with livestock that Starrenburg asked them: 
how it happened that they had so little cattle, seeing that the Hon. Company had 
never bartered with them, whereat they replied that a certain freeman, generally 
called Dronke Gerrit, was come to their kraal a few years previously, accompanied 
by others, and without any parley fired on it from all sides, chased out the 
Hottentots, set fire to their huts, and took away all their cattle, without their knowing 
for what reason since they had never ham1ed any of the Dutch. By this they lost 
everything they had, and were compelled to betake themselves to the Dutch living 
further out, and there steal cattle again, and if they could get anything, rob their own 
compatriots; and with these cattle they then ran off into the mountains and feasted 
on them until it was all finished, and then getting more, several times succeeding in 
this, from which they still have a few beasts today.104 
Writing from Vier en Twintig Rivieren Starrenburg noted despondently that although the Khokhoi 
there boasted no fewer than ten captains this translated into a mere two kraals with hardly any 
accompanying livestock. In five weeks of travelling he had only obtained fifty-seven cattle. In the 
entire stretch of country from the Piketberg, along the Berg River, to the mountains in the east 
(the Swartland) he had not encountered a single kraal, supposing that all of the Khoikhoi were 
avoiding him and hiding their cattle 105: 
102. Ibi<l. 
103. For Slarrcnburg's lcllcrs (an<l lhc governor's replies) sec CA, VC 17, 28 Nov. 1705, pp.295-98; 298-99; 299-
305; I Dec. 1705, pp.303-09; 5 Dec. 1705, pp.3 I0-317. 
104. "Slarrcnburg's Journal", 26 Oct. 1705, in Rai<ll (c<l.), Valentyn, p.25. 
105. CA, VC 17, 28 Nov. 1705, pp.295-298. 
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By this I have realised with regret how the whole country has been spoilt by the 
recent freedom of bartering, and the atrocities committed by the vagabonds ... and so 
from men who sustained themselves quietly by cattle-breeding, living in peace and 
contentment divided under their chiefs and kraals, they have nearly all become 
Bushmen, hunters and brigands, dispersed everywhere between and in the 
mountains. I 06 
Although one should not take Starrenburg too literally - (a Khoikhoi did not simply become a 
"Bushman" by losing his cattle though he might become like a "Bushman") - his broader point is 
quite clear: the open trade in livestock had led to the disintegration of traditional Khoikhoi 
societies and inaugurated a period of anarchy. Groups like the Grigriqua and the Cochoqua were 
ceasing to exist. Remnants of them had probably already started the process of evasive migration 
which would eventually take them to the banks of the Orange River.107 Some of them began to 
attach themselves to the stronger pastoralist societies about them, such as the trekboers or the 
Namaqua. Others, no doubt, did become hunters or brigands in the mountains. It is significant 
that the wealthiest Khoikhoi that Starrenburg encountered were those who lived near the 
protection of the Company post at Wavcren. They too, however, tried to hide their cattle from 
him and Starrcnburg seems to have failed to perceive that his, and his government's, activities 
were also contributing to the destruction of the Khoikhoi.108 By the time he returned to Cape 
Town he had 152 cattle in his herd. To Starrenburg this was a pitiful amount but even these had 
not been granted willingly for he had threatened to report to the governor those who were 
reluctant to part with their cattle.109 
Similar cattle trading expeditions were despatched in 1707 and 1710 under the conunand of Jan 
Hartogh.110 The first of these netted 220 oxen and 242 sheep but Hartogh thought it important to 
emphasise that the principal Khoikhoi supplier, Captain Koopman, had complained that: "when 
the freemen came to barter, they took away by force all the cattle, cows and heifers, so that they 
(the Hottentots) could save nothing to breed from if in that maimer they were robbed of their 
breeding stock". I I I Hartogh also added that some other Khoikhoi had said to him "that they had 
106. "Starrenburg's Journal", 4 Nov. 1705, in Rai<lt (e<l.), Valentyn, p.41. 
107. See chapter eight below. 
108. CA, VC 17, 26 Nov. 1705, pp.298-299; "Starrenburg's Journal", 20-22 Nov. 1705, in Raidt (e<l.), Valentyn, 
pp.49-51. 
109. See Fouche, Diwy of Adam Tas, pp.338-341, for examples of how Starrenburg's original journal had been 
altered in the version published by W.A. van der Stcl so as to delete Starrenburg's threatening language. See also 
CA, VC 17, 5 Dec. 1705, pp.310-311. 
110. CA, VC 18, Journal, 1707-1708, 25 Oct. 1707, pp.329-331; CA, VC 19, Journal, 1709-1710, 20 Oct. 1710, 
pp.346-347. 
111. CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched, 1707-1720, 18 April 1708. Also CA, VC 18, 22 Nov. 1707, p.369. 
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never seen it in their lives, or heard it from their ancestors, that the freemen were masters above 
the Company, but that they had always before this seen that the Company was the master".112 
The implication of this information was that the Company was losing control over its subjects in 
the frontier zone. Though this was doubtless true the Company was once again blind to its own 
faults. When Lieutenant Slotsboo visited the northern frontier districts in 1712 the Khoikhoi of 
Waveren were still relatively prosperous. A certain Captain Scipio and his followers owned over 
2 000 sheep but refused to barter with Slotsboo, giving as his reason "that they behaved quietly 
and did no harn1, and that they did not come to complain [ to the Company]" .113 Quite obviously 
the Khoikhoi viewed the Company's bartering expeditions as some sort of retributive exaction 
which were to be avoided at all costs. Another group of Khoikhoi around the Piketberg had many 
sheep and about 300 cattle but they too were loath to trade with Slotsboo and tried to hide their 
animals.114 Unfortunately for such survivors, desperately clinging to the remnants of their 
wealth, the continuous expansion of the colony was to dispossess them of far more than their 
cattle or their sheep. 
LAND AND LABOUR IN THE FRONTIER ZONE, 1705-1726 
Soon after the peace making ceremony of November 1705 colonial frontier fanners began to 
think it safe enough to pasture their livestock north of the Berg River in the vicinity of the 
Piketberg. The area was no doubt familiar territory to many colonists since hunting parties had 
been journeying as far as the Olifants River from 1660 onwards in search of elephant and 
hippopotomi.115 It was still possible to obtain ivory at the Verlorevlei in 1705116 but by this date 
the area to the south of the Olifants River Mountains was fast becoming more attractive to 
colonial pastoralists than to hunters. 
The first grazing pern1its issued for the Piketberg area which were recorded in the Dude 
Wildschutteboeken were granted in 1707, 1708 and 1709.117 From another source, however, we 
112. CA, LM 21, 18 April 1708. 
113. CA, LM 18, Letters Received, 1709-1718, 11 Nov. 1712; CA, LM 21, 11 Oct. 1712; 4 April 1713; Elphick, 
Khoikhoi, p.230. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Jan Danckert's expedition had reached the Olifants River in 1660. (See note 63 above). For subsequent 
hunting parties north of the I3erg River see P.J. van der Merwe, Trek, chapters two and three. Hunting pennits had 
preceded grazing pennits and requests for the latter only began to predominate in 1703. See Van der Walt, Das 
Ausde/1111111g, p.20. 
116. In November 1705 Starrenburg was told by some "I3uslunen" of the Piketberg district that some Dutch traders 
had just made oil~ illegally, with twelve big elephant tusks. CA, VC 17, I Dec. 1705, pp.303-306. 
117. The first colonists to register grazing pennits around the Piketberg were Jurgen l'otkiwit, Floris Slabbert, 
Jacobus Ovemy, Hendrik Roodenby, Jan Hofman, Willem ten Damme, Arie Kmijsman, Jan Baarentsz Seker and 
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learn that a certain Jacob van Hoeven had a cattle post at the Piketberg as early as 1706 which 
was occupied by a shepherd and two knechts called Jan Cazaar and Jan Willemsz.118 That the 
area was wild and dangerous at this stage may be deduced from the fate of Van Hoeven. Two of 
his slaves murdered him at the Berg River and then tried to convince his knechts that their master 
had disappeared whilst hunting elandl 19- an incident which illustrates both that it was unsafe to 
be a single Dutclunan in the frontier zone and that eland were still plentiful in the Swartland. A 
steady trickle of grazing permits continued to be issued for the area until, in 1714, the loan-fam1 
or leningplaats system was adopted.120 
Freeburghers could now secure the land they desired for the annual payment of twelve 
Rijksdaalders to the Company. For this fee they acquired the unrestricted use of an area of 
approximately 2 420 hectares - calculated by a radius of half-an-hour's walk from a central point. 
In practice, however, so long as they did not infringe on a neighbour's territory they could use as 
much land as they could control. The most crucial factor determining the establislunent of a loan 
fann was the availability of a pemmnent source of standing water. The prior rights of the 
indigenous Khoisan inhabitants were seldom consulted and it is, perhaps, far from coincidental 
that this development towards a more secure fonn of land tenure for the colonial pastoralists 
should have occurred shortly after the outbreak of smallpox in 1713 swept aside the last renmants 
of cohesive Khoisan societies in the area. 
The smallpox epidemic of 1713 fell on the Khoisan at a time when their societies were already 
reeling from an accumulation of shocks. Although the degree of mortality experienced among 
them has been the subject of debatel21 - principally because of the inadequacy of the records - the 
Andries Kuijper. CA, Receiver of Land Revenue, Oude Wildschutteboeken, (hereafter RLR), 1, pp.164, 165, 166, 
185, 206. I am extremely grateful to Professor Leonard Guelke for generously making his transcriptions of the RLR 
records available to me. 
118. CA, VC 17, 5 June 1706, pp.483-491. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Grazing pennits had been issued before 3 July 1714 but after this dale the Company insisted on a payment, or 
rental, for this privilcdge. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 4, 1707-1715, 3 July 1714, 
p.412. By profiting from the appropriation ofland the government was thus encouraging colonial expansion. At the 
same lime a number of fanners in the Land van Waveren were pennilted lo transfonn their loan fanns into freehold 
fanns. Ibid, 31 July 1714, pp.414-15. 
121. See R. Ross, "Smallpox at the Cape of Good Hope in the 18th Century", in C. Fyfe and D.M. McMasters, 
(eds.), African Historical Demography (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1971), pp.416-428; 
Andrew B. Smith, "The Disrnplion of K110i Society in the 17th Century", (seminar paper, Centre for African 
Studies, University of Cape Town, 23 Febrnary 1983); Elphick, Kl10ikhoi, pp.229-234. Ross estimates 30% 
K11oikhoi fatalities whilst Elphick suggests that the effect was "catastrophic" without estimating a percentage loss of 
population. 
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impact of the disease should not be minimised. From what we know of the effects of smallpox on 
other societies lacking immunological resistance, the fatalities must have been dreadful. Even if 
the true cause of these fatalities was not simply immunological deficiency but a combination of 
psychological, economic, social and political weakness (induced by the shock of conquest) 
combined with the cumulative effect of serial episodes of different diseases (such as typhoid, 
measles and the common cold) the consequences were no less lethaJ.122 The epidemic was first 
noted in the Company slave lodge on 18 April 1713.123 By 6 May it was remarked that the 
Khoikhoi were being badly afflicted and on 19 May the governor was told that those Khoikhoi 
who fled into the interior to escape the plague were being killed by their own people in an attempt 
to prevent its spread.124 There was still smallpox in Drakenstein on 28 November and it was 
recorded that the majority of Khoikhoi had been "weggerukt".125 Not long afterwards a visitor to 
the Cape reported that: "the Hottentots ... died in their hundreds. They lay everywhere on the 
roads ... cursing at the Dutchmen, who they said had bewitched them, they fled inland with their 
kraals, huts, and cattle in hopes there to be freed from the malign disease" .126 
Although information regarding the impact of the disease on the Khoisan of the Cape interior is 
sketchy we know that the Khoikhoi kraals of the Piketberg area were very hard hit. Whereas 
Lieutenant Slotsboo had found some of the Khoikhoi groups of the northern frontier regions 
moderately well supplied with livestock in 1712, the situation was very different in 1714. In 
November that year Sergeant J.D. Feyerabendt, a Company soldier who had been sent to barter 
cattle, reported from Sonquas Drift that the Khoikhoi were now scattered in an "unorganized" 
manner and very poorly supplied with cattlc.127 Earlier in the year representatives of the 
Piketberg Khoikhoi had come to the Castle to report that their captains were all dead and that 
barely one in ten of their number had survived the smallpox.128 Scanty though this evidence is, it 
may be seen that there were fewer impediments to the expansion of the colonial frontier in 1714 
than there had been before and it is in this context that the introduction of the loan-farn1 system 
should be viewed. 
122. See Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: Tlte Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge, 
1993), pp.196-216. 
123. CA, VC20,Joumal 1711-1714, 18April 1713,p.109. 
124. CA, VC 20, 6 May 1713, p.121; 19 May 1713, p.129. 
125. CA, VC 20, 28 Nov. 1713, p.296. 
126. Valentyn, quoted by Elphick, Klwikltoi, p.232. So great was the mortality amongst the Khoikhoi that the 
colonists feared that they would not be able to carry the crops from the fields lo the granaries - an indication of the 
importance of the Khoikhoi in agricultural labour by 1713. CA, LM 18, Letters Received, 1709- I 718, 3 Nov. 17 I 3. 
127. CA, LM 18, 9 Nov. 1714. 
128. Elphick, Kl,oikl,oi, p.233. 
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Since the loan-farm was to remain the preferred system of colonial land tenure within the frontier 
zone throughout the eighteenth century and, since it had important implications for all of the 
societies of the frontier zone, the institution should be examined carefully. In the first place such a 
system implied private ownership, or use of, the land. This was contrary to the Khoikhoi and San 
custom of regarding the land and its resources as being the communal property of the group.129 
Land thus became a conunodity. Even though the holder of a loan-farm did not, in theory, have 
the same security of tenure as one of the freehold farmers of the south-western Cape, in practice 
loan-farms became the private and virtually inalienable property of their owners. Nor did failure 
to pay the rent, or recognitiegeld, necessarily mean the confiscation of the property, for farmers 
could amass considerable arrears before exciting the government's wrath. BO It was not long, 
either, before allocated loan-farms began to assume a value quite independent of their annual 
rental fee. When a loan-farm changed hands it did so at a market related price with the new owner 
ostensibly paying not for the land but the opstal, or fixed improvements on the farm.Bl Even 
those who were lucky enough to secure a good loan-farm before anyone else, had to pay for it. In 
1732 the annual rental fee increased to twenty-four Rijksdaalders which was approximately the 
same price as the annual wage of a Company soldier.132 But stock and equipment - not labour -
were the real expenses for an aspirant trekboer for, although he had to invest far less on these 
items than an arable farmer, the costs help to explain why not every trekboer had his own loan-
farm. It has been estimated that it would have cost the average stock-fanner about 1 000 guilders 
(or 333 Rijksdaalders) to set himselfup.133 
It was for these reasons that many colonists in the frontier zone did not bother to register a loan-
fann in their own names but preferred to work as supervisors or knechts for wealthier men. Some 
lived as bijwooners, or tenants, on another man's land, handing over part of the natural increase 
of their flocks and herds as payment for this privilege. In practice the trekboers engaged in a 
great deal more reciprocal community sharing of the land's resources (amongst themselves that is) 
than the Oude Wildschutteboeken suggest. Occasionally fanns would be registered in the names 
129. See Shapera, Khoisan, pp.319-21 an<l Alan Barnard, Hunters A11d Herders Of Southem Africa: A 
Comparative Eth11ography of the Khoisan Peoples (Cambridge, 1992), pp.240-246. 
130. In 1792 Ne<lerburgh and Frijkenius calculate<l that arrears stoo<l at 376 360 Rijks<laalders. Boeseken, "Die 
Nederlan<lse Konunissarisse en die 18de eeuse samelcwing aan <lie Kaap", Archives Year Book/or South African 
History, 1944, pp.112-3, 200-01. 
131. L. Guelke, "Freehold fanners and frontier settlers", pp.86-87. 
132. For the increase in loan-fann rentals see G.C. <le Wet (e<l.), Resolusies va11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 8, 1729-
1734, 28 Feb. 1732, p.195. Details of the wages of Company soldiers may be foun<l in Gerrit Schutte, "Company 
an<l colonists at the Cape", pp.294-295. 
133. Guelke, "Freehold fanners", pp.86-87. 
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of two people but there were also many unrecorded people who were using the land.134 Groups of 
trekboers often grazed their herds together for mutual protection or pooled their grazing and 
water resources so as to enable their livestock to cover a wider range. In this way they benefited 
from changes in the veld's nutrients and guaranteed access to a number of different watering 
places in times of drought. Such arrangements lasted only as long as there was an external threat 
- or as long as the particular resources of an area could support multiple users. As the population 
of humans and animals grew, overgrazing occurred and water became scarcer. This led to more 
exclusive ideas of ownership and the increased competition for resources provided a further 
stimulus for the continuing expansion of the frontier. 
Trekboer possession of the land, whether at the level of the community or the individual, 
necessarily meant increasing Khoikhoi and San dispossession. As the colonists consolidated their 
hold over a region the chances of the Khoisan leading an independent existence diminished. One 
response to this situation was resistance, but increasingly, and for a variety of reasons, numbers 
of Khoikhoi began to enter the service of the colonists. By 1700 this process was already fairly 
advanced in the south-western Cape. In 1688, for instance, Simon van der Stel had written of the 
neighbouring Khoikhoi that: "they become more and more attached to us; so that in the busiest of 
the harvest or the ploughing season, they come down among us like the Westphalians in the 
Netherlands" .135 Although some Khoikhoi were thus already becoming integrated into the 
agricultural labour force of the south-western Cape and performed, in addition, a number of 
domestic tasks for the colonists, the majority of Khoikhoi to enter colonial society did so as 
herders or drovers. This was particularly true of areas where pastoralism was the predominant 
activity of the colonial fanners. 
The Khoikhoi were, after all, pastoralists themselves and cattle and sheep had underpinned their 
way of life for centuries. In the past, a time honoured response from those Khoikhoi who had lost 
their livestock, was to attach themselves, as servants or clients, to more fortunate pastoralists 
134. It should not be thought that the loan-fann records are either infallibly accurate or a comprehensive indication 
of colonial settlement in the frontier districts. Apart from failing to show the presence of k11ecl1ts and bijwooners 
they also fail to reveal the existence of sons and other relatives who might have worked for the family patriarch. 
Fugitives and deserters would never dare to register claims to the land they exploited; nor is the paucity of 
"Bastaards" in the registers a proof of their non-existence. Large areas of land were considered to be too 
environmentally marginal to warrant the expense of paying rekognisiegeld and these areas were used either as 
commonage or by unlicensed pastoralists. It was thus possible for marginal people to survive on marginal land 
provided they were prepared to remain mobile. As long as the frontier continued to advance and land was plentiful 
there was, in any event, little incentive for frontiersmen to register the land thev already possessed with their 
presence. 
135. Moodie, The Record, Part I, p.423. Sec also note 126 above. 
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who still retained flocks and herds .136 By tending the animals of their masters they hoped, 
eventually, to build up herds and flocks of their own. In the meantime they could enjoy the 
security and sustenance derived from remaining within a pastoralist society and could avoid the 
demeaning descent to a livestockless life of hunter-gathering. It was thus logical and consistent 
for those Khoikhoi who had lost their land and livestock to become the labourers of the trekboers. 
They brought with them their unrivalled knowledge of the local environment and their remarkable 
skills with livestock. Some of them even brought their own livestock, if they had managed to 
retain any, for they realised that they would benefit from the protection which an armed and 
mounted trekboer could provide against the many thieves and predators of the frontier zone.137 
We should note that, quite apart from the Company and freeburgher "trading" parties there were 
also large groups of runaway slaves, deserters and vagabonds roaming the frontier at this time, 
all of whom were a threat to Khoikhoi livestock.138 Different groups of Khoisan stole the cattle 
of more fortunate Khoikhoi and in such circumstances it paid to have the protection of the local 
trekboers. By caring for the flocks and herds of their protectors, frequently alongside the 
renmants of their own, the Khoikhoi did much to prolong their existence. 
In exchange for this protection, or as a condition for their continued access to water and grazing, 
the Khoikhoi began to perform labour services for the Dutch. The agreements which they entered 
into with the colonists were not fom1alised in writing - a fact which had two important 
consequences. In the first place there is very little written evidence of such contracts, and, in the 
second place, being oral, they were frequently broken by the parties involved. TI1e Khoikhoi could 
expect to receive wages, usually in the form of sheep, though towards the end of the century 
money became acceptable. Food and drink were a basic wage though sometimes clothes ("kos en 
kl ere") were also supplied. The majority of the Khoikhoi, being accustomed to a life of peripatetic 
independence, preferred short or seasonal spells of employment but it was usually only when 
employers or employees saw fit to complain about a breach of contract that the tem1s of service 
were recorded. 
136. See Shapera, Khoisan, p.294. 
137. For example, in 1730 some Khoikhoi who worked on the fann of Hendrik Eksteen at Saldanha Bay had their 
callle slolen from them by Khoisan raiders. A conunando of Company men recovered their cattle for them. CA, 
LM 25, Letters Dcspalched, 27 July-30 Dec. 1732, Governor lo Landdrost Lourensz, 31 May 1731, p.392. 
138. Sec chapter 4 below. 
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The first such complaint for which we have evidence was in 1717, 139 but the earliest details of a 
contract between a Khoikhoi and a colonist come from an incident in 1726. In March that year a 
Khoikhoi labourer in the service of Corporal Jacob Titus at the Company post of Saldanha Bay 
complained to the Cape Town authorities that his cattle were being withheld. According to Titus 
the Khoikhoi, who had cattle of his own, had been hired to take care of the Company's sheep for a 
period of two years. During this time he was to be paid two weaned ewes annually and be 
properly supplied with food and drink. The Khoikhoi in question had, however, left nine months 
before the expiry of the contract, taking his cattle with him but leaving his sheep. The reason for 
his departure was that he had been roughly treated by a soldier who accused him of having been a 
negligent shepherd. The Company warned Titus to return the Khoikhoi's sheep to him and added 
that "no further engagement shall be entered into with that people, rather leaving them to depart 
with their cattle whither soever they like".140 
Although the Company may have preferred not to employ Khoikhoi labourers the freeburghers 
had less choice in the matter given the high costs involved in buying slaves or employing 
Europeans. That some of the Khoikhoi saw fit to complain to the authorities about their 
conditions of service is testimony to the fact that they were coming to see themselves as colonial 
subjects. That the Company responded by settling disputes between masters and servants - and by 
punishing both colonists and Khoikhoi if the occasion arose - is an indication that, for its part, the 
Company was also coming to regard those Khoikhoi who lived amongst the colonists as falling 
under its jurisdiction.141 Despite the advanced state of disintegration of Khoikhoi societies within 
the colonial frontier by 1705 the Company did not renounce its earlier policy (however 
imperfectly observed) of neither harn1ing nor enslaving the indigenous inhabitants. Its ability to 
protect these inhabitants, however, was not particularly impressive and the eighteenth century 
witnessed a progressive deterioration in the circumstances of the Khoikhoi - especially those 
working for colonists.142 At this point it will be instructive to provide some examples of the 
139. On I June 1717 the Governor wrote to the landdrost of Stellenbosch as follows: "The Hottentots who are 
bearers of this complain that Hans Jes and Martin Schoemnaker have some cattle of theirs which they will not 
surrender. You are carefully to enquire into this matter and if the charges are true the parties named are to be 
prosecuted. Such frauds cmmot be allowed." CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched, 3 Jan. 1707-31 Dec. 1720, p. 76. 
140. CA, LM 19, Letters Received, 1717-1726, from Jacob Titus (or Titius) at Saldanha Bay, 2 April 1726; CA, 
LM 24, Letters Despatched, 5 Jan. 1726-27 July 1728, to Corporal Jacob Titus, 11 April 1726, pp.63-64. 
141. On this process see R. Ross, "The Rule of Law at the Cape in the Eighteenth Century", Jou ma/ of Imperial 
and Commo11wealtl, Histo,y, IX, 1980 and "The changing legal position of the Khoisan in the Cape Colony, 1652-
1795", Aji"ica11 Perspectives, 2, 1979, pp.67-87. See also Wayne Dooling, "Law and Community in a Slave Society: 
Stellenbosch District, c. 1760-1820", (MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1991 ). 
142. See pp.253-278 below. See also Nigel Pe1m, "Labour, land and livestock in the Western Cape during the 
eighteenth century: the Khoisan and the Colonists", in W.G. James and M. Simons, (eds.), The A11g1y Divide: 
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Company's response to unacceptable instances, which marred working relationships between 
colonists and Khoikhoi in the frontier zone of the early eighteenth century, so that later events 
may be viewed in perspective. 
In 1706 Joost Bevernagie, a settler in the Land van Waveren, shot a cow belonging to the 
Khoikhoi captain, Prins, because it had strayed onto his land. Bevernagie was summoned to 
appear before the Council of Justice and asked whether "he was not aware that the Hottentots are 
owners of that land, and that field and grass are conm1on to them for pasturing their cattle". He 
was ordered to give Prins another cow and to pay a fine often Rijksdaalders. Bevernagie claimed, 
however, that Corporal Tielweerts had told him that if Khoikhoi cattle came onto his land he 
could shoot them. For this ill-judged advice the corporal was demoted, fined and forced to 
straddle a wooden horse for three consecutive days with weights of twenty-five pounds attached 
to his feet. Quite clearly, therefore, in this case the Company could not be accused of taking the 
rights of friendly Khoikhoi lightly.143 
Crimes committed against the persons of the Khoikhoi were taken even more seriously. In 
January 1707 the landdrost of Stellenbosch was infonned by some Khoikhoi that, six months 
before, two colonists had killed a Khoikhoi man and buried him secretly with the help of a 
slave.144 The landdrost decided to investigate the matter and set off with a conunittee to view the 
exhumed corpse at the farm of Jacob Louw near the Paardeberg.145 The evidence was sufficient 
to lead to the arrest of the accused and to put them on trial. Thus it was that Jan Dirks of 
Stokholm (a Company sailor and knecht of Jan Louw), Jan Andriesz (a freeburgher and knecht of 
Jacobus van den Heiden) and the slave Titus of Maccasser were brought before the court. 
Though Andriesz and Titus confessed their guilt Dirks was made of sterner stuff Eventually, 
towards the end of March, Dirks was taken to the torture chamber in order to impress upon him 
the lengths to which the Company was prepared to go in order to extract his confession. When 
this gentle introduction did not loosen his tongue he was obliged, three days later, to put his foot 
on the corpse of the victim. Such tactics did not scare Dirks and, after a beating from the castle 
militia, he was returned to the torture chamber the next day. Fifty pound weights were attached to 
Social and Economic Histoty of the Westem Cape (Cape Town, 1989), pp.2-19; also "Anarchy and Authority in the 
Koue Bokkeveld, 1739-1779: The Banishing of Carel BuijtenJag", in Kleio, XVIl, 1985, pp.24-43. 
143. CA, Council of Justice (hereafter CJ) 4, Original Rolls and Minutes of Criminal Cases, 1701-1708, 30 Nov. 
1706, p.267. Sec also Elphick, K/10ik/10i, p.181; Bocsckcn aw.I Cairns, Secluded Valley, pp.28-29. 
144. CA, VC 18,Joumal 1707-1708,24Jan. 1707,p.19. 
145. Ibid, 25 Jan. 1707. 
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his big toes and he was suspended from the ceiling. At this point the records state, rather 
inaccurately, that "buijten pijn ofbanden" he freely confessed.146 
What had happened, back in July 1706, was that Andriesz had been on his way from Rondebosch 
to his master's post at Riebeek-Kasteel when he had stopped off at Jacob Louw's farm, 
"Doomekraal", near Paardeberg.147 Here he met Dirks who had two Khoikhoi with him, called 
Hans and Lapje, as well as two slaves. On Andriesz's wagon was a barrel of wine and a jar of 
brandy. The two knechts began drinking and continued late into the night, indulging, eventually, 
in a bout of ham1less wrestling with each other. During the fight some money fell from Andriesz's 
pocket without either of the contestants noticing it. Lapjes, though, quickly picked it up, wrapped 
it in a handkerchief and hid it in the oven. The drunken wrestlers fell into an exhausted sleep to 
awake, next morning, to recriminations, accusations and denials. Andriesz accused Dirks of 
taking his money; Dirks accused the slaves and beat them. Then Hans told the knechts that Lapje 
had taken the money so they tied him up and hanged him, by the arms, from a beam. Despite the 
fact that Andriesz recovered all of his money he proceeded to beat Lapje with a bull's pizzle on 
his naked body. When Andriesz tired he paused to refresh himself with some of the remaining 
liquor and allowed Titus, smarting from his previously unjust beating, to continue the 
punishment. Jan Dirks then beat poor Lapje for the length of time it took to smoke a pipe and was 
followed, once more, by Jan Andriesz.148 At last Lapje was cut down and his lacerated back and 
buttocks rubbed with pickling salt. He was then kicked outdoors, beaten by Titus with a stick 
146. Ibid., 2 Feb. 1707, p.37; 11 Feb. 1707, pp.46-47; 12 Feb. 1707, p.47; 15 Feb. 1707, p.49; 18 March 1707, 
p.99; 19 March 1707, p.100; 22 March 1707, p.107; 23 March 1707, p.103·, 8 April 1707, p.122-23; 11 April 
1707, p.124; 21 July 1707, p.243. In forcing Dirks to place his foot on his victim the Council of Justice was acting 
according to the principle of ad actum proximum, the belief that the guilty would confess when directly confronted 
with a situation that closely resembled the criminal act which they had allegedly conunitted. 1l1e Dutch words 
mean "without pain or chains". 
147. CA, VC 18, 23 July 1707, pp.244-257. 
148. Ibid. The punislunent of Lapje is penneated by sexual significance. In the first place wielding a "bullepees" 
as a whip is clearly analogous to using the penis as an aggressive weapon. 1l1e psychosexual significance of 
whipping the bare buttocks of a helpless victim has been analysed by Klaus Theweleit in Male Fantasies, Vol. 2, 
(Cambridge, 1989), pp.289-306. Theweleit states that: "Ritual flogging seems to me to be the most "sexual", the 
most obviously phallic of all fonns of torture; one which forces the victim to participate in a fonn of "negative" 
coitus. The rhytlun of the strokes offers a fair imitation of coital tlm1sts; the screams of the victim rise along the 
lines of tl1e excitability curve, climax, tl1en slacken ... The act of beating has duration; it stores up tension, defers, 
and heightens ... "p.303. 111c unit of duration - the smoking of a pipe of tobacco - was a conunon measure of time for 
those dispensing punishment in the preindustrial world. The masturbatory gratification derived by tl1e torturer at 
the whipping post has an ancient history. Thus in the second century, A.D., the writer Artemidorns, in his book The 
Inte1pretatio11 of Dreams, could explain how dreams of masturbation were closely associated with tl1e theme of 
slavery, "because what is involved is a service that one renders oneself (hands arc like servants who do tl1e bidding 
of their master, the penis) and because the word that means "to bind to a post", used in co1mection witl1 the 
whipping of slaves, also means "to have an erection". Sec Michel Foucault, 71,e Care of the Self: The l!istoty of 
Sexuality, Vol. 3 (Ilannondsworth, 1986), p.20. 
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and, finally, left to die. The three homicides then hid the body in a porcupine hole and swore each 
other to secrecy. Only Dirks tried to keep his promise.149 
This brutal story raises a number of interesting points about life and death on an early Cape 
frontier farm. It would seem to confirm the opinion of those who see the frontier as a region 
where violence and sexual transgression are never far below the surface, but the principal issue at 
stake here is the Company's attitude towards crimes against the Khoikhoi. The two knechts were 
sentenced to banishment from the colony with confiscation of their property. Titus was flogged 
and sent to Robben Island for five years.ISO Though these sentences do not seem harsh the 
Company's energy in investigating the case is a clear sign that it did not condone brutality 
towards the Khokhoi. Its attitude was that "these natives cannot be regarded and treated as less 
than free people", that beating and murder were intolerable outrages "even if perpetrated on a 
Hottentot" and that "the laws make no distinction [between crimes] committed against Christians 
and heathens" .151 
Elphick, who has made a close study of the court records for the years 1672-1713, concludes that 
sentences meted out to the Khoikhoi during this period were generally harsher than those meted 
out to whites for similar crimes.152 This was a tendency which increased markedly as the century 
progressed.153 On the whole, however, the years between 1705 and 1726 passed without too 
many unpleasant incidents between trekboers and Khoikhoi labourers in the northern Cape 
frontier zone. Partly, no doubt, this was due to the very limited number of trekboers involved. 
Guelke has estimated that there were a mere twenty-five independent stockholders in the entire 
colony by 1716 (as opposed to 260 agricultural producers)I54 and although this figure does not 
include knechts, or those fanuers who owned both arable land and loan-fam1s, it does serve to 
149. CA, VC 18, 23 July 1707, pp.244-257. 
150. Ibid., p.257. 
151. Cited by Elphick, Klwiklwi, p.181. 
152. Ibid., pp.181-188. 
153. In July 1708 Jean de Thuilet of Wagemnaakers Vallei was sentenced to be "geharquebuseerd" to death (i.e. 
shot with a harquebus) for having beaten his slave, Andries, and a Khoikhoi called "Kaffer" to death. CA, VC 18, 7 
July 1708, pp.664-669. In later years, however, the maximum penalty for killing a Khoikhoi labourer, where the 
guilty party was white, was banislunent or imprisonment on Robben Island. See Pe1m, "Labour, land and 
livestock", pp.13-19 for instances of inequalities in the treatment of colonists and Khoikhoi before the law. Wayne 
Dooling's "Law and Community in a Slave Society", pp.99-130, shows that even though Khoikhoi (and slaves) 
increasingly turned to the law for protection in the latter half of the eighteenth century this did not mean that the 
law treated servants or slaves as the equals of their masters. 
154. Guclke, "Freehold fanners", pp.84-85. 
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remind us that, during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the trekboers were 
themselves a vulnerable group within the frontier zone. 
KHOISAN RESISTANCE, 1712-1716 
After the peace ceremonies of 1708 the first signs of a resurgence of Khoisan resistance to 
trekboer encroaclunent occurred in 1712. In October of that year the Council of Policy received 
reports that 5 000 of the Great Namaqual55 were massing on the Olifants River preparatory to 
launching an attack against the colonists. So seriously did the Company regard this threat that it 
mobilised 185 anned men to meet it and, under the conunand of Lieutenant Slotsboo, the force 
marched for four days along the Olifants River without, however, finding any sign of either the 
Great or Little Namaqua.156 Nor did any of the local Khoikhoi seem to think an attack was 
inuninent. The rumours had been started by one Jacobus Ovemy who, together with three 
Khoikhoi, had journeyed to the Little Namaqua before the winter in order to barter for elephant 
tusks. Whilst there he had stolen five heifers from the San of the Little Namaqua and now, in the 
dry season, feared that the Little Namaqua would seek revenge by crossing the Olifants river and 
stealing his cattle. Ovemy had communicated his fear to his neighbours in the Piketberg and 
caused a general panic. As punislunent for raising the alann unnecessarily Ovemy was forbidden 
from grazing his cattle out of sight of the Castle at Cape Town.157 
This incident throws light on the relationship which existed between the Little Namaqua and the 
San. The minutes of the Council of Policy describe how the year before Ovcmy's visit the Little 
Namaqua had "suffered from some hostile acts between themselves and their buslunen and had 
taken away the cattle of the latter" .158 The use of the possessive pronoun is interesting because it 
indicates that the Little Namaqua exercised a type of hegemony over the San to their south. It 
would seem that the conflict between them had been resolved by the time of Ovemy's visit and 
that by robbing the San Ovemy was conunitting a hostile act against the Little Namaqua. These 
San, whoever they were, were to play a major role in the disturbances which followed. 
In November 1714, when Sergeant Feyerabendt was returning from a cattle bartering expedition, 
he reported from Sonquas Drift that he was sending a certain Khoikhoi by the name of Jakhals to 
155. For the Namaqua, both Great and Little, sec pp.281-288 below. 
156. CA, LM 18, Letters Received, 11 Nov. 1712; CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched, 4 April 1713. The commando 
included sixty-three Khoikhoi . 
157. CA, LM 21, 4 April 1713; CA, LM 18, 11 Nov. 1712 
158. CA, LM 18, Letters Received, 11 Nov. 1712. " ... maar <lat den Klyn Amaqua over cen jaar leeden cenige 
vyantschab ondcr haar en harrc bossiesmans gehaat hecll en liaar qualyk gehandelt en 't vee afgenomen ". 
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the Cape so that this individual could lay charges against the Little and Great Namaqua. These 
people, he alleged, had stolen all of his cattle leaving him with only a few sheep. Feyerabendt, 
however, requested that the governor might detain Jakhals since the "Gonnema" and "Sonqua" 
had, in tum, brought many charges against him.159 Clearly the Khoisan of the frontier zone were 
in a state of agitation. 
On 30 June 1715 some San in the mountains of the Waveren district (possibly the Ubiqua) made 
a raid on the cattle of the nearby colonists. The fanners gave chase and shot several of the 
robbers. One of the colonists was wounded in the leg by an arrow. Adding insult to injury the San 
had enough audacity to promise the fanners that they would return and that they would not be 
able to catch them since they would hide in the highest mountains. Despite this boast one of the 
robbers was caught by a certain Theunis Bota who forwarded him to the Castle for questioning. 
A follow up conunando was planned and reinforcements sent to the buitenposten but no further 
action was taken.160 On 3 August, however, the governor, De Chavonnes, received anotl1er report 
whose content was that the San had made off with 700 sheep belonging to Pieter Joubert, a 
Waveren farmer, and that Joubert's shepherd, a slave, had been kidnapped.161 An emergency 
meeting of the Heemraden was convened to discuss the situation but it was only on 15 October 
that the Government's response was finalised. Six soldiers, under the cofllllland of a corporal or 
sergeant, were to defend the colonists and friendly Khoikhoi around each of the military posts of 
the frontier zone - Hex River, Witscnberg and Piekenierskloof.162 The colonists, however, had 
not waited for the deliberations of their superiors to reach fruition and had acted on their own 
initiative. 
According to Sergeant Hendrik Treumiet, who wrote to the governor on 29 September, some 
freeburghers had been on an expedition (no doubt a conunando) from which they had returned on 
21 September. However, no sooner were they back in the Land van Waveren when, the very next 
day, the "Buslunen" had swept down and carried off 32 cattle and 700 sheep belonging to the 
farmer Pieter Willemsz van Heerden. Treurniet, two of his soldiers and thirteen freeburghers gave 
chase. Two and a half days later, though, the pursuers had to return without having caught the 
San for they had driven the livestock "day and night incessantly in order to get them beyond the 
159. CA, LM 18, 9 Nov. 1714. 
160. CA, 1/STB (Archives of the Landdrost and Heemrade, Stellenbosch), 1/4, Minutes of Landdrost and 
Heemrade, 5 Aug. 1715, p.149; CA, LM 21, 8 July 1715, p.54; Uoeseken and Cairns, Secluded Valley, p.30. 
161. CA, VC 21, 3 Aug. 1715, p.106. 
162. I3oeseken (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 4, 15 Oct. 1715, pp.461-464. 
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mountains". The colonists had found 6 dead cattle and 200 dead sheep, recovering only one 
wounded cow. A slave and two Kl1oikhoi had been in charge of the animals. The fonner was 
found dead in a river bed, his body pierced by ten arrows. One of the Kl1oikhoi was also found 
dead, his skull smashed in and his body similarly quilled with deadly darts. The third man had, it 
seemed, been kidnapped by the San.163 
One of the Waveren farn1ers, Jan Harmse Potgieter, told Treurniet that he believed the attackers 
were members of the kraal from which the colonists had returned on 21 September. They had 
taken cattle from this kraal, upon which one of its members, a man called Poetsjinelle, had 
declared: "Go along with the cattle and my wife, I shall be in the Land of Waveren as quickly as ' 
you, if you wish to make peace". It would appear from this that the colonists were taking 
hostages. Schalk van der Merwe, one of the commando members, had assured Poetsjinelle that he 
ought to make peace and that he would be very well received in Waveren if he did so. Indeed, 
when the commando returned, the colonists were confident that peace was as good as made. It 
had therefore come as a shock to them that Poetsjinelle and his companions had come to rob 
rather than to repent. Treurniet had also been informed by some alarmed colonists that the San 
(or Khoisan) were about to launch a major attack against them and that they preferred to abandon 
their fanns rather than be murdered.164 
Jan Hannse Potgieter was keen to lead a commando of thirty men against the enemy provided that 
they were given anununition and penuission to keep half of any cattle they recaptured. This offer 
the authorities declined, although they did urge the colonists of Waveren to support the military 
reinforcements which were being organised.165 It was not long, however, before the Khoisan 
struck again. On 11 November Joost Bevernagie had 100 cattle and 500 sheep stolen from him. 
Two of his slaves were abducted. Some time before this another settler, Jacob Mostert, had had 
36 cattle stolen and Pieter Rossouw's house had been burnt down. The estimated cost in stolen 
livestock was 30 000 guilders and it was claimed that the colonists of Waveren were so terrified 
that they had to sleep with firearms in their hands .166 The governor therefore agreed to the 
landdrost of Stellenbosch's request, namely, that a conunando of freeburghers should be allowed 
to hunt down the robbers. The conuuando would be supplied with gunpowder and anmmnition 
and be under the leadership of Schalk van der Merwe and Jan Harn1se Potgieter. The governor 
163. Cl\, LM 18, 29 Sept. 1715. 
164. lbid. 
165. Boesekcn (ed.), Resolusies vc111 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 4, 15 Oct. 1715, pp.461-464; Bocsckcn and Cairns, 
Secluded Falley, p.32. 
166. Boesckcn (ed.), Resolusies w111 die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 4, 20 Nov 1715, p.478. 
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did, however, think it prudent to caution the conunando not to embitter this "brutaal en barbaars 
volk" any more than they already were.167 
A special significance has been attached to this 1715 commando for it is seen as the first to have 
been a purely burgher affair and, in this respect, a prototype of the conunando system of the 
future. It has also been claimed that it was on this occasion that the tenn "conunando" was first 
used so that it was indeed the first "true" conunando.168 In fact its significance does not so much 
lie in its composition as in the structures of legitimation and control. Earlier conunandos had 
consisted solely of burghers or fanners. Every hot pursuit operation was, in a sense, a 
conunando. What was different about the commando that was authorised on 20 November 1715 
was precisely the fact that it was authorised. The govenunent was now legitimising independent 
civilian retaliation and underwriting the cost of their ammunition. Similarly, the tenn 
"conunando" can be traced back long before 1715 to 1676, when a conunando of soldiers, 
burghers and Khoikhoi was called out to avenge the murder of hippopotami-hunting colonists at 
the Bree River.169 
The conunando of Van der Merwe, Potgieter and twenty-two other burghers left Roodezand for 
the Kruis River on 2 December 1715. The Kruis was the name of the largest river flowing into 
the Verlore Vlei behind the Piketberg. As the conunando engaged in reconnaissance, sending 
scouts up the nearby mountains, it captured two Khoisan women. Not long aftenvards a kraal of 
at least fourteen Khoisan was discovered, protected by a very steep mountain on one side and a 
river with thick bushes on the other. On the morning of 11 December the conunando, which had 
been stealthily approaching the kraal during the night, was spotted by the Khoisan. Fighting 
ensued and the Khoisan defended themselves vigorously with arrows and assegais. One of the 
colonists, Johannes Vosloo, had his musket explode in his hands but a series of charges seemed to 
put the Khoisan to flight. Pieter Zwanepocl and Lanunert Lanunertsz rushed forward. In the thick 
bush the first was stabbed through the leg by an assegai and the second had his belly slit open. 
Poor Lanunertsz's entrails were pushed back into his skin and his friends crudely stitched him up: 
to no avail. He died on 16 December and was buried by the Brandewijns Fontein. The Khoisan 
167. Ibid. "brutal and barbaric people". 
168. Boeseken and Cairns, Secluded Valley, p.32. See also P.E. Roux, "Die Verdedigingstelsel aan die Kaap Onder 
die Hollands-Oosindiiese Kompanjie, 1652-1795", (M.A., Stellenbosch University, 1925), p.145; Van der Merwe, 
Noonlwaartse Bewegi11g, p.24. 
169. Roux, "Verdedigingstclsel", p.142. 
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had, in the meantime, fled and the colonists captured 84 cattle, 214 sheep, 8 women and 9 
children.170 
One of the women was sent forward by her captors in an attempt to convince the Khoisan to 
make peace. She returned with a defiant "No". The colonists therefore retreated with their booty 
being unwilling, whilst encumbered with livestock and captives, to renew the attack against a foe 
heartened by their ability to inflict casualties on the Dutch. True, many Khoisan had been shot, 
but the survivors were vengeful rather than vanquished. On 15 December, as the conunando 
reached Thee F ontein, the Khoisan decided to attack the livestock, shooting arrows so as to kill 
two cattle and wound some others, including two horses. Once again the colonists sought to 
parley, sending one of the women to ask why the Khoisan would not make peace. The answer she 
brought back was that so long as the colonists kept any hostages they would not return alive and 
that since the oncoming night was going to be moonless they would have lots to think about. The 
colonists tried to compromise by releasing three women with gifts of tobacco but their scornful 
enemies replied that they would be waiting for them at Roodezand. True to their word, when the 
conunando arrived home on 20 December, they found that Pieter van Heerden's cattle had been 
stolen.171 
On receipt of this report the government sent Sergeant Treurniet to reinforce the military posts 
with twenty men. They also sent the overseer of the Company store, Wolfgangh Zwartsenburgh, 
with tobacco, beads and arrack in the hope that peace could be made.172 Zwartsenburgh seems to 
have had a measure of success for on 10 March 1716 it was reported that he had found the 
Khoisan tired of stealing and anxious for peace. They had also made a request for staffs of office 
from the Company .173 The government decided to wait and see if they made any requests for a 
return of the livestock - half of which the Company had appropriated and half of which had been 
shared amongst the commando members - but was prepared to believe that peace had been 
achieved.174 On 3 August the /anddrost of Stellenbosch deemed it safe enough to request the 
withdrawal of men from the military posts and on 4 August this request was endorsed by the 
govemor.175 
170. G.C. de Wet, (ed.), Reso/usies va11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 5, 1716-1719, 7 Jan. 1716, pp.1-2. 
171. Ibid. 
172. Ibid., pp.2-3. 
173. De Wet, (ed.), Reso/usies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 5, 10 March 1716, pp.42-43; CA, LM 21, 28 March 
1716, pp.59-60. 
174. De Wel, (ed.), Reso/usies van die l 1olitieke Raad, Vol. 5, 18 Feb. 1716, p.24. 
175. CA,LM 18,3/\Ug. 1716; CA, VC21,4J\ug. 1716,p.175. 
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THE SLAUGHTERING BUSINESS, 1716-1725 
With a cessation in Khoisan hostilities the Company turned its attention to the crisis in the meat 
supply. Livestock diseases were rife and in September 1716 a "deplorable" state of affairs was 
being reported from all areas of the colony. The price of a pound of mutton increased by a 
stuiver, an unprecedented "extravagance". Never had there been such a "universal" sickness 
which, combined with losses due to Khoisan attacks the year before, had resulted in thousands of 
animals dying.176 Zwartsenburgh was despatched to barter for cattle and similar expeditions 
went out at about the same time of year (September-November) in 1717 and 1718,177 These 
expeditions obtained very little and in April 1718 the Cape authorities reported to Arnsterdan1 
that the Khoikhoi had hardly any more cattle.178 Even the September 1718 expedition to the 
eastern frontier could only obtain 54 cattle and 5 sheep,179 In July 1719 Amsterdam was 
infonned that mortality amongst the cattle was again on the increase whilst meat was scarcer and 
dearer (three stuivers a pound). Between l 600 and l 700 horses had also perished.180 By 1721 a 
great shortage of wheat was being recorded alongside a great shortage of meat and in May 1722 
the Heren XVII was infonned that the "chastening hand of heaven" was still causing continuous 
mortality amongst the colony's livestock. The price of meat was now fixed at three stuivers a 
pound whilst foreign shipping was not pennitted to take live animals on board as provisions,181 
In these circumstances it was necessary for the Company to send cattle-bartering expeditions 
much further than usual. Thus it was that in 1721 and 1724 Ensign Rhenius journeyed to Little 
Namaqualand.182 From the first of these trips he returned with 128 cattle - a disappointing result. 
The Little Namaqua did, however, seem to have escaped the worst ravages of the murrain and 
had also escaped the smallpox,183 By 1724 the situation had changed. Smallpox was now 
prevalent amongst the Little Namaqua having reached them from the north. They also had very 
176. CA V.C. 21, 14 Sept. 1716, pp.203-205. The cattle disease was first noted in July 1715 when the Company's 
wagons could not be employed due to the "sterven van een groote quantiteit trekbeesten". Zwartsenbergh was 
despatched to barter oxen from the Khoikhoi. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 4, 30 July 
1715, p.452. 
177. CA, VC21,23Nov.1717,p.164; 5Sept.1718,p.123. 
178. CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched, 4 April 1718, p.86. 
179. CA, LM 21, 30 March 1719, p.99; CA, VC 21, 23 Jan. 1719, pp.9-10. 
180. CA, LM 21, 31 July 1719, p.112. The disease was thought to have been caused by exceptionally cold and wet 
seasons. 
181. CA, LM 22, Letters Despatched, 29 Jan.-30 Fcb.(sic) 1722, 31 May 1722, p.100. 
182. CA, VC 21, 8 Sept. 1721, pp.120-121; 25 Nov. 1721, p.159; E. Mossop, (ed.), The Joumals of Brink and 
W1e11i11s, (Cape Town, 1947; Van Ricbccck Society, Vol. 28), pp.135-153. 
183. CA, VC 21, 25 Nov. 1721, p.159. 
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few cattle and sheep.184 According to a Khoikhoi informant Rhenius encountered at the Doorn 
River, the Namaqua were taking every precaution to prevent their remaining livestock from being 
bartered away, driving their flocks and herds into the mountains to hide them: 
He added that for two successive years we had cleaned them out of all their cattle; 
that they were no more inclined to trade with the Company and if all their cattle were 
gone from them they would come and fetch cattle from the Dutch.185 
Rhenius was also told that the Khoikhoi had been robbed by the San and that, on hearing that the 
Dutch had come to take away their livestock, they had slaughtered and eaten their cattle in 
prodigious quantities, "saying that it was better to eat them than that they should be booty for 
others" ,186 
When Rhenius returned to the Cape with no livestock the authorities were quick to ascribe the 
failure of his mission to the bartering activities of the burghers. The person they most particularly 
blamed for this state of affairs was the man who held the contract to supply the Company with 
meat, Jacobus van der Heijden.187 Van der Heijden had won this contract, or three-quarters of it 
in 1718 but, given the increasing difficulty in obtaining cattle and sheep, had come under 
considerable pressure to fulfil his obligations.188 His predicament had not been improved when 
his cattle post at Rivier Sonder End was attacked by Khoisan on 29 January 1719 and 700 of his 
cattle had been stolen. Van der Heijden claimed that he had been robbed in retaliation for the 
actions of the Company's cattle-bartering expedition of 1718, the leader of which, Jan 
Feyerabend, had taken the cattle of the "Gauris en Hijkons natien" by force.189 Van der Heijden 
was allowed to mount a commando to pursue the robbers but he cannot have been successful, for 
in February he was petitioning the Company for pern1ission to buy the stock which Feyerabend 
had acquired! This desperate attempt to fulfil his contractual obligations was referred to the 
Heren XVII for their judgementl90 - thereby ensuring that their reply would be too late to be of 
any use to Van der Heijden. When the meat contract came up for renewal in October 1719 
nobody wanted it and Van der Heijden was therefore allowed to continue to do his best for the 
184. Mossop, Brink and Rheni11s, pp.135-153. 
185. Ibid., pp.137-139. 
186. Ibid., p.143. 
187. CA, LM 23, Letters Despatched, 1723-1725, 10 Sept. 1725. 
188. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies vcm die Politieke Raad, Vol. 5, 14 June 1718, pp.287-288 
189. Ibid., 31 Jun. 1719, pp.329-330. 
190. Ibid., 31 Jun. 1719, pp.331-332; 28 Feb. 1719, p.336. 
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price of three stuivers a pound. Since, however, the supply of cattle and sheep showed no 
improvement Van der Heijden was forced to take more drastic measures.191 
On 28 February 1723 the minister of the church at Drakenstein, Petrus van Aken, wrote an 
extraordinary letter to Governor de Chavonnes. It began with the sombre oratory of an Old 
Testament prophet: 
Op dat wij geen stommen honden souden sijn, die niet bassen konnen, soo geven wij 
aan Uwel Edelen plighs halve te verstaan hoe wiy uijt geloof waardige en vroomen 
menschen, sugtenden over de hemeltergenden zonden des !ants, vernoomen 
hebben.192 
Van Arkel then proceeded to describe how Van der Heijden had equipped a party of seventy 
barterers - "wij willen seggen moordenaars en rovers" - who had no intention of bartering (since 
they had only been provided with 200 Rijksdaalders of goods) and who had journeyed to the 
"Gonakkens" (the Gonaqua near Algoa Bay in the eastern Cape). The colonists had then 
massacred them and carried off all of their cattle and sheep. Those Gonaqua who had survived 
the attack followed the aggressors, begging to be killed or taken captive so that they might not die 
of starvation. These details had been told to Van Arkel by some of the Khoikhoi who had 
accompanied Van der Heijden's men and who were deeply disturbed since they had never before 
seen so many corpses. l 93 
When the authorities heard this news it confinned them in a decision which they had already 
made: that Van der Heijden should not be permitted to maintain the meat contract. With 
unintentional irony they declared that "he has never done much good in the slaughtering business 
and so deserves no favour above others" .194 The whole affair was reminiscent of the attack on the 
Gonaqua in 1702 - "The Christian Voyage" - in which Van der Heijden had also been 
involved.195 As in the earlier case nobody was ever brought to account for their actions. The 
191. Ibid., 2 Oct. 1719, p.369; lO Oct. 1719, pp.373-374. In July 1722 the Here11 XVII wrote to the Governor to 
order that in future the meat contract be fixed for a one year period only and that the price of meat be lowered to 
two stuivers a pound. They also stipulated that the contract should be open to all except Van der Heijden. 
Pressures like this help lo explain Van der Heijden's desperation. 
192. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 6, 9 March 1723, pp.287-288; CA, LM 19, 28 Feb. 
1723. "That we should not be like dumb dogs that cam1ot bark, we dutifully infonn you how we have heard from 
trustworthy and honest persons, sighing under the atrocious sins of the land ... " 
193. Ibid. 
194. CA, LM 19, 23 June 1724. 
195. Sec p.67 above. For Van der Ilcijden's complicity ( or lack of it according to Fouche) in the 1702 affair sec 
Fouche, Adam Tas, pp.333-337. 
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failure to prosecute was, according to Acting Governor Jan de la Fontaine, because there was not 
enough evidence but it is likely that the matter was dropped because influential colonists were 
compromised. The death of the man entrusted with the enquiry, the Independent Fiscal Cornelius 
Beaumont, did not help matters either.196 
Van der Heijden had probably sent some of his men to Little Namaqualand as well, to barter for 
livestock along the san1e lines as in Gonaqualand. The authorities were also suspicious of a 
certain Nicolaas Gockelius, to whom they had given permission in 1722 to barter for cattle from 
distant Khoikhoi or Xhosa on condition that he gave the Company 100 head of cattle. He had 
indeed delivered 100 head of cattle to the Company post at Groenekloof in May 1723, at which 
date no questions were asked, but the Little Namaqua had, in all probability, been his victims.197 
The appointment of new meat contractors, Jan Kruywagen and Jacob van Bochem, did not bring 
stability to the meat supply for in May 1724 they had the misfortune to have some of their own 
cattle stolen from the specially reserved pastures of Groenekloof. 198 Though the robbers on this 
occasion were not Khoisan but drosters, or deserters, this simply served to emphasise how 
anarchic the northern frontier zone had become. In 1 725 the Council of Policy decided to 
withdraw from the colonists the right to engage in barter with the Khoikhoi and this was 
reiterated by a p/akkaat of 9 April 1727 .199 Immeasurable damage had, however, already been 
done. 
In 1726 the Heren XVII were informed that apart from a single hut or two there were no 
Khoikhoi within fifty or sixty Dutch miles of the Cape, "for besides their having died off 
considerably, the small remnant has receded far inland, in order to save their trifling herds of 
196. CA, LM 23, 10 Sept. 1725; De Wet, (ed.), Reso/usies van die Po/itieke Raad, Vol. 7, 1724-1728, 20 Feb. 
1725, p.127. ·n1e infonnants were Jacobus Bota and the leader of the 1715 conunando, Jan Hannse Potgieter. See 
CA, LM 19, 5 April 1723. 
197. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 6, 29 Sept. 1722, p.209; 11 May 1723, p.319. In 
September 1725 the Governor explained to the Here11 XVII that Rhenius' ill success at cattle bartering in 
Namaqualand "must be ascribed to the last free barter by the persons sent out by the burghers Jacobus van der 
Heyden and Nicolaus Gokkelius, for as soon as the Hottentots saw any of the Company's men approaching, [they] 
fled into the mountains over inaccessible tracts, without wishing to enter into any agreement to barter ... hence we 
hope and humbly pray that it may please you to withdraw this pennission to free barter". CA, LM 23, IO Sept. 
1725. 
198. CA, LM 23, 12 May 1724. 
199. The Council of Policy decided to withhold pennission to barter livestock even before it received the Here11 
XVII's reply. On 28 April 1727 the Council infonned the llere11 XVII that, in accordance with the instruction of the 
letter of20 July 1726 "we have expressly, by Plakkaat of 9th inst., forbidden private barter with Hottentots". CA, 
LM 24, 28 April 1727. 
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cattle from the mortality which has been raging here some years ago" .200 Quite clearly those 
Khoikhoi within reach of the colony were no longer able to protect or maintain their flocks and 
herds. Their poverty, which had been precipitated by the violent acquisitiveness of the colonists, 
made it even more difficult for the Company to resolve the meat supply crisis. 
TI1e Khoikhoi retreat into the interior, however, served only to draw the cattle hungry colonists 
after them. By the mid- l 720s, therefore, one may conclude that the characteristic features of the 
northern frontier zone were well established and the dynamics of colonial expansion irreversible. 
Despite prevarications and contradictions in both practice and policy the colonial government had 
allowed settlers to appropriate both land and livestock from the Khoisan societies of the interior. 
A pastoralist frontier, whose existence was dependent on continual expansion, was thereby 
inaugurated, as was the creation of a new group - the trekboers. For the Company the political 
implications of this socio-economic expansion were already clearly apparent - a loss of control 
over its subjects and a proliferation of violent confrontations between Khoisan and colonists. 
Despite half-hearted attempts to investigate and censure the more unacceptable instances of 
rapacious cruelty, the Company was itself responsible for the systematic despoliation of the 
Khoisan; by pennitting settlers to occupy their land; by authorising official livestock "bartering" 
expeditions whilst preventing, or attempting to prevent, unofficial expeditions from taking place; 
and by defending the colonists against the detem1ined resistance which resulted from these 
actions. The devastating smallpox epidemic of 1713 had been a further blow to the integrity of 
Khoisan societies already reeling from the processes of colonial conquest. Increasing numbers of 
deracinated Khoikhoi adapted to the insecurity of the times by entering the service of white 
fam1ers. Here they enjoyed a dubious protection, subject to the violence of masters whose 
impulses to cruelty flourished virtually unchecked in the lawless context of a rapidly expanding 
frontier zone. As the colonial frontier expanded, however, it not only moved into more hostile 
terrain but even further beyond the protective reach of the Company. The consequences did not 
take long to become manifest: intensified Khoisan resistance and increased rebelliousness 
amongst the colonial frontiersmen themselves. The interplay of these two factors fonns the 
subject of the following chapter. 
200. CA, LM 24, Letters Despatched, 5 Jan. 1726-27 July 1728, 25 Feb. 1726, p.30. The resolutions of the 
Council of Policy also mention the scarcity of livestock amongst the Khoikhoi. De Wet, ( e<l. ), Resolusies van die 
Politieke Raad, Vol. 7, 30 April 1726, p.259. 
90 
Chapter Three 
Resistance, Rebellion and War: The Northern 
Frontier Zone, 1725-17 40 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FRONTIER WAR OF 1739 
The re-closure of the livestock trade to freeburghers had come too late to protect the Khoisan of 
the south-western Cape. Nor did it do anything to arrest the continuous northwards expansion of 
the colonial stock-farmers, for in 1725 the first loan-farms were allocated over the Piekeniers 
Pass in the Olifants River Valley. I This meant that white settlement had now crossed the open 
plains of the Swartland and dared to penetrate the mountainous, isolated world beyond. It was a 
significant moment for it indicated that certain colonists were now confident enough to risk living 
in a terrain that gave every advantage to potential stock-thieves. The dense bush and rocky 
mountain slopes surrounding the Olifants River impeded horses and provided ample shelter for 
those seeking to elude commandos. Yet it would seem that in 1725 the prospects of Khoisan 
resistance appeared negligible. By 1732 the entire length of the Olifants River had been colonised 
for there were loan-farms as far north as the confluence of the Olifants and Doom Rivers, as well 
as at the Widouw River.2 
Beyond the Olifants River the aridity of the Knegtsvlakte and the Hardeveld discouraged further 
settlement and white farmers therefore turned their attention to the cast and the west. The high 
mountains of the Cedarberg and Bokkeveld,3 combined with the unalluring Onder Karoo behind 
them,4 discouraged direct easterly expansion. At the southern end of these mountains, however, 
lay the fertile valleys of the Warm and Koue Bokkeveld and it was at about this time that loan-
fam1s were first claimed in these districts.5 North of the mountains, in the area which became 
I. In September and October 1725 Amoldus Johmmes Basson, Francois Smid and Johmmes Ras registered "de 
groote vallij", "de klijne vallij" and "de lange vallij" respectively. 1l1ese fanns were described as being "over" or 
"aan" the Olifants River. CA, RLR 6, pp.53, 24, 53. The Piekeniers Pass is the pass which ascends the Olifants 
River Mountains and joins the Olifants River Valley to the Swartland. 1l1e name derives from the fact that 
soldiers, including pikemen ("piekeniers"), were posted there in order to stop the movement of hostile Khoisan. 
2. By 1732 there were some thirty fanns that had been registered or re-registered in the Olifants River Valley. It 
was Hendrik Crugel (or Kruger) who took out a fann at the "Wiedouw". CA, RLR 9, 4 Nov. 1732, p.339. See also 
Philippus Lodewikus Scholtz, "Die Historiese Ontwikkeling Van Die Onder-Olifantsrivier 1660-1902", Archives 
Year Book/or South African Histo,y, 1966, Vol. 2, pp.29-30. 
3. Sec Chapter 2, notes 52 and 53, for the origins of these mountains' names. 
4. The Onder Karoo, also known as the Tanqua Karoo and the Ceres Karoo, is the arid stretch of land between the 
Bokkcvcld and the Roggcvcld mountains. 
5. Sec Chapter 2, note 52. 
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known as the Onder Bokkeveld, the Khoisan presence was still considerable in the 1720s and 
1730s. In these years the Onder Bokkeveld was simply too far away for the small number of 
pioneer colonists to risk settlement. The alternative was to turn westwards, towards the Sandveld. 
The Sandveld of the western Cape coastal belt has always been a dry region. The undulating, 
sand-covered, coastal plains receive less than 300 mm of rain per annum but the environment in 
the 1720s was undoubtedly less harsh than it is today. Two hundred and fifty years of 
overgrazing and overexploitation of natural resources has impoverished a region which once 
supported herds of game, including elephant and rhinoceros. The vleis were rich in fish and bird 
life whilst hippopotamus were so common that the Verlorevlei was once known as the Seekoei 
Valleij. Hunters could also gather abundant marine resources, in the form of mussels and 
crayfish, as well as veldkos in the form of berries or corn1s.6 
On the eve of colonial intrusion the principal human occupants of the region were hunter-gatherer 
groups, which had had at least 1500 years of interaction with neighbouring pastoralists.7 It has. 
already been noted that at the begim1ing of the eighteenth century the San of this region were 
considered to be clients of the Little Namaqua,8 and they had no doubt come to some arrangement 
with local pastoralist groups as well. In the better-watered southern parts of the Sandveld, 
particularly along the Verlore, Lange and Jakhaals Vleis, dwelt the pastoralist Grigriqua, a group 
considered by many to have been, originally, San, and who were, in any event, also clients of the 
Little Namaqua.9 In 1682 Olof Bergh had encountered some of them near the site of present day 
Graafwater and in 1705 Starrenburg had visited Captain Hannibal's kraal at the Lange Vlei. IO 
These pastoralist groups would have moved about within the Sandveld, in search of water and 
grazing, and would, perforce, have had to share the landscape with the hunter-gatherers. 
Although archaeological evidence suggests that, following the advent of pastoralism in the area, 
there was some displacement of San from their usual haunts, 11 there is also clear historical 
6. See Anthony Manhire, later Stone Age Settlement Patt ems in the Sandveld of the South-Westen, Cape Province, 
South Africa (Cambridge, 1987), pp.18-32 for an enviromnental survey of the region. 
7. Ibid., p.127. 
8. See Chapter 2, p. 
9. Ibid. 
10. E.E. Mossop, (ed.), Joumals of 0/of Berg/, (1682) and lsaq Sc/zriver (1689), (Cape Town,1931), p.95; E.H. 
Raidt, (ed.), Francois Valentyn: Description of the Cape of Good Hope with the matters co11cemi11g it (Amsterdam 
1726; reprint Cape Town 1971 ), 2 vols,Vol. 2, pp.23-25. 
11. Manhire, Sa11dveld, pp.106-127. See also Royden Yates, Anthony Manhire and John Parkington, "Colonial era 
paintings in the rock art of the South-Western Cape: some preliminary observations" in Martin Hall and Alm 
Markell, (eds), Historical Archaeology ill The Wes/em Cape: The South African Archaeological Society Goodwin 
Series, Vol. 7, June 1993, pp.59-70 and Roy<len Yates, Anthony Manhire and Jolm Parkington, "Rock Paintings and 
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evidence of co-operation between the hunters and herders of the Sandveld. Under the disruptive 
pressures caused by colonial expansion the distinctions between various Khoikhoi and San 
groups became even more confused. Consequently, if there is any one area in the Cape where the 
use of the term Khoisan is appropriate, it is in the Sandveld in the early eighteenth century. 
Significantly, it was from this ancient zone of interaction between pastoralists and hunter-
gatherers that there occurred the most determined opposition to white settlement since the 
establishment of the colony. 
There had been colonists grazing their stock at the Verlore Vlei from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century whilst white hunters had been active in the area from an even earlier date.12 
Violence had threatened during the Overny incident of 1714 and had indeed broken out a year 
later when a punitive commando had campaigned, somewhat unsuccessfully, behind the 
Piketberg.13 In 1716 the Company succeeded in negotiating some sort of peace with the Sandveld 
Khoisan. This peace was obviously still in effect in 1724 when Hendrik Moel, the most northerly 
loan-fanner, undertook to search for the survivors of a ship-wreck to the north of the Olifants 
River mouth.14 But by 1728 it was evident that fighting had flared up again. In December of that 
year the authorities at Cape Town received information that the cattle of a certain Jan Valek had 
been stolen from his farm at Lange Vlei in the Sandveld.15 Valek was a wealthy freeburgher who, 
in addition to his Lange Vlei fann, had farms at the Jackhals Vlei (north of the Lange Vlei) and at 
Klapmuts (near the Company's important cattle post). Valek seems to have had a partnership of 
sorts with one Jurgen Hanekom, who also had fanns at Klapmuts and Lange Vlei.16 It is thus 
possible to sketch the lineaments of an economic network which linked the frontier regions, via 
wealthy freeburghers, to an important distribution point in the Company's meat supply system. 
History in the South-Western Cape" in TI1omas A Dowson and David Lewis-Williams, (eds), Contested Images: 
Diversity i11 Southem African rock art research (Johannesburg, 1994 ), pp.29-60. 
12. The first mention of the Verlore Vlei in the loan-fann records is in 1723 when it is recorded that Hendrik 
Moel registered "de Verloore Valije agter de Picketberg". CA, RLR 5, 3 Dec. 1723, p.112. It is, however, hard to 
believe that the Vlei was not utilised before this by colonists fanning at the northern end of the Piketberg, 
something which had been happening since al least 1709. CA, RLR I, p.166. 
13. See chapter two, pp.81 above. 
14. Moel had fanns at the Piketberg and also "de Verloore Valije agter de Piketberg". CA, RLR 5, 3 Dec. 1723, 
p.112. See also G.C. de Wet, ( ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 7, I Feb. 1724, pp.20-21. 
15. CA, LM 20, Letters Received, 1726-1732, 19 Dec. 1728. 
16. For the c01mection bctwee Valek and Hanekom see CA, LM 20, 24 Jan. 1729. ·n1is source also mentions their 
Klapmuts, Lange Vlei and Jakhaals Vlei fanns. For Valek and Hanekom's loan-fann holdings around this time see 
CA, RLR 6, 4 Aug. 1725, p.44; I Sept. 1725, p.53; 22 Nov. 1726, p.100; 14 March 1727, p.115; CA, RLR 8, 29 
Nov. 1728, p.151; 21 March 1729, p.231; CA, RLR 9, I Sept. 1730, p.8. Valek was also the owner of the fann 
"Elscnburg" at Stellenbosch and a member of the church committee. De Wet, (ed.), R.esolusies van die Politi eke 
Raad, Vol. 8, 1729-1734, pp.178, 274. Hanckom, for his part, owned the fann "Nattevalleij" in Drakcnstein. Ibid, 
p.299, n.172 and 173. 
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Valek himself does not appear to have resided in the Sandveld for he left the supervision of his 
farms to his three step-sons: Jan, Jacobus and Leendert Louw.17 More specifically it was 
brothers Jacobus and Leendert who looked after the livestock of both Valek and Hanekom at the 
Lange and Jackhals Vleis. To be even more precise it was they who entrusted the livestock to the 
care of some of the local Khoikhoi.18 
When these Khoikhoi were robbed of their charges by a group of so-called Bushmen in December 
1728 the Louw brothers gave chase with the assistance of some of the other frontier farmers of 
the area. It is worth mentioning the men by name for many of them were to play a large part in 
the events of the next twelve years. Accompanying Jacobus and Leendert were Daniel 
Bokkelenberg, Jan Pienaar, Abel Pienaar, Willem van Wyk and Marten Hilbrand, the knecht of 
Matthys Krugel. The commando caught up with the robbers and ordered them to return the stolen 
cattle. According to Jan Louw there were over three hundred "Bushmen" and they were confident 
enough to reply that they first wished to fight for them, forthwith showering the colonists with 
arrows and assegais. Bokkelenberg was wounded in the foot by an arrow but Willem van Wyk 
fired a shot which killed two of the Khoisan. This did not stop the others from continuing to shoot 
arrows and hurl assegais. The burghers then loosed a volley which killed ten of the Khoisan and 
put the rest to flight. The stolen cattle, twenty-three in number, were recovered as well as sixty-
two others which the vanquished Khoisan had abandoned. Apparently some of these animals had 
been stolen from the Guriqua. It is not clear what became of these cattle but presumably they 
were sent with the rest to Klapmuts and handed over to the Company.19 
The governor approved of the action taken by the conunando but it later appeared as though it 
had taken more than the sixty-two cattle initially claimed.20 On 5 January 1729 two Khoikhoi 
men came before the governor to complain that they had had their cattle stolen by the commando 
and that the livestock was in the possession of Hanekom and Leendert Louw at Lange Vlei. The 
story seemed credible and Governor Noodt therefore ordered Lourensz, the landdrost of 
Stellenbosch, to investigate the allegations.21 Lourensz was an energetic man and accompanied 
the Khoikhoi complainants to the Lange and Jackhals Vleis. At Valck's Jackhals Vlei farm the 
Khoikhoi identified seven of their cattle and thirty-one of their sheep. These animals were being 
17. Valek, a childless widower, married Maria van Brakel, the widow of Jacobus Louw, and hence regarded her 
three sons as his children. See C.C. de Villiers aml C. Pama, Geslagsregisters van die 011 Kaapse Families, Vols. 
land 2, (Cape Town, 1966), Vol. 1, pp.90 and 501; Vol. 2, p.1005. 
18. CA, LM 20, 19 Dec. 1728. 
19. Ibid. 
20. CA, LM 25, Letters Despatched, 27 July 1728-30 Dec. 1732, 26 Dec. 1728, pp.249-250. 
21. CA, LM 25, 6 Jan. 1729, p.251. 
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tended by the local San and one of Valek's slaves. The slave explained to Lourensz that three of 
the cows belonged to Marten Hilbrand and the rest to Daniel Bokkelenberg. The sheep belonged 
to Bokkelenberg and Abel Pienaar. When Lourensz was able to question Bokkelenberg and 
Hilbrand they both denied that the animals were theirs though Bokkelenberg claimed that one of 
the bulls was a gift from the San.22 Leendert Louw also professed his innocence, claiming only 
one of the animals, a heifer, which he maintained was a gift from a San by the name of Jantje. 
The explanations of Bokkelenberg, Hilbrand and Leendert Louw were endorsed by Willem van 
Wyk, whom Lourensz described as being the superintendent of Jackhals Vlei. According to Van 
Wyk the livestock had been found in the veld by a Khoikhoi herder nan1ed Dragonder but neither 
Dragonder nor Abel Pienaar could be found to corroborate the story.23 
What emerges from the above information is that there was close collaboration between the 
frontier trekboers and their Khoisan allies. Some of these allies were later to become bitter 
enemies of the colonists for we learn from later sources in 1739 that the most active leaders of 
Khoisan resistance in that year were Swaartbooij and his son Titus, alias Channant. Swaartbooij, 
according to Jan Valek (who had by this stage become a member of the Heemraad), was a 
"Captain ... who has lived with my children for a long time" .24 It is therefore safe to assume that 
in 1728 Swaartbooij and Titus were working for Valek at the Lange and Jackhals Vleis. 
It is also interesting to note that the registered owners of the loan-fam1s in question were not 
themselves to be found at the frontier and that the actual occupants of the fanns were sons, 
servants, slaves or Khoisan herders.25 Presumably wealthy men, such as Valek and Hanekom, 
spent most of their time at their properties closer to the Cape and left the less well-to-do to 
manage their frontier interests. The frontier farmers, for their part, protected the stock of their 
employers and concentrated on accumulating flocks and herds of their own. It may be seen that 
force and theft were ways of doing so though they could also expect to keep a percentage of the 
natural increase of their master's livestock. If all went well they could, in time, aspire to 
registering a loan-fam1 for themselves. 
22. CA, LM 20, 24 Jan. 1729. 
23. Ibid. 
24. CA, Council of Policy (hereailer C) 455, Inkomende Briewe, 9 July-9 Dec. 1739, 23 July 1739. " ... die lange 
tyd by sijne kinderen gewoont hadde". 
25. The case of Daniel Bokkclenberg is interesting for despite his prominence in the Sandveld there is no record of 
him having a loan-lann there. He was only twenty-one years of age in 1728 and yet he later became the owner of 
three limns in Drakenstein. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies va11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. IO, p.2, n.8. 
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On this occasion the governor felt that he did not possess sufficient evidence to act against the 
Sandveld frontiersmeri and, despite prodding Lourensz to obtain more information, the matter 
rested.26 Perhaps some of the unrest of 1728 was a consequence of the severe drought of the 
winter of that year which reduced grazing and water resources and produced "great mortality 
amongst the cattle" .27 The Council of Policy explained to the Heren XVII that the Company was 
particularly short of trek-oxen. These animals played a vital part in much of the Company's work 
and at least eighty or ninety young oxen of four years of age were needed. This quantity was, 
however, unobtainable from the colonists, who were also suffering from an acute shortage of 
trek-oxen. Nor were the Khoikhoi, with the exception of the Namaqua, likely to be able to supply 
the necessary quantities. But since a bartering expedition to Namaqualand would require large 
numbers of oxen in the first place, in order to draw the wagons required for logistical support, the 
Namaqua could not be a solution either. The Council of Policy therefore implemented a scheme 
that gradually increased the size of the Company's herd of trek-oxen but which simultaneously 
increased the demand for these valuable creatures. Every two years stock-farmers were now 
expected to pay three four-year-old trek-oxen to the Company as payment for their loan-farms, 
instead of the previous twelve Rijksdaalders per annum. This system of payment was still in 
operation as late as 1769 and is testimony to the perennial shortage of trek-oxen within the 
colony.28 
At the san1e time as the complaint about the shortage of trek-oxen the Council of Policy also 
noted that the impoverishment of the Company's cattle had been caused by a decline of pasturage 
due to overgrazing. Private persons had been grazing their cattle too near to the Company's posts 
and the Council was therefore obliged to withdraw the leases of those whose loan-fam1s were too 
close to Company pastures.29 Those who were displaced were granted land further afield, no 
doubt contributing to the competition for resources in the Olifants River and Sandveld districts. 
Khoisan resistance continued with attacks on colonial fanns in 1731. On 12 February of that year 
a group of Khoisan known as the "ten sons ofGrebnan" (or "Grebenau"), who had earlier robbed 
the burgher Frederick van Eeden, drove away thirty-three cattle belonging to Hans Jurgen 
Potgieter.30 After six days a conunando of twelve colonists succeeded in tracking the robbers to 
26. CA, LM 25, 14 Feb. 1729; CA, LM 20, 12 June 1729. 
27. CA, LM 25, 31 Jan. 1729. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. One of those who had to abandon a loan-fann at this time was J.M. Kruywagen, junior, whose fann at 
"de Sonquas fontein" was judged to be too close to the contracted butchers". CA, RLR 5, p. 90. 
30. CA, LM 20, 8 March 1731; De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 8, 13 March, 1731, 
pp.143-144. 
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their kraal whereupon the Khoisan began to stab the cattle to death. A warning shot was fired and 
the sons of Grebnan responded by shooting arrows at the Dutch. Their fire was returned and six 
of them were killed whilst others were wounded. Ten cattle were recovered alive. A woman and 
three children were taken captive and later sent to colonists over the mountains ("over bergh") 
because, it was explained, the husband of the woman was still alive.31 This, it would seem, is the 
first recorded instance of what was later to become a common occurrence: the capture of women 
and children by commandos and their subsequent placement as labourers within the colony. On 
this occasion one of the Khoisan who had managed to survive the fight shouted to the commando 
from the safety of a krans that though they might take away some cattle there were others that 
they would have to leave behind, dead, in the kraal. "We Bushmen have still more people, and 
will not leave the Dutch in peace," he added defiantly.32 
In replying to tl1is news the governor told Lourensz that in future, when such incidents occurred, 
he should not write about them but report them in person so that no time was lost in responding 
appropriately.33 It is perhaps as a consequence of this instruction that records from the frontier 
zone are sparse until, in 1738, events of such magnitude took place that they could not be covered 
by the verbal reports of the landdrost. 
The attacks made by the Khoisan on colonists north of the Piketbcrg in l 738 and 1739 were part 
of the ongoing process of resistance to the expansion of the colonial frontier. What was unique 
about the resistance which commenced in 1738 was its magnitude and ferocity. Its instigators 
were men who had been living with and working for some of the frontier farmers for several 
years. Not only did these Khoisan have particular and personal grievances to motivate their 
resistance but their knowledge of Dutch and the use of fireanns, acquired whilst servants, gave 
them valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents. In many instances 
ex-masters fought ex-servants, a fact which increased the bitterness of the fighting.34 
As mentioned above, two of the Khoisan who worked for Jan Valek were prominent in the 
resistance: Swaartbooij and his son Titus, alias Channant.35 Their war against against the 
31. CA, LM 20, 8 March 1731. 
32. Ibid. 
33. CA, LM 25, 13 March 1731, p.375. 
34. See N.G. Penn, "The Frontier In 111e Western Cape, 1700-1740", in Jolm Parkington and Martin Hall, (eds.), 
Papers i11 the Prehisto,y of the Westem Cape, South Africa (Oxford, 1987), Vol. 2, p.476. Scholtz fails to note that 
the instigators of the "Buslunan War of l 739"(as he calls it) were ex-servants of the colonists. He also fails to 
remark on the connection between the expedition to the Orange River (which he seems to have overlooked) and the 
outbreak of hostilities. Scholtz, "Ondcr-Olifantsrivicr", pp.35-40. 
35. Sec p. 95 above. 
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colonists had its origins in 1738 when,before the ploughing season, Swaartbooij, Titus and some 
other Khoisan accompanied a group of ten colonists to Namaqualand. The party had ten wagons 
laden with powder, lead, iron, copper, beads and other trading items. It is likely that the sponsors 
of this illegal expedition included wealthy men with com1ections in the northern frontier zone -
men such as Jan Valek and Jurgen Hanekom. Their involvement, though never proved, is made 
even more likely by the fact that Willem van Wyk, the superintendent of Valck's Sandveld farms, 
was a member of the expedition. The other colonists in the party were Lodewyk Pulter, Hendrik 
Ras, Matthys Willensz, Jacob Swart, Frans Can1pher, Andries van der Walde, Sybrand van Dyk, 
Augustus Lourens and Jan Gous.36 
After successfully bartering some cattle from the Little Namaqua, the expedition left these in the 
safe-keeping of a servant, Jantje, and proceeded to the land of the ,Great Namaqua across the 
"Groot" or Orange River.37 Here they stayed for a month at the kraal of Gal, a chief of the Great 
Namaqua. This expedition is notable not so much because it was illegal but because it is the first 
recorded expedition of Europeans to the Orange River.38 Other Europeans, in search of ivory, 
had certainly preceded them here, (indeed they were joined by a certain Pieter de Bruyn who had 
been out elephant hunting before them),39 but none had left a record, nor had so baleful an 
influence, as Van Wyk and his fellows. 
During their stay at Gal's kraal, the colonists occupied themselves with bartering cattle from their 
hosts whilst Willem van Wyk "took to wife, Hottentot fashion, a near relative of the chief, 
conducting himself in this matter and clothing himself at the time as a Hottentot".40 1l1is act of 
36. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March 1739, pp.256-7. 
37. See chapter 8 below. 
38. Popular opinion is that Jacobus Coetzee was the first European to reach the Orange River in 1760. See for 
instance J.M. Coetzee, Dusk/ands (Johmmesburg, 1971 ), p.115 and Reader's Digest Atlas of Sou them Africa (No 
place, 1984 ), p.29. The records of the Council of Policy are, however, quite explicit: "Capn. Gaaren verhaald 
wijders <lat over een geruijmen tijd geleeden eenige Europeanen, voorsien met wagens en verseld met andere 
Hottentotten, bij zijn vaders coraal, geleegen bij de soogenaamde Groote Revier, sijn gekoomen ... ". De Wet, (ed.), 
Reso/usies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March 1739, p.258. 
39. De Wet, ( ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March 1739, p.257. It is of interest to note how 
frequently Pieter de Bruyn's brother went out on ivory hunting expeditions according to CA, 1/STB 13/31, 
Alphabetiese Lyst Van Persone Wat op Veldtogten zyn uijt gegaan beginnende met Nov. 1737 (1736-1744). 
40 " ... en <lat irnniddels den landbouwer Willem van Wyk na der Hottentotten wiyse een nabestaende van gemelten 
capn. der Groote Namacquas getrouwt en sig bij <lat geval in alles als een Hottentot gedraagen en gekleet heeft". 
De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March, p.257. Van Wyk underwent a Namaqua 
initiation ceremony ('t Kanuni) to make him a member of the tribe. This is described by H. Cloete in a letter to 
Hendrick Swellengrebcl junior. Since the ceremony involved being urinated upon Van Wyk became quite famous 
in the colony and at the time of his death, in I 777, was known as Willem Namaqua. See G . .T. Schutte, 
Briefwisseling Van Hendrik Swellengrebel Jr Oor Kaapse Sake 1778-1792 (Cape Town, 1982 ), Cloete to 
Swellengrebcl, 27 Feb. 1779, pp.73-74. For Khoikhoi initiation ceremonies see A.B. Smith and Roy H. Pheiffer, 
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amity would appear to have been a ruse on Van Wyk's part, however, for when the time came for 
their departure the colonists slipped secretly away and instructed their servants to return to the 
kraal, attack the Great Namaqua, and carry off their cattle. This order the servants were willing 
to obey since their masters promised them a share of the loot and provided them with firearms for 
the occasion. In the subsequent surprise attack at dawn seven of the Great Namaqua, including 
Captain Gal, were killed and their cattle driven away. The expedition then returned to the 
Piketberg area but stopped along the way to attack the kraal of Arisie, a captain of the Little 
Nan1aqua. Arisie's wife was shot, her baby wounded, and another member of the kraal killed. In 
both of these attacks the "Hottentot Keyser", described as living with the farmer Hendrik Kruger, 
was prominent. So too was the "Hottentot Claas Kok" who was, in all probability, an ancestor of 
a family which would later become famous throughout the northern frontier zone.41 
On returning to the vicinity of the Piketberg the colonists failed to honour the agreement which 
they had reached with their Khoisan servants. Instead of compensating their murderous 
employees with cattle, they hid some of the stolen livestock in secret kloofs and redistributed the 
rest amongst friendly neighbours (whose numbers doubtless contained some sponsors of the 
expedition). The cheated servants, led by Swaartbooij and Titus, went to report the matter to the 
authorities at the Cape. Their story was corroborated and amplified by the evidence of Plato, 
Vulcanus and Arisie, captains of the Little Namaqua,42 as well as by Captain Gaaren, son of the 
late Captain Gal of the Great Namaqua, who, having survived the attack on his father's kraal, had 
journeyed all the way to Cape Town to seekjustice.43 
Though the Council of Policy only recorded the evidence of the Nan1aqua in March 1739 they 
became aware that all was not well in the northern frontier zone long before then. On 22 October 
1738 Lourensz, the landdrost of Stellenbosch, reported that the cattle of the farmer Augustus 
"Col. Robert Jacob Gordon's Notes On The Khoikhoi 1779-80", A1111als Of The South African Cultural Histoty 
Museum, Vol. 5, no.I, Feb. 1992, pp.10-20. 
41. De Wet, (ed), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, pp.257-259. 
42. In 1705 three Captains of the Little Namaqua called Plato, Jason and Vulkaan had made peace with the 
Company. See Chapter 2, p.21. 
43. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March 1739, pp.256-258. The resolutions note 
that Gaaren's trip had been accomplished " ... met veel moeijte en niet sonder verhindering hem en zijn bijhebbende 
volk door deese en geene landbouwers op den weg aangedam1. .. ". Perhaps it was Gaaren's deputation that was 
observed by the French Lieutenm1t Gem1es de la Chanceliere whilst he was at the Cape in 1739. He noted that they 
were camping out with their wives and families on the glacis of the Castle, and U1at U1ey "sang and danced around 
the town howling like wolves and mumbling songs with strange tunes. 1l1e men played upon a reed flute and U1e 
women kept time with U1eir [hands]". In Maurice Boucher, The Cape of Good Hope a11dforeig11 contacts 1735-
1755 (Pretoria, 1985), pp.43-44. 
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Lourens had been stolen by "der bosjemans wonende omtrent de Kleyne Namaquas".44 Since 
Augustus Lourens had been one of the members of the expedition to the Namaqua, and since the 
"bosjemans wonende omtrent de Klyne Namaqua" were precisely those people from whom 
Swaartbooij and Titus came, there is every reason to suppose that this robbery was their idea. 
The "bosjemans"' numbers were too great for those colonists who pursued them to recapture the 
cattle. But the farmers sent forward a K.11oikhoi servant to ask the robbers why they were stealing 
them. The answer was as follows: 
dat siy sulx dreden om hun uit haar land te verjagen dewijl sij in haarlieden land 
woonen en dat dit maar een begin was, dog dat sij alle de daaromtrent woonende 
menschen sulx souden deen, en wanneer dit niet soude helpen en sij niet en 
vertrokken sijlreden als dan alle het gesijde coorn dat thans op het veld is staande, 
als het rijp was, souder verbranden, dat sij soo doende wel genoodsaakt souden 
wesen om haar land te verlaten.45 
This was clearly a declaration of war. The hostilities which commenced with this attack were to 
escalate until, in 1739, the scale and ferocity of KI1oisan resistance exceeded all previous 
opposition to Dutch colonialism in southern Africa. At this early stage, however, the 
government's response indicated that they were not unaware that some of the colonists might have 
provoked the attack. A veldkorporaal, Andries Burger, was appointed for the district over the 
Olifants River. His instructions were to attempt to make peace with the "bushmen" in the best and 
least costly manner and to make a thorough investigation into the origins of the disturbances. An 
additional three veldkorporaals were appointed - for the Bokkeveld, Goudini and the Olifants 
River - but it was specified that these men should not themselves have been involved in the 
current upheavals in any way since the Council of Policy wished to be sure that "van onse zijde 
geen oorsaak is gegeeven waardoor dit volk soude moogen weesen aangeset om soodanige 
disorders als de geene die nu zijn gcschied, tc pleegen".46 Such moderation was commendable but 
probably influenced by the great difficulty that would be experienced were it necessary to send a 
conunando so far to the north. 
44. "TI1e bushmen living near the Little Namaqua". CA, C 651 Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 
1737-1739, 20 Oct. 1738; CA I/SIB 13/4 Krygsraad Reso!usies, 1729-1739, 28 Oct. 1738; De Wet, (ed.), 
Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 23 Oct. 1738, p.234. 
45. " ... tlmt they did this in order to drive tl1em out of their land and that this was just the begi1ming, and that tl1ey 
would do the same to all the people living tl1ere, and that if they would not leave they would bum all the wheat that 
was growing in the veld as soon as it ripened so as lo cause them to leave their land". In P.J. van der Merwe, 
Noordwaartse Beweging, p.8. 
46. "On our side no cause has been given to urge these people to conunit such disturbances as have taken place." 
CA, C 651, 20 Oct. 1738; CA I/STU 13/4, 28 Oct. 1738; De Wet, ( ed.), Resolusies van die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 9, 
23 Oct. 1738, p.234. 
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Further evidence that there was a spirit of rebellion amongst the Khoisan servants of the northern 
frontier zone can1e in November 1738. Two Khoikhoi servants of Gerrit Mos, a Piketberg fanner, 
slaughtered four of his sheep and hid the carcasses. The two men, Wittebooij and Wiltschut, then 
summoned a third, David, and three female companions for a feast. Unfortunately they were 
discovered by one of Mos' slaves and felt obliged to kill him. Having done so Wittebooij and 
Wiltschut began to live dangerously. They stole sheep from Pieter van Zyl's farm at the Olifants 
River and broke into Jacobus Louw's Jackhals Vlei farnmouse where they stole a tinder-box, a 
knife, flints and bread. From Albert van Zyl's farm they managed to steal a musket and decided to 
put it to good use by going to the Olifants River with their friends in order to shoot the aforesaid 
Van Zyl. Wittebooij was entrusted with the task but missed his target. The group was then forced 
to take flight but did not escape capture.47 We may presume, however, that other disgruntled 
servants succeeded in joining forces with larger groups of Khoisan rebels and added their 
numbers to the insurrectionary movement. 
As further rumours and reports concerning the activities of the expedition to the Namaqua 
reached the authorities they decided, in January 1739, to authorise Carel Christoffel Counitz, the 
substitute /anddrost of Stellenbosch, to confiscate any cattle that he thought had been acquired 
illegally and to conunand the offenders to appear before the Council of Justice.48 In attempting to 
carry out these instructions, however, Counitz succeeded in causing a great deal of dangerous 
resentment an1ongst the frontiersmen. His task could not have been an easy one for the stolen 
cattle had been redistributed amongst the herds of a number of people in order to make 
identification more difficult. Counitz undoubtedly made some mistakes but he had a pretty 
shrewd idea as to the identity of the offenders. In this he was aided by the confessions of Matthys 
Willemsz and Pieter de Bruyn, who had been under arrest in the Castle for a "considerable time" 
before they were identified by Captain Gaaren in March.49 Willemsz and De Bruyn had revealed 
that well over 1000 cattle had been stolen from the Nan1aqua and, in the light of this figure, the 
279 cattle confiscated by Counitz do not seem to be an excessive number.SO At a later date the 
governor was to receive a complaint from the farmers Hendrik Kruger (whose servants had 
participated in the attacks on the Namaqua), Sybrand van Dyk, Hendrik Ras and Arnoldus 
Basson. They complained that Counitz had taken not only the "bartered" cattle but also a large 
number belonging to themselves and to other people.51 A thorough investigation by Lourensz into 
47. CA, Court of Justice (henceforth CJ) 786, Documents in Criminal Cases, 27 Nov 1738, pp.198-204. 
48. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 4 March 1739, p.255. 
49. Ibid., 13 March 1739, p.258. 
50. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies vc111 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 10, 19 Jan. 1740, pp.2-4. 
51. 1l1eir evidence suggests the remarkable extent to which frontier fanners and neighbours mixed their herds 
together whilst grazing. To give only one example, of the twelve cattle confiscated from Hendrik Kruger eleven 
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Counitz's behaviour, undertaken by the landdrost at a later date, did not reveal that Counitz had 
erred greatly in executing his instructions. The case of the memorialists was also seriously 
weakened by the injudicious claims of Sybrand van Dyk who maintained that eighty-eight of his 
own cattle had been confiscated even though the landdrost well knew that "the said Van Dyk 
never possessed eight head, to say nothing of eighty-eight; and if he did have them he must most 
certainly like his comrades, have stolen and bartered them from the Hottentots" .52 
The way in which their cattle had been acquired was, however, of less importance to many of the 
colonists than the fact that Counitz, with Khoikhoi assistants, was busy confiscating them. On 24 
January Counitz was obliged to report to Lourensz that certain people were refusing to obey his 
orders.53 What made this disobedience especially alarming was that it coincided with the 
appearance of a notorious trouble-maker in the northern frontier zone: the deserted Company 
sergeant, Estienne Barbier. Under Barbier's leadership the smouldering resentments of the frontier 
colonists were fanned into an alarming outbreak of rural rebellion and social banditry. In order to 
understand how this came about, however, it is necessary to discuss Barbier and the concept of 
social banditry in greater detail. 
THE BARBIER REBELLION54 
Estie1me Barbier was born in France, in the village of Bazorches, near Orleans, in 1699.55 By 
1734 he had joined the Company as a soldier for he sailed from Zealand in June 1734 and arrived 
at the Cape in October of the same year. In June 1735 he appeared on the muster-roll as a 
sergeant, a very rapid and desirable promotion, for the life of a conm1on soldier at the Cape could 
belonged to Jacob Swart and one to Hennan Narlo. CA, C 110 l, Memorien en Requesten, Letter from Hendrik 
Kruger, Sybrand van Dyk, Hendrik Ras and AD. Basson, 24 July 1739, p.33. TI1ere is also evidence to suggest that 
some of the stolen cattle were temporarily deposited at local K.hoikhoi kraals to allay suspicion. Ibid., pp.135-136. 
Among U1e stolen cattle was a cow of the Khoikhoi Captain Keyser and, ifwe can believe Jan Valek, two calves in 
his possession had been obtained from Captain Swaartbooij witl10ut his having known Umt he was doing wrong. 
CA, C 455, Inkomende Briewe, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 12 Aug. 1739. 
52. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 10, 19 Jan. 1740, pp.2-4. 
53. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 4 March 1739, p.255. 
54. See Nigel Pe1m, "Estie1me Barbier: An Eighteentl1 Century Cape Social Bandit?", Social Dynamics, Vol. 14, 1, 
June 1988, for a fuller discussion of the issue. 
55. Professor Roy Henry Pheiffer has collected together the most important documents written by or pertaining to 
Estienne Barbier and presented them in his doctoral thesis, "Die Gebroke Nederlands Van Frans-Sprekenders Aan 
Die K.aap In Die Eerste Hel!le Van Die Agtiende Eeu" (University of the Witwatersrand, 1976). He has also 
subjected U1em lo a linguistic and historical analysis, providing the first accurate outline of Barbier's life. I have 
preferred to use his clear type-scripts of the documents rather than the originals in certain instances. The thesis has 
been published under the same title (Cape Town, 1980) but where I quote from Professor Pheiffer's collection I 
shall cite his tl1esis pagination. Thus, Pheiller, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. I, p.14. 
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be one of great hardship, characterised by brutal punishments and grinding poverty. This 
promising start came to an abrupt end when, in May 173 7, Barbier had the temerity to accuse his 
immediate superior, Lieutenant Rudolf Sigfried Allemann, of embezzlement.56 What Barbier was 
objecting to was the customary practice of those in authority at the Cape to extract as many 
perquisites and advantages from their offices as possible. The issue at stake was not whether such 
practices were illegal - they were - but whether the right people were being bought off. 
Notwithstanding the disgrace of Willem Adriaan van der Stel at the beginning of the century, 
graft and corruption were widespread amongst Company employees. This was something that 
Allemann and the various officials of eighteenth century Cape society understood very well. It 
was not something, however, that Barbier found acceptable and by raising his voice against the 
system he fell foul of it. 
Barbier's principal charges against Allemann were that the lieutenant had cheated soldiers by 
depriving them of a portion of their pasgeld and that he had been selling Company firewood to 
certain burghers.57 As Commisarius, or Inspector, of the Company's buiten-posten, Allemann 
was well placed to indulge in some private trading on his own account. The buiten-posten were, 
at this stage, the most advanced outposts of Company authority in the Cape and, as such, served 
as focal points for a variety of interactions between Khoisan, outlying frontiersmen and soldiers. 
Buying, selling and the exchange of goods took place whilst the labour of the soldiers at the 
outposts could be directed to profitable side-lines.58 Despite orders prohibiting Company officials 
from taking part in private trade, the practice was so common at the Cape that it was considered 
a perquisite rather than a peculation. This was especially true of the post of Inspector of the 
buiten-posten. Even Allemann's loyal supporter and biographer, Mentzel, admitted that Allemann 
56. Pheiffer, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. I, pp.16-19. 
57. A major source of infonnation on Barbier is O.F. Mentzel, Life At tl,e Cape /11 Mid-Eigl,teentl, Century: Tl,e 
Biograpl,y of Rudolf Siegfried Al/ema1111, Captain of tl,e Milita,y Forces and Commander of tl,e Castle /11 tl,e 
Service of tl,e Dutel, East India Company At tl,e Cape of Good Hope (Cape Town, reprint 1919). Allemmm was 
Mentzel's patron when the !alter served as a soldier at the Cape between 1732 and 1741. Mentzel's account, first 
published in 1784, is biased in Allemann's favour but, nonetheless, m1 invaluable source of infonnation. From 
Mentzel we learn that pasgeld, or dienstgeld, was the money which was paid by those soldiers who were able to 
earn money by practising a trade to those who were not so fortunate. Since the salaries paid to soldiers at the Cape 
were not sufficient for them to exist on they were obliged to supplement their income by accepting non-military 
employment. Quite obviously not everyone could be exempted from sentry duty so the custom was for the 
pagangers to pay nine guilder, twelve stuivers monUily to be divided among the rest of U1em. Mentzel, Al/ema1111, 
p.37. 
58. For the role of the b11ite11-poste11 see Sleigh, "Die I3uiteposle In Die Ekonomie Van Die Kaapse 
Verversingstasie". See also Cannel Schrirer, "Excavating Archives al Ou<lepost I, Cape", Social Dynamics, Vol. 
16, no. I, June 1990, pp.11-21 and Nigel Pe1m, "Excavating Archives at Oudepost: A Riposte", Social Dynamics, 
Vol. 17,no.1,June 1991,pp.lOl-5. 
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probably made at least forty guilder a month out of this position.59 Thus when Barbier produced 
statements from seven burghers who swore that Allemann had sold them wood, bast or reeds, the 
inspector of buiten-posten was able to declare that: "The Governor de la Fontaine, Adriaan van 
Kernel and Mijnheer Van der Henghel were all aware of what he was doing, and that it was in a 
way allowed as a reward for his trouble as Country Commissioner. "60 Indeed, had Allemann been 
so injudicious as to elaborate, he would have been able to demonstrate that not only had the 
previous governors, Van Noot and Van Assenburgh, acted in the same way, but so had the 
current independent fiscal (Van der Henghel) and governor (Swellengrebel) when they had held 
the post.61 With such illustrious examples to appeal to in mitigation (and so many reputations at 
stake) it was hardly likely that Allemann would be found guilty or that Barbier would be allowed 
to proceed with his accusations. 
A second reason why Barbier's case against Allemann was not investigated with greater vigour 
was that Allemann was a very good personal friend of the fiscal, Van der Henghel. In fact it was 
during Barbier's trial, on 20 September, that Van der Henghel became, for a short time, governor 
of the Cape. The circumstances of his appointment illustrate the corrupt and venal world of Cape 
politics at its worst. There is a sense in which Barbier's charges of official thieving came at a 
particularly delicate time since they coincided with an extremely unsettled period in the Cape's 
administration. There were no fewer than four changes of governor between August 1737 and 
April 1739. De la Fontaine retired in August 1737 to be succeeded by the secunde, Adriaan van 
Kervel. Van Kervel died on 16 September 173 7, and an ungraceful struggle for the governorship 
ensued between Van der Henghel and Swellengreble, the secunde. Ordinarily Swellengrebel 
should have become the governor, by virtue of his being the secunde, but Van der Henghel 
objected to this on the grounds that he, as senior upper-merchant, had a better claim. To an 
overbearing and dictatorial disposition Van der Henghel could add the claim that he was an 
educated Nederlander instead of being a simple Cape-born product like Swellengrebel. He could 
also offer bribes to prospective followers from the notoriously fat pickings of the fiscal office as 
well as the promise of even greater rewards in the future. Swellengrcbel, however, was worth a 
fortune, for his father was a wealthy German immigrant. In the short tern1 it was Van dcr 
Henghel's bullying that won the day for he convinced the Council of Policy to submit the question 
to the drawing of lots. He won. But in April 1739 the Heren XVII appointed Swellcngrebel in his 
place, prompted, it was rumoured, by a handsome present.62 
59. Mentzel, Allema1111, p.74. 
60 .. Mentzel, ibid., p.114. 
61. Mentzel, ibid., p.114; Pheiffer, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. I, pp.21-22. 
62. Mentzel, ibid., p.106; M.W. Spilhaus, South Africa I,, The Making, 1652-1806 (Cape Town, 1966), p.106. 
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With all this jockeying for position it might seem as though Barbier could have found some 
powerful allies but since his evidence was injurious to all, he was an embarrassment to all. There 
was, however, political capital to be made from the influential Allemann who was badly in need 
of a powerful friend. His guilt was widely acknowledged publicly and in order to escape further 
humiliations he became a fervent supporter of Van der Henghel, making him a present of his own 
riding horse, the only snow-white horse in the Cape. 63 The new governor responded by increasing 
the legal pressure on Barbier in order to crush him and suppress his accusations. 
Barbier was placed under civil arrest, facing charges of having slandered Allemrum, whilst a 
protracted, futile and costly legal process found Barbier's evidence to be inadmissible. Following 
an angry outburst in the court he was locked up in the Castle's "donker gat" for twenty-one days 
and, whilst suffering incarceration, the case Allemann contra Barbier was decided in the former's 
favour. Barbier was ordered to apologise to Allemann in a humiliating public ceremony and pay 
the legal costs. This Barbier refused to do and, as soon as he emerged from his cell, he appealed 
against the sentence. This time he proposed to appeal over the heads of the Cape officials to 
Batavia even though his official request to do so had to go through the local Council of Justice. 
Permission was granted but there was one snag. Copies of the court proceedings had to be sent to 
Batavia and Barbier had to pay for this expense. The cost, it transpired, was thirty-two 
Rijksdaalders and three skillings - a great deal of money for someone like Barbier who had 
already had to sell his watch and clothes. Barbier, however, agreed to pay this to the secretary of 
the Council of Justice, De Grandpreez, from his forthcoming goedemanden pay. By the time 
payment fell due though, on 21 February 1738, Barbier had had a chance to read the copies and 
was shocked to see that they did not reflect the word for word proceedings of the court. He 
realised tl1at the official version of proceedings would not win him justice if the papers ever 
reached Batavia and announced that he intended laying a charge against De Grandpreez. This, 
however, was impossible without the permission of the Council of Justice and Barbier at last 
realised that he had exhausted all legal channels.64 
In a long letter which Barbier wrote over a year later to Governor Swellengrebel he mentioned 
that there was a French saying which helped to explain his next move: "La fin, fait sortir le loup 
boors du Bois - de honger jaagh de wolfuijt de Bosch".65 As Barbier slipped out of the Castle on 
the night of 24 March 1738 anything must indeed have seemed preferable to the dark thickets of 
the law. 
63. Mentzel, ibi<l., p.107. 
64. Pheillcr, "Gebroke Ne<lerlan<ls", Vol. I, p.24; Vol. 2, pp.98-101, 112-118. 
65. "Hunger drives the wolf from the forest". 
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Like many other fugitives before him Barbier headed northwards. His first stop was the fann "De 
Rode Blom" on the outskirts of town and from there to Isak Nieuwout's farn1 in the Tygerberg. 
The next stage of his flight took him to Drakenstein where he spent a night at the farn1 of the 
widow of Lowies Leriche. Finally he reached "Orleans", the farm of the widow "Silje" or Celliers 
where he was to stay until February 1739.66 Perhaps Barbier might have been content to live in 
rustic obscurity with a widow who spoke his mother tongue, but towards the end of February a 
group of ten or twelve arn1ed men, filled with resentment towards the government, rode by the 
farm. The disaffected colonists were those who had had "their" cattle confiscated by Counitz and 
his Khoikhoi assistants. Barbier, who heard that "they wished to raise a rebellion", offered them 
his services.67 There was still something deep within him that hated the idea of injustice and 
although the grievances of the rebels were rooted in rural issues, with which Barbier had not 
previously been concerned, he was quick to make their cause his own by acting as their 
spokesman. His literacy and leadership soon placed him at the head of these rural rebels. His 
career as a social bandit had begun. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of Barbier's involvement with the rebellious 
farmers of the northern frontier zone it is necessary to explain social banditry and suggest reasons 
for its importance. Though the northern frontier was to experience many instances of pure and 
simple banditry and was, at a later stage, to be terrorised by groups which appeared to be classic 
bandit gangs - such as the Afrikaner gang - the Barbier rebellion was different. According to 
Hobsbawn1, the pioneer historian of the concept, social banditry is a primitive form of social 
protest which is "a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon ... little more than endemic 
peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance on the rich and the 
oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs. Its 
ambitions are modest: a traditional world in which men are justly dealt with, not a new and 
perfect world" .68 The "ideal" bandit is someone who does something which is regarded as 
criminal by the State or the local rulers, but who is not considered to be a criminal, or to have 
acted against local conventions, by the population. He is protected by the people, though he is 
frequently a lone wolf living on the margins of society. If he forn1s a band of followers, this band 
is usually small and held together only by his personal magnetism. If he robs, he is usually 
obliged to conform to the Robin Hood stereotype since "there is more to take from the rich than 
from the poor, and if he takes from the poor or becomes an 'illegitimate' killer, he forfeits his most 
66. PheilTer, "Gcbroke Nc<lcrlands", Vol. I, pp.25-27; Vol. 2, pp.12-14. 
67. Pheiffcr, "Gebrokc Nc<lerlan<ls", Vol. 2, p.14. 
68. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Manchester, 1959), p.5. 
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powerful asset, public aid and sympathy".69 When he can he is free-handed with his gains. As a 
social protest movement banditry is "inefficient in every way" being incapable of effective 
guerrilla organisation and archaic in siding with doomed, obsolete forces. Though it occurs 
amongst peasant societies which "know rich and poor, powerful and weak, rulers and ruled" these 
societies remain "profoundly and tenaciously traditional, and pre-capitalist in structure". 70 
These then are the broad patterns of social banditry. Part of Hobsbawm's interest in the 
phenomenon stems from the universality of these patterns. But underlying these forms is the 
deeper significance of content. What does social banditry represent? For Hobsbawm it is a 
predominantly rural response to the process of being broken into modem society. It is a form of 
primitive rebellion against the world of capitalism which "comes to them from outside, insidiously 
by the operation of economic forces which they do not understand and over which they have no 
control, or brazenly by conquest, revolutions and fundamental changes of law whose 
consequences they may not understand, even when they have helped to bring them about".71 
Hobsbawm has not been without his critics, and his theory of social banditry has been severely 
qualified or modified by several writers. Blok, for instance, points out that Hobsbawm has 
exaggerated the element of social protest in banditry as well as obscuring the ties which link the 
bandit to other groups, classes or networks. 72 Austen, in particular, believes that Hobsbawm has 
minimised the role played by the state in defining social banditry. Without a state, to put it 
crudely, there can be no social banditry. This is of particular relevance to the African historical 
experience - about which Hobsbawm has nothing to say - because it was not always necessary for 
deviant groups to enter the category of criminals opposed to a general political authority. As 
Austen says: 
They can instead resort to, or be confronted with, a process of segmentary self-help. 
Thus instead of "cops versus robbers" we may have community pressure against 
individuals, feuds between conununity segments, or the separation of dissident 
groups to form an entirely new state. In other words, for criminals to become social 
heroes - or more significantly, for heroes to become criminals - there must not only 
be poor classes who resent the rich, but also a political system claiming hegemony 
over both the rich and the poor.73 
69. Ibid., pp.19-20. 
70. Ibid., p.8. 
71. Ibid., p.3. 
72. A Blok, "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered", Comparative Studies ill Society alld 
History, 1972, Vol. 14, No.4, pp.494-505. 
73. R. Austen, "Social bandits and other heroic criminals: Western mcxlels of resistance and U1eir relevance for 
Africa", in D. Crununey, (ed.), Bwulit,y, Rebellion alld Social Protest ill Africa (London, 1986 ), p.89. 
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Austen's point is that in Africa - as opposed to Europe and Asia, from which Hobsbawm draws 
most of his examples - the states were usually too weak to define and delimit criminality. 
A further related problem is that in Africa the coming of the capitalist world economy (against 
which social banditry is a rebellion) frequently coincided with the arrival of the colonial frontier. 
Austen cautions that: 
We need to make a distinction between frontiers within a given social system, and 
the situation of "interpenetration between two previously distinct societies", which is 
the African colonial frontier. The former gives rise to banditry as one means of 
contesting the values that were to be deployed in controlling economic and political 
life. The latter produces "primary resistance" in which no institutions or repertoire of 
values are shared between the two sides.74 
As we shall see, Barbier's rebellion qualifies as social banditry by meeting both of Austen's 
requirements. Though the wider context of the rebellion was indeed the African colonial frontier, 
Barbier deliberately placed himself within (or on the margins of) the social system of Cape 
colonial society and against the general political authority of the capitalist VOC. In this he was to 
differ from the notorious Oorlam gangs who operated along the Orange River at a later date. 
Whatever the exact status of such gangs was, it is clear that, at the height of their influence, they 
operated outside of and against Cape colonial society.75 
There is one further set of objections to Hobsbawm's concept of social banditry which has to be 
considered before it can be imported into an African context. These objections centre around the 
two pre-conditions which Hobsbawm sees as being necessary for the existence of social banditry: 
(1) a social environment constituted by a traditional peasantry; and (2) a "precapitalist" or 
"preindustrial" social enviromnent. O'Malley, who identifies and dismisses these two 
preconditions, rightly draws our attention to the vagueness of Hobsbawm's use of the term 
"peasantry".76 For Hobsbawm, peasant types can range from the communal peasantry of mid-
nineteenth century Russia to French peasantry "who operate in a framework of bourgeois 
institutions and law, especially property law, most likely as individual commodity producers, 
possibly shading over to conunercial farmers".77 Such a broad definition of peasantry, as 
O'Malley notes, clearly permits the penetration of a capitalist productive order. It is, tl1erefore, 
74. Ibid., p.91. 
75. See chapter 9 below. 
76. P. O'Malley, "Social Bandits, Modem Capitalism and the Traditional Peasantry. A Critique of IIobsbawm", 
The Jou ma/ of Peasant Studies, 1979, Vol. 6, No.4, pp.489-50 I. 
77. E.J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics", The Joumal of Peasant Studies, 1973, 1, p.4. 
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extremely difficult to talk about a "traditional peasantry" when the matrix of social banditry is 
precisely that period of the peasantry's history in which it is being "modernised" or transformed. 
Rather than defining the support base of social banditry as being a "traditional peasantry", it is 
more accurate to state that "social banditry presumes as one of its conditions of existence chronic 
class struggle which permeates the social and geographical terrain of the bandit". In order for this 
"chronic class struggle" to support social banditry, it has to be manifested in a "unified conflict 
consciousness among direct producers" - "be they all peasants, or an admixture of sharecroppers, 
labourers, small-scale cash croppers or whatever".78 
Corrigan, however, has noted that this unified conflict consciousness need not necessarily be 
determined by common class membership since "particular producers in specific situations 
embody social relations and think thoughts about their experiences of labouring with others 
against enemies natural and human".79 These are important and useful distinctions to make for it 
would be very difficult to describe Barbier's rural supporters as being "peasants", still less as 
"traditional peasants". Moreover their conununal unity was, as we shall see, as much a product of 
conflict with the Khoisan as it was of class conflict. Though they thought of themselves as being 
of the rural poor, they certainly did not wish to make common cause with the even worse off 
Khoisan. 
There is one final point to make about Hobsbawm's stricture that social banditry occurs within 
essentially "pre-capitalist" or "pre-industrial" (also vague terms) societies. What Hobsbawm is 
really trying to draw our attention to, O'Malley insists, is that social banditry occurs in societies 
where "more effective mechanisms for articulating social protest" are lacking. He is arguing that 
only with the emergence of modem capitalism does one find the rise of institutionalised 
movements representing the interests of direct producers.SO It is certainly worth bearing this point 
in mind for, as we tum to a more detailed examination of Barbier's rebellion, it is obvious that 
nothing propelled him into his short career as a social bandit more strongly than the refusal of the 
authorities to listen to his complaints. 
On 24 or 25 February 1738 Barbier met with nine or ten of the angriest frontiersmen at the farm 
of Joharmes Ras near "de Paerl". Johannes was the elder brother of Hendrik Ras, one of those 
who had been on the expedition to Namaqualand, and obviously closely involved in the whole 
78. O'Malley, "Social Bandits", p.492. 
79. P. Corrigan, "On the politics of production: a conunent on "Peasants and Politics" by Eric Hobsbawm", The 
Jo11111al of Peasant Studies, 1975, Vol. 2, p.346. 
80. O'Malley, "Social Bandits", p.492. 
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affair. Barbier helped the protesters to compose and write a letter of complaint to Swellengrebel 
who was, at that moment, occupying the position of President of the Council of Justice. Though 
Barbier did not sign the letter (significantly only two out of nine signatories could write - the rest 
made crosses) he later confessed to having written it at the request of those present. The letter 
was a sharp attack on Landdrost Lourensz, who was accused of having stolen the cattle of the 
undersigned, and it was requested that Swellengrebel would order Lourensz to return the livestock 
forthwith. A remarkable feature of the letter was the inclusion of quasi-legal Latin terms, which 
Barbier had obviously picked up during the course of his long series of litigations. Such language 
was quite beyond the comprehension of the illiterate farmers whom Barbier now represented but 
by using it he must have enhanced his prestige greatly and encouraged them to believe that the 
law was on their side. Johannes Ras was despatched to deliver the letter to the relevant authorities 
at the Cape and the petitioners waited to see the result of Barbier's handiwork.81 
Ras' reception at the Castle was less than cordial. Van der Henghel, the governor, was tempted to 
arrest him whilst Swellengrebel advised him to take the matter up with the /anddrost of 
Stellenbosch. Since it was precisely this person against whom the complaint was lodged this did 
not appear to Ras, Barbier or their companions to be the best course to adopt. Instead they 
resolved to emulate the founder of the reforn1ed religion and nail their grievances to the church 
door.82 
It must have come as a most unpleasant surprise to the authorities to learn that Estie1me Barbier, 
whom they presumed to have escaped to Holland as a stow-away, had resurfaced. On, Sunday 1 
March 1738, the deserted sergeant appeared at the head of a group of armed and mounted men to 
read a seditious statement to the congregation of the church of Drakenstein as they came from 
their devotions. Having read his "Avis of great importance" - whose language was as rude as its 
message was subversive - Barbier compounded his crime by nailing the paper to the church door, 
an expressly forbidden act since the govenunent had reserved this particular channel of 
conununication for itself.83 What was in the document and who was behind Barbier? 
There was a very close c01mection between those involved in the expedition to the Orange River 
and those who followed Barbier to the Drakenstein church. The govenunent was inforn1ed that 
amongst those with Barbier at the church were Hendrik Kruger, Lodewyk Putter, Frans Campher, 
81. PhcitTer, "Gebrokc Ncdcrlands", Vol. 1, p.28; Vol. 2, p.15. De Villiers and Pama, Geslagsregisters, Vol. 2, 
pp.753-754. 
82. Pheiffer, "Ge broke Nederlands", Vol. I, p.29. 
83. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 4 March 1739, pp.255-256. 
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Arnoldus Basson, Hendrik Ras, Jan Olivier, Sybrand van Dyk and Johannes Ras.84 Putter, 
Campher, Van Dyk and Hendrik Ras had all been on the expedition in person whilst Kruger had 
despatched his servants. Arnoldus Basson was related to the Putter family whilst his wife, 
Catharina Olivier, was the sister of Jan Olivier.85 Quite obviously there were extensive family 
interests tied up in the disputed livestock but the "Avis" did not simply confine itself to the issue 
of confiscated cattle. 
Though Barbier had written the document he had not been without advisors and it represented a 
significant departure from the letter he had sent to Swellengreble. Its list of grievances was 
comprehensive and it may be taken as a fair reflection of the issues that were causing resentment 
amongst colonists on the Cape frontier.86 The "Avis" was aimed at a community of "Afrikaner 
brothers" and its first complaint concerned the issue of the payment of twenty-four Rijksdaalders 
per annum for a loan-farm. According to Barbier and his constituents this fee was ruining the 
farmers. The doubling of loan-farm rentals in 1732 had obviously not been easily absorbed by a 
significant sector of stock-farmers. In fact, the people whom Barbier represented questioned the 
very legality of loan-fann rental itself, claiming that its institution had never been announced by 
public edicts (plakkaten), and disputing the obligation to put down a deposit on leasing a farn1. 
The people held responsible for these evils were the "rulers" and the "principal ruler". Barbier 
took care to distinguish between the Heren XVII (whose laws were just) and the "roguish and 
danmed wilfulness of our rulers". In this he was conforming to the essentially refonnist ideas of 
primitive social protest, seeking to restore an imaginary traditional order. This order, he believed, 
was expressed in the Company regulations of 20 October 1687, which instructed officials at the 
Cape to provide prospective fanners with as much land as they could use and to equip them with 
the necessary items to start fanning. 
Times had changed. According to Barbier the governor was now a protector of "Scoundrels, 
idlers, and whip-branded thieves", as well as a participant in robberies against honest 
freeburghers. What rankled in particular was that the governor and the /anddrost (described as 
the "King of the Rogues") chose to believe the words of "unbaptised hottentots, who know 
84. See G.M. 1l1eal, Bela11grijke Historiscl,e Dok11me11te11, Deel I en 2. Verscheidene Historische Dokumenten 
Bettrekking Hebbende Tot Den Oproennaker Estienne Barbier (Cape Town, 1896), p.5. 
85. Putter's mother, Zacharia Visser, had re-married Johmmes Basson, the father of Arnoldus Basson. Arnoldus 
was married to Catharina Olivier, Jan Olivier's sister. De Villiers and Pama, Geslagsregisters, Vol. 2, p.667, 743. 
Andries van der Walt had worked as ak11ec/,t for Arnoldus Basson (1735-1737) and Jan Olivier (1737-1740) whilst 
Willem van Wyk was probably married to the step-sister of Frans Campher. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusie va11 die 
Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 13 March 1739; 21 March 1739, pp.256-260, n.79, n.80, n.84, n.100, n.105. 




nothing of salvation or damnation" and stole the cattle of the colonists so as to distribute them 
amongst their "hottentot cronies". This had encouraged the Khoisan to believe that they now had 
more rights than the colonists and the subsequent spate of robberies was thus a direct result of the 
government's interference. "And in addition the hottentots wish to violate the worthy Christian 
women: Saying that they have nothing to fear: alleging that the landdrost shall listen to them 
rather than to the Christian people". 
These violently anti-Khoikhoi sentiments and the exaggerated fears that "Hottentots" were getting 
above their station are a fascinating glimpse into the racial attitudes of frontier colonists at the 
time. As potential rapists of white women the Khoikhoi were clearly perceived to be desirous of 
crossing a cultural barrier which the colonists wished to remain impenetrable and inviolable. The 
emphasis on the heathenish nature of the Khoikhoi served to remind the authorities that they were 
essentially "other" than the Christian colonists and hence unsuitable recipients of even-handed 
ideas of justice. The government, in treating the Khoikhoi as though they were equal to 
Christians, was threatening the very identity of the colonists by exposing their women to sexual 
violation. 
After this attack on the government's allegedly pro-Khoikhoi policies, the "Avis" returned to the 
theme of the great difficulty experienced by aspirant farmers in making a beginning. Soldiers and 
sailors who were discharged from Company service with the intention of working for someone 
else (i.e. becoming a knecht) or leasing their own farm were obliged (or their employers were) to 
pay a fee to the governor. The best part of their labours was tl1en spent in paying back to the 
governor the interest on the money they had borrowed. Hundreds of young men and women 
(according to Barbier) found themselves unable to contemplate marriage, either because they had 
no prospects of being able to afford a fann or because they would have to pay too much to the 
governor. 
The document went on to list some of the corrupt trading practices of the governor and his 
officials, and it concluded by urging the colonists to cease paying deposits or rent for their loan-
farms; to cease paying money to obtain knechts and to submit a list of all claims against the 
government for forwarding to Holland so that they could be reimbursed and the "roguish acts of 
our land" exposed. 
Whilst it is difficult to prove that the govenunent was insisting on "deposits" or percentages of 
money over and above the rental of twenty-four Rijksdaalders per annum, it is highly likely that 
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in this, as in everything else, the administration was corrupt.87 What is not in contention is that 
young men were finding it difficult to acquire loan-farms and become independent farmers 
(though it is doubtful whether the marriage rate diminished as a result).88 It is significant that 
none of the colonists who went on the expedition to the Orange River had loan-farms of their 
own.89 This was not, of course, just because of the cost of the rental but because of other 
expenses involved in farn1ing - hence the attraction of stealing Khoikhoi cattle. 
A further stumbling block to aspirant farmers was that it was very difficult for newcomers to 
relax the tight control which the Company exercised over the meat market through the agency of 
monopolies granted to the privileged few. This was a point raised as early as 1715 in a 
memorandum drawn up by Frans van der Stel, the brother of Willem Adriaan.90 Although Frans' 
main target in his memorandum was Henning Huising, the holder of the Company meat pacht and 
the sworn enemy of the Van der Stels, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the details 
provided. The Company meat contractor was able to e1tjoy exclusive rights to an immense area of 
land some seven or eight Dutch miles from Cape Town. This area, known as Groene Kloof, was 
about 300000 morgen or 100 square Dutch miles in extent. It was well watered, richly pastured 
and close to the market. "It can therefore be imagined", wrote Frans van der Ste!: 
how many thousands of sheep it was possible to breed in that fruitful quarter ... and 
how at a public lease no-one at the Cape can supply meat at a lower rate than 
Huysing, or whoever may be in the possession of the Groene Kloof, as it almost 
costs him nothing, excepting the maintenance of the overseers, slaves, and the 
expense of a few additional trifles, hence it may be seen with what little difficulty 
those who depasture cattle there are able to supply meat to the Company at thirteen 
doits per pound ... From this it must also follow that the poor burghers cannot sell 
any cattle to the butcher, who himself owns so much cattle that he cannot sell all. 
If poor people were allowed to settle at Groene Kloof, continued Frans van der Ste!: "This course 
would also introduce more equality among the agriculturalists and cattle herders and prevent that 
the one is made to depend too much on the other, as otherwise the poor will be the slaves of the 
rich, so that two or three men of means might easily form a large cabal...".91 
87. See p.116 below for further evidence of deposits on loan-fanns. 
88. Robert Ross has conunented on the high growth rate of the free population of the Cape Colony which was 
largely due to the low age at first marriage of women. Sec R. Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation on 
the South African Frontier", in H. Lamar and L. Thompson, (eds.), The J<,·ontier in Histoty (New Haven, 1981 ), 
pp.217-218. 
89. This observation is based on a study of the Ortde Wildsc/11111ehoeke11 (RLR). 




Though it might seem ironic that such fears should be voiced by one who had himself belonged to 
precisely such a cabal, Frans van der Stel, "een Pest voor de Kaap",92 knew what he was talking 
about. Wealthy, well-connected men could edge out the poorer colonists and make their access to 
land and money more difficult. Although Barbier did not specifically identify or attack a 
cabalistic elite in his "Avis" there is a constant implicit criticism of those who worked hand in 
glove with corrupt officials and in some of his subsequent statements this criticism became far 
more explicit. 
For the time being, however, Barbier's message was quite subversive enough. The government 
was informed of events outside the church, as well as of the identity of the instigators and the 
content of their proclamation, by J.M. Friek, messenger of the Court in Paarl.93 Realising that 
with such a progran101e Barbier would be able to command a great deal of support, the 
authorities decided to act as swiftly and tactfully as possible in order to nip the revolt in the bud. 
The first step was to declare Barbier to be an outlaw ("vogel-vry" in the Dutch) and to issue 
instructions for his apprehension - dead or alive. l11e second step was to try to separate Barbier 
from his followers by issuing the latter a pardon if they abandoned him and gave tl1emselves up 
within a montl1.94 l11is proclamation was pinned to the church door and almost inunediately torn 
down by Barbier himself - another crime. But it is a measure of his local popularity that he was 
able to do so without being arrested. 
Barbier and his followers had been hiding out at the Piketberg since I March but they returned to 
Paarl, armed, on 16 March. They had received notice that the heemraden of Stellenbosch wished 
to discuss things with them and decided to risk an encounter.95 The first heemraden they 
encountered were l11eunis Boota and Charles Marais. These gentlemen suggested that the 
meeting take place the next day at the farn1 of the heemraad, Hendrik van der Merwe. After some 
discussion Barbier and his followers decided to keep the rendezvous, but fearing an an1bush by 
the landdrost and a commando, took the precaution of remaining well armed and in the open. 
Eventually they were persuaded to go to the fann house where there were five or six heemraden 
present.96 
92. Fouche, Adam Tas, pp.112-113. 
93. 1l1eal, Dokume11te, p.5. 
94. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 21 March 1739, p.259. 
95. Phei!Ter, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. 2, p.65. 
96. Ibid. At a later date Barbier's prosecutors were to make a great deal out of the words he uttered whilst going 
to this meeting when his followers feared an ambush: "Necn kinderen; het en is geen swaerigheijd; want wij bcn 
goed gewaep". 
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According to Barbier's account of proceedings, Captain Jan Louw accused him of being a seducer 
of the common people. Barbier's supporters quickly sprang to his defence, saying: "You are not a 
traitor, but in reality our good father, because you have helped us, and with justice; and you have 
opened our eyes to the truth; and without you we should all have been taken for scoundrels if you 
had not come to our rescue". 97 
Even if this speech was never actually made, it is a revealing indication of the way in which 
Barbier viewed himself. A further point of interest is the way in which Barbier expressed ideal 
political relationships. His model was an essentially paternalistic one - and this he shared with his 
supporters - of a good father looking after his children. At various places in his writings he 
describes good rulers as being "fathers" and appeals to them to protect their children. In this, as in 
many other of his actions, Barbier allowed hope to triumph over experience. Captain Jan Louw, 
however, was certainly no good father, for Barbier accused him of having neglected to forward 
letters of complaint from the colonists. These letters had been given to Charles Marais, who had 
in turn given them to Louw, where they had stopped. Barbier went on to castigate Louw and the 
other heemraden for having pern1itted Matthys Willemsz and Pieter de Bruyn to be arrested 
without cause. Warming to his theme he then demanded to know why the government no longer 
paid each colonist who attended the compulsory annual military drill at Stellenbosch three 
Rijksdaalders for expenses. Finally he returned to the question of the confiscated cattle, 
demanding their return. When Louw cautioned that only some of the cattle might be returned, 
Barbier launched into a blistering attack on the absent Landdrost Lourensz and his chief 
henchman, Louw: "You danmed Piet Lourensz, you scoundrel: Why did you order my livestock 
to be stolen: My house to be burnt, my wife to be violated; with your danmed brothers the 
hottentots; and you would not give back all of my livestock; why have you allowed me to be 
robbed?"98 
This outburst clearly contained fearful fantasies of future occurrences as well as present 
grievances of the frontiersmen and it is remarkable how Barbier assumed the collective identity of 
the people whom he championed. He also seemed to assume that Louw himself was as good (or 
as bad) as Lourensz and when Louw objected that he was not the /anddrost, and that Barbier 
should not speak so strongly against him, the reply was: "If you are not the Landdrost: in this 
case you are his principal; or you arc the King of the Hottentots himself. "99 
97. PhcitTcr, "Gcbrokc Nedcrlands", Vol. 2, p.70. 
98. Ibid., pp.73-74. 
99. Ibid. • 
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From the above it may be seen that Barbier had a highly developed sense of the dramatic, casting 
himself as both champion of the people and public prosecutor. Though the account he gives of his 
own words and deeds may have been heightened for effect there is good evidence that Barbier was 
indeed intemperate in his use of language. It may seem surprising that Barbier should delight in 
recording these outbursts of his, particularly since they are found in a letter ( or book, so great is 
its length), written to Swellengrebel (who was appointed as governor in April 1739) asking for 
pardon. The letter was probably written in AugustlOO and its tone may be explained by Barbier's 
assumption that Swellengrebel would be ill disposed towards any of Van der Henghel's consorts -
and in Barbier's estimation Lourensz was "King of those rogues". By attacking the ex-governor's 
cronies so vigorously, Barbier was counting on winning the new governor's support.IOI In 
addition, Barbier obviously found the exercise of writing about his case extremely cathartic. On 
paper, at least, he could shout down the corrupt traducers of the land, scoring great victories in 
debate, backed by the people's will and incontrovertible evidence. 
After lecturing the heemraden on their duties and suggesting that the landdrost had turned them 
into "Hottentoten Hemeraden", Barbier stated his demands: a free pardon for himself and his 
followers; the return of the stolen cattle or eight Rijksdaalders per head for those which were not 
returned; compensation payment for the inconvenience caused to those whose cattle had been 
confiscated and the release of De Bruyn and Willemsz. If this was not done, threatened Barbier, 
he would burn them and their houses whilst sparing their women and children. Some of the 
heemraden seemed to be suitably chastened by Barbier's sennon and in words that echoed the 
Bible, acknowledged that though he spoke the truth "they who speak the truth; have no haven". 
Barbier replied that though truth had no home in this country he would take it to the 
Fatherland.102 Charles Marais, who up to this point had backed Barbier's statements with the 
fervour of an acolyte, was suddenly accused by Barbier of being an "idler" and of having paid ex-
Governor de la Fontaine 100 sheep in order to secure a loan-farn1. Marais acknowledged the fact 
and Barbier used this as evidence to illustrate the obstacles facing poor colonists who wished to 
acquire farn1s.103 
The meeting ended with the heemraden promising to deliberate with the landdrost on 19 March. 
Once they had done so the Council of Policy was inforn1cd of events. They decided, on 21 March, 
100. Ibid., Vol. 1, p.39. 
101. For the idea that Barbier was trying to exploit ill feeling between Van der I-Ienghcl and Swcllcngrebel see 
Mentzel, Allema,111, p.107 and Pheiffer, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. 2, p. 107. 
102. Phciffer, "Gcbrokc Ncderlands", Vol. 2, p.77. 
103. Ibid., p. 78. 
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that there would be no pardon for Barbier. They realised, however, that it would be impossible to 
capture him or his followers, all perfect horsemen and shots, in an extensive country peopled with 
rebel sympathisers. Instead they offered a free pardon to anyone or any number of people, 
whether guilty of cattle thefts, barter, or following Barbier, if they delivered him into the hands of 
justice. Du Bruyn and Wilemsz were released on condition that they helped to capture Barbier.104 
It is some measure of Barbier's popularity that this offer did not result in his immediate 
apprehension. The Council of Policy therefore decided to defuse the burgher discontent by going 
back on its word to the various Khoisan complainants. On 31 March the government had passed 
a resolution which allowed the injured parties to take back any cattle which they recognised as 
being theirs from amongst those confiscated by Counitz and assembled at the Company cattle 
post at Groene Kloof.105 On 28 April, however, it was decided to re-confiscate the cattle, which 
had just been returned to Plato, Vulcanus, Arisie, Gaann, Swaartbooij and Titus on the grounds 
that "the Council has been infom1ed that the cattle in no way belong to them, or has ever been 
taken away from them, as they have falsely asserted".106 This complete volte-face was quite 
contrary to the expectations of the Namaqua who, on their departure from the Cape, had been 
provided with food, tobacco, arrack, "trifling presents of beads" and, in the case of Gaaren, a 
staff of office.107 Whilst such decisions went a long way towards reconciling the colonists to the 
Company they had quite the opposite effect on the Khoisan. 
THE FRONTIER WAR OF 1739 
On 20 April 1739 news was received in Stellenbosch that the livestock of Leendert Louw, Tobias 
Mostcrt's widow and Johannes Mostert had been stolen by "hottentots onder aan de kant van d' 
Olyphants Rivier en die Jackhals Valley".108 From the Bokkeveld came reports that the cattle of 
Schalk van der Merwe had been stolen too. The reports added that Tobias' knecht and three 
slaves had been killed in the attack.109 Details which were later supplied by an old servant who 
had witnessed the attack were that about I 00 Khoisan ("Hottentots" in the original) had arrived at 
Louw's fann and attempted to steal the cattle. The knecht had shot and killed one of the robbers, 
putting the rest to flight. Next day, however, they returned with five of the Bokkevcld Khoikhoi 
104. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 21 March 1739, pp.259-262. 
105. Ibid., 31 March 1739, p.263. 
106. Ibid., 28 April 1739, pp.265-266. 
107. Ibid. Also 13 March 1739, pp.258-259. 
108. CA, C 651, Dag Register Van Stellenbosch en Drakenslein 1737-1739, 20 April 1739; CA, C 454, 




who had muskets and killed the knecht. They then stole seven muskets from the house as well as 
powder and lead, kidnapped two slaves, drove away as many cattle and sheep as they could 
whilst stabbing others, including a horse, to death. As many as 500 of the 1500 sheep and 70 of 
the 108 cattle at the farm were taken. I IO 
There is every reason to suppose that Swaartbooij and Titus were behind this attack even though 
they were not in the Sandveld at this time. In the first place the Jackhals Vlei area was their 
territory and in the second place there is the testimony of a Khoikhoi from the Olifants River 
against them. This man was questioned, as to who the cause of the trouble was, by members of 
the commando which was sent to avenge the robberies: 
gaf mij denselven tot antwoord Channant (alias) Titus, Swarte Booij, Pokkebaas 
Claas en Jantje Keekelaar, op het welke ik denselven voorheid dat zulx niet konde 
weesen, terwijl die Hottentotten sig aan de Kaap bevonden, daar <lien Hottentot op 
repliceerde dat de eevengem. vier Hottentotten sulx aan haar natie aan de hand 
gegeeven hadden ten tijde dat den substituijt laddrost sig in het Bockenvelt bevond 
om van de aldaar woonende landbouwers haar vee af te haalen, en dat zij 
Hottentotten als doen beslooten hadden dat soo draa gem. substituijt het 
boovenstaande verrigt hadde en haarl. afgegeeven zijn soude, het hun beloofde vee, 
sij bij haar te rugkomst de uitterste veeposten souden aandoen, de mans vennoorden, 
de vrouwen wegvoeren en het buscruijt en loot meede genoomen hebbende, sij sig in 
't vervolg bij malkanderen craalsgewijse souden houden.111 
A general panic began to spread throughout the northern frontier zone as colonists drove their 
livestock southwards and abandoned their fanns. Reports of robberies and rumours of murders 
swept from one lonely farm to another. It was heard that the Khoisan had threatened to drive all 
Europeans south of the Berg River. At the height of the disturbances ten farms were burnt and a 
further forty-eight abandoned. Over 700 cattle and nearly 3000 sheep were swept away and the 
Khoisan responsible for this had at least thirteen muskets between them.112 
110. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 2 June 1739, p.272. 
111. Ibid., p.275. "he replied Channant (alias Titus), Swaarte Booij, Pokkebaas Claas and Jantje Keekelaar, to 
which I replied that this could not be since those Hottentots were at the Cape, to which the Hottentot replied that 
the above mentioned four Hottentots had suggested it to their nation at the time when the substitute-landdrost was 
in the Bokkeveld in order to take their cattle from the fanners who lived there, and that the Hottentots had then 
decided that as soon as the substitute had <lone so and returned their cattle to them, tl1ey would visit the furthest 
stock-posts, murder the men, carry off the women, take the powder and lead and thereafter gather together kraal-
wisc". 
112. Ibid., p.276; CA, C 651, 20 April 1739; CA, l/STB 3/8, Verklaarings, Pleidooie en Intcrrogatosien 
(Krimineel) 1740-1741, Jacobus Gil<lcnhuyscn to Lan<l<lrost, 30 Aug. 1739. 
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The frontier was in flames. By attempting to defuse a burgher rebellion the Council of Policy had 
done a great deal to ignite a Khoisan uprising. The landdrost and heemraden of Stellenbosch 
hastened to authorise and appoint local veldkorporaals to raise commandos in their districts but 
more than this was needed to deal with the escalating crisis.113 It was particularly irritating that 
the Khoisan attacks had been provoked by the same people who were now riding with Barbier but 
the government conceived of a plan to exploit this connection to their advantage. The Council of 
Policy decided to accept the offer of the ex-burgher councillor, Johannes Kruywagen, to lead a 
commando against the marauders. No doubt it was the scope, subtlety and economy of 
Kruywagen's proposals that made tl1em so attractive. He proposed that those people who had 
been guilty of bartering cattle from the Namaqua, as well as those who were, or had been in any 
way involved with Estienne Barbier, should be given a free pardon on the condition that they 
joined his commando.114 By adopting Kruywagen's proposals the Company had the opportunity 
to appear to be punishing both the European and the Khoisan malefactors. In reality all pretence 
of providing justice for the Khoisan was dropped and the expedient of using the initial instigators 
of the unrest to crush the uprising that they themselves had provoked was an extremely cynical 
measure. 
Kruywagen himself was an energetic commander. On 28 April he sent instructions to the 
Roodezand ordering all who had been involved in bartering cattle from the Namaqua and all who 
had assisted Estienne Barbier to appear fully-armed at the place of Hendrik Kruger at the 
Piketberg. At the san1e time he and some others proceeded towards Groene Kloof, "confiscating 
cattle from the Hottentots who had lately been at the Cape, and who belonged to the Little 
Namaqua and Bushmen tribes" along the way.115 On 30 April Kruywagcn encountered 
Swaartbooij and Titus with some of their followers but at this stage Kruywagen had no proof that 
they were responsible for the attacks further to the north. He was content to take sixty-eight of 
their eighty-three cattle and instructed them to return to their kraals at tl1e Lange Vlei and behave 
themselves. That he did not entirely trust them is clear from the fact that he provided them with 
an arn1ed escort to take them there and that he commented: "Swaartbooij and Channant alias 
Titus begged me to sell or barter to them two muskets pretending that they wished to kill 
elephants, which request however, for reasons I refused" .116 
113. CA, C 651, 20 April 1739. 
114. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 28 April 1739, pp.265-266. 
115. Ibid., 2 June 1739, pp.269-270. 
116. Ibid., p.270. 
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At Kruger's farm Kruywagen waited until 4 May when ten men arrived who wished to receive a 
pardon for their past misdeeds by joining the commando. TI1e next few days were spent in 
scouting and awaiting the arrival of more men. By IO May Kruywagen had thirty-six, at least 
twelve of whom were Khoikhoi, and the conunando crossed the Olifants River.117 Shortly 
thereafter the commando split into two groups, the larger group of thirty going in one direction 
and the smaller group, including Kruywagen, going eastwards into the Bokkeveld. Not far from 
the burnt and looted farm of Sybrand van Dyk in the Bokkeveld, Kruywagen's party discovered a 
kraal of Khoisan.118 The next morning, 18 May, as the colonists cautiously approached the kraal 
they were spotted and heard the cry "War has been inflicted on us by the Dutch!" followed by the 
shouted instructions of a woman telling her man to shoot. Fighting began as Kruywagen and his 
men fired into a large cave occupied by a number of Khoisan. TI1eir fire was returned and a bullet 
struck Kruywagen's musket-stock, shattering it and wounding the conunander's left hand and 
chest. The colonists continued to fire into the cave and, according to Kruywagen, "we must have 
shot and wounded a great many as we heard great groaning". Despite this some Khoisan in other 
caves kept up a fire of poisoned arrows on Kruywagen's men who showed a great disinclination 
to obey his orders, namely, that they should advance behind a shield of live cattle into the caves. 
They argued that Kruywagen might bleed to death and that it was better to retire with forty-six 
recaptured cattle than to bother about the remaining four hundred sheep still in the possession of 
the defenders. Hendrik Kruger, a member of the group, was able to identify the cattle as being 
those of Jochem Koekemoer. Kruywagen ordered these to be returned to Koekemoer and, together 
with his men, returned to Sybrand van Dyk's fann to dress his wounds and wait for news from the 
other section of the conunando.119 
Even before reaching the farm, however, some riders from the larger group found Kruywagen and 
told him that, three days before, Jan Gous, Jan Olivier and Gerrit van Wyk had come across a 
group of Khoisan in another part of the Bokkeveld who had in their possession the livestock of 
Tobias Mostert and Leendert Louw. In the ensuing skinnish all three colonists were wounded but 
the livestock was recovered. The day after this engagement the farn1s of Jochem Koekemoer and 
Hendrik Kruger had been burnt, the latter's wheat being set alight. Gous died later of his 
wounds.120 
117. Ibid., pp.270-273. 
118. Ibid., p.273. This fanu was near one of Kruywagen's, "naar d'Uijekraal". Van Dyk's fann, described as a 
"post", does not show up in U1e loan-fanu records and once again suggests the limitations of this source in providing 
a picture of actual land occupancy. 
119. lbid., pp.273-274. 
120. Ibid., pp.274-275. 
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Still without the bulk of his commando Kruywagen proceeded to Leendert Louw's farm where he 
found one of the slaves of Tobias Mostert who had earlier been abducted by the Khoisan. The 
slave had escaped and Kruywagen interrogated him to learn what he could of the robbers. 
Apparently they had six muskets, plentiful supplies of lead and powder, and had vowed to kill all 
Europeans they encountered. At night they kept good watch and during the day they guarded the 
passes through which the colonists would have to travel in order to reach them. Kruywagen did 
not entirely trust the slave and, thinking that he might be a spy for the Khoisan, "gave him some 
blows to get at the truth". His story did not, however, change.121 
On 23 May Kruywagen received information that Swaartbooij, Titus and nine other "Hottentots 
of the Little Namaqua" had carried off the cattle of Albert van Zyl as well as a servant and a 
musket. He immediately sent some of his men to Van Zyl's and on 24 May met the bulk of his 
conunando at Hendrik Kruger's Piketberg farm. The frontier was far from pacified but there was 
little more that Kruywagen could do with the forces at his disposal. It was reported that the 
Khoisan were threatening the livestock of the Sandveld farmers, Jacob Cloete and Jan 
Engelbrecht, though the fonner had already had all of his wheat stolen. Although 103 cattle and 
530 sheep had been recovered there were still many heads of stock missing. Kruywagen felt he 
had done all he could and therefore returned to the Cape to submit his report and make 
suggestions as to the best way in which to pursue the war. Those Khoikhoi who had participated 
in the commando were rewarded with one head of cattle a piece. The rest of the cattle were 
returned to Tobias Mostert, Jochem Koekemoer and Leendert Louw.122 
Kruywagen's new proposals were simple. Another commando should be sent out as soon as 
possible under the leadership of good officers and should include two surgeons in the personnel. 
The conunando should divide itself into two companies, the better to pursue its enemies, and be 
bolstered by the presence of two military posts which should be established on the Olifants River 
- one at Wanne Bad and the other at Compagnies Drift. These posts, garrisoned by nine soldiers 
each, should be prepared to go to the assistance of the commandos when necessary and prevent 
the Khoisan from slipping away. The Council of Policy decided to adopt these proposals and 
added that not only the residents of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein should join the proposed 
conunando but also those residents of the Cape district who had farms in the north-west.123 The 
first attempts to implement these plans, however, failed dismally. 
121. lbid,p.275. 
122. Ibid., pp.275-277. 
123. Ibid., pp.277-279. 
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The authorities had not bargained on the less than enthusiastic support of the colonists to the call 
to arms. They no doubt believed that since the most rebellious of their subjects had already 
bowed to Company rule by fighting in Kruywagen's commando the meeker majority would follow 
suit. However, the two men who had been chosen to round up men and supplies for the 
commando, Captain Theunis Boota and Lieutenant Johannes Louw, were obliged to report to 
their superiors on 23 June that they had had to return without being able to fulfil their mission. 
On reaching Vier en Twintig Rivieren, where they had expected to find men and supplies, they 
found instead that certain people from the Roodezand were completely unwilling to serve in the 
commando or furnish it with provisions.124 Once more the government's authority was being 
challenged by the colonists of the northern frontier zone and the Company, indeed the governor 
himself, viewed the matter in the most serious light. He ordered the landdrost of Stellenbosch, the 
officers and the two veldkorporaals of the Roodezand area, Jacobus Theron and Jan Coetsee, to 
report to him in person.125 These individuals were then questioned very roughly by the governor 
and the Council of Policy. The veldkorporaals pleaded that the heavy rains, swollen rivers, lack 
of grazing and cold weather were all discouraging factors. In addition it was time for ploughing 
and sowing and many farn1ers were reluctant to go on a conunando at that time. Jacobus Theron, 
the veldkorporaal for the district beyond the Roodezand's Kloof, explained that the men he had 
ordered out on conunando had replied "that they were quite willing to obey if those who had 
instigated the said Hottentots would also go, without however mentioning names" .126 
The government was far from pleased by this intelligence and reprimanded its appointed 
functionaries very severely for their lack of zeal. The governor demanded the names of anyone 
who refused to co-operate but there was very little alternative to postponing the proposed 
commando until September. In the meantime preparations were to be so thorough that Company 
control over the frontier would be assured. It was hard not to see the influence of Barbier behind 
the colonists' spirit of disobedience and it was not forgotten that the sergeant was still 
vagabonding in the district. The landdrost was instructed to bring him in: dead or alive.127 
Though Kruywagen's conunando had failed to crush Khoisan opposition it had succeeded in 
separating Barbier from his followers. The farn1ers of the frontier, sympathetic though they were 
to Barbier and his aims, were gradually beginning to realise that the threat which they faced from 
the Khoisan was greater than the threat of the Company. Even though the colonists had stirred up 
124. CA, 1/STB 13/4, 23 June 1739; CA, C 651, 22 June 1739. 
125. CA, C 651, 29 June 1739. 
126. De Wet, (ed.), R.esolusies vcm die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 7 July, 1739, pp.280-281. 
127. Ibid., pp.281-282. 
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a hornet's nest, the Company had now demonstrated its willingness to support their claims rather 
than those of the Khoisan. It is possible to see this change in attitude as one of the achievements 
of the Barbier rebellion. Barbier's supporters had, to some extent, got what they had wanted. 
111eir most pressing need was now to subdue the Khoisan and reach an agreement with the 
Company. Unfortunately for Barbier this meant the end of his dreams of an armed uprising. His 
followers, by joining Kruywagen's commando, accepted government authority. Barbier had once 
again to substitute the pen for the sword. 
Actually Barbier had never ceased to pursue his vendetta against officialdom by writing letters. 
Three of these were addressed to Swellengrebel and were despatched on the 6, 17, and 26 March. 
It would seem as though none of them reached their destination. A fourth letter, dated 22 March, 
took the forn1 of a "Public circulating letter". In this all "Afrikaner brothers" were urged to 
disobey Landdrost Lourensz. Indeed, if we are to believe Van der Henghel, Barbier threatened to 
evict him (Van der Henghel) from the Castle with armed force having gone so far as procuring a 
scaling ladder for storming the walls! 128 Despite the disappointment of seeing his followers 
joining Kruywagen's conunando in May there was reason for some optimism in April. On the 
14th of that month Swellengrebel had been appointed as governor in Van der Henghel's place. 
Barbier had reason to believe that the new governor would be far more sympathetic to his 
exposure of official corruption and redoubled his efforts at letter writing.129 
Not surprisingly, one of the targets of his displeasure was Jan Myndertz Kruywagen. This was 
not simply because Barbier wished to vent his spleen against the man who had taken away his 
arn1ed followers. In fact, Barbier was showing conunendable consistency in attacking one of the 
most powerful agrarian capitalists of the northern Cape frontier zone. Though Barbier was to 
wonder, sarcastically, how such a comic figure as Kruywagen ever came to volunteer or be 
appointed as leader of a conunando, Kruywagen had the largest vested interests in restoring peace 
to the frontier. He was, without doubt, one of the wealthiest and most influential men in the 
colony. As one of the holders of the Company meat contract he had the use of Groene Kloof as 
well as his many fanns in the West Coast and the Bokkeveld. He also had fanns in the Gouritz 
River area of the southern Cape. By 1743 it is estimated that Kruywagen was farming 
approximately 39 000 morgen of land in the vicinity of St Helena Bay.130 This did not make him 
popular with less fortunate colonists but it did give him the authority, according to Barbier, of a 
128. Phcillcr, "Gcbroke Nedcrlands", Vol. I, p.33; Vol.2, p.21. 
129. Sec note IOI above. 
130. Sec M.H.D. Smith, 1Juerepio11iers l'cm Die Sa11dveld (Pretoria, 1985), pp.58-59 for details of Krnywagen's 
land holding. Sec also CA, RLR 8, 15 Nov. I 728, p.138·, CA, RLR 9, 22 Nov. I 730, pp.74-77. 
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second governor. He had tremendous influence over the Company by virtue of his control over the 
meat supply and used this influence to detennine the allocation of loan-farms as well as the price 
to be set on land, livestock and the freedom of knechts. Nothing was achieved in the area without 
Kruywagen first saying "jaa, jaa" (Barbier portrayed him as a clown) and receiving payment for 
his approval. A man who had more farms than twenty colonists together was, in Barbier's eyes, 
breaking the orders of the Heren XVII. These gentlemen had decreed, on 30 October 1706, that 
no single colonists should be granted land in an amount disproportionate to his fellows. 
Kruywagen was therefore an enemy of the people whose sin was compounded by making it 
impossible for others to sell their meat to the Company since he, Kruywagen, could supply all its 
needs.131 
In these respects Kruywagen was obviously the successor of Henning Huysing and part of the 
eternal cabalistic elite that Frans van der Stel had identified in 1715. In attacking Kruywagen, 
Barbier was clearly voicing the grumblings of poorer colonists and continuing to act as people's 
champion. Barbier also busied himself by collecting letters of grievance from other colonists 
which he planned to forward to the govemor.132 All these actions help to explain why the loss of 
his anned followers did not mean the end of his freedom, for the frontier community continued to 
protect him. When Kruywagen's commando returned at the end of May, Barbier's ex-comrades 
did not tum him in. A governn1ent plakkaat of 2 June promised to pardon all Company deserters 
who returned within three months of the announcement but Barbier either did not learn of this or 
did not trust it. At any rate, it is highly unlikely that the terms of clemency extended to include 
him, for he was not just a deserter but an outlaw as well.133 
In the meantime the northern frontier zone remained unstable. It was obvious that only a major 
military operation would restore peace but until the coming of spring it was up to the local 
veldkorporaals to ensure the safety of their districts. Barend Lubbe, the veldkorporaal of the 
Olifants River, was instructed to make sure he did not antagonise the "Hottentot Pokkebaas 
Claas", or any other peaceful Khoikhoi in his district, during the execution of his duties134 - a 
sure sign that tensions were running high. In the Lange Vlei area the departure of Albert van Zyl 
and other fanners necessitated the appointment of a veldkorporaal for that district. The man 
131. PheitTer, "Ge broke Ne<lerlan<ls", Vol. 2, pp.84-88. 
132. Ibid., pp.50-54. 
133. Ibi<l., Vol. I, p.34; Vol.2, p.24. Barbier was later to argue that he would have turned himself in had he but 
hear<l of the plakkaat in time, or ha<l he dared to appear in the open when the veldwagters had been instrnctcd to 
kill him. 
134. CA, C 651, 7 June 1739; CA, 1/STB 13/4, 23 June 1739. 
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chosen was Hendrik Kruger .135 One of the most urgent priorities was to recover the firearms and 
anmmnition from the marauding Khoisan for until such time, the isolated colonists could not be 
sure of holding their own on their farms. This was underlined by the experiences of Hendrik 
Beukes, a knecht of the ex-heemraden member, Jacob Cloete. 
On 20 June Beukes had gone to his employer's farn1 near the Compagnies Drift on the Olifants 
River with three teams of oxen to sow wheat. Once he had done this he was supposed to take the 
oxen back to the Berg River, but, before he could do so, a large group of "Hottentots or 
Bushmen" took fourteen of the oxen, making them swim to the other side of the swollen river. It 
seems that Beukes was able to recover these oxen by reasoning with the Khoisan who were 
inclined to make peace with the Dutch provided that Kruywagen and Daniel Bokkelenberg 
returned the cattle they had taken from them. Two days later though the Khoisan obviously had 
second thoughts for they returned, took all twenty-four oxen across the river, and fired a couple 
of shots at Beukes for good measure. Beukes told the landdrost that all other farms in the vicinity 
had been abandoned, the nearest being three days journey south of the Olifants River.136 Not long 
after this came word that the cattle of Jan Engelbrecht and Myndert van Eden had been stolen in 
the Sandveld.137 
In accordance with Kruywagen's suggestions a group of Company soldiers was despatched to the 
Olifants River on 17 July, and the date of departure for the commando fixed for 30 August.138 
To add to the excitement of the time Lourensz received a report on 18 July that Barbier had been 
seen in the Roodezand district and he lost no time in sending off his substitute, Counitz to capture 
the outlaw. The unfortunate Counitz, though accompanied by two veldwagters, could not have 
relished the job, particularly since he was the most unpopular man in the area. He reported back 
to Lourensz that one of the veldwagters had run away with his arn1s and provisions. The 
veldwagter, when traced, explained that he had merely been detained by going back to search for 
these items which had fallen unobserved from his horse. Lourensz reported to Governor 
Swellengrebel that he suspected that fear was the real reason for his substitute's return. As luck 
would have it, various complaints about Counitz reached the governor at the same time. 
Ironically, many of these complaints had been penned with Barbicr's help. The governor's 
135. CA, 1/STB 13/4, 12 June 1739. 
136. CA, l/STI3 13/4, 13 July 1739; CA, C 651, 14 July 1739. 
137. CA, C 455, Inkomende Briewe, 9 July-9 Dec. 1739, Lourensz to Swellengrcbel, 23 July 1739. 
138. CA, C 651, 17 July 1739. 
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response was to dismiss Counitz from his post and Barbier remained free. Lourensz, meanwhile, 
asked for a new substitute.139 
On 31 July Barbier circulated a second public letter "Aan alles de Afrikanders gebroedsels". 
There was more than a hint of desperation in this letter for Barbier promised all who had had 
cattle stolen by the Khoisan, or who had been driven from their farms in the fighting, that he 
would repay them. He also assured his readers that he spoke in the name of the Heren XVII and 
the States-General of the Netherlands. It is not known whether this letter attracted much public 
support but at least nobody betrayed him.140 On 20 August Lourensz reported to the governor 
that he had sent his new substitute, Witstock, to the Roodezand to investigate reports that Barbier 
had been seen in the homes of the widow of Joost Bevernagie and the widow of Amoldus Basson. 
When Witstock went incognito to widow Basson's house he could not find him there though he 
learnt afterwards that Barbier had been hiding under the bed at the time. His infonnant was the 
son of the widow Burgert, at whose house Barbier had also stayed. Here he had struck the knecht 
of the widow Burgert over the head, for reasons which remain obscure. The knecht, Brand, said 
that Barbier had hit him: "because the widow Bevernagie had to pay a fine on his behalf and that 
the son of Burgert had sworn a false oath to this end, that he (Brand?) would wed the widow and 
wanted the fine again; he (Barbier) presented one of the pistols which he had to Brand and said 
'See here! Shoot me dead because I have deserved death' but seeing how Barbier was holding the 
muzzle against his body he did not dare hazard this."141 
Barbier was clearly beginning to despair whilst a life filled with so many widows was obviously 
fraught with complications! Though Witstock had been too late to discover Barbier he left 
instructions for the locals to hand the outlaw over to justice and set a Khoikhoi spy in place to 
report on his movements.142 
139. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 23 July 1739; CA, C 1101, 24 July 1739, p.14; CA, C 524, Vergaande 
Briewe, 24 July 1739, pp.410-411. 
140. Pheiffer, "Gebroke Nederlands", Vol. 2, p.31. 
141. " ... omdat de Wed. Bevemagie om zijnentwillen boete hadde moeten betaalen, en <lat de zoon van Burgert ten 
<lien eijnde een valschen Eed hadde gedaan, <lat hy met die Wedue soude trouwen en over sulx de Boete wilden 
weder hebbcn; presenteerende voorts aan gem. Brand een van de bijhebbcn<le pisloolen, onder het seggen "Sie 
<laar! Schiel my doo<l, want ik hebbe dog de <loot vcr<licnt" dog <lenselven heefi sulx aangesien hem Barbier de 
tromp naar het lyf heil<l niet <lurven hazardeeren". CA, C 455, Lourcnsz to Swellengrebel, 20 Aug. 1739. 
142. Ibid. 
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PACIFICATION 
By 8 August Captain Theunis Boota was on the march at the head of a force of eighty-three men, 
both European and Khoikhoi.143 The spring campaign was proceeding ahead of schedule and in 
front of the main commando the veldkorporaals, Andries Burgers and Barend Lubbe, had been 
busy. In response to the burning of Jurgen Hanekom's farm in the Lange Vlei, Burgers and ten 
men had attacked a group of Khoisan, killing twenty of them and capturing a musket. One of 
Burgers' men was killed by a poisoned arrow and it is of interest to note that it was "den vryswart 
Pieter Sijmonsz".144 At the Olifants River Barend Lubbe and his men attacked the kraal of 
Captain Jaager, killing sixteen of his people and recovering thirty-two of Van Eden's cattle, fifty-
five of Jan Engelbrecht's and one musket. One of Lubbe's men was shot by a poisoned arrow and 
died two days later. The Company sergeant, Wassner, part of the garrison at the Olifants River, 
was proud to announce that he had totally ruined Jaager's kraal and taken a further 109 cattle and 
30 sheep.145 
As Boota's commando moved slowly northwards the troublesome Khoisan of the Lange Vlei 
struck again, an1bushing two wheat laden wagons of Jan Engelbrecht. Engelbrecht had plaimed 
on sowing wheat at his La11ge Vlei fann and had gone with three companions to Adriaan Louw's 
to fetch some. On their return they were ambushed and Engelbrecht and Philip Meyer were shot 
dead. The other two colonists, Martinus van Staden and Willem Grobbelaar, escaped but the two 
wagons, the wheat, 200 cattle a11d 350 sheep were stolen.146 The neutral Khoikhoi captain, 
"Pokkebaas Claas" suddenly slipped away to join the "Hottentot Wessels" - a move regarded with 
great suspicion by Barend Lubbe, and in another incident which illustrates the heightened tension 
of the time a Khoikhoi called Barend, who lived at Albert Bergh's farm at the Piketberg, claimed 
that a certain Jan Karstens had killed two Khoikhoi, Wittebooij a11d Ouderkrooij, without any 
reason.147 
143. CA, I/SIB 13/4, 15 Aug. 1739; CA, C 651, 15 Aug. 1739. Tiieunis Boota (or Botha) probably knew the 
country well for in 1717 he and his brother Jacobus had been given pennission to go hunting beyond the Olifants 
River. CA, RLR 3, 11 Aug. 1717, p.282. 
144. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 12 Aug. 1739. 
145. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 20 Aug. 1739. 
146. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 5 Sept. 1739; De Wet (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 
9, 31 Oct. 1739, pp.301-302. 
147. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 20 Aug. 1739; De Wet, (e<l.), Resolusies w111 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 
9, 31 Oct. 1739, p.302. 
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Even at this stage there were still many members of Boota's conunando who were doing their duty 
with reluctance. Boota reported that on 8 September the majority of the men appeared before his 
tent: 
en habben aan ons versogt te moogen weeten wat voor ordres wij hadden, terwijle, 
soo se voorgaaven, hadden gehoort van eenige persoonen dat 't vee hetwelke door 
onse conunando van de Hottentots soude genoomen werden, aan die persoonen welke 
door den subsyituut land-drost het vee was afgenoomen, tot voldoening soude 
gegeeven worden, seggende siylieden voorts gewillig te zijn te gehoosaamen de 
beveelens van hunne Heeren en Meester met veel eerbiedigheid, en alles wat hun 
soude gecommandeert worden maar dat zij, indien zulx soude geschieden, eerder al 
de beesten wilden dootschieten, aangesien die menschen selfs oorsaak van al het 
quaad waaren, en dat zij voor hun aandeel geen hair pretendeeren.148 
Boota answered that it was up to the governor to decide on what to do with the cattle and that if 
they had any complaints they were to address them to him. The men seemed to accept this reply 
and the conunando continued operations. 
Proceeding northwards towards the Doorn River and sending scouts on ahead the conunando 
found one of the stolen wagons, abandoned because of a broken pole. Near "Uyen Kraal" the 
spoor of the "Hottentot Vuilbaard" was discovered and it was thought that his kraal must be near 
the farm of Jochem Koekemoer. A strong detaclunent of men was sent to locate it and, after doing 
so, attacked it on 17 September. Five Khoisan were killed, a musket recovered and some women 
and children taken prisoner. These survivors told their captors of another anned kraal in the 
vicinity and after marching all of the next day ( 18 September) through the mountains the kraal 
was spotted by scouts. At dawn next day the commando attacked from two sides, killing twenty-
nine Khoisan and capturing six. Eighty-two cattle and eighty-two sheep were taken.149 
There were, however, still other Khoisan groups in the mountains of the northern Bokkeveld that 
were deemed to be a threat. On 25 September it was the turn of Captain Jantje Klipheuwel's kraal 
to suffer a surprise attack at dawn. This time thirteen Khoisan were killed and a number 
wounded. One of the colonial Khoikhoi was killed and Hendrik Debes, a cavalry captain, was 
wounded in the head. Five muskets, three iron pots, a copper kettle, three horses and a saddle 
148. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 31 Oct. 1739, pp.302-303. " ... and wished to know 
what orders we had, as they had been told that the cattle which the conunando might capture would be given as a 
satisfaction to those persons from whom the substitute Landdrost had taken tl1e cattle: tliey added that they were 
willing to obey the orders of their Lords and Masters with every reverence, in everything ordered of them, but if 
that were the case they would rather kill all the cattle, as these persons were themselves the cause of the evil; and 
that as their share tl1cy would not claim a hair". 
149. Ibid., pp.303-304. 
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were found at the kraal: proof that - however these items came to be there - colonial commodities 
had reached the outlying Khoisan before the commandos. Klipheuwel's kraal also had 162 cattle 
and 209 sheep. Before leaving the kraal the commando returned forty-eight cattle and forty sheep 
to the survivors and "made peace" with them. The place was named "Oorlogskloof' - a name it 
retains to this day .150 
Still the commando continued to scour the northern Bokkeveld for any further kraals. On the far 
side of the Doom River one was found and attacked on 4 October. Seventeen K11oisan were 
killed, twenty-two wounded and the survivors granted peace though they lost a musket, 101 cattle 
and 120 sheep. On the colonial side a certain Hendrik Treuniet was wounded, whilst one horse 
was killed and another wounded. One further kraal was discovered near the Doom River and 
though it was abandoned the colonists rounded up forty-eight cattle and seventy-nine sheep which 
had been left behind. l11ere was, however, one Kl10isan man who had not left and "who would not 
surrender, so that it was necessary to kill him after he had wounded one of the men with an arrow 
and stabbed to death five oxen with an assegai".151 
It might be asked whether many i1mocent lives were not lost by these ruthless search and destroy 
tactics. Possession of a musket, or indeed livestock, need not have been proof of having waged 
war against the colonists. But although the justice of such actions is debatable the effect was to 
put an end to the possibility of independent Khoisan existence in the Bokkeveld. It was now clear 
to the scattered renmants of the area's Khoisan groups that they were vulnerable to conunando 
attacks and, with this realisation, went the knowledge that they could not prevent the entry of 
colonial trekboers into the Onder Bokkevcld or, beyond that, the Hantam and the Roggevcld. l11e 
Onder Bokkeveld could also be used as a stepping stone to Namaqualand and this was indeed the 
next move contemplated by Boota's conunando. It was thought that if there were any further 
Khoisan or cattle to be found then they would most likely be in Namaqualand. On I I October, 
therefore, Boota assembled his men and ordered them to go to Namaqualand but they were most 
unwilling. They explained that it would mean a four day journey without water. After more than 
two months on conunando there cannot have been many who were anxious to face further 
hardships and the decision was made to return home.152 
Boota arrived back at Stellenbosch on 27 September and the captured cattle were redistributed: 
some to the original owners, some to the Khoikhoi conunando members and the rest to the 
150. Ibid., p.304. 
151. Ibid., pp.305-306. 
152. Ibid., pp.306-307. 
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Company cattle post at Groene Kloof to join the herd that Counitz had confiscated. The governor 
and landdrost declared themselves well pleased with events and considered that it was now safe 
enough to recall the Company soldiers from the Olifants River.153 The Bokkeveld, Doorn and 
Olifants Rivers had now been cleared of all real or potential Khoisan resisters but what was the 
situation in the Sandveld? 
According to Boota the "slimste oproermaakers", Swaartbooij and Titus, had fled to the Little 
Namaquas.154 But whilst Boota had been leading his commando in the Bokkeveld another 
conuuando had been can1paigning up the west coast and it was here that the fate of the Lange 
Vlei Khoisan was decided. Shortly before the departure of Boota's conuuando the Council of 
Policy had received reports that a ship had been wrecked on the Namaqualand coast and that 
there were some survivors. These reports had come from some of the colonists who, in turn, had 
the information from the Khoikhoi. Vague though this infonuation was the Council decided to 
send an expedition of thirty to thirty-six men up the west coast to investigate. It did not like the 
idea that the Khoisan of those parts, with whom it was at war, might have acquired arms or lead 
from a wreck. The expedition would entail no extra expense since one of its objectives would be 
"the usual cattle barter with the Hottentots in the neighbourhood". Thus it was that Jan 
Gibbelaas, foreman of the Company Schuur, was entrusted with the expedition.155 
By 2 October Gibbelaas and his men had reached Meerhof s Casteel, about three days journey 
south of the Little Namaqua. Here they found a number of cattle and a group of Khoisan who 
took to their heels as soon as they saw the colonists. Finding this behaviour suspicious, and 
noting that some of the Khoisan had guns, Gibbelaas proceeded cautiously. He was able to 
persuade some of the Khoisan to approach him when he went towards them with a mere three 
men for company. There was a great deal of mutual suspicion which was increased when 
Gibbelaas recognised the notorious Swaartbooij, wearing a powder horn, and his son Titus, alias 
Chanuant. Talking smoothly, Gibbelaas asked them why they had run away since they were 
Company men and would not harm them. Swaartbooij and his son replied that they had 
recognised the voice of Willem van Wyk and had thought the men to be "booren".156 The 
Khoisan were correct; Willem van Wyk was with the conuuando. They were incorrect, however, 
to assume that the Company was less dangerous than the "booren" - though their use of the latter 
153. Ibid., pp.307-308; CA, 1/STil 13/4, 28 Oct. 1739; CA, C 651, 28 Oct. 1739. 
154. C/\,C651,280ct.1739. 
155. De Wet, (ed.), R.esolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 4 Aug. 1739, pp.285-286. 
156. Ibid., 8 Dec. 1739, pp.319-320. 
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term is a fascinating indication that, at least in the eyes of the Khoisan, the frontier farmers had 
achieved a separate identity. 
As the discussion took place Gibbelaas dispensed some tobacco and arrack whilst Van Wyk and 
the Khoikhoi Keyser joined the group. These two quietly informed Gibbelaas that they had 
overheard some of the Khoisan (some of whom were Little Namaqua) plotting to go to the Lange 
Vlei or the Piketberg to rob the farn1ers. Van Wyk was, of course, an extremely biased source of 
information but Gibbelaas did not need an excuse for getting his retaliation in first. Noticing the 
nearby Khoisan edging away and: 
heb ik uijt vreese <lat wanneer ik vandaar vertrocken soude ziyn, sijl. herwaarts 
koomende haar boos voorneemen souden ter uitvoer brengen, te meer dewijl ziy van 
de geene waaren die hier ten platten lande soo veel roverijen en moorden gepleegt 
hebben, en <lat zij behalven een snaphaan nog met boog en assegaaij gewaapent 
waaren; tot stuijting van <lit hun quaad voorneemen onder deselve soo als se de vlugt 
begaanen te neemen, doen schieten, bij welke actie tusschen de 30 en 40 van deselve 
zijn dood gebleeven, waaronder sig dn voorm. capn Swarte Booij bevond, zijnde 
desselfs soon Titus het ontkoomen, alhoewel denselven bij die gellegentijd is 
gequeste geworden, gelijke ik zulx aan desselfs caros, door hem in de loop agter 
gelaaten, hebbe kunnen verneemen.157 
Only three powder horns, some bullets and seven oxen were recovered. Those Khoisan who had 
the muskets had escaped since, trying to keep these from the sight of the conm1ando, they had 
been furtl1est away. 
O.F. Mentzel, who was a soldier at the Cape at this time, wrote an account of the massacre some 
forty-eight years later. Although his account seeks to portray the conunando as acting out of 
justifiable fear as "thousands" of "insolent" and "truculent" "Buslunen swarmed from all sides" he 
does add one detail that is chillingly convincing: 
Since the position had become serious, the Commander ordered grape shot to be 
fired from the field-cannon he had with him, and his men to fire their muskets in 
volleys of ten, thereby killing and wounding a considerable number of men and 
women. The war ended suddenly. The enemy fled, some of the women even 
abandoning their children in fright. Though this was a very weak Conunando, some 
of the soldiers proved that if they were free to do as they pleased, they could be 
wanton and savage. Some of the most brutal ones seized the small children by their 
157. Ibid., p.320. "fearing that after my departure they would come hitherward in order to carry out their evil 
intention, and the more so as they were of those who had conunitted so many thetls and murders, and moreover 
seeing that they were anned with muskets, bow and asscgaai, and in order to frustrate their evil purpose, ordered 
my men to fire at them as soon as they ran away, when between thirty or forty were killed, among them the Captain 




legs and crushed their heads against the stones. Others killed the wounded women 
and cut off their long breasts, afterwards making themselves tobacco pouches from 
these as tokens of their heroism.158 
After this massacre Gibbelaas' conunando continued northwards along the coast until it reached 
the Buffels River.159 Here they encountered three Grigriqua and two "beach bushmen" ("Strand 
Bosjesmans"). These individuals knew nothing about a wreck and maintained that the whole story 
had been fabricated by Swaartbooij to provide him with a pretext for attacking a kraal of "beach 
bushmen", killing some of them and taking their cattle. Swaartbooij had then told the Little 
Namaqua that he had attacked the "beach bushmen" because they had murdered the crew of a 
wrecked ship. Gibbelaas checked this story by travelling a further thirty leagues northwards along 
the coast without finding any evidence of a wreck; nor could the "beach buslunen" or Grigriqua 
whom he employed to search the coast find anything.160 
On the way back to the Cape the commando went inland so as to make contact with the Little 
Namaqua and barter for cattle. So anxious were the Namaqua for peace, and so detennined were 
they to disassociate themselves from the violent robberies of the past year, that they allowed 
themselves to part with 111 cattle. TI1e arrival of some thirty or forty well anned and 
bloodthirsty men in 'their midst no doubt had a lot to do with their generosity. So too did the 
compromising presence of 118 cattle amongst their herds which were identified as having 
belonged to Albert and Pieter van Zyl. These cattle had been stolen by Swaartbooij and Titus in 
May and it is not clear how they ended up in the possession of the Little Nan1aqua. These cattle 
were returned to the colonists and the Namaqua made promises of obedience to and co-operation 
with the Company in the future. The commando then left for the Cape which it reached on 28 
November,161 
From the Piketberg to Namaqualand, from the west coast to the Bokkeveld, the Khoisan had been 
shattered, dispersed and subjugated. The Company could also rejoice in the fact that Estienne 
Barbier had ceased to be a menace for on 9 September the elusive outlaw had finally been 
158. H.J. Mandelbrote, (ed.), A Geographical And Topographical Description Of The Cape Of Good Hope By 
O.F. Mentzel, Part Three (Cape Town, reprint 1944), pp.309-319. When conunenting on this passage Mandelbrote 
had nol found Gibbelaas' journal which is in lhe Council of Policy records. 
159. In the original the river is called the "Cous" or "Cung" river. De Wet, (ed.), Resol11sies van die Politieke 
Raad, Vol. 9, 8 Dec. 1739, pp.320-321. This is a fonn of the Namaqua name. Sec Nienaber and Raper, Toponymica 
Hotlentottica, 13, (Pretoria, 1980), pp.779-780. 
160. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 8 Dec. 1739, pp.320-321. 
161. Ibid., pp.321-322. 
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captured in the Roodezand.162 According to Barbier he had been on his way to the Cape, on the 
wagon of Steven Fouche, to give himself up. According to Mentzel, however, he had been 
betrayed. Barbier was set upon a horse, with his feet tied beneath its belly, and reached Cape 
Town, via Stellenbosch, on 11 September. The governor ordered him placed in the "Danker Gat". 
Mentzel describes that: 
Up till this time Barbier had been of good courage. He had laughed and jested over 
his captivity and had given it clearly to be understood that he had a letter of safe-
conduct, on the production of which he would speedily be released from arrest, while 
Herr Allemann would be punished in his stead. He was taken off the horse by the 
Patrol guard and went into the Castle on foot; when he had passed through the gate 
and come to the sergeant's guard-house he made as if to enter it, imagining that it 
would be his right as a sergeant to spend there his period of detention. He was 
ordered, however, to go on and was taken to the Donckle Gatt; when he realised that 
it in very truth was his destination he suddenly lost all his courage, became very cast 
down and began to weep.163 
This time Barbier was kept in the "Danker Gat" for nine weeks. It was six weeks before he was 
even charged with anything for, as Mentzel explains, this was the custom, producing an excellent 
effect on the prisoner who would then confess everything in order to obtain a speedy death.164 On 
22 October Barbier's case began. The various documents which he had addressed to both the 
populace and the government were circulated for the consideration of the Council of Policy. 
Barbier had already been interrogated on 2 October by his old enemy, Van der Henghel, who was 
once again filling the office of fiscal. A confession was hardly necessary. The Council had quite 
enough evidence to condenm Barbier and he did not deny any of the actions he had conm1itted or 
retract any of the words he had said. All he could do was ask that his case be heard in Holland 
and that the Council show him mercy.165 
The answer came on 12 November when sentence was passed. Barbier was found guilty of seven 
grave charges, most of which, since they were aimed at upsetting the political and civil order, 
were considered to be worthy of punishment by death. The cncitement of armed rebellion an10ngst 
the people against their "lawful authorities" was the key issue. Barbier had encouraged others to 
challenge the State's authority in the name of the States-General. In the eyes of his judges, his 
crimes were enorn10us. l66 
162. Pheiffer, "Gebroke Nederlan<ls", Vol. 2, p.24. 
163. Mentzel, Allema,111, pp.115-116. 
164. Ibid. 
165. Pheiffer,"Gebroke Ne<lerlan<ls", Vol. 2, pp.12-24. 
166. Thea!, Dokume11te11, pp.6-12. 
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He was sentenced to be bound on a cross and to have his right hand, then his head, chopped off. 
His body was to be quartered. His head and hand were to be raised on a stake and placed at the 
Roodezand's Kloof. The four quarters of his body were to be hung in four different places next to 
the busiest roads of the colony. In choosing to implement this atrocious execution the state was 
simply being true to its nature. As Foucault has explained: "The public execution is to be 
understood not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to 
the ceremonies by which power is manifested".167 
The sentence was carried out on 14 November 1739. It was a Saturday and the crowd around the 
scaffold was so dense that Mentzel, who was present, could not get close enough to hear De 
Grandpreez reading the sentence. The words "lands verrader" occurred frequently in the 
indictment. After a short prayer Barbier was stripped, bound, and put to death in the prescribed 
manner. His entrails were buried under the scaffold and the parts of his body distributed for 
public display along the high roads. "Such was the melancholy end of a turbulent fellow," 
reported MentzeJ.168 
But there was some indication that Barbier was still held in esteem by the colonists of the 
northern frontier. The knecht of the pontoon holder at the Berg River reported to Landdrost 
Lourensz that somebody at the crossing had burnt down the pole on which one of Barbier's 
quarters was affixed. The landdrost, who had previously requested a gallows for Stellenbosch so 
that he could suspend slave suicides upside down, went personally to re-erect the pole.169 The 
State was detennined to impose the "spectacle of the scaffold" in the countryside as well as in the 
town. l 70 It would also seem as though Barbier's supporter, Arnoldus Basson, refused to submit 
to the Company for on 18 August 17 40 he was found guilty of disobedience by the Council of 
Justice and banished to the Netherlands. l 71 
The government could now afford to exan1ine certain aspects of the recent events and take 
measures to ensure that there would be no recurrence of unrest. One of its first actions was to 
167. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Hannondsworth, 1979), p.47. He adds: "In the excesses of torture a 
whole economy of power is invested" (p.35). 
168. Mentzel, Allemmm, pp. l l 6-l l 7. 
169. CA, C 455, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 3 Dec. 1739 and 8 Dec. 1739. TI1ere are several letters from Lourensz 
to the governor in which he describes the vigour with which he drags the corpses of slaves who conunitted suicide 
to deposit them in porcupine holes. CA, LM 20, Letters Received 1726-1732, Lourensz to Governor, 12 Feb. 1729. 
170. The phrase is Foucault's. I think Hobsbawm is wrong to say that the ritual of public execution belongs to the 
myth of urban crime rather than to social banditry. E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (Hannon<lsworth, 1972), p.128. 
171. De Wet, ( ed.), Reso/risies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 21 March 1739, p.260, 11.105. Basson attempted to 
return to the Cape as an anonymous sailor but died on the voyage home. 
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issue a new and very severe proclamation against bartering cattle from the "Hottentots and 
Caffers". Especially detestable were those who: 
with violence deprive those poor people, who ever against Europeans are defenceless 
beings of their property, by which great loss and injury are brought upon the 
country, and likewise the judgement of God, as can be clearly seen in the failure of 
the crops so many years successively, and in other vexations.172 
Such pious and humane sentiments seem surprising coming from the same body which had 
approved of Kruywagen's suggestions, deprived Captain Gaam and others of their cattle and 
authorised the commandos responsible for having killed at least a hundred Khoisan. The 
proclan1ation went on to threaten even capital punishment for future offenders, if the 
circumstances of the case warranted it, but there can have been few who took this threat at its 
face value. 
The cattle which had been captured by the commandos, as well as those which had been 
confiscated by Counitz, now had to be re-allocated. Counitz's behaviour, which had been the 
subject of a thorough investigation, was found to be almost blameless, at least insofar as the 
complaints of those from whom he had confiscated cattle were concerned. No cattle were returned 
to these people. Instead all the cattle collected by Counitz, Kruywagen and the commandos were 
sold and the proceeds used to pay for the costs of the commandos.173 The Company was still 
irked by the disobedience of those burghers of the Roodezand who had at first refused to go on a 
commando, and who had hinted that such duty was the responsibility of the initiators of the 
unrest, but it was decided to overlook their "malicious foolishness" on this occasion since they 
had subsequently participated in the conunandos.174 
All that was now required was a final reckoning with Titus for in December 1739 Daniel 
Bokkelenberg of the Lange Vlei reported that he had been seen in the area and was engaged in 
trying to get the local "bushmen" to join him on an attack on the Europeans.175 The landdrost 
immediately sent instructions to Veldkorporaal Andries Burgers to raise a commando and to go 
to Bokkelenberg's farm. Before anything further could be done, however, Bokkelenberg sent 
another report, claiming that a Khoikhoi of his vicinity had come to warn him that Titus, together 
with some of the "Bokkeveld Hottentots", namely the kraals of Ruyter, Caffer and Boebesak, 
172. lbi<l., 8 Dec. 1739, pp.322-323. 
173. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies vc111 die Politi eke Raad, Vol. I 0, 19 Jan. 1740, pp.2-5. 




were planning on attacking the local fanners. Once more Andries Burgers was urged on his 
way.176 
His journey was unnecessary. Even before he arrived at the Lange Vlei the landdrost had news 
from Bokkelenberg that Titus alias Charmant had breathed his last. What had happened was that 
Titus had suddenly appeared before one of Bokkelenberg's shepherds and held an assegaai to his 
chest, asking him if he would join him in an uprising. The shepherd, not surprisingly, said that he 
would and was then instructed to meet Titus the next day at the Lange Vlei with Titus' brother in 
his company. Titus then boasted, as he ate one of Bokkelenberg's sheep, that he would return the 
next day with one hundred of his soldiers and, once re-united with his brother, destroy 
Bokkelenberg's farn1, steal his cattle and slaughter his sheep. The shepherd went and told 
Bokkelenberg all he had learnt and that night his master and Pieter du Bruyn proceeded to the 
designated rendezvous at the Lange Vlei. To complete the ambush they had Titus' brother, 
presumably a servant of Bokkelenberg, drive the sheep there the next morning so that Titus and a 
single companion had no hesitation in approaching boldly. Bokkelenberg and De Bruyn then 
sprang out and when Titus tried to run away De Bruyn shot his ann off. Incredibly the chase 
lasted another half an hour before the weakening Titus was caught. Shortly thereafter he died.177 
On receiving this news Landdrost Lourensz expressed the hope that all the tumult and uproar 
caused by the "Hottentots-Bosjesmans" would now cease and that the good settlers would once 
more return to their fan11S in the Pikctberg and Olifants River districts.178 The war had been very 
expensive for many of the frontier fanners and the govermnent was concerned that the poverty of 
several was preventing them from paying their loan-farm rentals.179 Some, like Pieter van Zyl 
and Jacob Cloete, had not been able to use their fanns for fourteen months.180 There was, of 
course, concern that the resentments which had fuelled the Barbier rebellion might resurface 
again but, to an extent, the seriousness of the frontier war of 1739 contributed to the Company's 
success in containing rural revolt. By waging war against the Khoisan the Company appeared to 
be taking the side of the settlers. With their farms in flames and their cattle in the hands of 
Khoisan attackers the majority of the frontier farmers had no time to join an anti-government 
revolt. But there were other reasons for the limitations of the Barbier rebellion and these have to 
do with the fact that it was, essentially, a movement of social banditry. 
176. CA, 1/STB 13/5, 5 Jan. 1740; CA, C 652, 5 Jan. 1740. 
177. CA, C 456, Inkomcndc Briewc 3 Jan. 1740-31 March 1740, Lourcnsz to Swcllengrebel, 20 Jan. 1740. 
178. CA, 1/STB 13/5, 2 Feb. 1740. 
179. DcWcl,(ed.),Resolusiesva11diePolitiekeRaad, Vol. IO, 19Jan. 1740,p.5. 
180. Scholtz, "Ondcr-Olifonlsrivicr", p.40. 
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In the first place it may be seen that the Barbier rebellion meets Hobsbawm's requirements for 
social banditry in the figure of Barbier himself. The lone wolf on the margins of society; the 
fugitive from the State who is protected by the people; the friend of widows and the poor; the 
chan1pion of the oppressed and defier of the oppressor - all these are characteristics of the social 
bandit. In the second place Barbier's rebellion confonns to Hobsbawm's idea of social banditry as 
a primitive forn1 of social protest. It was, demonstrably, "a cry for vengeance on the rich and the 
oppressors, a vague drean1 of some curb upon them". Barbier went to some pains to demonstrate 
that the world he desired was one in which the traditional laws of the ultimate authorities (in this 
case the VOC and the States-General of the Netherlands) were respected. The rebellion was also, 
clearly, a reaction against the world of capitalism; in this case the powerful agrarian capitalism of 
the Cape gentry and their corrupt friends amongst the Company officials. Though the poor 
farmers who joined or protected Barbier were not "traditional or pre-capitalist peasants" they did 
not have to be. As O'Malley has explained the "unified conflict consciousness" which they 
displayed in a terrain permeated by chronic class struggle is a more useful concept to employ than 
that of the "traditional peasantry". 
Barbier's rebellion also satisfies Austen's stipulations about pre-conditions for social banditry. 
The State was very much present in both the town and countryside of the western Cape in the 
1730s. It was detennined to structure the social, political and economic life of the colonists to the 
best of its ability for its hegemony was not to be flouted. It declared Barbier an outlaw and 
pursued him to the end. Significantly Barbier did not choose to slip beyond the colonial frontier 
altogether - like other deserters or escaped slavesl81 - but stayed within the fringes of colonial 
society. It was no easy matter to abandon the protection of sympathetic supporters and exchange 
it for the arid inhospitality of the African interior. There was, in any case, a major war being 
fought between the Khoisan and the colonists along the northern frontier. (Besides, Barbier was 
not so much interested in running away as he was in revenge). Though the African colonial 
frontier and the "primary resistance" of the Khoisan provide much of the background to the 
rebellion, they were not the same thing. Even though there was a strong connection between 
Barbier's followers and the origins of the frontier war of 1739 it is quite obvious that the Barbier 
rebellion was not a case of "primary resistance". It arose within colonial society and was 
conducted within colonial society. 
Ironically it was the government's very success in crushing Khoisan resistance in the war of 1739 
which was to weaken its hold over the colonists in the long tcnn. White stock-fanncrs were now 
181. See following chapter. 
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m complete control of all suitable pastoral land south of Namaqualand and west of the 
Bokkeveld. Over a hundred Khoisan had been killedl82 (compared with a handful of colonists) 
and great quantities of Khoikhoi livestock, not all of it recovered booty, had been taken from the 
survivors. Those Khoisan who remained in or around the Bokkeveld, Piketberg, Sandveld, 
Olifants and Doorn River areas were now a cowed and broken people living in isolated kraals. 
Their only hope of survival lay in their acceptance of Dutch overlordship (symbolised by the staff 
of office given to the kraal captains by the VOC) and their promise to keep the peace. Thus it was 
that on 8 September 1740 Hendrik Kruger arrived at Stellenbosch with a representative of those 
"buslunen" who had survived the commandos and who now wished to make peace and receive a 
staff of office.183 Kruger was instructed to escort the deputation to the Cape and on 10 
September copper-headed canes were given to Captains Waterboer, Anthonie Dragonder and 
Klein Jantje.184 
The defeat of the Khoisan now emboldened the colonists to expand into the interior and satisfy 
their hunger for land, Khoikhoi labour and livestock. A voiding the arid Knechtsvlakte to the north 
the trekboers moved in a north-easterly direction, into the Onder Bokkeveld, the Hantam and the 
Roggeveld. The consequences of this move were to be felt not only by the Khoisan of the Cape 
interior but also by the colonial authorities. From this date onwards there was to be a decrease in 
state control in the frontier zone and 1739 was perhaps the last occasion when the Company was 
able to bring a decisive influence to bear on both the Khoisan and the colonists. It has been well 
argued that the life of the trekboers was, in any event, a fonn of institutionalised rebellion185 and, 
from 1740 onwards, the distance of the frontier zone from Cape Town made it impossible for the 
Company to rule all of its subjects. In future conunandos would be composed exclusively of 
frontiersmen and their servants, making it almost impossible for the Company to exercise more 
than a purely nominal control over them. 
This was particularly significant for the conunando was to become the most important political 
institution of the frontier zone and the realities of power were reflected in the growing 
unwillingness and inability of the Company to regulate relations between the Khoisan and the 
colonists. Before 1739 the government at the Cape had attempted, albeit ineffectively, to protect 
the Khoisan from the excesses of the colonists. After the Barbier rebellion and the war of 1739, 
182. It is fairly certain, if the Gibbelaas conunando is representative, that atrocities and killings were under-
reported. Reported Khoisan casualties between 1738 and 1739 were, however, over a hundred. 
183. CA, C 457, Letters Received, Lourensz to Swellengrebel, 9 Sept. 1740. 
184. CA, C 616, Dagregister 1739-1743, 10 Sept. 1740, pp.410-412. 
185. R. Austen, Aji-ican Economic Hist01y (London, 1987), p.161. 
138 
Resistance, Rebellion and War: The Northern Frontier Zone, 1725-1740 
however, the trekboers had little cause to complain that the authorities were not supporting their 
interests. The influence of the state, where it was felt at all on the frontier, was henceforth to be 




Fugitives and the Frontier Zone, c.1700-1770 
DROSTERS AND DROSTER GANGS 
Not all pioneers of the colonial frontier were stock-farmers, licensed-hunters or official explorers. 
Some, indeed the foremost, were fugitives, whose greatest desire was to remove themselves from 
the strictures of the VOC's laws. These runaway slaves, deserted sailors, absconding soldiers, 
"landloopers", vagabonds, debtors, escaped murderers, bandits, counterfeiters, thieves and 
assorted criminals were, in a sense, the cutting edge of colonial expansion. Of necessity they had 
to remain one step ahead of the colony, beyond the vanguard of the frontier farmers. In their 
lawless diversity these refugees and rogues constituted the outer margins of the frontier zone, the 
uncontrollable excrescence of the colony and, as such, their influence on the Khoisan societies of 
the interior was considerable. 
Individual fugitives would often form themselves into groups, bound together in a particular form 
of resistance to oppression - flight. These groups of drosters (from the Dutch word drossen: "to 
run away" or "to desert") were an integral aspect of the frontier zone and the changing nature of 
their composition and character is an important indicator of the transforming processes of 
colonial expansion. I Although the inunediate impact of these groups on the societies of the Cape 
interior was essentially destructive, in the long ruri they played a more positive role. From the 
wreckage of traditional societies arose hybrid groups, the Oorlams or "Bastaards" of later fame. 
Very often, at the nucleus of such a group, would be some drosters or their descendants. It is thus 
essential to devote some attention to these most important catalysts of change. 
The most common type of fugitive was the runaway slave.2 In 1686 the Council of Policy was 
alarmed by the "daily and continuous" flight of Company and private slaves who, armed with 
guns, sustained themselves in groups in the wilderness. It was resolved to punish recaptives with 
a beating with rods, the amputation of an ear and the attaclunent of chains to their persons. These 
measures were to be enforced until an improvement in circumstances was noted.3 By October 
1702 however, runaways were still so prevalent that the Company post-holders along the colony's 
I. For a further discussion of these issues, particularly after 1770, sec N. Pcm1, "Droster Gangs of the Bokkeveld 
and the Roggcveld, 1770-1800" in So11tl, Afi"ica11 Historical Jo11mal, 23, ( 1990), pp.15-40. 
2. Studies which deal with fugitive slaves and their relationship with other societies at the Cape are R. Ross, Cape 
of Torments: Slavery and Resistance i11 So11tl, Aji'ica (London, 1983) and N. Worden, Slavery i11 Dutel, South Aji-ica 
(Cambridge, 1985) 
3. A.J. Uoeseken, (ed.), Resulusies van die Pulitieke Raad, Vol. 3, 1681-1707, 20 Julv, 1686, p.140. 
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frontier were instructed to send out a man every day to look for fugitive slaves and shoot them if 
necessary.4 The situation had obviously not improved by June 1711 for on this date the 
punishment for recaptives was upgraded so as to cause more terror amongst the slaves and to act 
as a deterrent. A first offender would now not only be whipped but branded on the cheek. For a 
second escape attempt the punishment would include branding on the other cheek and, if a man 
was unlucky enough to be caught for a third time, he could expect to have his ears and nose cut 
off.5 These punishments were, however, contingent on the captive not having committed any 
death deserving crimes (such as theft) during his flight. If he had done so he could expect no 
mercy. 
It is, perhaps, unnecessary to explain why a slave should wish to run away from a regime where 
such punislunents were pennissible. But what objectives, apart from flight, did the fugitive slave 
have? The mountains of the Cape interior had always beckoned enticingly to fugitives, offering a 
wild and elusive place of refuge seemingly removed from colonial control. There were doubtless 
many who imagined that they would be able to live a life of independence beyond the boundaries 
of the colony, trusting to their own strength and resourcefulness to survive in the wilderness. 
Others harboured unrealistic ambitions of returning to their countries of origin or distant lands 
reported to be safe havens. Several runaways, for instance, were recaptured after trying to reach 
Angola, Madagascar or Natal, their ignorance of geography acting as a stimulus rather than as a 
deterrent. Whatever their plans, however, fugitives were bound to encounter indigenous groups at 
some stage in their flight and their influence was invariably disruptive. 
For tl1e most part these drosters were desperate, armed and ravenous, thus posing a direct threat 
to the lives and livestock of the Khoikhoi. It was, in fact, extremely difficult for inexperienced and 
ill equipped new-comers to survive in the Cape mountains, making it almost inevitable that the 
Khoikhoi would be approached. Some of the drosters may have had no other wish than to be 
accepted as new members of a protective Khoikhoi group though they were not always assured of 
a friendly welcome. The Company, in any event, worked hard to ensure that the neighbouring 
Khoikhoi would return colonial property. Groups such as the Chariguriqua, for instance, who had 
won the reputation of welcoming runaway slaves, were made to suffer the consequences of their 
misplaced generosity. The mixture of bribery and threats which was employed is well illustrated 
in the Council of Policy's instructions of 1696: 
4. CA, LM I 0, Council of Policy, Pree is of Letters Despatched, 1699-1708, IO Oct. 1702, pp. 763-764. 
5. A.I. 13oeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 4, 1707-1715, I June, 1711, p.227. 
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de Grigriquase Hottentots geleegen aan geenzijde de Elephants-rivier, een Natie 
die met de E.Compagnic egeen de minste correspondentie noch vrundschap 
gewoon is te houden, onder haer voor een gewoon te hebben alle wegh geloopen 
lijffe <ij> genen deser vrije ingesetenen die tot haer overcomen aan te houden en 
in haar dienst emploijeren, sonder dat men oijt geweeten heeffi: op wat plaatse 
dese gefugeerdens haer onthielden: Een maniere van doen regel reght strijdich de 
prijsselicke gewoonte van andere Hottentotsse-natien, de welcken als sijnde van 
een civielder humeur ende aan de E.Compe. getrouw, gewoon sijn, wanneer sij 
een wegh geloopen slaeff hebben achterhaelt, deselve op te brengen, en waer 
door deselve hare rechte lijflheeren weder gewerden: En dat het verder ook sijn 
bedencken inhad off niet wel dese gedeserteerde jongens off morgen in getal 
aannemende, 't zij in 't samenspannen met dese Grigriquase Hottentots, offi:e !mer 
van dese laaste hebbende meester gemaeckt, souden ondernemen sommigen onser 
vrije ingesetenen die wijt en zeiyt van een woonen, bij ontijden als anders 't 
overrompelen en te ruineren: om welcke gedreighde onheijlen dan die in tyd ende 
wijlen daer uijt souden mogen comen t' ontstaen, voor te comen, mitsgs. ook tot 
restitutie van dese geaufugeerdens te geraaken, Soo is 't dat bij sijn Ede. en desen 
E.A.Politijcquen Raade 't gene voors. we! ingesien ende overwogen sijnde, 
cenpaarlijk hebben geresolveert ende beslooten den genoemde vaandrager, tot 
versterckingh van sijn bijhebbende manschap, een sergt. met noch thien Comps. 
dienaren en twintich vrijborgers van Stellenbosch toe te senden onune, te saamen 
alsoo geconjungeert sijnde, over de geseijde Elephants-rivier nae de voors. 
Grigriquase Hottentots te marcheeren, en sonder de minste bloedstortinge, op de 
acconunodabelste ende saghste wijse en maniere, onder schijn van ruijlingh off 
handel, de geseijde weghgcloopen slaven die bij haar noch gevonden mochten 
werden, te bemachtigen met ordre nochtans (omme in cas van onwillicheijt off 
weijgeringc) een van de gcseijde Grigriquase capiteijns offi:e sommige haarder 
vrouwen off kinderen als ostagiers nae desen Casteele sien op te brengen, onm1e 
alhicr soo Iange te vcrblijven tot <lat de meergeseijde Grigriquase Hottentots de 
voors. aangehouden slaven aen de E.Comp. weder sullen hebben gerestitueert ... 6 
6. "1l1e Grigriquase Hottentots lying on the other side of the Olifants River, a nation with whom the Hon. 
Company is not used to having the least correspondence or friendship, are accustomed to have runaway slaves of the 
free inhabitants amongst them who have come to them and whom they employ in their service, without anyone 
knowing where these fugitives hide themselves: a course of action completely contrary to the praiseworthy 
behaviour of other Hottentot nations, who are of a more civil disposition and loyal to the Company, and who are 
accustomed, whenever they apprehend a nmaway slave, to deliver him up, so that he is returned to his rightful 
master: and that it was also thought that if the numbers of these deserted slaves increased, they might join together 
with the Grigriquase Hottentots, or make themselves masters of them, and attempt to surprise and ruin some of our 
free inl1abitants who live far apart from each other: in order to prevent these threatening troubles from taking place, 
and also to restore these fugitives, his Exe. and the Council of Policy unanimously resolved to reinforce the 
aforesaid ensign [Schrijverj and his company with a sergeant, a further ten Company servants and twenty 
lreeburghers of Stellenbosch, and to despatch the assembled company over the aforesaid Olifants River to the 
Grigriquase Hottentots, and without the least shedding of blood, in the most acconunodating and gentlest maimer, 
under the guise of trade or exchange, to capture the aforesaid nmaway slaves who might be found with them with 
orders (in case of unwillingness or refusal) to take one of the aforesaid Grigriquase captains or some of their women 
and children as hostages to the Castle, to stay here for as long as it takes for the aforesaid Grigriquase I Iottentots to 
rel um the abovementioned slaves to the Company ... ". Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies ,·mt die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 
lJ Dec. 16%, p.307. 
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Not all Khoikhoi needed Company prompting to discourage fugitive slaves. Drosters were 
dangerous and it was extremely risky for runaways to count on Khoikhoi support. It should be 
appreciated that by 1700 the Khoikhoi were themselves refugees from the colony, anxious to 
avoid or repel all aggressive intruders into their territory. Unfortunately for them, during the first 
three decades of the eighteenth century, circumstances were particularly favourable for deserters. 
The colonial frontier petered out relatively close to Cape Town. As late as l 709 it was, indeed, 
still possible for fugitive slaves to skulk for days undetected in the thick bushes around the 
Liesbeeck River and Rondebosch.7 The dunes near Salt River and the sandy wastes of the Cape 
Flats also provided hiding places whilst Table Mountain itself was a domain of drosters well into 
the eighteenth century.& The trouble with these peri-urban retreats was that inevitably, like a moth 
to a candle, the fugitives would steal food from the colonists and get caught. Proximity to the 
town was risky but the massive mountains of the Cape Fold System rose alluringly just behind 
the surrounding farn1s of the south-western Cape. Only after 17 40 did these untamed ranges fall 
within the colonial frontier and to many fugitives it must have seemed as though all that stood 
between them and freedom was a very short journey to the horizon. At the same time the low 
population density of the frontier regions made it easy for runaways to move without detection. 
The result was that the early eighteenth century Cape frontier zone bristled with drosters, most of 
whom, as far as the Khoikhoi were concerned, were extremely undesirable characters. 
We do not know what effect the Company's 1696 visit to the Chariguriqua had, but during the 
first decade of the eighteenth century the route up the west coast, beyond Groene Kloof and 
Saldanha Bay to the vicinity of Verlore Vlei and the Agter Piketberg, remained a favourite with 
deserters. The advantages of this route were that fugitives could survive by eating marine 
resources such as mussels and crayfish. Further progress northwards was usually unappealing 
because the countryside became drier and wilder. To the east runaways would have to brave the 
as yet unconquered Khoisan and the mountains behind the Olifants River. For this reason most 
droster groups tended to stall somewhere south of the Verlore Vlei. One group of slaves 
recaptured in 1707 had plaimed to hide in the "ver berge" and make their way to the Namaqua but 
they had not got very far.9 Even more typical, however, were the experiences of a group of 
droster slaves from Madagascar in 1706. 
7. See for instance the evidence of the fugitive slaves Sato van Maccaser1 Jan van Mallebar and Jacob van 
MallebarinCA, VC 19, 7May, 1709,pp.145-153. 
8. See Ross, Cape ofTo1111e11ts, pp.64-66. In March 1736 it was thought that a severe fire in Cape Town might 
have been caused by slave or European drosters who were hiding out on Table Mountain. G.C. <le Wet, (ed.), 
Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 20 March, 1736, p.59. 
9. CA, VC 18, 1707-1708, 5 Nov. 1707, pp.348-355. 
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This group had chosen the west coast route in an attempt to return to their home. During the 
course of their flight they attacked various Khoikhoi kraals in the vicinity of Saldanha Bay and 
abducted a Khoikhoi man by the name of Prins in the hope that he would show them the way to 
Madagascar. The gang then wandered as far as the Piketberg, killing two Khoikhoi at a colonial 
cattle-post on the Berg River before returning to the coast. Here they robbed a kraal called 
"Hoeties Kraal" at "Hoeties Baai" but the occupants fought back when the slaves attempted to 
steal their herds and flocks. Four of the slaves were killed and another, David, was eventually 
captured by the post-holder at Saldanha Bay.10 
Incidents like these help to explain why the Khoikhoi were increasingly wary of colonial fugitives 
and likely to receive them with violence. In January 1712 it was reported that a recaptured slave 
had died because "The Hottentots beyond the mountains had beaten him most brutally; they had 
smashed the back of his skull, and with kieries cut his back as if it had been sliced with knives; 
his lips and eyes were so belaboured that there appeared hardly an hour's life in him" .11 Of 
twenty or thirty slaves who escaped in October 1712 it was rumoured that eight had been killed 
by the Overberg Khoikhoi.12 As more and more instances of rough treatment at the hands of the 
Khoikhoi became known to would-be escapees a new pattern emerged which was clearly 
discernible to Mentzel in the 1730s: 
Towards run-away slaves belonging to the colonists, the Hottentots feel a disgust 
which is not only inborn, but also founded on common sense. They know very 
well that a run-away slave can only preserve his life by robbing them of their 
cattle. Therefore, if they catch one of them, they hand them over to the nearest 
colonist, who then takes him away and surrenders him to the authorities. But 
should a fugitive slave succeed in reaching the Kaffirs, he would be protected 
against all danger, for they never give the slaves up, because they become their 
best fighters, more courageous than the Kaffirs themselves. They defend 
themselves desperately against the colonists, for fear of being caught and handed 
over to justice, preferring death to recapture. It is the aim of all such slaves, who 
band themselves together and plot to desert, to join up with the Kaffirs.13 
10. CA, VC 17, 1705-1706, 5 Oct. 1706, p.678. It is more than likely that the present day "Hoedjies Bay" (the 
northern en<l of Saldanha Bay) is named aller "Hoeties Kraal" and not, as Raper suggests, after the Dutch family 
name Oetgens van Waveren. Raper, Place Names, p.215. 
11. CA, LM 18, Letters Receive<l 1709-1718, 16 Jan. 1712. 
12. "Some fugitive Javanese and Macassaren slaves having been followed up and only one caught, it was consi<lere<l 
Uiat U1e fugitives might do a great <lea! of hann - they were therefore followed on horseback by l O men, and a 
reward of 3 Rds., was olTere<l to the surrounding Hottentots for every one caught by U1em. 15 were captured and 
brought to the Castle and punished, the rest were, it is sai<l, killed in a light with the Hottentots, amongst them U1e 
ringleader, an Oriental exile sent hither last year". CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched 3 Jan. 1707-31 Dec. 1720, 4 
April 1713,p.29.SeealsoCA,LM21,220ct 1712. 
13. Mentzel, Description of the Cape, Vol. 3, p.300. 
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In time, as more and more Khoikhoi became absorbed within the colony and subject to the brutal 
exploitation of farm labour, a greater solidarity emerged between them and the slaves.14 But this 
common consciousness of colonial oppression was not present in the early decades of the 
eighteenth century. Instead, as Mentzel explains, the cruelty of the Khoikhoi was contrasted with 
a rather idealistic vision of life amongst the Xhosa. These expectations may have provided 
inspiration for a group of twenty to thirty slaves who revolted at Groot Constantia in 1713. They 
made a dash for the Hottentots Holland Mountains, hoping to reach "Caffersland", but most of 
them were killed or recaptured by the Khoikhoi over the mountains.15 We must presume that not 
all escapees were recaptured and that many did find succour in the distant interior. But the 
evidence of unsuccessful runaways suggests that the fate of such people, though obscure, was 
probably unpleasant. 
A noteworthy feature of the early decades of the eighteenth century was that fugitive slaves often 
joined forces with criminals or deserters of European origin. On one level this is indicative of a 
conunon consciousness of oppression, for the treatment of Company soldiers and sailors was 
often worse than that of slaves.16 But it is significant that such instances of solidarity were rare 
after 1740 and this is because of processes at work in the frontier zone. By 1740 the colonial 
boundaries had extended to the point where white deserters could find employment and shelter 
with outlying colonists. Frontier farmers were always happy to have white supervisors working 
for them and if such men were fugitives from the law they could not demand high wages. As long 
as they were far enough away from the Company to avoid detection white deserters could merge 
with colonial frontiersmen. Before the 1730s, however, they were often too conspicuous to do so 
and for this reason, finding security in numbers, they fled together with slaves. 
There is an interesting episode from the years 1706-1709 which illustrates some of the 
characteristics of the droster gangs of the northern frontier zone at this time. In 1706 a slave 
called Simon of Mallebaar fled to the vicinity of Vier en Twintig Rivieren where he fell in with 
various "vagabonden, schelmen en gaandieven". In 1709, together with some other slaves who 
had stolen sheep, tobacco, muskets and anununition from their masters, Simon placed himself 
under the supervision of two European men (one called Jan Bakker and the other known only as 
Jan) who undertook to lead the group to "een ander land". The Europeans had compasses but 
after six weeks, somewhere over the Olifants River in "'t Cochemans land", their food supplies 
14. See Penn, "Drosler Gangs" an<l Ross, Cape o/Torme11/s, p.48. 
15. CJ\, VC 20, 1711-1714, 24 Jan. 1713, pp.7-23. 
16. A poinl ma<le by Ross in Cape o/Torme11ls, p.22. 
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ran out. The group split up and the Khoikhoi attacked them, stealing their goods, smashing their 
guns and throwing their anununition in the river. The survivors were later attacked by some 
"Namacquas of bosjesmans" and taken prisoner before being handed over to colonial justice. 
Simon was hanged.17 
The case of a group of fugitives recaptured in 1712 also provides many telling details concerning 
the brotherhood of droster conununities, the insecurity of life in the frontier zone and the limited 
options available to those wishing to escape to the interior. 
Jan Jorisz, or Snijer (as he was known to his companions), had been born in Harlingen and joined 
the VOC as a sailor. His was not a distinguished career. In Batavia he had been caught after 
deserting from his ship and handed over to the "Caffers" for correction. For three consecutive 
half-days he had straddled the wooden horse of torture and then spent six months in chains. In 
Cape Town, in 1709, he was once more chastised by the "Caffers" for similar crimes and 
condemned to eight months hard labour on Robben Island without a salary. Shortly after his 
release, fearing punishment for drunke1mess, he deserted again and began to sleep out in the veld, 
living from the knapsacks of shepherds. Then, at the Koeberg farm of a man called Ten Danune, 
he met a slave, Benjamin van Madagascar, with whom he entered into "brotherhood". In the hard 
world that had shaped both slave and sailor "brotherhood" was not an abstract concept. It is not 
known what rituals or ceremonies the men employed to solemnise their pact but from that 
moment on they were bound to each other. 
Benjamin was Ten Danune's trusted overseer but the slave was rather free with his masters 
goods, distributing them to Snijer as well as to other "landloopers en vagebonden". These other 
recipients of Benjamin's generosity included four slaves from neighbouring farms. They wished to 
escape to Natal and Snijer, nothing loath, decided to accompany them. Benjamin gave him a 
musket (no doubt one of Ten Danune's), five or six bullets, a handful of powder, three loaves of 
bread and two knapsacks of meal. Thus equipped Snijer and the slaves - Titus, Abel, Jonker and 
Abraham - set off up the coast to beyond the Piketberg where they found "een groote valleij"(in 
all probability the Verlore Vlei) and it was here that the group split up. Snijer and Titus returned 
to the fringes of the colony, where the pickings were richer, but at the Paardeberg Titus went his 
own way. Not long after this Snijer was arrested and flung into the Castle's "Donker gat" to await 
trial.IS 
17. CA, VC 19, 1709-1710,25 June 1709,pp.221-227. 
18. CA, VC 20, 16 Julv 1712, pp.121-139. 
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It seemed as though Snijer's days of roving were over. He was not alone in the dark confines, for 
he had two cell mates, the slaves Scipio van Com1andel (commonly known as Cupitie and 
whipped and branded in 1699) and Moses van Bengalen. Both slaves were under sentence of 
death for having stolen property whilst on the run. But, in an unprecedented occurrence, all three 
prisoners succeeded in escaping from the "Donker Gat". How this escape was effected is not 
recorded though it is probably the only successful escape to have been made from the colony's 
most notorious place of incarceration. The fugitives hastened to Snijer's "brother" and benefactor, 
Benjamin van Madagascar. It was not long before they were joined by another desperate 
"rondlooper", a young sailor by the name of Nicolaas Ooms, whose credentials were almost as 
impressive as Jan Snijer's. Ooms had previously received a public flogging in Colombo for the 
"despicable wounding" of his under-helmsman and had been banished to the Cape for five years. 
Here he was sentenced to labour at the public works but he managed to unloosen his chains and 
seize a knife, threatening to kill anyone who tried to stop him. But somebody did overpower him 
and Ooms was returned to the chain-gang. Shortly afterwards, however, he broke his bonds again 
and escaped into the veld. Like many other deserters he drifted between the Tygerberg, the 
Paardeberg and Groene Kloof, finding shelter with shepherds, scavenging along the beach and, 
doubtless, slaughtering livestock. Eventually his wanderings took him to Ten Datmne's fam1 at 
Koeberg where he found Snijer, Scipio a11d Moses. During a drinking session (with wine provided 
by the hospitable Benjan1in) the four runaways pledged compa11ionship ("maatschappij hebben 
gemaakt") and resolved "haer fortuyn te gaai1 zoeken en verder veldwaart in te lopen, 
vagabondeeren" .19 
Their first objective was Groene Kloof. On the way there they encountered a mounted slave who 
had some bread and meat on his horse. He was obliged to share his provisions. At the fann of the 
widow Basson they found the knecht, Jan ter Sluijs, who was also asked for food which he could 
not deny. The four pressed onwards to Petrus Tavenraat's fam1 where the slave Arend gave them 
some bread. The "landloopers" realised that despite this they were ill provisioned for the journey 
which they had undertaken and resolved to steal a gun. They had seen one at Jan ter Sluijs' hut so 
they decided to return there, much to the knecht's dismay. They greeted him with a "Goeden avont 
of tabee", to which he replied: "Tabee of niet, ik houw juiluij hier niet, of te we! juijluij moet 
vertrckken".20 But he was a lone man in the night, on the edge of the colony. Jan Snijer had a 
19. Ibid. "To seek their fortunes and go deeper into the veld, vagabonding." 
20. Ibid. "Good evening or tabee". "Tabee or not, I'm not having you here, you must leave". "Tabee" was a common 
fonn of greeting in the colony and is thought to derive from the Dutch word for tobacco, "tabak", since the first 
words that most non-Europeans addressed to a pipe smoking Dutchman were invariably a request for tobacco. 
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club whilst Ooms displayed his favourite weapon - a knife. Scipio slipped into the hut and found 
two guns; a musket with a rifled barrel and a blunderbuss. There was also ammunition. "Mannen 
je doet my kragt en gewelt aan" ,21 Jan ter Sluijs complained. At least, however, his life was 
spared and the thieves departed. 
They left for the Paardeberg and found Lucas, a slave of Dirk van Schalkwijk, at his master's 
farm. Lucas provided food and slaughtered a sheep for them. He also gave them some tin table-
board, so that they could make bullets, and showed them where Van Schalkwijk kept his 
gunpowder cartridges. With this extra anmmnition the fugitives continued northwards, through 
the Swartland to the Piketberg where they slaughtered two sheep belonging to some nearby 
Khoikhoi. These Khoikhoi, seeing four strangers laden with meat, guessed that they had been 
robbed and asked for tobacco or dagga in exchange. The runaways promised that they would 
deliver some on their return and hurried onwards. The Khoikhoi raised the hue and cry. Shortly 
thereafter two shots whistled over their heads and looking behind them they saw two Dutcl1111en 
approaching on horseback. They dropped the meat and ran but it was obvious that they would be 
overtaken. Ooms stopped, turned, and fired the rifled musket. Snijer discharged the blunderbuss. 
It misfired. In the panic of re-loading, Ooms januned his musket. With bullets flying about them 
the fugitives continued ru1111ing but it was hopeless. The two sailors eventually fell to their knees 
and begged their pursuers for mercy. They and the slaves were captured and taken to the Cape. 
All were hanged. Benjan1in van Madagascar was whipped, branded and mutilated by having his 
nose and cars cut off. He then served six months hard labour at the Company's works and was 
condenmed to spend six years in chains.22 
Amongst the conclusions which emerge from the above accounts are that both slave and 
European drosters were capable of uniting in brotherhood and that their gangs were a danger to 
both Khoikhoi and colonists. Most droster groups were compelled to adopt a parasitic existence, 
preying off the societies of the frontier zone since they were unable to achieve long tenn self-
sufficiency by themselves. As a result their presence in any given area was soon apparent and 
their discovery almost inevitable. Neither Khoikhoi nor colonists felt secure with such men at 
large and co-operated to ensure their capture. The life of a droster gang was therefore 
overshadowed by insecurity and the situation of such a gang even more vulnerable than that of 
their potential victims. After the smallpox epidemic of 1713 the Khoikhoi groups of the interior 
were weaker but the colonists were stronger so the situation facing drosters was not substantially 




safer. Nor could drosters always rely on a sympathetic welcome from the slaves they might 
encounter at the various outposts on their wanderings. Not every slave was as welcoming as 
Benjamin of Madagascar and some could be relied upon to alert the authorities. In 1724, for 
instance, three Dutch vagabonds were reported to be circulating in the Riebeek-Kasteel district 
after having stolen food from the slaves at the farms.23 The fact that all these drosters were white 
may have had some bearing on both their reception and behaviour. Nor should it be assumed that 
all droster gangs spared those whom from whom they extracted hospitality. Solitary hunters or 
stock-fanners would often have their throats cut by men who had nothing to lose by committing 
further crimes. In one gruesome instance a pursuing conunando shot dead three of a group of 
nme runaway slaves and found a human finger - from a white person - amongst their 
possessions!24 
During the second decade of the century droster gangs seemed to grow in both numbers and 
audacity. After the mass escape from Groot Constantia in 1713 came the flight of forty 
Madagascan slaves from the Company between February and April 1716. A further eleven 
deserted on Christmas day of that year.25 In January 1717 a group of fifteen slaves escaped from 
Stellenbosch26 whilst in May 1719 twenty runaways attacked the Swart brothers on their isolated 
fann in the Overberg and stole 200 sheep.27 It was obviously very tempting for fann slaves to 
join passing droster gangs, especially when there were other slaves in them. In January 1713 a 
gang of about thirty runaway slaves arrived at the farm of J. Elivier at Vier en Twintig Rivieren 
and "forced" seven other slaves to join them after they had bound the knecht and another servant. 
This gang was anned with guns and they liberated three further slaves from two neighbouring 
farms.28 
The fate of all of these escapees is unknown though a steady trickle of sentences was passed on 
recaptured slaves year after year. In a sense the records arc misleading in that they do not reveal 
very much about successful escapees. It would be too much to suppose that every single droster 
was either recaptured or killed by the Khoikhoi. Later evidence suggests that some drosters did 
manage to survive for a long time even without Khoikhoi assistance. There must also have been 
23. CA, LM 23, Letters Despatched 1723-1725, 23 Oct. 1724, p.170. 
24. CA, LM 20, Letters Received 1726-1732, lO Oct. 1730. 
25. G.C. de Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 5, 1716-1719, 22 Dec. 1716, p.120; 5 Jan. 1717, 
p.128. 
26. CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched 1707-1720, 11 Jan. 1717, p.69. 
27. CA, LM 19, Letters Received 1717-1726, 25 May 1719. 
28. CA, LM 18, Letters Received 1709-1718, 6 Jan. 1714. 
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some who found protection amongst the Khoikhoi after the 1690s but there is no direct evidence 
of this. In any event there was no let up in the activity of droster gangs in the 1720s. 
In 1724 the slaves of the Company meat contractors were attacked by drosters (whether white or 
black is not stated) whilst they were herding cattle north of Groene Kloof. The drovers were 
bound hand and foot whilst their herd was stolen.29 In 1725 it was thought necessary to offer a 
reward of ten Rijksdaalders for recapturing a slave,30 a feat which was, presumably, becoming a 
more dangerous and less frequent accomplislunent. The next year, in January 1726, the strength 
and size of a group of runaways in the Saldanha Bay district was sufficient for the governor to 
order the landdrost of Stellenbosch to send out a commando against them. According to the 
reports of the post-holder at Saldanha there were more than twenty drosters, well supplied with 
guns and ammunition, causing great fear amongst the outlying fam1ers. The commando does not 
seem to have encountered the group but conflicting reports of its size, ranging from over forty to 
a mere six members, suggest that its membership fluctuated according to its fortunes.31 It was 
probably the same group of drosters which was reported as being active in the area in April 1726 
when the fanns of the widow Ten Danune and Tobias Mostert were plundered. Thirty 
Stellenbosch burghers were ordered to rendezvous with sixty men of the Cape burgher corps at 
Hendrik Eksteen's farm near Saldanha Bay. The membership of the group was thought to 
comprise both white and black vagabonds and a reward of ten Rijksdaalders was offered for each 
one captured - dead or alive. It is not known what success the commando had but the drosters 
probably disbanded as danger approached.32 
Not all white deserters felt constrained to join the ranks of roving slaves for not all were as 
desperate as Snijer and Ooms. But many soldiers and sailors of the VOC were keen to escape the 
murderous discipline and grinding poverty of life in the lower echelons of the Company. The 
expanding frontier offered such men many opportunities and, as the Company itself admitted, 
those who deserted were not inhibited by the thought that they would lose their pay since this was 
generally "nothing in particular" .33 There was doubtless a strong psychological impulse for 
freedom behind this flight to the frontier. In this respect it is instructive to read what Richard 
Slotkin has written about the vast frontier zone of the New World: 
29. CA, LM 23, Letters Despatchcd 1723-1725, 12 May 1724, p.148. 
30. Ibid , 6 Feb. 1725, p.200. 
31. CA, LM 24, Letters Despatched 1726-1728, 24 Jan. 1726; CALM 19, Letters Received 1717-1726, 26 Jan. 
1726, 31 Jan. 1726. 
32. CA, LM 24, Letters Despatched 1726-1728, 20 April 1726, pp.65-66. 
33. CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched 1707-1720, 31 July 1719, p.112. 
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The most striking quality of life in the New World was the relative absence of 
social restraints on human behaviour, the relative ease with which a strong man 
could, by mastering the law of the wilderness-jungle, impose his personal dream 
of self-aggrandisement on reality. In Europe all men were under authority ... [The 
New World] stimulated ·a monstrous ambition against authority, an obscene 
Faustian lust to satisfy nature by violating all bonds of obedience, religion and 
morality.34 
On a smaller scale the frontier zone of the northern Cape, like all frontiers of European expansion 
in the post-Columbian period, evoked similar emotions within the breasts of men grown tired of 
the confinements of their own repressive society. Few, perhaps, succeeded in surrendering totally 
to their "obscene Faustian lusts" but, at the very least, the haemorrhaging of such disordered cells 
from the ordered body of the Company's colony posed a grave threat to political authority. 
Nothing seemed to irritate the Company more than the knowledge that certain of its servants had 
absconded and taken up the life of a vagabond on the frontier. In 170 l it was estimated that there 
were no fewer than fifteen such men roaming provocatively just beyond the Company's reach and 
their numbers increased year after year. Most of these deserters were well known to the 
authorities and their names were given to the landdrost to enable him to take steps to capture 
them.35 It was most annoying, for instance, when the fonner overseer at the Company's post at 
Visserhoek, Claas Arentsz (nicknamed Leegenboeten), was seen going about the countryside with 
a gun over his shoulder.36 But Company officials in the frontier zone were often extremely scared 
or reluctant to arrest their fellows. Thus in 1725 Korporaal Voetsman at Roodezand was sternly 
rebuked for having chatted to the deserter Philip Kalden (who was hiding at the widow of 
Coenraad Scheepers) without arresting him.37 In 1730 the governor was especially concerned to 
capture Pieter Holbroek, a deserted soldier who was living with a slave woman in a cave in the 
mountains above the fann of Francois du Toit. A conunando was sent to catch Holbroek but he 
had to be shot before he would leave the cave, after which he and his lover were sent to the Castle 
for interrogation.38 
Just as slaves sometimes ran away together in large groups, so too did Company soldiers desert in 
sizeable parties. Ten soldiers, including the ex-corporal of the Company post at Riviersonderend, 
34. Slotkin, Rege11eratio11 111ro11gl, Violence, p.34. 
35. CA, VC 15, 70ct. 1701,p.1007. 
36. CA, LM 21, Letters Despatched 1707-1720, 3 Nov. 1717, p.78. Five other vagabonds are named in this letter. 
37. CA, LM 23, Letters Despatched 1723-1725, 5 Feb. 1725, p.199. 
38. CA, LM 25, Letters Despatched 1728-1732, 22 June 1730, p.349; CA, LM 20, Letters Received 1726-1732, 21 
June 1730. 
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fled into the interior in August 1727. All were recaptured.39 In April 1729 thirteen anned soldiers 
of the garrison deserted to the Hottentots Holland mountains and became engaged in a skim1ish 
with the pursuing dragoons. The leader of the deserters, Jan Busch, was killed, two others were 
wounded and the rest captured.40 Although both of these mass desertions ended in failure they 
indicate that there were significant numbers of Company men who were desperate to exchange a 
life of misery for the promise of the frontier. 
Company deserters were not, of course, the only white delinquents in the frontier zone and the 
VOC tried hard to monitor the activities of all its subjects. In theory every free colonists who 
went fanning or hunting needed a pennit or licence. The right to settle in, or indeed visit, the 
Cape interior, was subject to Company approval. Those who did not have their own loan-fann 
had to be registered as living with somebody who did. Knechts were considered to be bound by 
their contracts to work on the fanns of their bosses.41 Single men, the "eenloopendes", were 
required to be "inschryven" (registered) with a particular colonist and to be registered on the lists 
of "eenloopende personen".42 Anyone, in other words, who was not either on the Company's lists 
or domiciled in a registered place could be considered as a vagrant or "rondlooper" and, as such, 
a trouble maker. 
A perpetual and largely hopeless campaign was waged against such people. In 1687 the Council 
of Policy had complained that certain colonists were wandering about and living "dan bier dan 
daar" without ever notifying the authorities of their whereabouts. Others were guilty of hiring out 
their knechts to all and sundry without pennission, even though they \Vere on loan from the 
Company. This caused great chaos. It was stipulated that in the future all freeburghers who 
moved from the Cape to Stellenbosch would have to report to the Burgher Heemraden and 
register their nan1es. In addition some were harbouring fugitives and deserters, both free-born and 
39. CA, LM 24, Letters Despatched 1726-1728, 18 Aug. 1727, p.147; CALM 20, Letters Received 1726-1732, 19 
Aug. 1727, 22 Aug. 1727. 
40. CA, LM 25, Letters Despatched 1728-1732, 3 April 1729, 7 April 1729; CALM 20, Letters Received 1726-
1732, 3 April 1729, 5 April 1729. 
41. A great deal of work still has to be done on the subject of k11ecl1ts but see R. Shell, "Land, Labour and Cape 
Families: The Introduction of Slavery and Serfdom" (unpublished paper presented in the Department of History, 
University of Cape Town, no date), pp.20-42. 
42. Sec CA, 1/STB 13/31, Alphabetiesc Lyst Van Persone Wat op Veldtogten Z)11 uijt gegaan, bcginncnde met 
Nov. 1737 ( 1736-1744 ). In January 1735 the Landdrost and Heemraden of Stellenbosch resolved that in future all 
those going inlaml would have to give their names to the secretary and report back once they had returned. CA, C 
650, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakcnstcin 1729-1736, 16 Jan. 1735. 
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slave, foreign and local. The Council therefore issued a stern warning that anyone who failed to 
report such people would be regarded as a traitor to the conununity and punished accordingly.43 
This was but one of many such edicts to be issued for, forty-two years later, plakkaats were still 
warning colonists of the growing tendency of harbouring such fugitives44 whilst the number of 
"rondloopers" had simply expanded with the frontier. In 1737 Landdrost Lourensz of 
Stellenbosch complained of the number of men in his district who were simply not where they 
were supposed to be and "egter nooijt een vaste woonplaats komen te houde, maer als 
vagabonden en land-lopers over al rondswerven, sonder dat men weet waar deselve te soeken of te 
vinden zijn ... " .45 The implications of this were that such people could not be found. This caused 
great confusion in the muster rolls when it was time for the compulsory military exercises or 
commando duty. Furthennore, absentees committed all sorts of "schelmstukken" and acted as a 
bad example to youngsters in the district. Lourensz named six of the chief culprits and the 
Council of Policy resolved to cleanse the land of these "lediglopers" by forcing them to become 
Company sailors and banishing them from the Cape for five years.46 
Sometimes the settler community had an interest in protecting these roving "landloopers" who 
could be sponsored to undertake dangerous hunting trips or bartering expeditions without 
implicating more respectable burghers. Most frontier fanners could use the labour of a man who 
was grateful for food, shelter and confidentiality. Widows, in particular, were often well-disposed 
towards those who offered them their services.47 There were, of course, many rogues and thieves 
amongst the rootless frontier colonists but, on the whole, white settlers were able to protect 
themselves against these undesirables far better than the Khoikhoi could. 
The impact of these "illegal" frontiersmen on the indigenous societies of the interior is a crucial 
issue but difficult to quantify owing to the lack of evidence. The perpetrators of evil deeds did not 
often leave witnesses or advertise their accomplishments. It is also debatable whether there was 
much to choose between lawful or unlawful European residents of the frontier zone when it came 
to their destructive impact. Contemporary observers, however, were in no doubt that vagabonds 
43. Boeseken, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 3, 1681-1707, 25 Dec. 1687, p.181. 
44. CA, LM 25, Letters Despatched 1728-1732, 28 March 1729, p.278. 
45. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. 9, 1735-1739, 3 Dec. 1737, p.168-169: " ... do not 
actually have any fixed abode, but wander about as vagabonds and rovers, without anyone being able to ascertain 
their whereabouts ... " 
46. Ibid. "Lediglopers" is probably best translated as "shillless or worthless idlers". 
47. The case of Estienne Barbier (in chapter three above) is a good example of the type of hospitality that 
personable fugitives could expect from widows. 
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and freebooters were behind the various outbreaks of violence on the colony's frontiers in the 
early decades of the eighteenth century. In 1715 Frans van der Ste! was speaking for many when 
he urged the govenunent to appoint a good landdrost who would: " ... search for and exterminate 
all vagrants, who are continually wandering about the country, remain unregistered, and with 
some malevolent residents, impoverish the Hottentots and embitter them against our nation, by 
means of robbery and other atrocious acts ofviolence".48 
By this date, however, much of the damage had already been done and vagrants would have had 
to travel far to find any Khoikhoi groups to impoverish. It is noteworthy that at times of frontier 
disturbance or Khoisan resistance there seemed to be an abatement in droster activity. With 
vengeful commandos and Khoisan raiders abroad the frontier zone was not a safe place for 
fugitives. 
After 1730 there were very few reports of fugitive gangs active m the areas south of the 
Piketberg. The colony had now expanded to the extent that it was no longer easy for refugees to 
evade capture around the Saldanha Bay, Groene Kloof or Stellenbosch districts. Discontented 
slaves might suddenly gather together, attack their masters, plunder the farm house and run away 
- as happened in the Tygerberg in 173849 - but they could not stay in such a thoroughly colonised 
area for long. The Roodezand was reported as still being full of fugitives, both slaves and 
Europeans, in 172850 and runaway slaves were hiding in the caves of the Paarl Mountain as late 
as 1742.51 But the main area of droster activity was now around the Piketberg and to the north in 
areas such as Renoster Hoek (which lies north of the Piketberg and south of the Olifants River 
Mountains) or the Olifants River. 
This shift in focus became evident in September 1731 when a group of runaway slaves fired on a 
conunando at Renoster Hoek and killed the burgher Samuel de Beer. Four of the gang were 
captured but Landdrost Lourensz was aware that there were other fugitives at large, including 
"certain Europeans living at the Piketberg".52 A second conunando was sent to deal with this 
menace but the drosters could not be found.53 In November 1731 two fugitive slaves were shot 
48. CA, LM 18, Letters Reeeived 1709-1718, 17 April 1715. 
49. De Wet, (ed.), Resolusies vc111 die Politi eke Raad, Vol. 9, 17 Aug. l 738, p.220. 
50. CA, LM 20, Letters Received 1726-1732, 12 Nov. 1728. 
51. CA, C 457, lnkomende Briewe April 1740-Dec 1740, 16 Feb. 1742. 
52. CJ\, C 650, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein 1729-1736, 10 Sept. 1731, 12 Sept. 1731; CALM 
20, Letters Received l 726-1732, l l Sept. l 73 l. 
53. CJ\, C 650, 12 Sept. 1731. 
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dead whilst stealing sheep from a Piketberg fanner. Lourensz learnt from a third, who was taken 
captive, that the droster group he was after had split up because of quarrels and that they had 
returned from beyond the Olifants River (where they had been) to hide around the Piketberg.54 It 
is not known whether the rest of this group were ever caught but in March 1736 another 
conunando was sent out behind the Piketberg to deal with fugitive slaves. On this occasion two 
slaves were apprehended and one of them was shot dead when he refused to surrender. The 
second escaped whilst being taken back to Stellenbosch.55 
During the frontier war of 1739 it was too perilous for fugitives to roam the northern borders but, 
shortly after fighting stopped in 1740, desertions resumed. The Company was still plagued by the 
desertion of its employees, as can be seen from a resolution passed by the Council of Policy in 
1745. Noting an increase in desertions it ordered an increase in the punishment for offenders. A 
recaptured deserter would be severely whipped at the place of execution, branded and placed in 
irons to serve as a convict for ten years without pay. Furthermore, it was decreed that anyone 
convicted of harbouring or assisting a deserter would suffer the same punishment. If these 
measures failed to have an effect the Council proposed to apply the same penalty as existed in 
Bengal, namely, death.56 In Stellenbosch, meanwhile, the Landdrost and Heemraden had decided 
in a resolution of 1743 to offer a reward of ten Rijksdaalders for slaves recaptured over the 
Olifants River, six Rijksdaalders for slaves on the colonial side of the river and three 
Rijksdaalders for those on the south side of the Piketberg or Hottentots Holland Mountains.57 
This revealing gradation suggests that fugitive slaves were no longer as great a threat as they had 
been in the south-western Cape. They continued, however, to plague the colonists of the Piketberg 
and Olifants River areas for many years. 
In 1755, for instance, a group of fourteen runaway slaves was apprehended by Veldkorporaal 
Jacob Gildenhuysen and his conunando in a kloof of the Piketberg. The drosters would not 
surrender and instead brandished knobkerries and shouted loud defiance. They also had a musket, 
two pistols, gun-powder and a cutlass; but when the shooting started they were no match for the 
colonists. Five slaves were shot dead and the rest recaptured. Their number included a female 
slave, slaves from local fanners and slaves from farmers of the south-western Capc.58 
54. CA, LM 20, Letters Receive<l 1726-1732, 13 Nov. 1731. 
55. CA, C 650, 12 March 1736. 
56. CA, LM 58, Resolutions of the Council of Policy 1743-1745, 19 Oct. 1745. 
57. CA, C 652, 26 July 1743. 
58. CA, I/STU 3/10, Criminal Records 1749-1758, 19 Nov. 1755. 
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A similar incident occurred in May 1775 near Gerrit Smit's farm, "de Drooge Rijs Kloof' behind 
the Piketberg. Smit discovered that his barn had been broken into and that some wheat was 
missing. He called a friend, Gideon van Zijl, and with two servants followed the spoor of the 
barefooted robbers. They found four fugitive slaves hiding in a bush. The slaves all had knives 
and Smit ordered them to throw down their blades and approach him one by one. The four began 
talking in Malay, which Smit did not understand. When they began to advance in a menacing 
fashion he shouted at them, in Portuguese, to get back and drop their weapons. Still they 
advanced. Smit told Van Zyl, who had the only other musket, to shoot one in the legs. The shot 
was fired. The slave fell down. But the other three shouted "Amok! Amok! Matta Garra!" and 
charged.59 Van Zyl had to flee because his musket was now unloaded. Smit, though, put a bullet 
through the closest droster and killed him. The other two then chased Smit for one hundred and 
fifty yards before returning to their original position at the bush. The two colonists reloaded and 
once more ordered the slaves to drop their knives. This time one of them shouted "Biel Biel" and 
rushed at Smit. It was suicide. The slave died, shot through the body, with the knife still in his 
hand. The survivor told Smit that they had escaped from the Company works at Cape Town.60 
A closer inspection of these, and other, incidents concerning fugitives in the years after 1740 
reveals that the expansion of the colony would seem to have had a transfonning effect on the 
composition of droster gangs.61 From about this stage onwards whites and slaves went their 
separate ways. The fugitive gangs that fled beyond the Olifants River no longer contained white 
deserters and the reasons for this are linked to the dynamics of frontier expansion. Between 1740 
and 1770 the boundaries of the colony advanced rapidly to a point beyond which further progress 
was problematic. In some directions environmental conditions made pastoralism an impossibility 
whilst in others Khoisan or Xhosa resistance was too strong to be swept aside.62 In these 
circumstances fugitives would have to be really desperate to venture into the doubly inhospitable 
interior and, for the most part, white deserters did not have to, since they were readily absorbed 
by the far flung frontier farmers. Slaves, on the other hand, could decide whether they wished to 
59. CA, 1/STB 3/11, Criminal Records 1759-1782, 8 May 1775. Eastern slaves, who came from a culture where 
"ru1ming amok" was a ritualised fonn of violence against a hopeless situation, often ran amok as a fonn of 
resistance (invariably suicidal) against slavery at the Cape. See Edna Bradlow, "Running amok and its historical 
significance", Caba, 5, I, 1990, pp.8-11. For other examples see the Constantia slave uprising of 1713 (CA, VC 20, 
24 Jan. 1713, pp.7-23 and p.146 above) and the uprising of bandieten on Robben Island in 175 l (CA, CJ 359, 
Criminelc Process Stukcn 175 l, pp. 319-371 and N. Penn, "From Penguins to Prisoners: Robben Island, 1488-1805" 
in N. Penn, I I. Deacon and N. /\lcxandcr, Robben Island: The politics of rock and sand (Cape Town, 1992), pp.26-
27. 
60. CJ\, 1/STB 3/1 l, 8 May 1775. 
61. Sec Penn, "Drostcr Gangs", for a consideration of li1gilivc groups in the second half of the eighteenth ccnturv. 
62. Sec chapter five below. 
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attempt the perilous journey beyond the colony's boundaries or to hide out in the inaccessible 
mountains within the colony. Both courses were adopted and the Cedarberg Mountains in 
particular served as a place of refuge for runaway slaves until well into the nineteenth century. 63 
"BASTAARDS", "BASTAARD-HOTTENTOTS" AND OORLAMS 
Slaves and Company servants were not the only fugitives to flee from the colony after 1740. 
From this date onwards there is increasing evidence that entirely new categories of colonial 
subjects were moving outwards and away from the colony in an attempt to avoid economic, social 
and political oppression. The new fugitives were people who were described, in the discourse of 
the day, as "Bastaards" or "Bastaard-Hottentots" and although their presence is most clearly 
marked in the records after 1770 their "pre-history", shadowy though it is, deserves some 
attention. Not only were such people active within the frontier zone, they were, in many cases, 
products of the frontier zone. Indeed, some of them were doubtless themselves the descendants of 
colonial fugitives and frontier Khoikhoi. 
The word "Bastaard" was used by contemporaries to refer to people who had been born of 
miscegenous relationships.64 The term described a wide range of people of differing status and 
the nuances of its meaning changed with changing attitudes. Quite clearly, however, the word 
implied the stigma of illegitimate birth as well as the idea of racially mixed parentage. In the 
Cape colonial context there were three major instances of miscegenation: that of Europeans with 
slaves; that of Europeans with Khoikhoi; and that of slaves with Khoikhoi. The first instance was 
relatively rare on the Cape frontier (though fairly common in Cape Town) and the status of the 
resultant children varied from case to case. Some children, especially girls, might become 
absorbed within white society whilst other children, especially if they were dark-skinned males, 
might become slaves.65 The offspring of Europeans and Khoikhoi were ostensibly free but, as a 
number of studies have shown,66 the status of "Bastaards", though superior to that of slaves, 
Khoikhoi and San, declined - economically, socially and politically - throughout the eighteenth 
63. See Penn, "Droster Gangs" for the droslers of the Ccdarberg. 
64. For a discussion of the word "Bastaard" sec M. Legassick, "The Northern Frontier to c.1840: The rise and 
decline of the Griqua people" in R. El phi ck and H. Giliomee, (eds.), The Shaping of South Afi'ican Society, 2nd 
edition, pp.369-370. See also Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.170-179. 
65. For a discussion of race, class and social status in eighteenth century Cape society see R. Elphick and R. Shell, 
"Intergroup relations: Khoikhoi, settlers, slaves and free blacks, 1652-1795" in Elphick and Giliomce, The Shaping 
of South Afi'ican Society, pp.184-239; I I. F. Heese, Groep Sander Grense (Bellville, 1984); W.M. Freund, "Race in 
the Social Structure of South Africa 1652-1836" in Race and Class, XVII, (1976); H. Giliomec, "Eighteenth 
Century Cape Society: Culture, Race and Class", S0cial Dv11a111ics, ( 1983). 
66. Sec sources cited in footnote 65 above. Sec also J.S. Marais, 71ie Cape Coloured People, pp.10-13. 
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century. This process was first experienced in areas of high white population density close to 
Cape Town where mixed marriages became less and less socially acceptable and where it became 
more and more difficult for "Bastaards" to acquire loan-farms. 
Elphick and Shell have remarked that: "In the newly settled pastoral reg10ns . . . considerable 
miscegenation, but not intermarriage, occurred".67 In the early phase of colonial expansion white 
men far outnumbered white women in the frontier zone and, indeed, in the Cape as a whole. 
Before the heroic childbearing efforts of white women succeeded, several generations down the 
line, in rectifying the sexual imbalance within white society, white frontiersmen struggled to find 
white wives. Biological imperatives, however, combined with the unmonitored freedom of the 
frontier zone to promote sexual conduct, and sexual relationships, which would have been 
censured in the more settled areas of the colony. Whilst "civilised" observers of white Cape 
society displayed a prurient revulsion when describing the sexual channs of Khoikhoi women, 
white frontiersmen had fewer qualms. They slept with Khoikhoi women but, for the most part, 
declined to marry them. According to Elphick and Shell very few marriages at the Cape church 
(and none at Stellenbosch which was the magisterial seat of the northern frontier zone) were 
obviously mixed marriages and it does indeed seem that the majority of "Bastaards" were born 
out of wedlock. 68 
This state of affairs was partly due to the paucity of churches in the northern Cape frontier zone. 
It was only after Governor Gustaaf van Imhoff visited the outlying districts of the Cape in 1743 
that a decision was made to establish a church in the Swartland and a church between Roodezand 
and Vier en Twintig Rivieren. Van Imhoff had been shocked by the "sorgeloosheijd en 
onweetenheijd" (carelessness and ignorance) of a large number of frontier farmers concerning 
religious matters so that it seemed to him: "dat het aldaar eerder na eene versaameling van blinde 
heijdenen als naa eene colonie van Europeers en Christenen komt te gelijken" .69 
A lack of churches might certainly have contributed, as Van Imhoff feared, to a barbarisation of 
frontier fanners and a careless attitude towards the sacrament of marriage. But the qualification 
ought perhaps to be that it was Christian intennarriage that did not occur. We have already noted 
how in 1738 Willem van Wjk "took to wife, Hottentot fashion a near relative of the chief, 
67. Elphick an<l Shell, "Intergroup relations", p.199. 
68. Ibid., p.199. 
69. Resolutions of Council of Policy, 14 Feb. 1743, in G.C. <le Wet (e<l.), Resolusies 1·w1 die l'olitieke Raad, Vol. X 
1740-1743 (Pretoria, 1984), p.226. 
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conducting himself in the matter and clothing himself at the time as a Hottentot"70 and later 
evidence from Namaqualand suggests that white colonists were adopting Khoikhoi wedding 
customs in the l 770s.71 It seems that although some of the frontier colonists saw little reason to 
marry, in a Christian fashion, the Khoikhoi women with whom they slept, they were somewhat 
more punctilious about providing a Christian baptism for the offspring of such relationships. The 
Christening book of the Swartland church (the most north-westerly church in the colony for most 
of the eighteenth century) has a special section - "Gedoopte Bastaarts 1752-1769" - and many of 
the names there are typical Dutch sumames.72 It is to be assumed that these "Gedoopte 
Bastaarts" c1tjoyed a status in society superior to that of unbaptised "Bastaards", Khoikhoi or 
slaves but the very fact that their names were recorded separately is evidence of discrimination. 
Their precise status no doubt depended on the details of their family background and the social 
climate of the district into which they were born. Favoured children of respected colonists 
probably passed unobtrusively into the ranks of colonial society, suffering no discrimination on 
account of their mixed blood. Others were not so fortunate. 
Lichtenstein, an observer at the Cape between 1803-1806, conunented on the difference between 
the attitudes of colonists towards the "Bastaards" in the mid-eighteenth century and at the end of 
the century. He recognised that the crucial test was whether or not they were allowed to obtain 
and retain property. Initially, he noted, a "Bastaard" might acquire property after having worked 
as a farm overseer when, on the death of the master, the servant "would often assume his name; 
and not infrequently sought himself some little spot, to which he retired with all belonging to him, 
and gained a subsistence for himself and his family by the breeding of cattle" .73 "Bastaards" who 
succeeded in possessing farms of this sort did not, apparently, attach the same importance to 
legitimising their claims by the prompt payment of loan-fam1 rental; or perhaps the delayed 
payment was because their claims were not readily recognised by the authorities. Whatever the 
reasons however, it would seem that "Bastaards" ended up with the least desirable, often 
unregisterablc, land within the colony or else with land outside the colony. As Lichtenstein 
observed: 
The white children of the colonists did not hesitate to make use of the right of the 
strongest and to drive their half yellow relations out of the places where they had 
fixed their abodes. These Bastard Hottentots were then obliged to seek an asylum 
in more remote parts, till at length, driven from the Sack River as they had been 
70. Sec p. 98 above. 
71. Sec p.288 below. 
72. J.A Heese, "Onclerwys in Namakwalaml 1750-1940", (D. Eel., Univcrsiteit van Stellenbosch, 1942), p.80. 
73. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.J03. 
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before from the Bokkeveld, nothing remained for them but to retreat to the 
Orange River.74 
The availability of land did not, however, become a crucial issue until the 1770s. Before this date 
the expansion of the frontier, coupled with the low population density and the relatively weak 
demographic presence of adult male "Bastaards", served to mask the fact that, once the frontier 
began to close, racial criteria would help to determine access to farms. 
The offspring of slaves and Khoikhoi were known as "Bastaard-Hottentots" and, in certain 
quarters, were considered to constitute a category of unfree labour from a fairly early stage. In 
1721, for instance, some freeburghers of the Stellenbosch district had written to the government 
to ask for permission to bind in service, for a certain number of years, the children of slave and 
Khoikhoi unions.75 The issue seems to have lain donnant until 1775 when the Landdrost and 
Heemraden of Stellenbosch decreed that "Bastaard-Hottentot" children should be bound to serve 
their masters until the age of twenty-five.76 But this early interest in the matter is probably 
indicative of both common attitudes and common practice, at least in the more thoroughly 
colonised areas of the south-western Cape. The trend was towards a decline in the status of 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" and, ultimately, "Bastaards" too. Though this process was delayed on the 
open frontier individuals of mixed racial descent could not have been oblivious to the increasing 
and encompassing forn1s of discrimination practised against their kind within the colony. 
Eventually they would be faced by a choice: to stay within the colony and accept their declining 
status, or to move beyond the colony and assert their independence. 
Like the drosters who had preceded them the "Bastaard" or "Bastaard-Hottentot" individuals who 
decided to move beyond the colony often gathered together in groups. These, in turn, formed the 
nucleus of societies which later became known as Oorlams. 77 To some extent the Oorlams were 
larger, more successful versions of droster gangs. They were composed of the same motley 
collection of colonial fugitives but were distinguished by their having achieved a measure of 
political independence, economic viability, social cohesion and military capability which enabled 
them to secure themselves in a region beyond the reach of colonial conunandos. Although there 
were runaway slaves amongst them it would be erroneous to think of these groups as maroon 
74. Ibid, p.304. 
75. AJ. Bocsckcn, ( cu.), Resolusies va11 die Politieke Raad, Vol. 6, 1720-1723, 2 Sept. 1721, pp.128-129. 
76. Cl\, C 655, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakcnstcin, 1771-1779, 28 Dcc. 1773. 
77. For a discussion ofOorlams sec Du Brnyn, "'Ilic Oorlams Afrikaners" and Nienaber, Stanmame, p.794-803. 
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communities since the adherence of many Khoikhoi, San and "Bastaard-Hottentot" members gave 
them a strongly indigenous component. 
The word "Oorlam" is, perhaps, preferable to the pejorative terms which it replaced but it should 
be stressed that its usage was not as widespread or common as recent research would suggest. 
Until the late eighteenth century it was somewhat of a floating signifier and its meaning only 
began to solidify once the groups which it denoted themselves acquired a more stable identity. 78 
An 1805 definition of the word has it that Oorlams are "Hottentots who come from the upper 
country (i.e. beyond the frontier) and are born and bred with the farmers; most of whom 
understand and speak the low Dutch language".79 The paradox of this definition is obvious: 
Oorlan1s are people living outside the colony but possessing attributes acquired inside the colony. 
Du Bruyn states, more generally, that the term refers to "all Khoikhoi and Basters who took up 
employment with whites and acquired European skills ... particularly a knowledge of the use of 
horses and firearms". 80 
Such knowledge could only be obtained through contact with the colonists and was often dearly 
bought. Quite apart from the essential skills of marksmanship and horsemanship it was also 
necessary to acquire gunpowder, muskets, horses and all the other conunodities that were highly 
prized: tobacco, brandy, hats and clothes of European style. From their contact with the hunters 
and robbers of the open frontier the proto-Oorlams learnt how to dispose of ivory, hides and 
stolen livestock. From their labour with white stock-fanners they learnt both low Dutch and the 
value of organisation along the lines of the conunando system. Belatedly, some learnt the 
rudiments of Christianity, thinking that its possession would preserve them from the status-
reducing threats of the closing frontier. And, ultimately, many learnt that the best they could 
aspire to was a marginal position. 
Oorlan1 identity, as well as the status of "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots", evolved slowly. 
It would be quite wrong to believe that either the categories or conditions of their existence were 
formalised in the first half of the eighteenth century. The fluid nature of both racial attitudes and 
78. Legassick believes that the word was applied by extra-colonial Khoikhoi to those Khoikhoi who had been in 
colonial service and that the latter group came to accept the designation. See Legassick, "TI1e Northern Frontier to 
1840", p.4 IO n.49. In the seventeenth century the Dutch called sailors who were homeward-bound from the east 
"Orangh Ianunen", from the Malay "orang lama", meaning a person who has had long and wide experience. 
Afrikaans: "Oorlam(s)". The implication was also that they were lawless fellows. Sec H.B. ·mom (ed.), Joumal Of 
Jan Va11R.iebeeck, Vol. I, 1651-1655(CapeTown, 1952),p.223. 
79. Lcgassick, "The Northern Frontier to 1840", pp. 368-369. 
80. Du Bruyn, "Oorlams", p.2. 
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identities in the northern Cape frontier zone at this time is well illustrated by the events 
surrounding the disappearance of a particular individual named Jacob Nortje in 1749. Nortje's 
name was registered in the roll of "eenloopendes" and the man for whom he worked was a certain 
Willem Odendaal.81 In February 1749 a Khoikhoi named Andries came across Nortje, whom the 
records describe as a burgher, on the fann called "Matroose Craal". He was surprised to see that 
Nortje had taken off his Dutch clothes and donned a Khoikhoi kaross and cap in their place. In 
response to Andries' questions Nortje eventually confessed to having shot his baas, Odendaal, by 
accident and said that he had then thrown away his musket and clothes. He had obtained 
Khoikhoi clothes from Knapkoek, a Khoikhoi hunter of the Haegel Kraal. Thus attired Nortje left 
Andries, saying that he was on his way to the Piketberg.82 
Not long after this Daniel Bokkelenberg, who owned the farm "Het Cruijs" behind the Piketberg, 
told some of his neighbours that it seemed a runaway "jong" (i.e., a slave) of David Malan was 
hiding on the farn1 of Abraham Mouton and pretending to be a "Bastaard-Hottentot" called Claas. 
Bokkelenberg and two others went secretly to Mouton's farm one night and took the suspicious 
character captive. The prisoner then confounded them by claiming to be Jacob Nortje and neither 
a "jong" nor a "Bastaard-Hottentot". He explained that he had shot Odendaal in the back of the 
neck by accident whilst the two of tl1em had been stalking an eland. Odendaal's widow, 
Magdalena le Roux, was subsequently able to confirm that Nortje (whom she described as a 
"landbouwer") and Odendaal had indeed gone out hunting together, barefooted and friendly, but 
that the two horses had returned later without tl1eir riders. Upon investigation the body of 
Odendaal was discovered with a bullet wound in the neck. 83 
Nortje's strange behaviour suggests that the death of Odendaal was indeed accidental and that it 
had triggered a series of complex psychological responses within him. It would seem, to put it 
mildly, that the trauma of the event had induced a profound identity crisis within a person whose 
sense of self-identity was already insecure. It is obvious from the responses of the various people 
who encountered Nortje that he had the official status of a burgher, albeit of the low class, 
"eenloopende" variety. It is also clear that he did not look quite white, being able to pass himself 
off as a "Bastaard-Hottentot" and being mistaken for a slave. We eairnot know whether these 
aspects of his appearance bothered Nortje but we can speculate that they did when we consider 
his response to killing Odendaal. To kill a fellow human is to break powerful taboos and often 
81. CA, 1/STB 13/31 Alphabctiese Lysl Van Persone Wat op Veldtoglen zyn uijt gegaan ( 1736-17440). 
82. CA, 1/STB 3/10, Criminal Records 1749-1758, 21 Feb. 1749. 
83. Ibid., 13 March 1749, 11 April 1749, 21 April 1749. 
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places the killer in a liminal state, both socially and psychologically. The killer is in a state of 
impurity and social alienation. Only the performance of cleansing rituals, akin to those of rites of 
passage, can reintegrate the individual into his society and restore his psychic equilibrium.84 It is 
significant that Nortje's first response to killing Odendaal was to divest himself of his clothes, 
thereby attempting to cleanse himself of the deed but also to divest himself of the colonial identity 
which he had transgressed. He then adopted one of the many other identities close to hand in the 
frontier zone - that of a Khoikhoi. Later, however, he both took and was given further frontier 
identities and it was only on being captured that he seemed to re-accept his status as burgher, 
perhaps so as to stave off punishment. In the event, however, Nortje managed to break the chains 
which had been put around his neck and escape from the cellar where he had been locked up. He 
was not found again and we may suppose that he continued to live as a fugitive, in the liminal 
state of the frontier zone, under his multiple identities. 
The above evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to generalise about racial categories and 
identities in an open frontier situation. In 1749 the status of someone like North was, even to 
himself, unclear. By the 1770s, however, as the colonial frontier ceased to expand and processes 
of closure intensified, more and more "Bastards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" began to leave the 
colony in order to avoid the inferior status which was being forced upon them by white colonists. 
The reasons for the deterioration will be discussed in the following chapter. It should be noted, 
though, that in taking the positive step of fleeing the colony these non-white fugitives began to 
establish, for themselves, a common Oorlan1 identity. In time their ranks would be augmented by 
numbers of other frontier fugitives, both droster gangs (which, as we have noted, included fewer 
and fewer European members) and refugee Khoikhoi. Before considering these further 
developments, however, it is necessary to make some concluding remarks about the role of 
fugitives in the frontier zone. 
Fugitives were, as we have already stated, the true pioneers of the colonial frontier. They were 
always in search of the outer limits of the colony in order to pass beyond them. In so doing, 
paradoxically, they only served to extend the colonial frontier for they, unwittingly, took the 
colony with them. It is, perhaps, a moot point whether their impact on Khoisan societies was 
more or less devastating than that of the trekboers on their heels. Ultimately, both trekboers and 
84. My analysis has been infonned by Mary Douglas, Purity And Danger: An Analysis Of Tl,e Concepts Of 
Pollution And Taboo (London, reprint 1989); R. Buijtenhuis, Essays 011 tl,e Mau Mau: Contributions to Mau Mau 
1-!istoriograpl,y, (Leiden, 1982); Eric Leed, No Alan's Land: Combat and Identity in World War One (Cambridge, 
1979). 
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fugitives were part of the same frontier zone. It is for this reason that one should not make too 
great a distinction between them. 
Although it has been convenient for the purposes of our discussion to treat the subject of fugitives 
within the frontier zone separately from that of frontier farmers, or other officially authorised 
colonial frontiersmen, this should not be interpreted as endorsing Guelke's view that "there were 
two different frontiers at the Cape inhabited by two different kinds of European settler".85 The 
"fugitive frontier" is certainly not the same as Guelke's "frontier of inclusion", nor does the 
frontier of colonial farmers correspond to his "frontier of exclusion". However one chooses to 
describe the processes and peoples of the Cape colony's frontier zone, and whatever concepts one 
uses to enhance one's understanding of events, it is not helpful to construct mutually exclusive 
principals of binary opposition. Guelke's idea that there was a frontier of "exclusion" - pioneered 
by a fragment of south-western Cape society that was primarily white, middle class, orthodox and 
dedicated to the maintenance of an exclusivist European way of life - and a frontier of "inclusion" 
- pioneered by single white men who hunted, traded and tended livestock, did not settle and who 
constituted a community involved in the "blending of cultures and people within an informal 
social framework"86 - is simply unrealistic. In the first place it draws attention away from the 
non-European frontiersmen and women, suggesting that their role was a reactive, rather than an 
active one. What about the drosters and "Bastaards" of the frontier zone? Secondly, it implies 
that the contradictory impulses which he describes could not both be present (along with other 
"obscene Faustian lusts" or pious Calvinistic, capitalistic values) simultaneously in the body of 
one individual. There was nothing to prevent today's murderous cross-cultural robber-rapist from 
becoming tomorrow's white-wived, prosperous fanner. In the inchoate flux of an open frontier 
zone individual identities, cultural certainties, political strength and economic fortunes fluctuated 
wildly. It was only as the frontier began to close that these shifting values began to crystallise 
and, in the Cape's northern frontier zone, processes of closure only began to occur once the 
frontier ceased to expand. 
85. Guclke, "Two Frontier Conununities", p.419. 
86. Ibid., p.434. 
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Khoisan and Colonists of the Cape Interior, 
1740-1772 
INTRODUCTION 
After the war of 1739 and the crushing defeat of Khoisan resistance in the Sandveld and the 
Bokkeveld the colonial frontier advanced rapidly. Once the trekboer pioneers moved into the 
areas north and east of the Bokkeveld, they left behind them the narrow and mountainous confines 
of the western coastal belt, and entered the spacious but arid expanses of the interior. At first, 
Khoisan resistance to this advance seemed slight, even negligible. This, at least, is the impression 
given by the records, which are sparser for this period of frontier history than for any other time 
. during the eighteenth century. Such records as do exist contain far fewer references to conflict 
between the Khoisan and the trekboers than do the records for the pre-1740 and post-1770 
periods. But it is also possible that the rapid advance of the trekboers dispersed the colonists to 
such an extent that, initially, their impact on the Khoisan and environmental resources of the 
interior was limited and, therefore, fairly painlessly absorbed. 
Between 1740 and 1770 the area of land available to the colonists increased tenfold whereas the 
population of the frontier fanners grew at a much slower rate. Guelke has estimated that, 
throughout the colony as a whole, there were only 225 stock holders in 17 46 and 600 in 1770. I 
There was a mean population density of only one free person per ten square miles on the 
frontier,2 a fact which helps to explain both the paucity of infonnation from that zone and the 
reduced conflict during the period 1740 to 1770 . 
. i Colonial pastoralists quickly established loan-fanns for themselves along the Roggeveld 
escarpment in the north-cast and amongst the rolling hills of the Kamiesberg to the north. By the 
early 1770s, however, it was becoming clear that any advance beyond these points was going to 
be extremely problematic. The frontier had, in fact, ground to a halt and the ensuing stasis 
I. L.T. Guelke, "The Early European Selllcmcnt of South Africa" (Ph.D., University of Toronto, 1974 ), p.215. 
2. L.T. Guclke, "Frontier Sclllcmcnt in Early Dutch South Africa", A1111als of the Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 66, no.2 (March 1976), p.34. 
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precipitated a major cns1s, resulting in fundamental social, political and economic 
transfom1ations throughout the frontier zone.3 
There were two major reasons why the trekboer advance was halted in the 1770s: military and 
environmental. In the first place it was at about this time that widespread and determined Khoisan 
resistance broke out on an unprecedented scale along the length and breadth of the frontier zone. 
The colonial response was to intensify and institutionalise the commando system. Despite bitter 
and prolonged fighting no military solution seemed possible and it was in the crucible of the 
struggle that the frontier zone began to close - with profound consequences for all of the societies 
involved. The second reason for the frontier's failure to advance was closely related to the first. 
At the heart of the conflict between the Khoikhoi, the San and the colonists was competition for 
,l._envirolll11ental resources. The most dogged resistance to colonial expansion took place along an 
important environmental frontier - imprecise and shifting though it was - between the winter and 
sununer rainfall regions of the Cape.ihe intensity of the struggle along this envirolll11ental divide 
is an indication as to how vital it was, for both pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, to have access 
to the natural resources of both rainfall regions. But the inability of the trekboers to move beyond 
this contested boundary was not only due to Khoisan resistance. It was also related to the fact 
that, to the north and east of the interior escarpment, the annual rainfall was too low to pem1it 
successful pastoralism. It is no coincidence that pastoralist expansion into the interior of the 
northern Cape remained stalled along the dividing line between the winter and sununer rainfall 
regions for over a hundred years; and it is no coincidence that when a northern boundary to the 
colony was finally proclaimed in 1798 it followed, in the north-west, roughly the same line.4 
-~It is thus clear that the crisis of the 1770s and the subsequent interactions between the trekboers, 
the Khoikhoi and the San can only be understood in the context of the environment of the interior. 
It will be necessary to consider the resources of the various inland regions and to describe the 
strategies that were adopted by the various frontier societies to exploit these resources. Since 
pastoralism was the dominant economic activity within the frontier zone and the trekboers the 
dominant pastoralist society, it will be useful to stress those aspects of the interior enviromnent 
which affected trekboer expansion. 
3. See N. Penn, "Labour, land and livestock in the Western Cape <luring the eighteenth century: The Khoisan an<l 
the colonists", in W. James au<l M. Simons, (eds.), 71,e A11g1y Divide: Social and Economic Hist01y of the Western 
Cape (Cape Town, 1989), pp. 9-19 for a discussion of lhe period. 
4. P. J. van <ler Merwe, Trek. p.182. 
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.; It will also be necessary to describe how competition for the environmental resources began to 
influence the lives of the various peoples of the frontier zone. As the trekboers gained possession 
of more and more of the region's natural resources, the independence of both Khoikhoi and San 
societies was eroded. In a climate of increased Khoisan resistance, incessant commando activity 
and escalating violence the treatment of colonial servants, including "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-
Hottentots", deteriorated. The interplay of these processes is most clearly observed in a key 
episode which took place in the Roggeveld just before the launch of the General Conunando of 
1774 ~ a revolt of Khoikhoi labourers. This chapter closes with a detailed consideration of this 
revolt for it is, in many ways, the climactic moment of the various themes discussed. 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
The most significant features of the Cape interior - sometimes known as the Cape Thirstland - are 
its low rainfall and its paucity of perennial water. Nowhere does more than 250nm1 of rain fall 
per annum and drought is conm1on.5 These factors help to account for the extremely rapid 
expansion of the colony after the war of 1739 .. i{:olonial pastoralists, or trekboers, were now free 
to advance beyond the Olifants River and the Bokkeveld Mountains but the pace and direction of 
their advance was largely detennined by the availability of water and grazing. For these reasons 
they avoided a direct advance to the north or north-west as in these directions lay the parched and 
barren plain of the Knegtsvlakte. Instead the trekboers moved in an easterly and north-easterly 
direction, reaching the Roggeveld Mountains of the interior escarpment early in the l 740s.6 The 
rapidity of this advance is to be ascribed to the fact that the grazing and water resources between 
the Bokkeveld and the Roggeveld did not encourage pem1ancnt settlement. Between these 
mountain ranges lies the Onder Karoo, known by the early trekboers simply as the Karoo, and 
known today as the Ceres or Tanqua Karoo.7 As late as 1944 this arid expanse could only be 
used as temporary, seasonal trekveld by the fam1ers of the Bokkeveld and Roggeveld.8 The 
pastures of the area only becan1e attractive to pastoralists after the winter rains and in early 
5. See D.A. Findlay, "The San Of The Cape Thirstland And L. Antl1ing's 'Special Mission"' (B.A.. Hons., University 
of Cape Town, 1977), chapter I, for a survey of the enviromnent of the Cape ll1irstland. 
6. On 25 May Louw Pretorius registered a fann "aan de Rogger valley genaamt het bockvell" and in November 
1746 Christiaan Godlieb Lievery (or LeevenbegXwith the widow Geede Aard van der Walt) and Pieter Ems Crnger 
registered "Uijtkijk" and "de Vogel fontein" "Over de Doom Rivier in 't Roggenland". CA, RLR IO, p. 197; 
CA.,RLR ll,pp.134-135. 
7. "Karoo" means dry, hard and sparsely covered in the Khoikhoi tongue whereas "Tanqua" or "Tankwa" probably 
derives from "Sanqua" or San, hence San Karoo. The Tanqua River 11ows (in winter) beneatl1 the Roggeveld 
mountains and it may be Uiat the district takes its name from the river. Nienaber and Raper, Hollellfotica, A**, 
pp.663-664, 1017-1018. 
8. Van der Merwe, Trek, pp.146-154. 
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spring, roughly between May and September. At other times the lack of water made it an 
inhospitable place with "neegens eenig punt of het kleinste plekje waarop het oog met welgevallen 
zou willen rusten".9 
Despite the fact that the Onder Karoo could not be permanently occupied by the trekboers it was 
to become an essential area of land to those in both the Bokkeveld and the Roggeveld. In the 
winter it was a far wanner area than the Bokkeveld and Roggeveld Mountains, where the 
temperatures were sometimes cold enough to kill livestock - especially lambs. It was therefore 
crucial that the farmers in the mountains were able to move their stock to the lower, warmer 
Onder Karoo. "Geen vee zou men in het Roggeveld zo min als in het Koude Bokkeveld kunnen 
houden, zonder het voorrecht van geduurende het winter saison gebruik te maken van de 
Carro," 1 O declared the conm1ission appointed to examine livestock and agricultural production in 
1805. The winter trek to the Onder Karoo also gave the veld in the mountains a chance to recover 
and provided a change of grazing for the livestock, factors which were essential for the well being 
of the animals. 
i<As the century progressed it became customary for certain trekboers to regard particular places 
in the Onder Karoo as being theirs and they would return to these spots every year. Such a place 
was known as a "legplek" or "legplaats". No extra rent was charged for the legplaats and it was 
considered to be "attached" to the loan-fann of the claimant. It seems that the legplaats system 
began to be fonnaliscd towards the end of the eighteenth century and one may assume that this 
was in response to greater pressures on what had fonnerly been c01m11unal resources. But despite 
the increasing claims of individuals to enjoy exclusive rights to certain areas, the Onder Karoo 
remained a communal trekveld throughout the eighteenth century and served as a meeting place 
for Bokkevelders and Roggevelders who could exchange articles of produce, hunt and socialise 
together. I I 
9. "no single point or the smallest place upon which the eye can rest with pleasure". The words are Lichtenstein's 
who travelled with Commissioner <le Mist in the area in 1803. E.C. Godee-Molsbergen, (ed.), Reize11 i11 Zuid 
Afrika i11 de Holla11dse Tijd, Vol. 2 (The Hague, 1916-1933), p.186. 
10. "No stock could be kept by people in the Roggeveld, an<l even less by those in the Kone Bokkevel<l, did they 
not have the privilege of making use of the Karoo during the winter season". G.M. ll1eal, Bela11grijke llistorische 
Dok11me11te11 Over Zuid Aji·ika, Vol. 3, (London, 1911), Notul of Dagverhaal Der Reis En Verrichtingen Van 
President En Geconuniteerde Leden Uit De Conunissie Van Veeteelt En Lan<lbouw In De Bei<le Roggevelden, Den 
Hantam, &c., p.354; Van <ler Merwe, Trek, p.154. 
II. Van <ler Merwe, Trek, pp.142-145; Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, pp.149-161; Thea!, Dok11me11/e11, Vol. 3, 
pp.324-370. 
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Some trekboers did not cross the Onder Karoo to the Roggeveld in the 1740s but ventured in a 
north-easterly direction to the Onder Bokkeveld. The Onder Bokkeveld is a plateau which lies at 
the northern end of the Bokkeveld Mountains between the Doom and Hantam (sometimes known 
as the Karoo Doom) Rivers. This area had been made safe for colonists in the war of 173912 but 
the intensity of fighting in the Onder Bokkeveld suggests that it was considerably more attractive 
to pastoralists than either the Knegtsvlakte on the plains below or the Onder Karoo. This was in 
fact the case since the rainfall, though less than that of regions to the south and west, was even 
sufficient to enable the early colonists to grow some wheat for their own consumption. The 
grazing too was excellent for cattle, sheep and horses .13 ~These factors contributed to the area 
becoming relatively over-populated at an early date and placed a strain on both the fertility of the 
soil and the grazing resources. In 1785 when Robert Gordon visited the Pakhuis Pass in the 
Onder Bokkeveld he remarked how: "In a derisory way this place is called Little Cape Town by 
the neighbours on account of the many small and wretched huts".14 Even before this increase in 
population however, the very first trekboers to enter the region were accustomed to trekking 
northwards in the sunm1er, beyond the Langeberg and Kubiskow, to the southern parts of 
Bushmanland, then known as the Agterveld.15 In so doing they initiated the most characteristic 
seasonal trek in the north-western Cape - the trek from a winter rainfall region to a summer 
rainfall region. 
Quite clearly it was not the trekboers who "discovered" the existence of the different rainfall 
regions, or the fact that it was beneficial to move from one area to another seasonally-;tBoth the 
Khoikhoi and the San had been following the seasonal shifts in rainfall for centuries and it was 
they who, voluntarily or involuntarily, guided the trekboers into the most logical exploitation of 
the enviromuent. As O.F. Mentzel put it:J'The Hottentots are, as it were, the bloodhounds who 
smell out the most fertile lands".16 
The boundary between the winter and summer rainfall regions is not a precise line but rather a 
shifting corridor in which there might be a little rainfall in both the winter and sununer months. In 
any given year either winter or sunuuer rainfall conditions might prevail within this corridor.17 It 
12. Sec chapter 3 above. 
13. Van der Merwe, Trek, p.191. 
14. R. Gordon, 28 Dec. 1785, in Peter E. Raper and Maurice l3oucher, (eds), Nobert Jacob Gordon: Cape Travels, 
1777 To 1786, 2 Vols (Johannesburg, 1988), Vol. 2, p.406. 
15. Van <ler Merwe, Trek, p.192. 
IG. Man<lclbrote, (e<l.),Me11/zel, Vol. 2, p.36. 
17. JI I. Wellington, Sou them Africa: A Geographical Studv, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1955), pp.245-247. 
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should be reiterated that the entire north-western Cape, whether in the winter or summer rainfall 
region, is an area of low rainfall. Before the invention of the windpump, and hence the availability 
of artesian water, it was essential for pastoralists to exploit the grazing and water resources of 
both regions. The best strategy for a pastoralist to adopt was therefore to occupy some point 
within or near the all-season rainfall corridor and then respond to seasonal shifts in rainfall by 
following the rain into the winter or summer rainfall regions. This was precisely the strategy 
adopted by the trekboers and, with some variation to meet local conditions, this seasonal 
movement became the basic rhythm of the northern frontier zone from 17 40 onwards. 
The all-season rainfall corridor coincides, roughly, with the line of the interior escarpment which 
runs from Namaqualand in the north-west, through the Hantam and Roggeveld Mountains, to the 
Nieuweveld mountains in the south-east. The mountains of the escarpment have the additional 
advantage of being better watered than their surroundings since they receive more rainfall and 
possess pennanent springs. ,For these reasons the trekboers hastened to establish themselves at 
favourable points near to the mountains of the escarpment and ·within, or close to, the all season 
rainfall corridor. ~hese regions, occupied by colonists between 1740 and 1770, constituted the 
northern frontier zone in the mid-eighteenth century and may be divided into the following 
districts: Namaqualand, the Onder Bokkeveld, the Hantam, the Roggeveld and the Nieuweveld. 
Namaqualand was colonised somewhat later than the other districts and is the subject of a 
subsequent chapter.18 The Onder Bokkeveld, however, was probably the first area to be 
appropriated after the war of 1739. Indeed, the northern Doom and Wiedouw Rivers had 
attracted European settlers from about 1732 though it is unlikely that settlement was extensive 
before the local Khoisan had been pacified.19 Some of the area's attractions have already been 
outlined. The sununer trek from the Onder Bokkeveld to the Agterveld or southern Buslunanland 
was encouraged by the existence of several good, though brackish, springs between the Langberg, 
the Kubiskow and the non-pere1mial Krom River.20 North of these points, however, there is no 
standing water though water can be found by digging pits in select places. After rain, which, if it 
falls, falls in the fonn of irregular thunder showers, the grazing in Bushmanland becomes 
outstanding and water collects in vleis or in pools in the normally dry river beds. In general the 
further north one travels the more difficult it is to find water. Since rain might fall in one place 
18. Sec pp.281-288 below. 
19. Sec p.138 above. 




Khoisan and Colonists of the Cape Interior, 1740-1 772 
one year and in another place the next, the grazing and water resources of Bushmanland, like 
those of the entire sununer rainfall area, are unpredictable. 
These factors obliged the eighteenth century pastoralists who entered the area to be highly mobile 
and discouraged the growth of the legplaats system. Though some farms were allocated at the 
Kubiskow in 1760 there were large parts of Bushmanland that remained unallocated Crown land 
until the twentieth century. In October and November the grazing in the Onder Bokkeveld would 
deteriorate and water become scarce. A move to the sununer rainfall area at such a time was 
essential. By April and May, however, the water of the sununer rainfall area would begin to dry 
up and the trekboers would return to their farms in the Onder Bokkeveld to await the winter rains 
and graze their stock on the veld which, hopefully, had recovered from the previous year's 
grazing.21 
To the north-east of the Onder Bokkeveld is a mountain which lies to the north-west of the 
Roggeveld: the Hantam.22 The Hantam is separated from the Roggeveld by a plain, receives more 
rain than its surroundings and possesses several good springs. For these reasons it was probably 
occupied by colonists as early as 1740 although the first loan-farm in the area - "Akerendam", 
site of the present day Calvinia - was granted in 1750.23 The district was very good sheep 
country and the grazing was found to be quite exceptional for horses. It was discovered that 
horses which grazed on the mountain's slopes were inunune to horse sickness.24 Since horses 
were such a crucial component of the trekboers' economy and, along with fireanns, the basis of 
the conunandos' strength, no single fanner ever claimed a monopoly of grazing on the mountain's 
slopes. Those who owned fanns around the base grazed a limited number of horses on the plateau 
in conunon every autumn.25 By 1778 there were fourteen farms around the mountain.26 
21. Van der Merwe, Trek, pp. 190-194; also Van der Merwe, Pio11iers Van Die Dors/a11d (Cape Town, 1941 ). 
22. 1l1e name is derived from the Hottentot word "heytama" which describes the Pelargo11ium bifo/ium, which has 
an edible root. See Nienaber and Raper, Hotte11totica, A**, pp.519-521. 
23. C.G. Botha, Place Names in the Cape Province (Cape Town, 1927), p. 109; Van der Merwe, Noordwaartse 
Bewegi11g, p.4; CA, RLR 12, p.163. 
24. Godee-Molsbergen, Reize11, Vol. 2, p.180, 11. l. 
25. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Briewe van Veldkomelle en Private Persone, Landdrosl to W.A. Nel of Hanlam, 5 Nov. 
1787. In March 1800 J.G. van Reenen wrote from the Hantam to state that, as far as he could remember, it had 
been decided in 1787 or 1788 by Governor Van de Graaf that nobody could graze on the I Iantam Berg, either with 
homed stock or horses, except neighbouring fanners who could graze two or three horses in the worst part of the 
year, namely March to May. He hoped that the rnling could be found and proof sent because the fanners Jan van 
Wijk and Abel Pienaar had brought a herd of filly horses to the mountain in November. CA, 1/STB I 0/150, .T.G. 
van Reenen lo Landdrosl, 22 March 1800. 
26. R. Gordon, 28 Dec. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.212-3. 
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South-east of the Hantam was the Roggeveld or Roggeland.27 The first recorded loan-fanns in 
the area were registered in 1743 and by 1750 the number of registrations had risen to thirty-
one.28 Contemporaries divided the Roggeveld into different regions. The mountains lie on a 
north-west to south-east axis and the north-western parts were known as the Onder Roggeveld, 
separated from the Middle Roggeveld, to the south, by the Aape Berg. The south-eastern end of 
the range was known as the Klein Roggeveld. 
The Onder Roggeveld was hard country; rocky and snake infested. The amaryllis, or goat-poison 
bulb, was fairly common and could cause the death of any animal which ate it.29 Water was 
scarce and the district subject to terrible droughts. When Gordon visited the area for the second 
time in January 1786 he recorded that: "This countryside was so parched that no one had ever 
seen it like this. Most fanners were preparing to flee with their flocks to the country around the 
Riet and Sak Rivers which are in Buslunanland" .30 But these rivers were themselves non-
pere1mial and hardly more than streams at the best of times. 
The Roggeveld was not always as dry as it became. According to the Roggevelders of 1803, 
when colonists first entered the area there was a super-abundance of water: 
Such that in the middle of sununer the nearest neighbours could not get to each 
other, on account of the rivers being overflowed, and of the deep morasses in the 
valleys. There seldom at that time passed a week, even in the hottest months, that 
violent thunderstonns did not bring with them a profuse supply of rain: on the 
contrary, whole sunm1ers had of late years passed without the intervention of a 
single stonn .31 
From another source we learn that there were very heavy rains in the colony in 174632 and it is 
quite likely that the entry of the trekboers into the Roggeveld coincided with a western oscillation 
27. The most likely origin of the name "Roggeveld" is that the grass of the area looked like a kind of "rog" or "rye", 
probably the Wilde Rog (Secede Africa1111m). See V.S. Forbes, Pioneer Travellers in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1965), p.42. J.H. Cloete suggests that it is named after a Khoisan or "Bastaard-Hottentot" named Cupido 
Roggeveld who is mentioned in Wikar's journal as being a raider in the region but the use of the word "Roggeveld" 
or "Roggeland" in the loan-fann records predates Wikar's ( 1779) infonnation. See J.H. Cloete, "Nole on 
Roggeveld", Afi-icc111a Notes and News, 1949, Vol. 6, p.52. 
28. See note 7 above. See also CA, RLR IO, pp.167-170; CA, RLR 12, pp.38, 56, 68, 70, 72, 103, 110, 115, 128, 
132, 148, 163. 
29. R. Gordon, 25 Dec. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, Gordo11, p.210. Lichtenstein reported that the San prepared 
their arrows with poison from the homed snakes of the Onder Roggeveld. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, p.119. 
30. R. Gordon, 2 Jan. 1786; also 31 Dec. 1785, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.409, 407: "Found this country 
frighteningly dry everywhere. For some years has had little rain and presently hardly a drop for six months". 
31. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, pp.123-124. 
32. CA, LM 7, Lcibbrandl's Precis Resolutions of the Council of Policy 1742-1760, I Feb. 1747. 
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of the sununer rainfall boundary.33 The good rainfall conditions of the 1740s might be another 
reason why there was reduced conflict within the frontier zone at this time. 
Rainfall was not the only enviromnental resource of the interior to deteriorate after the entry of 
the trekboers into the region, for the vegetation too altered substantially between 1740 and 1800. 
According to Acock's map of the vegetation of South Africa in 140034 the vegetation of the 
Roggeveld escarpment was of a scrubby mixed grassveld type - eminently suitable for 
pastoralism. Today, however, the vegetation of the area is typical of the Karoo type, suitable for 
sheep but not for cattle. The process of deterioration did not go unremarked by the eighteenth 
century colonists35 and the carrying capacity of the veld was greatly reduced by 1805.36 
It is quite clear that, from the outset, the escarpment was a somewhat delicate and marginal 
resource base for pastoralists. By itself it could not provide adequate grazing and water resources 
all the year round and in these circumstances stock-fanners had to be highly mobile. Each fan1ily 
of trekboers in the Onder Roggeveld had at least two fanns and, in addition, like fanners 
throughout the Roggeveld, a legplaats in the Onder Karoo so that the freezing winters of the 
mountains could be avoided.37 In the sununer the Onder Roggevelders, together with the 
Hantamers and, if it was a dry year, the inhabitants of the Middle and Klein Roggeveld, would all 
trek to the north and east in search of thunder showers and the waters of the Sak and Riet Rivers. 
The Middle Roggeveld was just south of the Onder Roggeveld whilst the Klein Roggeveld, or 
Komsberg, was to the south of the Middle Roggeveld, marking the point where the escarpment 
makes a right angle and follows a south-west to north-east axis. This axis was, and is, known as 
the Nieuweveld and was first entered by the trekboers in 1760.38 The Middle and Klein 
33. Wellington notes that on one occasion (the sununer of 1900-1901) sununer rainfall conditions spread to the 
west coast. Wellington, Southem Africa, Vol. I, p.247. 
34. J.P.H. Acocks, Veld Types of South Africa, Memoirs of the Botanical Survey of South Africa, no.40 (Pretoria, 
1975), maps between pp.6-7. 
35. "In many parts of the country here people complain that the growth of grass is greatly impeded by Rhinoceros 
Bush (santilenea). ·me seed is propagated by wind and even by it falling into tl1e wool of sheep as they wander. 
When the colony first began these bushes were not so plentiful". R. Gordon, 14 Dec. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, 
Gordon, p.205. 
36. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, p.123. 
37. R. Gordon, 20 Dec. 1778, in Raper and Uoucher, Gordo//, p.208: "111e inhabitants all travel to the Karoo in the 
winter on account of the cold. Pict Krieger stays but his stock goes. They take their possessions with them or bury 
them in the ground". Lichtenstein remarked that although there were forty-seven fanns in the Ondcr Rogge veld 
there were no more than twenty-two householders. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, p.124. 
38. The first time the Nicuwcvcld was mentioned in the loan-limn records was in 1762 when Willem Stecnkamp 
registered "Matjeskuijl gclecgen agtcr 't Roggevcld in 't Nicuwland". CA, RLR 16, 26 Jan. 1762, p.225. Gordon 
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Roggeveld had substantially the same characteristics as the Onder Roggeveld though they were 
better provided with water, having the Vis, Renoster and Riet Rivers (all non-perennial) flowing 
to the east of the escarpment. Consequently the fanners of this part of the Roggeveld were only 
obliged to undertake a sununer trek beyond the Sak River in exceptionally dry years.39 For the 
rest of the time they would trek only as far as their legplaatsen at the Vis, Renoster and Riet 
Rivers. 
The Nieuweveld was never successfully occupied by the trekboers during the eighteenth century 
for two major and related reasons: its natural environment and the intense Khoisan resistance 
which occurred here. The resistance will be discussed in greater detail below40 but the climatic 
and geographical features of the area can be dealt with here. Unlike the Roggeveld the 
Nieuweveld is predominantly a sununer rainfall region though, like the rest of the Cape interior, 
this rainfall is low (12-25 cm. per ammm).41 P.J. van der Merwe did not think that the 
Nieuweveld and the area at the base of its escarpment, the Koup, was enviromnentally any worse 
than the rest of the escarpment42 though the meaning of the word "Koup" might cause one to 
imagine otherwise.43 The actual mountains themselves were scarcely more prepossessing than the 
dusty plains beneath them and fanns throughout the area were frequently abandoned, not so much 
because of Khoisan hostility but because of drought and poor grazing.44 In 1776, for instance, it 
was not found necessary to appoint a ve/dkorporaal for the Koup as the entire district had been 
abandoned due to drought and the lack of grazing.45 Quite apart from the desiccating droughts 
was the fact that colonists could only dwell in the Koup and Nieuweveld mountains if the 
Khoisan could be evicted from the area. This was never wholly accomplished in the eighteenth 
century because the adverse environmental conditions prevented the trekboers from establishing 
slates that the San of the Sneeuberg knew the Nicuwevcld as "a\nou" though what this means is not stated. R. 
Gordon, 12 Nov. 1778, in Raper and I3oucher, p.194. 
39. Van dcr Merwe, Trek, pp.198-199. 
40. See chapter 6 below. 
41. Wellington, South Africa, Vol. I, p.241. 
42. Van der Mcrwe, Noordwaartse Bewegi11g, pp.117-115. 
43. The "Koup" was also known as "De Coup" or "Gouph" and the most likely meaning of its names were "open 
plain", "skeleton country", "stink gal" or "poephol". Sec J.A. Engelbrecht, The Kora11a (Cape Town, 1936), p.15; 
Botha, Place Names, pp.35 and 54; Nienaber and Raper, I!otte11totica, A**, pp.773-776. 
44. Gordon described the area as being very stony Karoo and noted that there were said to be many lions in the 
district. Travellers and commandos in the Koup frequently mentioned the abandoned fanns of the area. R. Gordon, 
3, 4, 5 Nov. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.190-192. 
45. CA, C 655, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drnkenstein 1771-1779, 5 Nov. 1776. The district was 
abandoned until July 1779 on this occasion. Sec also Moodie, The Reconl, Part 3, pp.GO and 81 
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themselves there as a pennanent presence. Realising this, Khoisan resisters tended to use the area 
as a place of refuge, thereby enhancing the discomfort of the region's frontier farmers.46 
It was not possible for trekboers to base themselves in the Nieuwcveld Mountains, as they had 
based themselves in the Roggcveld, and undertake a seasonal trek from one rainfall region to 
another. The Nieuwcvcld trekboers could only trek into the adjacent winter rainfall area of the 
Roggeveld, which was already occupied by other colonists and a marginal resource area in its 
own right.47 It is true that there was sununer grazing north of the Nieuweveld, if the rains had 
been good, but this water and grazing were used by the trekboers of the Roggeveld and Hantam 
during the summer and the area was thus regarded as seasonal trekveld which could not be 
permanently appropriated as someone else's legplaats. This area was known by a number of 
nan1es in the eighteenth century: the Sak River, the Karecberge, the Agter Nieuweveld or the 
Agtcr Roggeveld. 
From the above survey it should be clear that pastoralist societies of the Cape interior needed to 
ensure seasonal entry into the sununer rainfall regions north and cast of the Roggcveld. Without 
access to these regions possession of the escarpment would not have been sufficient. But neither 
the escarpment nor the Cape interior were devoid of Khoisan inhabitants before the arrival of the 
trekboers and it is time to consider the situation of the indigenous inhabitants of the region on the 
eve of the colonial invasion. 
THE KHOISAN OF THE CAPE INTERIOR 
It should be admitted at the outset that information concerning the Khoisan of the interior is 
extremely scarce, even after 1740. Few visitors were attracted to the region during the eighteenth 
century and even fewer bothered to record their observations. Those men who would later 
describe the activities of their conunandos, in the fonn of reports to the landdrost, were not so 
much concerned with recording details of the social life of the Khoisan as they were with 
providing a simple score sheet of people killed per day. During the nineteenth century Dr. 
Wilhelm Bleck and his sister-in-law, Lucy Lloyd, succeeded in recording a great deal of 
infonnation regarding the language and folklore of the /Xam, the San who lived in the vicinity of 
46. Sec chapter (> below. 
47. The rccor<ls atkr 1780 bear witness to the <lctcrioration of the resources or the escarpment whilst 1itigation an<l 
contlict over form houn<larics incrcasc<l. Sec Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, pp.132-133. Sec also chapter 11 below. 
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present day Calvinia and Kenhardt.48 This information, however, contains little that illuminates 
inter-group relations in the eighteenth century or earlier. Present archaeological research has not 
yet focused on the crucial area of the escarpment but has, instead, concentrated on areas closer to 
the Orange River.49 The result is that our knowledge of the history and pre-history of the Khoisan 
of the interior remains sketchy and conjectural. 
We may assume, however, that just as in other areas of the Cape, Khoikhoi pastoralists had been 
more recent, intrusive arrivals amongst aboriginal San societies. We may also assume that 
contact between pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in the interior had been of shorter duration than 
sin1ilar contact along the coast or the Orange River. This was due to environmental circumstances 
since the interior, being more arid than elsewhere, was initially skirted by the Khoikhoi 
pastoralists. Such archaeological evidence as we do have, suggests that the dispersal of Khoikhoi 
pastoralists along the Orange River took place about 500 years A. D. and had the effect of 
displacing some riverine hunter-gatherer groups southwards into Bushmanland.50 Khoikhoi 
groups probably settled in the Roggeveld a lot later than this, though exactly when they did so is 
hard to say. Evidence collected in the area in 1809 is quite specific about the fact that the 
Khoikhoi were present along the escarpment before the colonists arrived: 
The supposition that the enmity of the Bosjesmen was originally occasioned by 
their resentment at being forced by the colonists to quit the territory of their 
ancestors, seems unfounded, as it appears that they have always resided in the 
country they now inhabit since the Cape has been possessed by Europeans. In the 
course of my journey I have seen several persons who remember the events of 
more than half a century. They relate that the colonists began to settle in this part 
of the country some sixty years ago, when they found it inhabited by Hottentots, 
who readily entered their service. The Bosjesmen resided at that time beyond the 
48. The material they collected is housed in the Bicek-Lloyd Archives (B.C. 151) in the Manuscripts Collection of 
the Jagger Library at the University of Cape Town. I thank Pippa Skotnes for making her typed transcriptions of the 
documents available to me. See also the contributions in P. Skotnes, (ed.), Sound From The Thinking Strings (Cape 
Town, 1991) and the proceeds of the Bleck-Lloyd Conference held at the Alphen Hotel, Cape Town in September 
1991. For published selections of the material in the Bicek-Lloyd archives see W.H.I. Bleek, Report of Doctor 
Bleek conceming his researches into the Bushman language and customs, presented to the Honourable House of 
Assembly by command of his Excellency the Govemor (Cape Town, 1873 and 1875); L.C. Lloyd, A Short Accoullf 
of fiirther Bushmen material collected (London, 1889) and W.H.I. Bleek and L.C. Lloyd, Specimens of Bushmen 
Folklore (London, 1911 ). 
49. See for instance A.J.B. Humphreys and A.I. Thackeray, Glwap and Gariep: Later Stone Age Studies in the 
Nurthem Cape (Cape Town, 1983) and AB. Smith, (ed.), Einiqualand: 71,e Khoisan of the Orange River Frontier 
(Cape Town, in press). 
50. Humphreys and Thackeray, Glwap and Gariep, p.294; C. Ehret, "The First Spread of Food Production to 
Southern Africa", in C. Ehret and Merrick Posnansky (eds.), 77,e Archaeological and linguistic Reconst111ctio11 of 
African /-listo1J' (l3erkley, 1982 ), pp. 158-181; J\.13. Smilh, "Competilion, Conflict and Clicnlship: Khoi and San 
Relationships in lite Western Cape", unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, 1985, pp.11-12. 
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Zak River, with the exception of a few kraals that lived a little on this side of it, 
for the convenience of exchanging skins for the tobacco of the Hottentots, who 
procured that article from the colonists in the Bokkeveld, south of the Karoo.51 
This report emphasises that although the San were not the dominant group in the Roggeveld they 
were not totally excluded from it and, in fact, enjoyed relations of exchange with the Khoikhoi. 
Significantly, even at this early stage, the San had acquired a taste for tobacco. The semi-
nomadic life style which both societies were obliged to adopt doubtless contributed to the fact that 
the geographical boundary lines were not clearly drawn and that there was a measure of overlap 
between them. The broad patterns of land occupancy are, however, quite clear. There were 
Khoikhoi in the Roggeveld, before 1740, and the majority of the San lived over the Sak River. 
The situation in the area north of the Bokkeveld and west of the Roggeveld (i.e. the Onder 
Bokkeveld-Hantam region) is not so straightforward. Interaction between Khoikhoi and San 
groups was probably as complex here as that which occurred in areas to the south and west 
where pastoralism had been introduced at an early date. The area had suffered the disruptive 
effects of the heavy fighting of 1739 and this contributed to the destabilization of local Khoisan 
groups. Even in the confused setting of the 1740s, however, there were clear distinctions to be 
made between Khoikhoi and San. In 17 41 it was recorded how the "Hottentots Capitaine gent. 
Keyser, van die Bosjesmans Natie", whose kraal was in the Bokkeveld, had killed the 
"Chirigriquas Hottentot" Claas Hannibal of the Verlore Vlei and stolen twenty of the 
Chirigriqua's cattle.52 This incident highlights a number of interesting facts. The first is that the 
fight occurred because one of the Chirigriqua, Spring in 't Veld, had stolen the wife of Keyser -
an example, if one is needed, that sexual relations between Khoikhoi and San did occur. A second 
notable fact is that the woman in question, Patrys, had been helping to take in the harvest at the 
farm of Hendrik Krugel at the time of her abduction - an example that some of the Bokkeveld San 
were prepared to work for the colonists. A third point of interest is that the Company was 
approached by the Chirigriqua to act as arbitrator and dispenser of justice in the case - an 
indication that the local Khoisan had surrendered their autonomy. The Company decided not to 
take action against Keyser for murder and robbery because "if Keyser be touched or punished for 
the crime, the other Bushman Captains who arc his friends would endeavour to avenge 
themselves on the Europeans, it being a wild and savage nation, who have at all times made it 
their habit to rob and steal"; and because "Keyser has always been a faithful protector of the 
51. Moodie, The Record, Part 5, p.34. 
52. G.C. <le Wet, ( e<l.), Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Vol. I 0, 1740-1743, 19 June 1741, pp.125-127. 
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Europeans, even against his own nation" .53 The Chirigriqua were, by contrast, considered to be 
too feeble to make a nuisance of themselves. 
Many, but not all, of the Bokkeveld Khoisan had doubtless fled tl1e area, both to avoid ilie 
carnage of 1739 and because they did not relish seeing their land taken by colonists or the 
Company acting as the area's ultimate authority. Some ended up in Bushmanland and it is 
tempting to conclude that Bushmanland must therefore have served as a refuge area for San who 
had been forced from other areas by Khoikhoi pastoralists long before the Europeans arrived. To 
some extent this is true, but the situation was more complex than this. The Cape Thirstland was 
more than just a refuge area since it had always possessed resources of game and plant food 
abundant enough to support hunter-gatherer groups. There is sufficient evidence to state that the 
San of the Cape interior were not simply recent and unwilling occupants of an undesirable 
locality. They were, on the contrary, practised exploiters of, what was to them, a bountiful 
environment.54 So long as the pastoralists of the escarpment did not intrude too radically into 
their domain, or prevent them from following the seasonal movement of wild animals, there was 
no reason why they should be unduly discontented. 
In support of this contention it is necessary to exan1ine the relationships which existed between 
the /Xam and other Khoisan groups more closely. In particular it is necessary to challenge 
Elphick's view that in the Cape interior: 
The pastoral Khoi and their coloured descendants were recent inunigrants and 
were engaged in bitter warfare with hunter-gatherers who undoubtedly spoke 
languages quite unlike their own, lived by different norms and seemed quite 
irreconcilable to the presence of newcomers.55 
To begin with it should be noted that the term /Xam was primarily used as a linguistic, rather 
than an etlmic description. Bleek used it to describe the language of his San infom1ants, who 
came from the Calvinia and Kenhardt districts of the Cape interior. This language was probably 
very similar to the language spoken by the San of the Roggeveld and Westphal has identified it as 
belonging to the same group of Bush languages that he classifies as Bush "c", a dialect of which 
53. Ibid. The translation is that of Leibbran<lt from CA, LM 49, Resolutions of the Council of Policy, 1713-1742, 
pp.68-69. See also CA, l/STl3 3/9, Verklarings, Plci<looie en Interrogatorien (Krimineel), Relaas van den 
Hottentots Capitaine Keyser, 23 May 1741. 
54. Sec J. Parkington, "//Xabbo's father's father's place it was: Perceptions of /Xam hunter-gatherers", in I'. 
Skotnes, ( e<l. ), Sound From 71,e 71,inking Strings. 
55. Elphick, Khoikhoi, p.5. 
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is spoken today (or was until recently) in the Kalahari Gemsbok Park. This would correspond to 
Dorothea Bleek's "Southern Bush" group of languages and Elphick has provisionally identified 
the languages spoken by the Sneeuberg San, the so-called "Chinese Bushmen" or Swy ei, as 
belonging to this group as well.56 It therefore seems that there was a similar Bush language 
which stretched from the north-western Cape interior to the eastern Cape interior. It would be 
reasonable to expect that contiguous groups within this "Southern Bush" language group could 
understand each other, their dialect differing according to their distance from one another.57 How 
well could the Khoikhoi understand "Southern Bush" dialects? 
Though there was a linguistic distinction between Khoikhoi and San this should not be 
exaggerated or extrapolated, to suggest tl1at the two groups lived in mutually unintelligible and 
irreconcilable hostility. Elphick argues that the languages spoken by the hunters were diverse, 
distinct and localised, differing from one group of hunters to another and, by implication, largely 
unintelligible to the Khoikhoi. In support of this proposition he quotes Lichtenstein's remark that 
"No Hottentot understands a word of the Bushman language". This observation, made in the 
Roggeveld in 1803, was, Elphick believes, equally true of the Khoikhoi and San of the 
Sneeuberg.58 We should note, however, that on this matter, judging from accompanying 
remarks,59 Lichtenstein was a highly unqualified commentator, and that another traveller had a 
very different opinion. When Robert Gordon visited the area between the Hantam and the 
Bokkeveld in 1779 he noted that "Chief Schoneveld (or Doeroep)", a "Bushman Chief' of the 
Eiquaas or Grassveld San (who lived at the Kubiskow Mountains), spoke "very well".60 This 
implies that, whether the language spoken was Khoikhoi or Dutch, there was no conununication 
problem. A "Buslunan girl" encountered between the Hantam and the Roggeveld was perfectly 
56. E.O.J. Westphal, "l11e Linguistic Prehistory of Southern Africa Bush, Kwadi, Hottentot, and Bantu Linguistic 
Relationships", Africa, 33, no.3, July 1963, pp.256 and 244; R. Elphick, "The Cape Khoi and the First Phase of 
South African Race Relations", (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972), pp.68-69; R. Elphick, Klwiklwi, pp.29-30. 
57. As Gordon suggested when he visited the vicinity of the Sneeuberg in 1777. See R. Gordon, 16 Dec. 1777, in 
Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.114. 
58. Elphick, Klwikhoi, pp.29-30. 
59. Lichtenstein based this observation on his experience of meeting two "Bushmen" in the Klein Roggevcld in 
1803. His remarks ought to be seen in the context of some of his other observations wherein he doubts "if the tenns 
language and customs can be applied to people upon the very lowest step in the order of civilisation, as the 
Bushmen may certainly be esteemed: one might almost call this extraordinary race without customs and without 
language". Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, p.143. One wonders how much attention ought to be paid to the linguistic 
observations of such an expert who believed, moreover, that the San "have no names" (ibid., p.148). He noted, 
however, that some of the colonists spoke the "Bosjesmans" language (ibid., p.127) and that the "Bosjesmans" he 
met could speak some words of Dutch. [The fact that the expression "Groot Baas" featured prominently is revealing 
(ibid., pp.146-147)]. It is therefore most surprising that he could claim that no Khoikhoi could understand a word of 
the "Bushman" language. 
60. R. Gordon, 2 Jan. and 4 Jan. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.214-6. 
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understood by Gordon's Boland Khoikhoi servant, Koerikei.61 It would seem, therefore, that the 
Khoikhoi and San west of the Roggeveld could understand each other, a fact which indicates that 
a significant period of interaction had occurred between them. Gordon also noted similar 
instances of mutual intelligibility between the Khoikhoi and San societies of the Orange River, 62 
whilst in the eastern Cape both Gordon and Sparrman (another eighteenth century traveller) 
recorded that, despite certain difficulties, the Khoikhoi who were with them could understand the 
"Chinese Bushmen" of the Sneeuberg.63 
Where there was linguistic interaction there was also social and economic interaction, not all of 
which, obviously, was hostile. This does not mean, however, that the differences between 
Khoikhoi and San were not considerable; nor that the San were a sub-species of failed 
pastoralists or the Khoikhoi were simply stock-keeping San. It is true that, as the process of 
colonisation stripped more and more Khoikhoi of their livestock, they came to resemble San, 
particularly in the eyes of the colonists who, in any event, tended to regard the San as a type of 
Khoikhoi (as is revealed by their name for the San: "Bosjesmans-Hottentotte"). But 
notwithstanding a substantial body of scholarly work which seeks to demonstrate that the San 
were, in effect, livestock-less Khoikhoi or a Khoikhoi underclass,64 there is too much evidence to 
the contrary. The culture and consciousness of the /Xam language speakers, clearly revealed in 
the Bleek-Lloyd material, is not that of a pastoralist society.65 The hunter-gatherers of the Cape 
Thirstland were highly specialised societies which had been occupying a particular niche in a 
particular environment for a long time. The San also had a strong sense of group identity, closely 
linked to territoriality which, in their own minds, separated them not only from the Khoikhoi but 
from other groups of San as well.66 Even within Bushmanland Bleek's infonnants made a 
distinction between "Flat Bushmen" (or "Plain Buslunen"), "Grass Buslunen", "Mountain 
Buslunen" and "Hardast Bushmen".67 There were also clear distinctions between the /Xam (if we 
61. R. Gordon, 28 Dec. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.212. 
62. R. Gordon, 20 Aug. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.272. 
63. "1l1ey speak Hottentot but their dialect as well as many words, though pronounced with clicks, differs from the 
others, so that they do not understand each other much." R. Gordon, 15 Nov. 1777, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, 
p.83. The point to stress here, surely, is the amount understood rather than the amount misunderstood between 
Boland Khoikhoi and Sneeubcrg San. 
64. See for instance Cannel Schrire, "Identity of San" and Edwin Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies. 
65. This is a point made very strongly by those who have worked most intimately with the Bleck-Lloyd material. 
See for instance JD. Lewis-Williams, Believing and Seeing: Symbolic lvfea11i11gs in Southem San Rock Pai11ti11gs 
(London, 1981 ), and R.L. Hewitt, Stmcture, meaning and ritual in the narratives of the sou them San (Hamburg, 
1986). 
66. J. Deacon, "My place is Bitterpits", Aji"ica11 Studies, 45, 2, 1986. 
67. This is clear throughout the narratives of the /Xam in the I3leek-Lloyd Archives. 
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may call them thus) and the Swy ei of the Sneeuberg in language, appearance, adornment, 
weaponry and the style of their art.68 
A comparative study of the rock art of the Sneeuberg and the rock art of the Thirstland has led J. 
and I. Rudner to state that: "the theory that the painters from the east and south were driven into 
the Thirstland is not supported by the type of paintings found there. It rather seems that the 
painters in the Karoo, although belonging to the same cultural group as the painters in the east, 
had little contact with them".69 Despite this diversity amongst San groups they were, none the 
less, more like each other than they were like the Khoikhoi. There is a great deal of common 
subject matter in the rock art of the interior and the rock art of the Sneeuberg - the eland, for 
instance, is a favourite subject in both areas. Lewis-Williams has identified strong convergences 
between the rock art of the southern San, the folklore collected by Wilhelm Bleck from the /Xam 
and the ethnographic data collected from present day !Kung to the north. All of this suggests a 
fair degree of unifonnity and a common cognitive culture amongst the San of the interior. 70 How 
then docs one account for the Rudncr's claim that there was little contact between the Swy ei and 
the /Xam? 
The most likely explanation is that there was a significant environmental divide between the two 
groups. Whilst it was feasible for groups to base themselves near to the all-season rainfall 
corridor in the Roggcveld, once they settled too far to the east, access to the winter rainfall area 
became impracticable. If, however, groups were so far to the east that they fell completely within 
a relatively well-watered summer rainfall area there would be no necessity to trek into a winter 
rainfall area. The Sneeuberg was such an area, for groups could ahYays escape a drought by 
trekking northwards to the Orange River or eastwards, (provided the southern Nguni would allow 
this) deeper into the better watered territories beyond the Sunday River. Between the Sneeuberg 
and the Roggeveld, lay an area of low summer rainfall, the Nieuweveld, that was suitable to 
neither pastoralists nor hunter-gatherers as a focal point for seasonal cycles of movement. The 
arid country to the north and south of the Nieuweveld therefore served as an cnviromnental 
frontier which, to an extent, kept the /Xam and the S wy ei apart and distinct. It was this thinly 
68. See for instance letter of H. Clocle lo Swcllengrcbel, 27 Feb. 1779, in G.J. Schulte, (ed.) Briefwisseling Van 
Hendrik Swellengrebel Jr Oar Kaapse Sake 1778-1792 (Cape To\\11, 1982), pp.312-313. Cloete explained that 
there were "many difTerenl kinds ofI--Iotlenlols ... and several kinds of I3uslunen". "Ilic Snceuberg San, for instance, 
used smaller bows and arrows than those in the I3okkcvcld and the Kamicsberg and wore sticks through their noses. 
69. J. and I. Rudner, "Rock-art in the Thirslland Areas", S0111/, Aji-iccm Arcl,aeological !J111/eti11, no.23, 1968, p.87. 
70. Lewis-Williams, /3elieving and Seeing, p.36. T. Dowson's Rock-E11grcm11gs of 1/,e Nortl,em Cape l111e11·or 
( Johannesburg, I 992 ), makes the same point. 
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populated corridor that later proved to be the path of least resistance into the interior for many 
fugitive Khoikhoi groups from the southern Cape as they fled before the advancing colonists.71 
The impact of these migrants on the /Xam and the Khoikhoi of the Roggeveld was probably 
minimal as they were unlikely to have tried to establish themselves in the escarpment. The real 
danger to the Khoisan of the interior came from the west as the trekboers began to enter the 
Roggeveld. It is this process that we should now consider. 
THE TREKBOERS AND THE ROGGEVELD KHOISAN 
Although the trekboer presence in the Roggeveld was initially very limited, its impact on the local 
Khoisan was as destructive as the processes of colonisation had been in the south-western Cape. 
At first, however, this was not readily apparent. With an expanding population and an expanding 
frontier the first priority facing the trekboers was to accumulate sufficient stock, and sufficient 
land, to enable themselves and their sons to secure the basic minimum of pastoral self-
sufficiency .72 But the process of accumulation was slow between 1740 and 1770, both because 
of the relative weakness of the sparse trekboer population in a vast, hostile environment and 
because of the relative poverty of the Khoikhoi of the interior. There could be no dramatic raids 
on Khoikhoi livestock in the vicinity of the escarpment simply because the Khoikhoi of this region 
did not possess very much livestock. 
The opgaafrollen (tax records) of the colonists indicate that there was actually a decline in the 
number of cattle and sheep in colonial hands in the late l 740s.73 The critical shorta~e of livestock 
which both the colonists and the VOC had experienced during the years 1714-1728 had been 
temporarily alleviated by the massive confiscation of Khoikhoi cattle following the war of 173974 
but there was to be no such windfall after 1740. The decline in the livestock holdings of the 
colonists might have been attributable to under-recording in the opgaafrollen,75 or to the heavy 
rains of 1746 which caused a great loss of livestock throughout the colony.76 A more likely 
explanation, however, is that the trekboers really were finding it difficult to accumulate stock in 
71. See chapter 8 below for a discussion of the Korana migration. 
72. See N. Pe1m, "Pastoralists an<l Pastoralism" for a discussion of the dynamics of the trekboer pastoralist 
economy. 
73. Van Duin an<l Ross, lfronomy of the Cape, pp.59-61. 
74. Sec p.135 above. 
75. Van Duin an<l Ross, Eco11omv of the Cape, p.59. 
76. CA, LM 7, 1 Feb. 1747. 
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the Cape interior. It is revealing that real growth in the numbers of livestock only began after 
1770 when the trekboers entered the better watered areas of the eastern Cape.77 
Stock farming in the interior was indeed a more demanding activity - with fewer returns - than 
stock farming elsewhere in the Cape. In the harsh and unfamiliar world of the Roggeveld it was, 
initially, far more important for the colonists to try to attract Khoikhoi labourers to their side than 
to attempt to displace them completely. Their knowledge of local conditions and their skills in 
maintaining pastoral production in an arid environment, quite different from that of the south-
western Cape, made the Khoikhoi indispensable. We should, therefore, envisage the colonial 
penetration of the Roggeveld as being achieved by a process of gradual infiltration rather than by 
shock tactics. This does not mean that the Khoikhoi did not find their livestock being taken from 
them by the characteristically colonial methods of force, fraud and unequal exchange. There 
were, of course, some colonists who robbed or defrauded the frontier Khoikhoi. But, as the 
evidence will reveal, there were a significant number of Roggeveld trekboers who sought to 
exercise a paternalistic protection over their Khoikhoi labourers and who tried to prevent even the 
VOC from taking the cattle of the local Khoikhoi. 
Significantly, the first recorded instance of overt resistance to the trekboer presence in the 
Roggeveld can1e from the San and not from the Khoikhoi. In 1748 a certain Johannes Louw 
proposed that a man should be excused from military duty at the Cape in order to keep a watchful 
eye on the "Bosjesmans" of the "Roggeland" _78 There was obviously trouble brewing and in May 
1754 the Landdrost and Heemraaden of Stellenbosch were infonned that the trekboers who lived 
north of the Doorn River and in the Voorste and Agterste Roggeveld were, and had been for some 
time, subject to the robbery of their livestock by people described as roving "Bosjesmans" or 
"Bosjesmans-Hottentots". Half of Roclof van Wijk's flocks and herds had been stolen in the 
Agterste Roggeveld and a Khoikhoi herder had been murdered. The attackers had also threatened 
to burn down the houses of the colonists. On receipt of this news the authorities hastily appointed 
veldkorporaa/s in the troubled areas and instructed them to organise a conunando. As a further 
precaution the ve/dkorporaa/s of the Olifants River and Vier en Twintig Rivieren were ordered to 
assist the colonists of the Roggevcld in every possible way. This, however, they did not do.79 
77. Van Duin an<l Ross, Economy of the Cape, p.63. 
78. CA, l/STl3 13/5, Krygsrna<l Resolutien, 16 Jan. 1748. 
79. CA, I/STU IJ/6, Notule van Krygsraa<l, 20 May 1754; CA, C 654, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en 
Drnkenstein, 1751-1759, 28 May 1754. 
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Just as in 1739, those colonists who were not directly threatened by Khoisan resistance were 
extremely reluctant to exert themselves for their more distant brethren or, for that matter, for the 
Company. Barend Lubbe and Barend Vorster, the veldkorporaals in question, did not send a 
single man from their districts on the commando. In their defence they explained that they had not 
been supplied with sufficient anununition, an oversight for which they were ultimately responsible 
and for which they were severely reprimanded.80 Despite the non-participation of any colonists 
from west of the Bokkeveld the Roggeveld conm1ando was able to submit a successful report by 
November. 
The conm1ando had encountered four different kraals and experienced resistance from each of 
them. In response to the poisoned arrows directed against them the commando members had 
killed sixty-four San. All but seven of the stolen animals were recovered and only three of the 
conunando - one colonist and two K110ikhoi - had been wounded. One of the kraals had, however, 
successfully defended itself against the conunando for it had been well protected behind rocks. 
The conunando had tried all day, without success, to overcome the resisters and was forced to 
retire in the evening to the taunts of the defenders who shouted: 11 dat ziy hun vee nergens souden 
kmmen verbergen of sij souden het wel weeten te krijgen 11 • 81 
It was also reported that not long before this an entire herd of cattle had been stolen from the fann 
of Jacobus Gildenhuys between the Roggeveld and the Bokkeveld. Three of the local fanners, 
with twenty of the local K110ikhoi in support, followed the thieves and managed to kill thirty-four 
of them, recovering most of the cattle at the same time. The survivors of this band of robbers said 
that they would make peace but only if a kraal of San whom they called the "Duikerpens" were 
subjugated. The Krygsraad of Stellenbosch therefore resolved to try to deal with the 
Duikerpens.82 The conunando despatched on this mission was successful in finding the 
Duikerpens, as well as some other kraals in the vicinity, and made peace with them. Three San 
captains were given gifts of sheep and a Company staff of office. It is not clear where these 
80. CA, 1/STB 13/6, 19 Nov. 1754; CA C 654, 19 Nov. 1754. Lubbe was replaced as veldkorporaal because of his 
age in 1759. See CA, !/STI3 13/7, Notule van Krygsraad, 13 Feb. 1759. 
81. "That t11ey would not be able to hide their stock anywhere that they could not find it". CA, C 654, Dag 
Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1751-1759, 19 Nov. 1754. Also CA, C 490, Letters Received by Council 
of Policy, 1754, 20 Nov. 1754. 
82. Ibid. 
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actions took place though it was reported that two other kraals lay further to the east. One of 
these was persuaded to make peace but the other could not be found.83 
The first complaints to reach the authorities concerning the theft of Khoikhoi cattle by colonists 
occurred in February 1750 when Oubaas, a Khoikhoi captain of the Roggeveld, reported how his 
kraal had twice been visited by the farmer Godlieb Rudolf Opperman. On both occasions 
Opperman had taken two oxen from Oubaas in exchange for, firstly, two old cows and secondly, 
a young heifer. At a later date Oppennan had driven off all Oubaas's cattle and kept six of them 
after making a token and unwanted payment. 84 
It seems, however, that Company servants in search of livestock were a far greater menace to the 
Khoikhoi than the trekboers. Another incident recorded in 1750 illustrates not only that the 
Khoikhoi were used to being visited by Company officials but also that the name of the VOC was 
capable of inspiring an awesome respect amongst the vulnerable indigenes of the frontier zone. In 
1749 the fanner Johannes de Beer, his knecht Jan Martens and their Khoikhoi servants visited the 
Klein Roggeveld. Martens, splendidly attired in a hat with a silver tress and with a pistol strapped 
to his side, announced to the local Khoikhoi that he was a corporal of the Company engaged in 
bartering for livestock. Using the authority of his borrowed office Martens succeeded in obtaining 
eight cattle and thirty-eight sheep from the Khoikhoi captain Jurgen, promising the latter that he 
would be rewarded with a Company staff. Using a similar story De Beer and Martens obtained 
twelve cattle and thirty-four wethers from the Khoikhoi captain Hennanus. In both cases the 
proffered payment took the fonn of some glass beads and tobacco, clearly unsatisfactory in the 
eyes of the Khoikhoi since, on discovering that Martens had duped them, they protested to the 
authorities. 85 
Their protests were no doubt encouraged by the genuine Company corporal, Frederick Sigmond 
Modeman, who, journeying to the Roggeveld from the Company post at Rietvallei at the 
Buffelsjagts River, discovered that De Beer and Martens had pre-empted the Company in its 
83. CA, C 491, Letters Received by Council of Policy, 1755, 3 April 1755. Perhaps one of the peace-makers was 
Captain Vredevelt ( or Groinam) whom Gordon noted was the chief of the Canunaga, or Hartebeest River people in 
1779. R. Gordon, 2 Jan. 1779, in Raper and I3oucher, Gon/011, p.214. 
84. CA, 1/STB 3/10, Verklarings, Pleidooie en Interrogatorien (Krimineel) 1749-1758, Relaas van Hottentot 
Capitain Oubaas, 21 Feb. 1750. Oppennan was made veldko1poraal of the Voorste Roggeveld in 1753. CA, 
1/STB 13/6, Notule van Krygsraad, 1750-1759, 16 Nov. 1753. He trekked from the Roggeveld in 1757 CA, C 654, 
15 Oct. 1757 just before an official enquiry into his activities was initiated. CA, LM 7, 13 Dec. 1757. 
85. CA, l/STI3 3/10, Relaas van Hottentot Ontong, 21 Feb. 1750; Relaas van Ilottcnlol Janljc, 21 Feb. 1750; 
Rclaas van 1-Iollcnlol Maurits, 21 Feb. 1750. 
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search for livestock. Modeman informed his superiors that the Roggeveld Khoikhoi had little or 
no cattle and that Oppem1an, De Beer and Martens were not the only colonists guilty of robbing 
the Khoikhoi.86 
Despite the above incidents we should not assume that the K11oikhoi were nothing but innocent 
victims of colonial duplicity. There had been K11oikhoi participation in the commandos of 1754 
and 1755 and it is clear that there was a great deal of K11oikhoi co-operation with trekboers in the 
field of pastoral production. We are given an outstanding glimpse into the nature of the 
relationship which existed between the two groups in the 1760s, thanks to the uproar that was 
caused by the new corporal of the Company's post at the Buffelsjagts River, Hendrik Veldsman, 
when he came to obtain cattle and sheep for the Company from the Roggeveld Khoikhoi in 1768. 
There were no bogus Company corporals to precede him but, unfortunately for the Roggeveld 
Khoikhoi, Veldsman was far more efficient at extracting livestock from them than any of the 
trekboers had been. He made his first appearance in the Roggeveld, beyond the Vis River, in 
December 1768. Here he encountered the K11oikhoi drovers, Roman and Barend, who were 
looking after the stock of the farmer Frans Can1pher whilst their own stock grazed on the farm of 
Albert Venter. From these few details we can learn a great deal about farming in the Roggeveld, 
for they reveal that the trekboers had already obtained legplaatsen in the summer rainfall region; 
that there was communal sharing of fanns and K110ikhoi labour; and that the Khoikhoi still had 
livestock of their own which they were allowed to keep on white-owned fanns. Roman and 
Barend had eight cattle plus a cow and a calf. Veldsman conunanded them to bring him their 
livestock, threatening them with blows to ensure their compliance. When they had done so he 
gave them, though they did not want to trade, a flask of arrack, three strings of copper beads and 
half a span of tobacco (which proved to be unfit to smoke) per beast. The cow and the calf he 
took without payment.87 
Veldsman next went to the farm of Roelof van Wijk at Lccuwe Drift on the Vis River in the 
Roggeveld. By this stage he had managed to acquire 200 cattle and as many sheep. There were at 
least five K11oikhoi servants and a knecht in his entourage, as well as three wagons of cheap trade 
goods. Such a visitor must have been an unwelcome sight to a Roggeveld farmer in midsununer 
when water was scarce but Van Wijk had little option but to allow Veldsman's stock to devour 
86. CA, 1/STB 3/10, Rclaas van Frederick Sigmond Modeman, 21 Feb. 1750; CA, LM 7, 13 Dec. 1757. 
87. CA, 1/STI3 3/11, Verklarings, Plcidooie en Intcrogatoricn (Kriminccl) 1759-1782, Rclaas van Hottentot 
Roman; Relaas van I-lollentot 13arend, 26 Oct. 1769. 
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his pasturage whilst Veldsman tried to persuade the local Khoikhoi to part with their livestock. 
There were at least five Khoikhoi who worked for Van Wijk and he asked Veldsman to deal fairly 
with them. Veldsman assured him that he would and accompanied the Khoikhoi to Van Wijk's 
other farm where they kept their cattle. It would seem from this detail that at this stage the 
trekboers and the Khoikhoi kept their livestock separate from one another on different farms. In 
this way it was possible for a trekboer to control, by virtue of his servants' occupancy of the land, 
larger areas of the region's resources, and, when necessary, he could move his livestock from one 
farm to another. It would also seem as though the Khoikhoi were not, as yet, completely 
subjugated as servants, for although the trekboers claimed the land, the Khoikhoi could use it for 
their private flocks and herds. For paltry quantities of arrack, beads and tobacco Veldsman was, 
however, able to reduce the private flock of Van Wijk's Khoikhoi servants by twenty-four sheep 
and their private herd by eighteen cattle. The Khoikhoi were very unhappy about this and 
declared to Van Wijk that they had been forced to trade against their will, asking him to complain 
to the authorities on their behalf. 88 
Meanwhile Veldsman's knecht, Jan Schreuder, had visited Roelofs brother, Gerrit van Wijk, in 
the Agter Roggeveld and aimounced his intention of bartering cattle from the Khoikhoi there. He 
had, he said, already bartered cattle from the Khoikhoi Platje, Spai1jir, Klaas and Toontje. Gerrit 
vai1 Wijk remarked that Toontje had been lying sick on his (Van Wijk's) fann for some time and 
had certainly not agreed to his cattle being driven away. The correct procedure, Van Wijk 
suggested, would have been either to infonn himself or Toontje. Van Wijk's wife then made a 
remark that reveals a great deal about the grazing arrangements between the Khoikhoi and the 
trekboers: "Als ons vee ondcr dat van ons buuren geraakt, mogen wij het selven niet uitsetten, 
zonde den Baas daarvan ke1misse te geeven".89 
It is clear from this that the "protector" of the cattle was regarded as having some sort of 
proprietary right over them. Schreuder was ordered away but many other Khoikhoi came to 
complain to Gerrit van Wijk that the stock which they had earned in his service had been taken 
from them by force after token paymcnts.90 
88. CA, 1/STB 3/11, Relaas van Roelof van Wijk, 26 May 1769. Veldsman bought twenty-seven trek-oxen from 
Roclof van Wijk for eight Rijkst!aalders each. He gave Van Wijk a receipt. 
89. "If we have any cattle amongst those or our neighbours even we cmmot remove them without notifying the 
Baas". CA, 1/STB 3/11, Relaas van Gcrrit van Wi_1k, 13 April 1769. 
90. Ibid. Schrcuder's idea of paying Toontje was to give Toontje's brother, Spanjir, two pints or wine, a length of 
copper beads and a span of bad tobacco. Spanjir drank the wine himself 
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Yet another Van Wijk received a visit from Veldsman at this time. In January 1769 Comelis, the 
nephew of Gerrit and Roelof, found a large number of cattle and sheep standing in his farm's 
water supply under the supervision of Veldsman's Khoikhoi servants. Comelis and his brother 
Christoffel drove the animals out of the water and told the Khoikhoi that the animals could drink 
provided that they did not foul the water. When Veldsman himself arrived he did not take kindly 
to the intervention of the Van Wijk brothers who, he claimed, had tried to prevent Company 
livestock from drinking. "Dan geloofd jy een hottentot meer als twee Chrissen men?" asked 
Comelis indignantly. "Ja - meer geloofd als twee Chrissen menschen die houw ik neer beter als 
een Hottentot," came Veldsman's insulting reply.91 He then gave instructions for his large herds 
and flocks to be outspanned right next to the Van Wijk's home so that the grazing would be 
impaired. Some time after this most unwelcome visitor had departed Comelis learnt that as a 
parting shot Veldsman, who must have possessed a malicious sense of humour, had infonned a 
nearby Khoikhoi called Thys that he had been granted a fann between Comelis and his father. 
Even if such a grant had been pem1issible, the two fanns were too close together for this to have 
been feasible, Thys, moreover, had been promised a Company staff and a captaincy by the 
departing corporal. 92 
The power and arrogance of such a minor Company official is a remarkable indication of the 
influence the VOC was able to exert over the Khoikhoi and trekboers of the frontier zone. It 
seems that V eldsman was detennined to flaunt this power for in the Onder Roggeveld he 
deliberately drove fifty or sixty of his horses into a valley of reeds which Gerrit Visagie had been 
saving as thatching material. A month later he deliberately drove 400 cattle and a large number of 
sheep into the same patch of reeds, daring Visagie to complain.93 In the Onder Bokkeveld he 
bound a Khoikhoi called Smit with a rope and hit him with a sjambok. He then dragged Smit to 
his kraal and infonned his wife that Smit would be released in exchange for his animals, namely 
five cows, three oxen and three milk cows. If Smit wanted to be paid for these animals he was 
expected to find Veldsman's wagons in the Roggeveld and there receive one span of tobacco, a 
string of red beads and a bottle of arrack per beast. 94 
It is quite obvious from the above that the Roggcveld trekboers did not like the idea that a 
Company servant could take livestock from their Khoikhoi labourers. Their resistance to such 
91. "Do you then believe a Hottentot more than two Christians?" "Yes - more than two Christians whom I regard as 
being no better than a Hottentot". CA, 1/STB 3/11, Rclaas van Comelis van Wijk, 17 April 1769. 
92. Ibid. 
93. CA, l/STl3 3/11, Rclaas van GeITit Visagic, 19 May 1769. 
94. CA, l/STl3 3/11, Relaas van Hottentot Smit, 2 June 1769. 
192 
Khoisan and Colonists of the Cape Interior, 1740-1772 
powers need not be ascribed to benevolence - though the Van Wijk's do appear to have been 
benevolent, albeit paternalistic, masters95 - for it made sense to attract skilled and motivated 
herders and drovers as one's labourers. The proprietary control which a trekboer could exert over 
his labourers' livestock made his own position that much more powerful and secure. Land, labour 
and livestock were the basis of the trekboer economy. At this stage the interests of master and 
servant coincided. 
The interests of the Company were, however, different and it was the intervention of people like 
Veldsman that upset the fragile balance of the open frontier to the detriment of the Khoikhoi. The 
excessive demands for livestock, backed by force and directed at the Khoikhoi, destroyed the last 
remnants of their herds and flocks and, in so doing, the last renmants of their independence. It 
should not be assumed that Veldsman was exceeding his authority. A letter from Landdrost 
Mentz of Swellendam to Governor Tulbagh clarifies this: 
Your Excellency will be enabled to perceive, from the returns of the Company's 
cattle herewith transmitted, that 258 bull calves have been bartered from the 
Hottentots: but as corporal Veldsman infonns me that many of the burghers will 
not suffer the Hottentots living with them to barter their cattle to the Company, I 
feel it my duty humbly to submit to the consideration of your Excellency, that if 
the inhabitants may prevent the Hottentots living with them from bartering their 
cattle to the Company, the barter, in the course oftime, will not yield much profit 
- for as much as few or no Hottentots no longer reside in the kraals, but for the 
greater part with the inhabitants ... 96 
As the latter remark indicates, the majority of Khoikhoi were no longer independent, and a 
corollary of this lack of independence was a decline in status. In these circumstances not all 
colonists were prepared to treat their servants with a benevolent paternalism. As environmental 
resources and livestock became scarcer, the response of certain colonists was to maltreat their 
Khoikhoi servants and strip them of their few remaining cattle and sheep. In 1763 for instance a 
number of Khoikhoi testified against Jan Otto Dideriks of the Roggeveld,97 and their evidence 
illustrates the pressures which could be exerted by some masters against their servants. 
95. TI1e Khoikhoi Jantje Wagenrijde, who worked for Roclof van Wijk, had borrowed seven of Van Wijk's oxen in 
order to travel to the Onder Bokkeveld and fetch his aged father from a kraal there. He was bringing him back to 
Van Wijk's fann so that he could be cared for when he was stopped by Schreuder who tried to take his laden oxen 
away. CA, I/STI3 3/11, Relaas van Hottentot Jantje Wagenrijde, 26 May 1769. 
96. Extract of a letter from Landdrost Mentz to Governor Tulbagh, Swellendam, 22 Feb 1769, in Moodie, The 
Record, Part 3, p.18. n.2. 
97. Strictly speaking Dideriks was of the Hantam, indeed, he was the first to have registered a fann, "Akerendam", 
in the Hantam in 1750. He also registered a farm, "Driefontein", in the Roggeveld in 1755. CA, RLR 12, p 167; 
CA RLR 14, p.85. 
193 
Chapter Five 
According to the evidence of the Khoikhoi Danser and Coridon, it was hard to work for Dideriks. 
Both labourers had lived on Dideriks' fann for several years (in Coridon's case for ten years) but 
had left because their wages and food were being withheld from them. Dideriks had refused to 
allow them to remove their own livestock, which consisted of fairly large flocks of sheep (Coridon 
claimed to have a hundred) and some cattle. Dideriks, it seems, slaughtered some of these sheep 
for his own consumption, refused to hand over the remainder and chased away Danser and 
Coridon, threatening to shoot them when they protested. It is clear that it was not only the 
livestock of the Khoikhoi over which Dideriks claimed possession but the persons of the Khoikhoi 
too. One of his Khoikhoi servants, Kleynveld by name, had attempted to run away but had been 
recaptured by one of Dideriks' slaves. Dideriks and his "bastaard soons", Carel and Andries,98 
began to torture Klynveld, chaining him, kicking him, beating him and pulling out his finger nails 
with a pair of pliers. The reason for this torture was to get Klynveld to disclose how many sheep 
he had allegedly slaughtered. Whether or not Klyneveld had taken any sheep is not recorded for 
he died from his ill-treatment after being dragged outside in his chains and dumped behind the 
kraal.99 
Dideriks was sentenced to twenty-five years on Robben Island. I 00 The relative severity of his 
sentence suggests that his conduct was outside the nonns of acceptable behaviour, but he was not 
unique. There are strong similarities between his case and that of Carel Hendrik Buijtendag of the 
Koue Bokkeveld who brutalised his Khoikhoi servants in the 1770s. Buijtendag's history has been 
recorded elsewherelOI but the official response to his cruelty towards his servants suggests that, 
as the frontier moved further away from Cape Town, it was becoming a slow and difficult 
procedure for a mistreated Khoikhoi to receive either justice or protection from the authorities. 
The vast majority of Khoikhoi complaints against their masters were probably never even 
recorded but, ominously, more and more reports of Khoikhoi losing their livestock to their 
employers, or suffering from restrictions of movement, came before the authorities. All 
indications are that from the late 1760s the condition of Khoikhoi labourers on the frontier began 
98. These sons had been begotten on the "Hottentollinne Caatje". Dideriks used to brand the sheep of his 
Khoikhoi labourers with Caatje's mark when his labourers tried to reclaim them. CA, 1/STB 3/11, Relaas van slaaf 
Jacob van Mallabaar behoren aan Jacobus van Rheenen, 24 Nov. 1763. 
99. CA, 1/STB 3/11, Relaas van Hottentot Danser, 2 Nov. 1763; Relaas van Hottentot Coridon, 2 Nov. 1763·, 
Relaas van slaaf Jacob van Mallabaar, 24 Nov. 1763. 
100. N.A. Worden, "Rural Slavery in the Western Districts of Cape Colony During the Eighteenth Century" (Ph.D. 
thesis, Cambridge, 1982 ), p.376. 
10 I. N. Penn, "Anarchy and Authority in the Koue Bokkeveld, 1739-1779: The Banishing of Carel Buijtcndag", 
Kleio, XVII, 1985, pp.24-43. 
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to deteriorate as both wages and family members were withheld from them when they attempted 
to leave the service of a particular employer.102 
This suggests that there was increasing competition for both Khoikhoi labour as well as for 
pastoral and environmental resources. Inevitably, such pressures had an impact on the San, as 
both Khoikhoi wishing to escape from colonial oppression and trekboers in search of better 
grazing began to encroach on the territory of the hunter-gatherers. Those Khoikhoi who fled into 
Bushmanland were by no means assured of being treated as allies and could well have been 
regarded as yet another set of competitors for scarce resources. It would not, however, be 
unreasonable to suppose that, even in the late 1760s, some Khoikhoi would have joined the San in 
common resistance to the encroaclm1ent of the trekboers. What was the situation of the 
Roggeveld San in the 1760s? 
Commando activities 111 the Roggeveld after 1755 and before the 1770s are not very well 
documented and our knowledge of San resistance during this period is therefore rather sketchy. 
There is a mysterious lacuna in the records concerning an incident which took place in the 1760s. 
In the 1770s Thunberg claimed that there had been a massacre of 186 San in the Roggeveld in 
1765.103 The only confirmation of this report comes from the farm "Oorlogskloof' near present 
day Sutherland in the Roggeveld. There are a great many graves here, some thirty, laid out in 
three groups, with piles of rocks above them. There is also a separate gravestone nearby with the 
date 1768 on it. Both the name of the fann and the massed graves lead one to suppose that there 
was some bloody engagement here in 1768; and that the single, dated grave belongs to a colonist 
whilst the others belong to Khoisan victims. There is also a mass grave, with Khoisan remains, on 
the Farm "Gunsfontein". But there is no reason to suppose that this dates from the 1760s since it 
could equally well be a legacy of the murderous and better documented fighting of the l 770s.104 
The increased San resistance after 1770 was linked to the gro,,ing competition for, and 
deterioration of, the enviromnental resources of the interior escarpment. Between 1740 and 1770 
a total of 221 new loan-fanns had been registered in the Roggeveld and 75 in the Nieuweveld.105 
I 02. In Febrnary 1771 there were a number of complaints from Khoikhoi in the Swcllcndam district that wages 
were being withheld rrom them. See O.M. Bergh to La11ddrost of Swellen<lam, 15 Feb. 1771, in Moo<lic, The 
Record, Part Ill, pp.8-9. Sec also N. Penn, "Labour, land and livestock", pp.13-19 an<l chapter 7 below. 
103. V.S. Forbes, (c<l.), Carl Peter Tl11111berg Travels At Tl1e Cape Of Good /lope 1772-1775 (Cape Town, 1986), 
pp.290-291. 
I 04. Karel Schoeman, Oie Wereld 1£111 Oie Digter: '11 boek oor S11therla11d e11 die Rogge,·eld fer ere van NP. vcm 
Wvk J,ouw ( Pretoria, 198(, ), pp. 19-20. 
l 05. These figures arc based on a study or the loan-fann records, CA, RLR I 0-21 inclus1 vc. 
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But the colonial impact was not restricted to the locality of the fanns. Every sununer the 
trekboers, of whom there were many more than there were fanns registered, roamed deep into 
Buslunanland in search of fresh pastures for their stock. With their guns and horses the colonial 
fanners were also able to hunt the game, upon which the San depended, with devastating 
efficiency.106 The pressure was mounting and in 1770 unprecedented hostilities broke out along 
the length and breadth of the frontier zone. 
According to traditions recorded amongst the Roggeveld fam1ers of the early nineteenth century 
the outbreak of fighting in 1770 had a specific, localised causus belli which ignited an already 
explosive situation. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Van Reenen family was one 
of the wealthiest at the Cape, holding extensive properties and ultimately winning the Company 
meat contract. In addition to owning farms on the eastern frontier, the Van Reenens also had 
fanns in the Hantam and at the Sak River (the latter probably legplaatsen). Before 1770 relations 
between the trekboers and the San of the Roggeveld were, apparently, amicable but this was 
changed by a knecht of the Van Reenens, Andries Jacobs, who either beat a San captain, Hacqua 
(the name meant "horse" and was acquired from his swiftness in rmrning), with a sjambok or 
abducted a San woman. Jacobs was killed by the San in retaliation and his cattle were stolen. In 
response to this the local trekboers raised a conunando and attacked Hacqua's kraal. It was this 
event, tradition has it, that marked the start of almost ceaseless fighting. I 07 
The man who recorded this tradition, Colonel Collins (who toured the frontier districts of the 
colony collecting information for the British govcnrn1ent in 1809), also noted that at about the 
same time as the attack on Hacqua's kraal: 
some Hottentots left the service of the farmers, and joined the Bosjiesman, to 
whom they gave the example of robbing them, which they soon followed, and 
which has contributed in a greater or less degree since that period, not 
infrequently attended by murder.108 
Collins was probably referring to the events surrounding the murder of Johan Hendrik Tcutman 
and his wife and daughter in the Roggeveld in 1772. Since this incident is indeed of considerable 
importance and illuminates the situation in the Roggevcld at the time most admirably it merits a 
more detailed consideration. 
I 06. See chapter 11 below fi.>r the impact of colonial hunting parties on I3ushmanland by the 1790s. 
!07. "Journal of a Tour lo the North-Eastern Boundary, the Orange River, and the Stonn Mountains" by Colonel 
Collins, in I 809, in Moodie, The Record, Part V, p.34: also Part Ill, p.M, 11 
108. Moodie, 711e Record, Part V, p.34. 
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THE ROGGEVELD REBELLION OF 1772 
In 1 772 the Louw family was one of the most influential in the Roggeveld. The recently deceased 
Adriaan Louw senior, patriarchal head of an extensive family, had owned five fam1s which were 
now held by his widow and managed by his knecht, Nicolaas Muller.109 Such extensive holdings 
required a large labour force which, for the most part, was comprised of the local Khoikhoi. One 
of the workers was, however, a "Bastaard-Hottentot" named Thys who lived with Muller at the 
farm "de Kareeboom".110 
One day in April 1772 Muller sent Thys to the Bokkeveld in order to fetch a horse which Muller 
had purchased from a certain Augustus Lodewyk de Beer. On his way back Thys visited the farm 
of Pieter van Heerden, also in the Bokkeveld. Van Heerden asked Toys whether the "Hottentots" 
in the Roggeveld were still stealing as much as before, to which question Thys was obliged to 
reply that both "Hottentots" and "Bushmen" had recently stolen the sheep of Willem van Zijl. Van 
Heerden then made a pronouncement which profoundly disturbed Thys: 
Als <lat zoo is en zij willen hmme rust niet houdcn zoo zal ik, als ik van den 
Landdrost last krijgen mogte om daar heen met bokkevelds menschen, op 
conunando te gaan, alle de in de craalen zijnde hottentots en basterds 
doodschieten, want zij leggen 't <loch maar op steelen aan.111 
Since he was a "Bastaard" himself Thys sought clarification. "Dan zou de baas mij ook dood 
schieten, en ik heh nog nooit gecn scaap of iets gestoolcn." "Ja," Van Heeden replied, "jy moet 
dan in geene kraalen blyven; met byvoeging want de hottcntotten willen <lit jaar in 't geheel geencr 
uithoudcn; de boeren hmmen niets uitvocren want ze moeten altijd maar op conunandos."112 
As the, by now, highly alanned Thys made his way home he mulled over what Van Heerden had 
told him. It would seem from Van Hccrden's remarks that the Roggeveld was home to a 
considerable number of independent kraals, both Khoikhoi and "Bastaard". In the atmosphere of 
109. My reconstruction of the 1772 rebellion is largely base<l on infonnation contained in CA, CJ 403, Crimineel 
Processtukken, 1772, pp.303-499. Additional infonnation has been gleaned from the loan-fann records, CA, RLR, 
an<l De Villiers and Pama's Geslagsregisters. 
110. CA, CJ 403, Rclaas van Basten! Hottentot Thys, pp.459-468. 
111. "lf that is the case an<l they <lo not want to keep the peace I shall come with a conunando of Bokkcvcld people, 
if I gel pennission from the La11ddrost, and shoot dead all of the kraal-dwelling Hottentots an<l bastaar<ls because 
they only exist by stealing." Ibi<l. 
112. "Then the Boss is going to shoot me as well and I have never stolen a sheep or anything else." "Y cs. So you 
had better not stay in any kraals; in addition the l lottcnlols arc not going to last another year; the Boers have nol 
done so yet because they arc always on commando." Ibid. 
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heightened tension and increasing commando activity it was no longer possible to be neutral. One 
was either for the colonists, in the colonial conunandos and domiciled on a colonial fann, or 
against them. Significantly, Khoikhoi and "Bastaards" were perceived of as being as great a 
threat as the San, proof that, in the eyes of the trekboers, there was already some conununity of 
interest between the non-European inhabitants of the frontier zone. 
Stopping at Jochem Scholtz senior's farm Thys picked up two letters for delivery to Scholtz's 
daughter, Elizabeth, who had married Gerrit Matthys van Wijk the year before. Gerrit lived at 
one of his family's farms in the Roggeveld, probably that of the widow of Christoffel van Wijk, 
though it cannot be named with certainty, for the Van Wijks, like the Louws, had multiplied 
prolifically and brought a great deal of land under their control. The knecht at the fann was a 
certain Nicolaas Claasen and Thys told him what Van Heerden had threatened, asking him 
whether he thought it was possible. Unfortunately for his peace of mind Claasen assured him that 
it was.113 Unfortunately, too, for the peace of the Roggeveld Thys' news now began to spread in 
an increasingly distorted fonn throughout the district, sowing fear and disturbance wherever it 
was heard. 
Amongst the Khoikhoi on Van Wijk's fann who seized on the rumour were two men nan1ed Jas 
and Toontje. They believed that Thys had delivered a letter from the "groot volk" which stated 
that a commando was going to come from the Bokkeveld and kill all of the Khoikhoi and 
"Bastaards" of the Roggeveld. This report they passed on, from one Khoikhoi to another, causing 
great anxiety about staying either in their kraals or on colonial farms.114 It is notable that neither 
the Khoikhoi nor the colonists found Thys' story incredible, an indication that the situation within 
the frontier zone was already extremely tense. The fact that Thys had returned with letters 
seemed, to the illiterate Khoikhoi, conclusive proof that they were going to become the target of 
conunando activity. 
It is important to realise that, in the rebellion which followed, rumour played an essential rather 
than an accidental part. In this respect the Roggeveld rebellion was confonning to other uprisings 
of groups of rural, pre-literate people against exploitation and oppression. As Ranajit Guha has 
written: "rumour is both a universal and necessary carrier of insurgency in any pre-industrial, 
113. lbi<l. 
114. CA, CJ 403, Rclaas van llollcnlol Jas, pp.479-480. 
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pre-literate society" .115 Why this should be the case, and why this was indeed the case in the 
Roggeveld rebellion needs some consideration. 
What is rumour? In their study of the psychology of rumour Allport and Postman note that 
rumours only circulate if the topic has some importance for the individuals who hear and spread 
the story. They also state that "any human need may provide the motive power to rumour".116 
Thus, there is no one type of rumour and rumours may emerge from sexual interests, anxieties, 
hopes, desires, hatreds or fears. Rumours must, however, address important concerns in order to 
flourish. They must also, according to Allport and Postman, contain the essential ingredient of 
an1biguity. Although there is often a "kernel of truth" in a rumour it is actually its ambiguity 
which makes it so potent.117 Guha elaborates upon this point and emphasises that it is incorrect 
to regard rumour as being either a lie or a type of news. It should, perhaps, be regarded as a form 
somewhere between a tale and a myth. Whereas the source of news is identifiable and can be 
traced back to a point of origin: 
rumour is necessarily anonymous and its ongm unknown (even though on 
occasions ... a fictive source may be assigned to it). Hence its message cannot be 
authenticated by any reference to a source nor can its purveyors be asked to 
guarantee its accuracy or answer for its effects in any way. Secondly, the process 
of transmission implies, in the case of news, a necessary distinction between the 
conununicator and his audience. No such distinction exists in the case of 
rumours which are passed on · from a teller to a hearer who himself becomes a 
teller' - a instance of absolute transitivity. In other words, the encoding and 
decoding of rumour are collapsed, unlike news, at each point of its relay .118 
For Guha, then, anonymity and transitivity contribute to the essential ambiguity of rumour and 
enable it to function as a mobile and explosive agent of insurgency. Anonymity pern1its the 
meaning of the rumour to remain open, unrestricted by authenticity of source and adaptable to the 
impulses of the tellers and hearers who transform it during the course of transmission. The 
extreme transitivity of rumour enhances its rapid and spontaneous transmission, especially within 
pre-literate societies where conununication through oral speech thrives on inunediacy and 
spontancity.119 
115. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant I11s11rge11cy i11 Co/o11ial India (Delhi, 1992), p.251. 
116. G.W. Allport and L. Postman, The Psychology ofR11mo11r(New York, 1947), pp.33-36. 
117. lbid,p.33. 
118. Guha, Peasant I11s11rge11cy, pp.259-60. 
119. Gayatri Spivak is critical of Guha's distinctions between wrillen and spoken pronouncements. Sec G. Spivak, 
"Subaltern Studies: Deconslrucling Ilisloriogrnphy" in G. Spivak, /11 Other Worlds: Essays !11 C11/t11ra/ Politics 
(London, 1988), pp.211-5. 
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Although it is possible for messages of insurgency to spread within pre-literate rural societies by 
both verbal and non-verbal fonns the former means is by far the most important. Amongst verbal 
forms spoken utterances are, naturally, more important than writing in such societies, though this 
does not mean that written messages cannot be "read" by preliterates in their own way and 
imbued with their own meaning. We have already noted how the letters which Toys delivered to 
the Roggeveld were taken as signs of impending doom, possessing a meaning quite independent 
from their written content. Such use of written documents are fairly common in pre-literate 
societies. Georges Lefebvre, in his study of the Great Fear of 1789, cites several examples in 
which illiterate peasants flaunted books or posters purporting to contain the king's orders but 
which were really 'lothing of the sort. A verbal signal was being converted into a visual one 
whose meaning was now as malleable as rumour.120 
Rumour does not, of course, cause an uprising or insurgency. The Roggeveld Khoikhoi had good 
reason to rebel long before Thys delivered his message. As Guha explains: "it is the subjection of 
the rural masses to a common source of exploitation and oppression that makes them rebel even 
before they learn to combine in peasant associations".121 What rumour does is to act as the 
"trigger and mobilizer" for insurgency.122 The reasons for its efficacy in this respect are related 
to its characteristics as a particular type of spoken utterance. Pre-literate societies are, as we have 
seen, largely dependent on spoken utterances for the circulation of infonnation and rumour, 
according to Guha, is spoken utterance par excellence. Speech "responds to any given stimulus 
more urgently, emotionally, and dynamically than written utterance" and rumour, with its far 
greater functional inunediacy (derived from the importance of its content, its ambiguity and the 
context of social tension in which it circulates), creates an almost uncontrollable impulse for one 
person to pass it on to another. This passing on of a message creates and implies a bond of 
conununity between transmitter and receiver. It helps to evoke a "comradeship response" of 
equality and solidarity. The socialising aspect of rumour, in tum, helps to explain the speed with 
which rumours arc disseminated.123 
In the case of the Roggevcld Khoikhoi Thys' story certainly spread extremely rapidly, not just 
amongst the colonial Khoikhoi and "Bastaards" but amongst independent Khoikhoi and trekboers 
too. It would seem as though the rumour was used as a shibboleth, to test the "comradeship 
120. Georges Lefebvre, The Great Fear Of 1789: Rural Panic in Revol11tio11wy France (Princeton, 1982), p. 96. 
121. Guha, Peasant Insurgency, p.225. 
122. lbi<l , p.256. 
123. lbi<l., pp.256-8. 
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response" of the recipient. Whereas the news served to draw dependent and independent Khoikhoi 
together, with few exceptions it served to separate white trekboers from the rest. 
Despite the pressures of the previous thirty years and the extensive alienation of land there were, 
still, a considerable number of Roggeveld Khoikhoi who were not living on colonial farms. 
Toontje himself was the head of an independent kraal and when Jas told the trekboer Pieter 
Visagie what Thys had said Visagie's reply was: "Daar leggen zoo veele kleine craaltjes in bet 
roggeveld die geen kwaad doen waarom zoude men die willen doodschieten?"l24 A good example 
of a Khoikhoi who was still attempting to maintain an independent existence was Oude Jantje 
Links, whose experience was probably typical of many of his countrymen. He had initially lived 
on a farm in the Roggeveld under the Louw's knecht, Nicolaas Muller. After a while he had 
established a kraal for himself further away but had been driven off by the Dutch who took the 
land for the use of their own livestock. Oude Jantje Links was forced to move to the Droogeberg, 
an aptly named place of few attractions, where he and his sons tended their flocks. Even here, 
however, he was not to be left alone for when some San stole Cornelis Coetzee's sheep and killed 
his shepherd, Oude Jantje was commandeered for conunando duty. On this occasion he was, at 
least, given a musket by Cornelis van Wijk but, like many other Khoikhoi, he cannot have 
relished this compulsory military service.125 
It is not possible to date this c01mnando exactly but it probably took place between 1770 and 
1772 when there was a great deal of conunando activity in the area. In April 1770 veldkorporaal 
Adriaan van Jaarsveld reported that the "Hottentots" of the area beyond the Salt River, behind the 
Koup, (i.e. the Nieuweveld) had stolen and slaughtered eighty-four cattle. Eight of the robbers 
had been killed by Van Jaarsveld's conunando and an unspecified number had been captured.126 
In November 1770 Landdrost Faber of Stellenbosch reported to the governor that there had been 
widespread stock theft and murder in the districts beyond the Salt River in the Roggeveld and the 
Koup, as well as beyond the Doorn River and the Nieuweveld. Three shepherds had been killed 
by the "Bosjesmans Hottentots", one of them a Khoikhoi servant of Comelis van Wijk,127 and it 
is therefore possible that it was on this occasion that Oude Jantje Links was given a musket by 
Van Wijk and forced to take part in a retaliatory conunando. It is not known how many of the 
robbers were killed but Oude Jantje remembered later that the commando in which he served had 
124. "111crc arc so many little kraals in the Roggcvcld that have not done any hann why should any one want to 
shoot them dead?" CA, CJ 403, Relaas van Hottentot Jas, pp.479-480. 
125. CA, CJ 403, Rclaas van Oudc Jantje alias Oudc Jantje Links, pp.447-455 
126. Faber to Tulbagh, 4 July 1770, in Moodie, 71,e Record, Part Ill, pp. 7-8. 
127. Faber to Tulbagh, 6 Nov. 1770, in Moodie, 71,e Record, Part Ill, p.8. 
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been led by a certain Johan Jurgen Faberl28 (not to be confused with Landdrost Faber of 
Stellenbosch). The following year, in the Kaup, some Khoisan made a night attack on several 
farm houses. Jacob Joubert's house was riddled with arrows, three of his servants killed and 900 
of his sheep stolen. The local trekboers were forced into a temporary evacuation of the area but a 
conunando, led by Van Jaarsveld, killed ninety-two Khoisan in retaliation.129 
Details of the above events are sparse, since the original reports have not been found, but it may 
readily be seen that the killing of ninety-two Khoisan on a single commando represents a 
significant escalation in the scale and intensity of violence. In April the next year, 1772, a further 
fifty-one Khoisan were shot dead by a conunando after a series of robberies in the Nieuweveld in 
which 102 cattle and 519 sheep were stolen.130 Life in the Cape interior was, therefore, highly 
insecure and it is understandable that people like Oude Jantje Links would lend an ear to Thys' 
bad news. It was not, however, from Thys that Oude Jantje heard of the impending extennination 
of kraal dwelling Khoikhoi but from Johan Jurgen Faber. 
Faber was an illiterate ex-sailor who was working as knecht for Lodewyk Jacobus Theron on a 
fann at the Vis River in the Roggeveld.131 His past experiences as a conunando leader might 
have equipped him to exercise leadership on a small scale but they had not taught him how to act 
wisely. Thus it was that when Faber encountered Oude Jantje on the farm of Cornelis van Wijk 
he took great delight in conveying to him his own version of Thys' news: 
Ja hottentot, soo ik je seg, wat het groote volk docn sal, dan suit jij bcdroeft 
wecsen; waar suit jij dan blijven, want 't groat volk sal al de hottentots die in 't 
Roggeveld zijn schoon maaken laaten, <lat is dood laaten schictcn, en sulx soo 
we! kindcren als groote hottentots mannen en vrouwen.132 
Oude Jantje Links, who had seen at first hand what conunandos could do, returned to the 
Droogeberg a very worried man. He warned those Khoikhoi whom he met of the forthcoming 
attack on the "makkc hottentots" and, from others, received corroboration that the "Bastaard" 
Thys had said the same thing as Faber.133 The stage was set for a bloody tragedy. 
128. CA, CJ 403, Relaas ofOude Jantje Links, pp.447-455. 
129. Faber to Tulbagh, 3 May 1771, in Moodie, The Record, Part Ill, pp. 9-10. 
130. Faber to Van Plettenberg, IO April 1772, in Moodie, The Record, Part Ill, p. 11. 
131. CA C.J. 403, Relaas van Jan Jurgen Faber, p.487. 
132. "Yes Hottentot, if I were to tell you what the big people arc going to do you would be sad, because the big 
people are going to clean up all the Ilottcntots in the Roggevcld, that is shoot them dead, children as well as adults, 
men and women." CJ\ C.J. 403, Rclaas van Oudc Jantjc Links, pp.447-455. 
133. Ibid. 
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The rumour, borne by Toontje, travelled from the "voorste" Roggeveld farm of Christoffel van 
Wijk's widow to the "agter" Roggeveld fann where Nicolaas Muller presided. Once it reached his 
Khoikhoi shepherds they decided to desert forthwith and make their way to a cave which they 
knew of in a rock face beyond the farm. There were ten of them besides Toontje: Klyn Booij, 
Cupido, Spanser, Springveld, Danser, Kromme Ruijter, Fix, Claas, Jantje (or Oude Ruijter) and 
Piet.134 Four of them had muskets and some powder and lead which had been given to them to 
protect themselves from wild animals. They simply abandoned the majority of cattle and sheep 
under their care taking, initially, a mere 250 sheep for their own use. As they proceeded to the 
cave, however, Toontje remembered that he had an old score to settle and, given the 
circumstances, decided that the time had arrived to do so. Whilst Cupido, Spanser and Springveld 
looked after the sheep the other men paid a visit to Johan Hendrik Teutman.135 
Some time before this, Toontje and his brother Kleyn Booij had been busy buying drink from 
Lodewyk de Beer when, engrossed in their transaction, they had allowed their cattle to stray into 
Teutman's garden. The incensed Teutman gave Toontje a blow which the Khoikhoi neither forgot 
nor forgave. It is not clear where this incident took place since De Beer was primarily a 
Bokkeveld fanner and there is no record in the Oude Wildschuttenboeken of Teutman having 
rented a fann at all. From other sources, however, it is clear that Teutman had a fann in the 
Roggeveld very close to Nicolaas Muller. He was described as being a burgher and might have 
been a bijwooner on Van Wijk's land for he was certainly not a knecht.136 
On the April day that Muller's Khoikhoi labourers decided to desert, Teutman, who was fairly 
elderly, was sitting at home whilst his wife and daughter were busy about the house. The men 
suddenly appeared before him and demanded tobacco. Teutman's response was somewhat 
surprising but was indicative of the atmosphere of mistrust which pervaded the Roggeveld: "Jou 
baas soude denken <lat ik met jou lcyden konkclde, ik kan jou geen tabak geeven" .137 Kleyn Booij 
then aimed his musket at Teutman and pulled the trigger: the gun misfired. Fearfully Teutman 
cried out "O God!" but Klcyn Booij hurriedly reloaded and fired again This time Teutman fell 
lifeless to the ground. Danser then shot dead Teutman's wife and, when Tcutman's daughter ran 
from the cook-house to investigate, Kronune Ruijter shot her too. The Khoikhoi dragged the 
134. It is possible that some or these Khoikhoi (Spanscr and Toontje for instance) were the same as those who 
were with the Van Wijks in 1769. Sec p. 191 above. 
135. CJ\ CJ. 403, pp.303-322. 
136. Ibid. 
137. "Your Boss will think that I am plotting with you, I cannot give you any tobacco" Ibid. 
203 
Chapter Five 
bodies outside and dumped them in a nearby river bed. That night the murderers stayed in the 
house.138 
Teutman's Khoikhoi servant, Jantje Reebok, had been away fetching sheep from Willem 
Steenkamp and when he returned later that night he was surprised to find his boss' house 
occupied by Khoikhoi shepherds. His wife, Mary, explained what had happened but since Reebok 
had already heard from Oude Jantje Links, whom he had met on the Droogeberg, that all 
Khoikhoi were to be killed he had no hesitation in joining Toontje's band. The house was stripped 
of weapons, clothes and food and the next morning the group departed for the cave.139 
At the cave they were joined by Cupido, Spanser and Springveld, as well as by their wives and 
children. Soon Oude Jantje Links and his son Kleyn Jantje Links - as well as Oude Dirk and 
Kleyn Dirk - arrived, accompanied by their women and children. A nearby family of independent 
Khoikhoi, who had never lived with the colonists and understood no Dutch, also added their 
numbers to the group so that, eventually, there were over seventy people waiting fearfully in the 
mountain fastness.140 
The site they had chosen was at the top of a steep kloof called, by the Khoikhoi, "Cagang" and 
probably the present day Gannaga Pass.141 Any one attempting to reach the cave would have to 
climb up the kloof in full view of the fugitives. The Khoikhoi defenders also built a stone wall 
across the approach to the cave, from behind which they could safely fire at their enemies. Those 
colonists who were later confronted with the task of stonning the cave regarded it as an 
impossibility.142 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid., pp.320-322. 
140. Ibid.; Relaas van Klijn Booij, Klijn Jantje, Klijn Dirk, Cupido, Spanser, Springveld en Jantje van Tuijtman, 
pp.383-446. 
141. When Thunberg and Masson visited the Roggeveld in 1774 they visited two fanns belonging to the Louws in 
the vicinity of the Gallllaga Pass; "Haartebeestfontein", at the head of the Kookfontcin River, and "Knegts 
Banken", slightly to the north. Both of these belonged to Jacobus Adriaan Louw (though there is some confusion as 
Thunberg refers to both an Adriaan Louw and a Jacobus Louw). It is tempting lo suppose that "Kncgts Banken" 
was the residence of the Louw's knee/II, Nicolaas Muller. Sec Forbes, Thunberg, p.298 and Forbes, Pioneer 
Travellers, p.42. 
142. Ibid., Rclaas van Captain Kees, pp.375-382. In September 1993 I went to search for the cave and found a 
cave in exactly the place where the records suggested it would be, near the lop of the Gannaga Pass. Professor Jolm 
l'arkington, of the Archaeology Department al the University of Cape Town, accompanied me and confinned that 
there were signs of human occupancy in the cave as well as faint painted handprints (usually interpreted as a 
Khoisan sign) on the cave's wall. 
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For about a fortnight, however, nothing much happened. The Khoikhoi fugitives maintained a 
sharp lookout for any signs of activity and kept Nicolaas Muller's farm under observation. 
During this time it does not seem as if the Roggeveld colonists were aware of the Teutmans' 
murder, nor that there was a hostile stronghold within their midst. It was, in fact, the Khoikhoi 
who drew attention to themselves by stealing some more sheep. There was a flock in the vicinity 
being looked after by Januarie, a slave of the Louws who had been appointed by Muller. The men 
debated what should be done with Januarie and decided to kill him since, they argued, if they 
were to be betrayed they would all be killed simply because they were Khoikhoi. Neither 
Christians nor slaves should therefore be spared. The unfortunate Januarie was duly seized and 
despite the fact that he cried out pitifully, "lk heh jouluyden immers geen quaad gedaan!"I43 he 
was stabbed with an assegaai and his throat was cut. His murderers made off with 575 sheep but 
some of the flock returned that night to Louw's house without their shepherd. It was this that 
alerted Muller to the fact that things were far from well in the neighbourhood. Shortly afterwards 
he heard of the murder of the Teutman family whilst a letter came from young Gerrit van Wijk to 
inform him of the news which Thys had been spreading. It was also reported that the fugitives 
were ensconced in a virtually impregnable cave not far from Muller himself. The time had come 
to call for assistance.144 
The local trekboers now felt as insecure as their servants had two weeks before. When they wrote 
to the veldkorporaal of the Agter Roggeveld, Willem van Wijk, who in turn wrote to other 
veldkorporaals further afield, their message was that the Khoikhoi were planning to attack all the 
Roggeveld fanners and murder all the Christians. By the time Lucas Sigismond Faber, the 
landdrost of Stellenbosch, wrote to Acting Governor Van Plettenberg concerning the matter it 
had assumed even more alanning proportions. It was imperative, Faber urged, to send assistance: 
in order to smother in its birth, this murderous and rapacious band, and to stop 
them from the conunission of further excesses, for otherwise the greatest 
mischiefs are to be apprehended, should the said Hottentots, united with the 
Bosjesmans, fall upon the inhabitants of that quarter, of whom three have already 
abandoned their fanns.145 
There was thus a very real fear that the Khoikhoi revolt might be united with San resistance and 
succeed in driving the colonists from the Roggevcld. 
Willem van Wijk believed that only hand-grenades could dislodge the band from their position. 
The govenunent acceded to his request by sending a corporal, together with five grenadiers duly 
143. "I have not <lone any hann to you have I?". lbi<l., p.324. 
144. lbi<l., Rclaas van Nicolaas Muller, pp.351-355. 
145. Faber to Van l'lettenberg, 23 May 1772, in Moodie, The Record, Part Ill, p.11. 
205 
Chapter Five 
equipped with grenades, from the Castle garrison.146 Further reinforcements were sent from 
neighbouring districts until about one hundred men were gathered at Gerrit van Wijk's farm.147 
Before their arrival, however, the Khoikhoi had paid a nocturnal visit to Nicolaas Muller who, 
unlike others, had not abandoned his farm. The rebels' intention was to kill the knecht but their 
resolve was somewhat dampened by a report, from two of the fann's female Khoikhoi (whom 
they had approached for dagga), that Muller had two Dutchmen staying with him. The raiders 
contented themselves with firing thirteen shots at the fannhouse and wounding two horses before 
returning to the cave.148 
As it transpired the hand-grenades were not necessary. The veldkorporaals of the Agter Hex 
River district, Gideon Joubert and Pieter Jacobs, had had the foresight to recruit Captains Kees 
and Bokkebaas of the Gonjemans or Cochoqua Khoikhoi. The Cochoqua had a long history of 
collaboration with the colonists and they undertook, in exchange for being provided with guns, to 
subdue the rebel Khoikhoi of the Roggeveld.149 For the assembled commando beneath the cave 
this was a most agreeable solution for they caimot have relished the prospect of a direct assault 
up the mountainside. Four days after the attack on Muller, Kees, who had accompanied Jacobs 
from the Hex River, was entrusted with thirty guns for his volunteers whilst the rest of the 
conm1ai1do encainped at Jacobus Louw's farm. Stealthily and circuitously the Cochoqua 
approached the kloof, remaining hidden behind rocks during the day and having to go without 
food as a result. At nightfall Kees and his men crept silently up the kloof, managing to reach the 
top without being detected. They then hid themselves close to the cave and waited. I SO 
Next morning, unaware of the danger, eight of the rebel Khoikhoi stepped out of the cave. Their 
plan was to visit the nearby kraal of a certain independent Khoikhoi called Oude Baas, possibly 
with the idea of recruiting him to their ranks. Suddenly Kees ai1d his men sprang from behind the 
rocks and fired a volley of shots at them. Six fell dead - Toontje, Kronune Ruijter, Fix, Jantje 
Hartkop, another Jantje and Claas - whilst Klcjn Dirk and Oude Jantje Links ran back unscathed 
into the shelter of the cave. Captain Kees then called on them to lay down their guns - now 
reduced to three - and surrender. Klcjn Booi and Jantje Links asked for a pardon but Kees 
answered that they would all have to go before the authorities, face charges and make a 
146. O.M. Bergh to W. Van Wyk, 25 May 1772, in Moodie, Tlte Record, Part III, p.12. 
147. CA, CJ 403, Relaas van Schalk Willem Burger, pp.359-366; Relaas van Captain Kees, pp.375-382. 
148. Ibid., pp.324-325; Relaas van Nieolaas Muller, pp.351-355; Relaas van Klijn Jantje, pp.395-402. 
149. Faber to Governor, 26 June 1772, in Moodie, Tlte Record, Part III, p.13 and p 107, n.; CA, CJ 403, Relaas of 
Captain Kees, pp.375-382. See Elphick, Kltoikltoi, pp. 133-134 for details of earlier Cochoqua collaboration. 
150. CA, CJ 403, pp.327-328; R.claas van Captain Kees, pp.375-382. 
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declaration. Sixty-two men, women and children were taken prisoner but one "young clever 
fellow" managed to escape. Four hundred sheep were recovered.151 
The captives were taken to the farm of the widow of Adriaan Louw (i.e. Muller's farm) whilst 
Kees and his men fired a salvo of ten shots to signal their success. The waiting commando 
thereupon descended from the heights, where they had been observing proceedings from a safe 
vantage point, and the prisoners were escorted to Cape Town. Danser, who had been the one to 
kill Teutman's wife, died along the way and it is tempting to speculate that certain members of the 
conunando treated him too roughly.152 
On their arrival in Cape Town the prisoners were observed by the Swedish botanist Thunberg 
who was, at that time, resident in the town. Thunberg mistakenly believed that "these Hottentots 
were Boshiesmen", and that they had, moreover, devastated two villages and defended themselves 
by "rolling large stones down upon their enemies", but he was probably only repeating the 
exaggerated beliefs of the excited populace. Despite these errors he did report some information 
that does ring true: 
They did not deny their crimes, but asserted that they acted so in their own 
defence, the Europeans making every year fresh encroachments upon their lands 
and possessions, and forcing them continually further up into the country, 
whence they were driven back again by the other Hottentots, or else killed.153 
It is these "other Hottentots" who were "Boshiesmen" and not the woeful band of nine and fifty 
captives brought in irons to Cape Town. 
Thunberg has left us an eye-witness description of them which reveals, amongst other things, the 
extent to which European apparel had failed to conquer the Roggeveld by 1772. They were: 
... of a dark brown complexion, some of whom were naked, wearing only a band 
around their waists, which covered the pudenda before. Others wore, hanging 
loose over their shoulders, a sheep's skin, the ends of which scarcely met before, 
the upper part going, like a calash, over the head. The women had their little ones 
hanging behind on their shoulders; and girls eleven or twelve years of age had 
already children. The women were adorned with car-rings, and broad rings of 
metal round their wrists. Their mouths and cheekbones were very prominent, so 
that they bore the strongest resemblance imaginable to apes. After these 
151. lbi<l. 
152. lbi<l. 
15 3. Forbes, ( c<l. ), 1111111berg, pp.46-4 7. 
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Hottentots had been in prison for some time at the Cape, they lost their colour, 
and became almost white.154 
The male prisoners, in fact, had to wait until the end of October before they came to trial. The 
women and children were placed "among such of the inhabitants as will take any of them into 
service, for their food".155 The "Bastaard" Thys also had to stand trial, for the authorities 
believed that he had declared that he had orders to murder all the Khoikhoi of the Roggeveld 
personally. This seems an unlikely thing for Thys to have said and it was probably yet a further 
distortion of the truth. This did not deter the Council of Justice from doing its utmost to establish 
the network of transmission which led to and from Thys. By discovering the source of the rumour 
and silencing it they hoped to remove the possibility of future rebellion. In this they were acting 
like rulers throughout history who, when faced with rebellion, believed that it must have been 
caused by rumour and that behind the rumour was some conspiracy. Though we have seen that 
rumours do not cause rebellion the authorities were correct to regard it as dangerously subversive 
and their attempts to suppress it are therefore understandable. It is distinctly possible that in their 
search for certainty and their determination to pin the source of the rumours on to one man the 
Council of Justice greatly simplified the story and the role of Thys may not have been as 
prominent as the records suggest. Rumours are not spread by one person alone and Thys, on trial 
for his life, was desperate to inculpate others in the chain of voices. 
As it was, Pieter van Heerden, the man who had first frightened Thys with threats of an 
annihilating conunando, denied ever having mentioned such a thing.156 Jan Faber also denied 
having said a similar thing to Oude Jantje Links although the Khoikhoi insisted that, not only had 
he said it, but that he had said it in the presence of Cornelis van Wijk. Van Wijk denied this 
whilst Faber asserted that he had never set eyes on Oude Jantje Links in his life. The latter 
statement was somewhat invalidated by Oude Jantje Link's ability to identify Faber when the 
court put him to the test. The Council of Policy did not, however, feel that it could accept the 
word of a Khoikhoi against that of two Europeans and neither Thys nor Oude Jantje Links were 
belicved.157 
154. It is interesting to note that this description, a classic example of the presentation of the "Other", ends with 
the insight that European institutions, in this case imprisonment, can actually physically whiten (i.e. read "civilise") 
savages. Ibid., p.47. See also p.143. 
155. O.M. Bergh to Landdrost of Stellenbosch, 28 June 1772 and Faber to the Governor, 29 June 1772, in Moodie, 
The Record, Part III, p.14. 
156. CA, CJ 403, pp.330-331. 
157. CA, CJ 403, pp.332-333, 492-493. Sec W. Dooling, Law and Community, for oilier examples of the relative 
weighting of the testimonies of Khoikhoi versus European in court. 
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Sentence was passed on 31 December l 772. Kleyn Booi was bound to a cross and "broken 
thereon alive, from under upwards, with the coup de grace". Kleyn Jantje Links, who was deemed 
to have held Januarie, the slave, whilst Fix and Jantje Hartkop killed him, was hanged. Their 
bodies were left to rot in the open. Kleyn Dirk, Cupido, Spanser, Springveld, Jantje Reebok and 
Oude Jantje Links were all severely flogged but the first four of these prisoners suffered the 
further punishment of having their achilles tendons cut out and being sentenced to a life of hard 
labour at the Company's slave lodge. Thys was sentenced to ten years hard labour on the public 
works at Robben Island whilst Dikkop and Frederick, two of the independent non-Dutch speaking 
Khoikhoi, were released "without expense or injury" .158 
It may be instructive, at this point, to compare and contrast the Roggeveld rebellion with that of 
Estienne Barbier.159 Barbier was a remarkably literate man and written documents played a 
crucial part in the rebellion which he led even though many of his followers were themselves 
illiterate. There was no question of anonymity in the Barbier rebellion since virtually every 
insurrectionary statement could be traced back to an identifiable source - Barbier himself. 
Ultimately, this narrow, personal focus was probably responsible for the limited success and 
appeal of Barbier's rebellion. Would-be insurgents may have thought twice about joining a cause 
so intimately linked to the figure of a disgraced and outlawed sergeant. The close identification 
between Barbier, the man, and the issues which he championed also worked to the advantage of 
the authorities since it enabled them to target Barbier, rather than the real grievances, as the 
source of trouble. The transitivity of his message was also affected by his insistence on 
documenting his case with letters, written statements and proclamations. There was little room for 
ambiguity in Barbier's denouncements and public circulating letters couched, as they were, in 
semi-legalistic language. It is very likely that, by being too specific in some matters, Barbier 
limited his appeal. The authorities understood him only too well and by intercepting and 
restricting the flow of his documents prevented his message from reaching a wider contemporary 
audience (though not, paradoxically, from reaching posterity). 
What sort of impact did the Roggeveld rebellion have? If the authorities hoped that the harsh 
punishments they meted out would have an exemplary effect and discourage future rebellions they 
were to be disappointed: they were already too late. The Roggevcld rebellion seems to have 
inspired a similar episode - though on a smaller scale - in the Hantam. As early as June 1772, in 
158. Exlracl or lhe Journal, 31 Dec. 1772, anJ Abslracl or Convictions before lhc Court or Justice in lhe Castle or 
lhc Cape of Good I lope, 1769-1782, in MooJic, 711e /?ecord, Part Ill, p.17 anJ pp. I U(J-107 
159. Sec pp.102-126 above. 
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the very same letter in which Landdrost Faber reported the capture of the Roggeveld rebels to the 
governor, he noted that "another gang of Hottentots" had attacked the farmer Christian Bock in 
the Hantan1.l60 The incident bore many resemblances to the attack on Teutman. The "hottentot 
Claas", who had resided with Bock for some time, together with some accomplices, attempted to 
set fire to Bock's house whilst he was sleeping. Despite the fact that poisoned arrows were fired 
at him Bock seized a gun and put his assailants to flight. Claas was eventually captured, flogged, 
branded, riveted in chains and sent to labour for life on Robben Island.161 
Apart from this small flicker of sympathetic insurgency the Roggeveld rebellion seems to have 
had little impact outside of the Roggeveld. Like all pre-literate rural uprisings localism limited the 
boundaries of widespread, united action. This was particularly true in the vast, isolated terrain of 
the Roggeveld where, even today, human settlements are few and far between. Though the 
rebellion was crushed the conditions which caused it remained and were far from being localised. 
The situation of Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" servants, in fact, continued to worsen throughout the 
entire frontier zone. In these circumstances resistance, if not rebellion, was bound to be 
widespread and it manifested itself in desertion. Quite how many Khoikhoi servants joined the 
ranks of San resisters at this stage (thereby forsaking "secondary" for "primary" resistance) must 
remain unknown. But we must assume that, in some cases, the primary resistance of the San 
became merged with the secondary resistance of the Khoikhoi and resulted in what should 
properly be called Khoisan resistance. Certainly, after 1772, attacks against the trekboers were 
so intense that clearly a military crisis had arrived. Together with the already existing 
environmental crisis of the northern Cape frontier zone this would herald a new era: an era 
dominated by the institution of the commando. 
160. Faber to Governor, 26 June 1772, in Moo<lie, 11,e Record, Part III, p.13. 
161. lbi<l.; also Faber lo Governor, 20 Ocl. 1772 an<l Extract or lhe Journal 31 Dec. 1772, in Moo<lie, 11,e Record, 
Part ill, pp.17-18. 
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Commandos and the San, c.1770-c.1800 
PASTORALISM AND THE COMMANDO SYSTEM 
The growing competition for, and deterioration of, the natural resources of the Cape interior had 
reached crisis proportions by the beginning of the 1770s. Conflict between colonial frontiersmen 
and the Khoisan was to rage unabated to the end of the century and was to have a profound effect 
on societies both within and beyond the colonial frontier. Indeed it is almost impossible to 
separate violence conunitted outside the boundaries of the colony from the violence which, 
increasingly, came to permeate relationships between colonists, "Bastaard-Hottentots" and 
Khoisan within the colony. The best way to focus on this interplay is to concentrate on the 
institution which linked the interior to the exterior and was, in itself, the most important 
institution of the frontier zone: I the conunando. 
Although the conunando was ostensibly a military institution, designed for the defence of 
trekboer society and for the destruction of its foes, it came to play a vital role in the trekboer 
economy. The military power of the commando system served the essential purpose of enabling 
the pastoralist economy of the trekboers to expand. Without the ability to appropriate more land, 
water and grazing for the increasing flocks and herds of its members a pastoralist society is 
doomed to stagnation or decline. Without the means to protect livestock against predators, both 
human and animal, there could be no increase in the first place. At its most simple level, 
therefore, the conunando was the military institution of a pastoralist society. 2 
The connections between commandos, pastoralism and the trekboer economy caimot, however, be 
dealt with so briefly. If we wish to understand why conunandos became such an integral part of 
the trekboer economy, and what their exact role was within it, we need to consider the dynamics 
of pastoral production in closer detail. Only then will it become clear why it was that conunandos 
played a structural part in the trekboer economy and only then will we be able to understand why 
the frontier zone was so violent. 
I. IL was Legassick who described the commando as the major institution of the open frontier zone. Legassick, 
"The northern frontier zone to 1820", in Elphick and Giliomee, (eds.), Shaping, I st cd , p.247. 




It is an important feature of nomadic pastoralism that production, apart from being primarily for 
subsistence, is based on the domestic unit, and that the distinctive fonu taken by the community is 
realised at the level of the domestic unit. In both Khoikhoi and trekboer societies the typical unit 
of production was the family group consisting of a man, his wife, unmarried children and perhaps 
some servants. Such a unit was basically a unit of kinship and its influence could be enlarged into 
a patrilineal extended family unit which included three generations within its nexus. Within such 
a domestic group there was a close correlation between the number of cattle or sheep a man could 
own and the availability of the labour (the size of his family) at his disposal. In other words in 
nomadic pastoralist societies the conditions of herd and family reproduction are parallel.3 
Nomadic pastoralism requires labour for the control of selective breeding of the stock, for 
guarding the stock against thieves and predators, for watering it, milking it etc. Conversely the 
family or labourers are dependent on the reproduction of their stock for their subsistence. Thus 
fluctuations in the size of either a man's flock or family are crucial for the reproduction of both. 
In order to guarantee this reproduction on the domestic level, notions of kinship and alliance are 
utilised by pastoralists but these involve the domestic group with other groups (particularly 
through marriage) and through them with the community as a whole. As Bonte says: 
The reproduction of a domestic unit ultimately appears inseparable from that of 
the set of domestic units constituting a conuuunity. Or rather, the reproduction of 
domestic units is simultaneously the reproduction of the relations between these 
different units defining the fonu of conuuunity production.4 
The community plays an essential role in acquiring natural resources for its composite group, 
resources which they would be incapable of acquiring for themselves and which are essential for 
the reproduction of the community as a whole. When conditions are favourable for the 
reproduction of both man and beast there is an increase in the size of both the family and the 
flocks and herds of the pastoralists. Since any given area of land has only a finite carrying 
capacity and resource range the need arises for more land to become available to the conununity. 
There is, however, no such thing as unoccupied land and the expansion of a pastoralist society is 
invariably at the expense of other groups, usually either pastoralists or hunter-gatherers. It is here 
that the larger social group achieves, by conquest, what the individual domestic groups could not 
achieve on their own. 
3. Lefebure, "Nomadic Pasloralist Sociclics", p.3. 
4. 13onte, "Non-stratified Social Fonnalions", p.180. 
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This process of expansion is the effect of growth within the domestic units and for as long as 
growth continues there must be expansion. If expansion is not possible, the result would be 
tensions within the domestic units which would, in tum, alter the very basis of production. In 
pastoralist societies these tensions are shifted from the domestic level to the community level and 
become a political problem.5 The process of expansion is usually spearheaded by sons who find it 
necessary to leave the domestic group of their fathers because of the declining resources of the 
parent area, the increase of their own stock or simply the desire for independence. Even if a 
nomadic pastoralist society is not strong enough to conquer the territory of its neighbours, the 
institutionalisation of warfare and raiding is an essential mechanism for reducing tensions at the 
domestic level. There are some writers who regard warfare and raiding as being structural to 
nomadic pastoralist societies.6 Despite the fluctuating fortunes of war its institutionalisation 
allows elders to discipline younger men. If a raid is successful there is the prospect of increased 
herds, labour or even land. If a raid is unsuccessful at least it reduces some domestic tensions by 
reducing the number of sons. Participation in a war party is also seen as being an important rite 
of passage, whereby boys become men. Such patterns of raiding seem to have been the norm 
amongst the pre-colonial Khoikhoi and Smith has noted that the attempts of the VOC to interfere 
with this process was a contributory factor in the disruption of Khoikhoi society.? Whatever 
balance of power had existed between Khoikhoi groups in different areas it was completely 
altered once the trekboers, a new and more powerful pastoralist society, arrived. 
Some type of military organisation is thus crucial for the survival of a nomadic pastoralist society 
and it is obvious that the trekboers had developed their own: the commando. Though its origins 
were rooted in the requirements of pastoralist production it also had features which linked it to the 
three different modes of production found within the frontier zone. Thus, at its simplest level of 
organisation, the conunando was based heavily on the kin structures inherited from the domestic 
groups. The leaders of the conunando tended to be the heads or important members of large 
kinship groups who could rely on their strong economic and social status within the community, 
as well as a well developed system of kinship alliance, to mobilise the conununity. 
The power of the conunando system, however, far exceeded the potentials of a system based 
solely on kinship. It served both to entrench certain inequalities which existed within the domestic 
units of production and to create a dominated group which was completely excluded from the 
5. Lclcbure, "Nomadic l'astoralist Societies", p.9. 
6. Bonte, "Non-stratilie<l Social Formations", p. 191. 
7. J\.13. Smith, "The Disruption ofKhoi Society", p.18. 
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political sphere and subject to increasing exploitation. It is a commonly held belief that nomadic 
pastoralist societies are egalitarian since there is supposedly a rough economic and political 
equality between members of the society. As Lefebure points out, this alleged equality applies to 
heads of domestic units only and not to individuals like women, young men and servants. 
Moreover, a domestic unit which has more offspring (more labour), better leadership, or more 
capable family members within it, will not be the equal of a domestic group not similarly 
blessed.8 But even approximate parity between domestic units is altered once a politico-military 
system like the commando is established. Those groups which are able to exercise leadership 
within the conunando are able to achieve far greater control over conununal resources (grazing, 
water), livestock, and labour than weaker groups.9 
Though such inequalities were enhanced by the conunando system they were nothing compared to 
the inequalities which existed between the conununity from which the commando originated and 
those conununities whose interests it did not represent. During the eighteenth century it became 
possible to speak of a dominating and a dominated class in the northern Cape and it was the 
conunando that helped to structure these classes. Although one of the commando's functions was 
to conquer land for the expansion of trekboer society, its other function was to create and 
maintain conditions that were favourable for the extraction of surplus labour from those people 
whose land had been conquered. This was initially achieved through the exercise of power and 
domination - a political as opposed to an economic process - and the resultant relations of 
production may be described as being tributary. By this it is meant that the primary producers 
were left access to the means of production whilst tribute (in this case usually labour) was 
extracted from them by political or military means. 
It has already been explained how it is possible for tributary relations of production to c.o.-exist 
with other relations of production within pastoralist societies and within an open frontier zone. It 
should not surprise us therefore to observe that domestic relations, slave relations, and relations 
whereby labour was remunerated either with services or in kind, even in cash, occurred 
simultaneously in the northern Cape frontier zone. As the frontier experienced increasing closure 
though, so too did the relations of production change and the Khoikhoi were increasingly divorced 
from the means of production. 
8. Lclcburc, "Nomadic Pastoral Societies", p.6. 
9. Lclcbure, "Nomadic Pastoral Societies", p. 9; Bonte, "Non-stratified Social Fonnations", p. 189. 
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Throughout the period under consideration the situation of the Khoisan deteriorated as the 
conunando determined the truly vital issues - such as who owned the land and under what 
conditions, and who should labour for whom and under what circumstances. It was the 
conunando that conquered grazing and water sources for the trekboers, that won or recaptured 
livestock, and that detern1ined whether family labour was to be retained or appropriated by 
someone else. These issues were invariably decided to the detriment of the Khoisan for, with their 
largely kin-based structures and their lack of guns and horses, they were never able to develop an 
adequate response to the conunando system. Firepower and horses had given the trekboers an 
overwhelming military advantage from the very beginning of their contact with their primitively 
armed and pedestrian competitors. As Goldschmidt notes: "It is difficult an10ng pedestrian stock 
owners to establish a means of exploiting the labour of others on a mass scale". IO It was both 
Company and trekboer policy to ensure that guns, anununition and horses remained a preserve of 
the colonists but in order to increase the strength of the conunando, Khoikhoi, "Bastaard-
Hottentot" and "Bastaard" auxiliaries were forced to undertake commando duty. Once such 
disaffected members of colonial society decided to use their skills and weapons against the 
trekboers the conunando system ceased to be solely a colonial institution. In time, as we shall see, 
these extra-colonial commando groups would put an end to further trekboer expansion in the 
north-western regions of the frontier zone. It should also be noted that the privileged access which 
the trekboers had to the south-western Cape, with its conunodities and agricultural products, also 
tipped the balance against the indigenous population who lacked such access. 
In the early phase of frontier expansion we have seen how many of the Khoikhoi were deprived of 
their livestock through the most simple operation of primitive accumulation; namely, robbery. In 
these circumstances a colonist who allowed the head of a Khoikhoi domestic unit to retain his 
flocks and herds (already depleted by robbery and disease) would appear as akin to a benefactor. 
Such a colonist would, however, lay claim to the best pasturage and water resources of the area 
and the access to these would be denied to the Khoikhoi unless he and his followers were 
prepared to act as drovers or shepherds for the new master of the land. Initially, this arrangement 
had offered the Khoikhoi some security and even some wages. By the 1770s, however, with the 
institutionalisation of the conunando, it became virtually impossible for the Khoikhoi to retain 
even a vestige of their own livestock since, with limited access to essential resources and 
decreasing control over the labour of their own family members (which was appropriated by the 
trekboers) their herds and flocks could no longer reproduce themselves. In addition the Khoikhoi 
10. W. Goldschmidt, "A General Model for Pastoral Social Systems", iu L'equipe ecologic ct anthropologie Jes 
Socictes Pastornles, (eds.), Pastoral Production and Society, p. 23. 
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found it increasingly difficult to extract either their wages or their original livestock from the 
protective custody of their masters. Even personal freedom of movement became more and more 
difficult as the trekboers prevented their Khoikhoi labourers from removing or withholding their 
labour or the labour of their families. In such circumstances the power a trekboer derived from 
his network of kin or commando members determined the amount of labour he could control and 
the degree of exploitation which he could bring to bear on that labour. It has been noted that by 
providing the colonists with livestock as well as supplying the labour required to manage it, the 
Khoikhoi occupied "a position for which there is hardly any parallel in colonial history". I I 
The conuuando system, then, played a major role in determining the social and economic status of 
the various societies of the frontier zone, shaping and structuring the relationships which existed 
between the dominant and the dominated. It was not only Khoikhoi whom it forced into the 
position of unfree labour. Select members of the San societies which opposed the colonial 
advance were taken prisoner and placed as captives within the trekboer economy. Conuuandos 
also ensured the continued subservience of other categories of labour within the colony who might 
otherwise have rejected the conditions of their employment. "Bastaard-Hottentots" and slaves 
realised that commandos did not only operate beyond the borders of the colony but policed the 
populace within. The conunando system was the institution through which colonial power was 
manifested and, more fundamentally, the institution which defined one's place within the colonial 
order. 
In this regard 1774 is an important date, for it is the date of the General Conunando, an event 
which marked the transition of the conunando from being a rather ad hoc military response by 
frontier stock-farmers to being a fully fledged, govenunent-approved system of colonial 
domination. It was during the 177 Os that many of the characteristic structures and features of the 
commando were perfected. The details and events surrounding the General Conunando are 
tlierefore of considerable interest for they ushered in a new era on the frontier and helped forge an 
institution which was to cast a long shadow across South African history. By focusing on the 
years surrounding and succeeding the General Conunando it will be possible to illuminate many 
of the social, political and economic developments taking place in the frontier zone. Apart from 
anytl1ing else these years were also of crucial military significance and occupied the central place 
in what was, after all, a bloody and protracted frontier war. The responses of trekboer, Khoikhoi, 
"Bastaard-Hottentot" and San societies during the era of the General Commando are vital parts of 
I I. Ncumark, Economic Injl11e11ces 011 the South Aji-ica11 Frontier, pp. I 75-6. 
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the story, for whether people chose to resist or collaborate with the conmmndo system its 
transforming power could not be denied. 
COLONIAL AUTHORITY AND THE GENERAL COMMANDO OF 1774 
The intensified Khoisan resistance of the years 1770 to 1772 was most alarming and posed a 
considerable challenge to the existing commando system but, as long as the colonial frontier 
continued to advance, the crisis could be postponed. By 1772 it was clear, for both environmental 
and military reasons, that there could be no further colonial advance beyond the Hantam and the 
Roggeveld.12 There was still, however, the possibility of expansion in a north-easterly direction 
and there was indeed a strong movement towards the east amongst the pioneers of the colonial 
frontier in the opening years of the 1770s. But this safety valve did not remain open for long. 
By 1770 trekboers had entered the regions of the Camdeboo, Bruintjies Hoogte and the Fish 
River. As the authorities began to receive reports of the extent to which the colonists had 
advanced (and of their rather improper conduct in these remote regions) they began to take steps 
to contain further expansion in this direction.13 In this the government was motivated by its 
perennial desire for greater control over its subjects. It was well aware of the fact that the Xhosa 
lay to the east and wished to prevent the trekboers from entering their territory. If this were 
allowed to take place it would inevitably give rise to disputes over land and cattle. As it was, the 
Company was distressed to learn that substantial numbers of colonists had already been engaged 
in bartering cattle from the Xhosa, contrary to its strict edict of 1739, and that a well-beaten 
wagon track led from the district of Swellendam to Xhosa territory. Many colonists, furthennore, 
had been grazing their cattle in these distant parts without paying any rental to the Company for 
loan-farms. The govenunent's response was to forbid any colonist from crossing the Gamtoos 
River and to repeat its previous prohibition, on pain of death, on bartering cattle from the 
Khoikhoi or Xhosa. The boundary between the districts of Stellenbosch and Swellendam was 
more clearly defined but no attempt was made to define the boundaries of the colony in either a 
northerly or north-easterly direction. Instead, the authorities approved of the occupation of the 
Camdeboo and of the mountains - dubbed the Buslunan Mountains - which lay to the north-east. 
The reasoning behind this was that the area had "no other inhabitants than wild Buslunen and 
Hottentots, who possess no cattle, and who must subsist solely by the game in the fields, and 
12. Sec chapter 5 above. 
13. Report of Landdrosts and Commissioned llccmradcn or Stellenbosch and Swcllcndam, 7 Feb. 1770, in Moodie, 
71,e Record, Prt. 111. pp. l-4. 
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therefore on that side also no evil is to be apprehended".14 Nothing could have been further from 
the truth. 
Environmentally the areas beyond the Camdeboo - the Sneeuberg and Bruintjies Hoogte - were 
far more attractive than the Karoo. The country was rich in grass and the colonial authorities 
might well have pondered why such a favourable region was devoid of either Khoikhoi or Xhosa 
pastoralists. The reason was that the San were stronger around the Sneeuberg than they were in 
any other region of the Cape and the entry of trekboers into the region was to inaugurate the most 
violent period in the colony's history.15 This was not, however, apparent to the authorities in 
1770 and they argued that since the colonists were bound to move there anyway the Company 
might as well be paid rental. Although Governor Tulbagh was sufficiently scrupulous to stipulate 
tlmt only persons of good name and repute should be allowed to settle on the remote fanns this 
was hardly an enforceable proviso and in no way guaranteed that conflict between the colonists 
and the San would be avoided.16 The entry of the trekboers into the Camdeboo had, in any event, 
coincided with the upsurge of Khoisan resistance in the Koup, the Nieuweveld and the Roggevcld 
and tl1e San of the Sneeuberg can hardly have been unaware of the nature of the struggle further 
to the west. They can not have been well disposed to the entry of strangers into their territory and, 
as Colonel Collins perceptively noted in 1809, "the persons who were first obliged to seek a 
residence in such a country as Camdeboo, were destitute of the qualifications necessary to remove 
those unfavourable impressions" .17 
What Collins was suggesting was that it was a fairly hardened type of frontier farn1er who dared 
to be at the expanding edge of the colonial frontier. Figures for loan-farm allocation in the 
Camdeboo and Sneeuberg districts indicate that tl1ere was a considerable influx into these regions 
within a very short space of time. Between 25 May 1770 and 5 August 1773, l 09 fanns were 
granted in the Camdeboo and Sneeuberg out of a total of 192 granted in the northern frontier zone 
as a whole.IS This invasion was not unopposed by the Swy ei, the Sneeuberg San, and by 1773 
their resistance had prevented any further advances in the north-eastern sections of the northern 
frontier zone. The colonial frontier, as a whole, had ceased to advance whilst Khoisan resistance 
14. Ibid; also Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.4-7. The height at the eastern end of the Bosjesmans Mountains 
became known as De Brnyns Hoogte - later Bruntj ies 1-Ioogtc - aficr one of U1e boundary conunissioners. 
15. Sec chapter 5 above for details concerning the distribution of the Khoisan of the interior. 
16. Extract of Resolution of Council, 13 Feb. 1770, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.5 
17. Collins, Supplement to U1c relations of a Journey inlo the Country of the Bosjesman and Calfre People, in 
Moodie, 71,e Record, !'rt. V, p.9. 
18. These figures are based on a study of the loan-Cann records, CA, RLR 21-22. 
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had become so widespread and intense as to threaten the continued existence of the trekboer 
economy. The situation demanded extraordinary countermeasures. 
Veldkorporaal Adriaan van Jaarsveld was one of those who had moved eastwards from the Koup 
in 1770. In April 1773 he reported from the Sneeuberg that the attacks of the San had never 
before been as bad as they had been in the last eight months. He explained that the summer 
favoured the San, for the rains hindered the colonists by affecting their firepower and tracking 
abilities whilst making it unnecessary for the San to light tell-tale fires against the cold. Van 
Jaarsveld complained that losses in livestock had become intolerable to both the innermost and 
outern1ost farn1ers since no animals were ever recovered alive from a robbery, being found 
slaughtered instead. He urged that the colonists in his district be allowed to attack the San and 
destroy them in the winter, when they would be obliged to give away their positions by lighting 
fires.19 A similar request for action came from the Hantam and Roggeveld districts and on 28 
December an important meeting of the combined Boards of the Landdrost and Heemraden and 
the Krygsraad met to discuss the crisis.20 The solution, it seemed, was to organise a conunando 
of such magnitude and scale that it would crush all Khoisan resistance throughout the length and 
breadth of the northern frontier zone. It would be, if not total war, a general conunando. 
It was apparent that the trekboers of the frontier zone were relying on the authorities to provide 
them with the necessary support, in leadership and material, to put an end to Khoisan resistance. 
For their part the authorities did not question this objective for a moment and saw their function 
as being "to concert ... the measures whereby the said robberies of the Bosjesmans Hottentots 
might be resisted, those villains attacked upon all sides in their dens, and, if possible, reduced to a 
permanent peace" .21 The implications of this are that the Company realised that its interests 
would best be served by the continued expansion of the trekboer frontier. There was, no 
suggestion that the reasons for Khoisan resistance should be investigated. Instead the committee 
concerned itself with the practicalities of waging war and in organising a General Conm1ando. 
One of the first actions of the authorities was to appoint a supreme conunander, or veld 
commandant, to lead the forthcoming conunando. The man chosen was Rudolph Gottlieb 
19. CA, Colonial Oflice (hereafter CO) 6127 Morn.lie's Lists of Official Documents, 1737-1837. Second 
Supplement to Papers relating to Buslunen. 1769-1785. Van Jaarsveld to Landdrost, 30 April 1773; see also 
Moodie, 711e Record, Prt.111, p.33. 11. l. and p.65 11. I. 
20. CA, C 655 Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1771-1779, Combined Meeting of Landdrost and 
Heemraden, and Militia Ollicers, 28 Dec. 1773; also Moodie, Tlte Record, !'rt. 111, pp.19-20. 
21. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.20. 
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Oppennan who, despite the accusations which had been brought against him in 1750, was 
considered to embody "the necessary discretion and the greatest share of fitness and vigilance" .22 
It should be noted, however, that Oppennan was chosen only after consultation with the other 
veldkorporaals and to this extent owed his appointment not so much to Company decree as to the 
approbation of his peers. No doubt he possessed "a due knowledge of the constitution of the 
country, the condition of the inhabitants and the character of the Hottentots" but these very 
virtues made him a frontiersman rather than a Company man.23 
The question of leadership on the General Conunando serves to highlight one of the central 
paradoxes of the commando system in the late eighteenth century: at the same time as the state 
sought to exercise greater control over the frontier zone, through the organisation and provision 
of conunandos, it was obliged to surrender substantial power to local conunando leaders. In the 
early years of the eighteenth century conunando leaders were appointed by the VOC from officers 
of the garrison. But as the Company lost control over the ever-expanding frontier, the commando 
leaders, though appointed by the Company, were drawn from amongst the frontier farmers 
themselves.24 The Company simply acknowledged the existing leader of a frontier conununity. 
The Company had always regarded the colonists as being eligible for military service and in times 
of war it was envisaged that the burghers would rally to the defence of the state. The principle of 
compulsory amrnal military drill in Cape Town or Stellenbosch, with target practice and weapons 
inspection, should remind us that, initially, the early colonists had been discharged Company 
soldiers who owed the duty of military service to their govemment.25 Developments in the colony 
might have led to the unexpected situation whereby the Company was having to come to the aid 
of the colonists (rather than the other way round) but at least structures of command and habits 
of obedience were in place. With the resources and authority of the state behind it the conunando 
system could deliver far more power than a system of local defence based solely on kinship ties. 
The trouble was that once this system was placed in the hands of a local fanner he gained power, 
often at the Company's expense. Whoever controlled the conunando became immensely influential 
for he could dispense vital supplies of gun-powder and shot or allocate captives as labourers. The 
conunando leader could also enforce attendance on a conunando or demand provisions from non-
participants. The area of operation and the time and duration of the campaign were also 
22. Sec chapter 5 above for Oppennan's 1750s escapades. 
23. CA, C 655, Meeting of Combined Boards, 28 March 1774; also Moodie, 71,e Record, Prt. 1 I 1, pp.22-23. 
24. Sec chapter 2 above for details concerning early conunandos at the Cape; also Roux, "Verdedigingstelscl", 
pp.129-58. 
25. Roux, pp. 50-55, 64-65. 
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leadership decisions. Clearly the potential existed for a local commando leader to become a law 
unto himself. Increasingly, this potential would be realised, though there were very real local 
constraints on the powers of commando leaders as well as on the power of the govenuuent.26 
This becan1e apparent when the proposed unitary leadership of the General Commando was 
undennined by the sheer vastness of the area of operations. The available force of 250 men had to 
be divided into three separate units to campaign in three different areas under three different 
leaders. The first, under Oppennan, was to operate from the districts of the Swartenberg, 
Camdeboo, Sneeuberg, Nieuweveld and Koup. The second was to operate from the Middle and 
Klein Roggeveld and the Bokkeveld under the conunand of the veldkorporaals Nicolaas van der 
Merwe and Pieter Jacobs. The third was to operate from the Onder Bokkeveld, the Hantam, the 
Groot Roggeveld and the Olifants River under the veldkorporaals Gerrit van Wijk and Willem 
Steenkamp .27 
It was also evident that leadership of a commando was not always a sought-after position. The 
impending General Commando and the prospect of hard work and danger prompted many of the 
thirteen veldkorporaals to tender their resignations.28 Their office often exposed them to danger 
and required them to marshal their subordinates for conunando duty - not always a popular task. 
Whilst this could enhance a man's local standing it could also make him unbearably unpopular. 
With this in mind the Landdrost, Heemraden and Krygsraad officers suggested promoting the 
veldkorporaals to the rank of veldwagtmeester or sergeant. Along with this promotion, however, 
went increased responsibility as the veldwagtmeesters were expected to submit biammal reports 
to the commandant (himself promoted to the rank of cornet) and triammal reports to the 
landdrost on the number of men in their district, the changes of residence that might occur, the 
number of young men eligible for military drill at the Cape and, in general, all that might be of 
interest in their district.29 
It may be seen from the above that the Company hoped to use the General Conunando, and its 
essential co-ordinating role therein, to impose its authority throughout the frontier districts. In the 
long run such control was beyond the Company's reach for the structures of command that were 
created served to bolster the authority of the veldwagtmeesters and reduce that of the distant 
26. Sec especially chapter 9 below for the example of how Petrns Picnaar used the office of veldwagtmeester lo 
achieve his goals. 
27. CA, C 655, Meeting oflhe Combined Boards, 28 March 1774; Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.22-23. 
28. CA, C 655, 20 Dec. 1774 and 4 April 1775. 
29. CA, C 655, 28 March 1774. 
221 
Chapter Six 
administration. The Company's one trump card was its control of the ammunition supply, though 
it could hardly withhold supplies of powder and shot from its beleaguered subjects.30 By the 
1770s it had become evident that if cheap supplies of meat were to continue to reach Cape Town 
then the trekboers had to be supported in their struggle against the Khoisan. Ultimately, the 
Company had no option but to attempt to strengthen the position of the frontier farmers by 
increasing the efficiency of the conunando system. The more successful they were, however, the 
more likely were the fanners to resent government interference. 
THE SAN AND THE COMMANDOS 
Although the conunando affected the existence of all of the societies of the frontier zone it is true 
to say that its affect was greatest on those societies which it regarded as being its principal 
enemy: the San. Even though the ranks of the San were indeed augmented with Khoikhoi resisters 
this should not obscure the fact that, after 1740, the great brunt of conm1ando activity fell upon 
societies which were, primarily, those of hunter-gatherers. Whilst it is important to realise that 
there are instances where it is probably more correct to speak of Khoisan resistance it is also 
important to acknowledge that a great many of the inhabitants of the arid Cape interior -
"Buslunanland" - were indeed San. No useful purpose will be served by treating all resistance as 
Khoisan resistance and ignoring the great differences which existed between hunter-gatherers and 
pastoralists. The principal antagonists of the conunando era were the trekboers and the San. The 
section which follows attempts to discuss some of the aspects of the bitter struggle which 
developed between them. 
The preparations for the General Commando arc significant because of the light which they throw 
on the "Buslunan" policy of the time. This had an important bearing on the treatment of San 
labourers for the instructions issued to the General Conunando were that those San resisters who 
were not "reduced either to a permanent peace and tranquillity or otherwise entirely subdued and 
destroyed" were to be taken captive. Initially it was ordered that women and defenceless males 
should be spared - the women being released and the young and adult males being given to the 
poorest colonists for a "fixed and equitable term of years". In practice, however, very few adult 
males were ever taken alive and, moreover, it was argued that it was heartless to release widows 
and orphan children. They were to be incorporated into the labour force and the only stipulation 
was that they were to be treated the same as "the other free Hottentots who have entered the 
30. In fad, the Uritish government or 1795 was the first administration of the Cape to withhold ammunition from 
colonists, in this case in order to suppress burgher rebellions in Swellendam and Graan:Reinet. 
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service of our inhabitants for hire", and that they were not to be maltreated, "(as has more than 
once happened with many) and thus excited to wicked revenge" .31 
Captive San were not, as it transpired, treated like other "free Hottentots" but more like 
"ingeboekte Bastaard-Hottentots". Their names and particulars were supposed to be entered in 
special rolls and most were to work for their masters until they were eighteen years of age.32 The 
surviving rolls date from 1776 to 1803 and list a total of 258 child captives officially recorded 
during this period. These figures need to be regarded as quite inadequate for there were many 
more San who were captured by colonists during these years of intense commando activity than 
are recorded here. The General Commando alone took 289 captives and in any given year 
individual commandos would admit to taking far more captives than the numbers entered in the 
/anddrost's lists.33 It is not too difficult to sec that the initial intention of treating captive San as 
"free" Khoikhoi was yet another casualty of the realities of conunando warfare. But nor should it 
be supposed that the commando simply proposed to extirpate the San. Even from this early 
statement of policy it may be seen that, from the General Conunando onwards, conunandos 
would have twin objectives in mind: the crushing of opposition and the acquisition of labour. The 
trekboers had been given carte blanche to pursue their own interests. They could either sweep the 
Khoisan out of their path or incorporate them into their economy as unfree labourers.34 
In so far as competition for land was an issue, the instructions issued to the General Conunando 
were that those San who were disposed to make peace should be "given" "as many farms or tracts 
of country as, without too great injury to our o,,n inhabitants. they may require for themselves or 
for pasture for their cattle" .35 This detail, apart from being one of the earliest examples of official 
"native land policy", reveals that the Company was aware that not all of the resisters were 
cattlcless San. It also reveals how broad and vague were the po,,ers being granted to the 
31. CA, C 655, 19 April 1774. 
32. CA, 1/STB 18/196. 
33. For example, between 1787 an<l 1788, in the eastern <listricts alone, commandos capture<l 112 San ( see p.248 
below). In the "Bosjesmans" lists, however, a mere 2 arc listed for 1787 and 11 for 1788. 
34. There was a lively <lebate between those, like Dr. Jolm Philip, who saw the instructions to the General 
Commando (and later orders of the Council of Policy rcf'crring to the "e:-;tirpation" of the San) as being an order for 
the extennination of the San an<l those, like Moo<lie, who saw the documents as being more contradictory an<l 
nuance<l. Whatever might have been sai<l, however, in practice the commandos took captives in order to create 
unfree labourers. This is a point ma<le quite cearlv by Miklos Szalm·, Eth110/ogie 1111d Gescl,icl,te: Zur 
Gn111d/eg1111g ei11er etl,11ologiscl,e11 Gescl,ic/1ts-sc/1reiln111g mil /Jeispie/e11 011s der Gescl,ichte der Kl10i-Sa11 in 
S11daji·ika (Berlin, 1983), pp.196-198. For the debate between Philip and Moodie see Robert Ross, "Donald 
Moo<lic an<l the Origins of South African l listoriographv", in R. Ross. /Jevo11d Tl,e Pale (Johannesburg, 1994 ), 
pp. 196-208. 
35. Cf\, C 655, 19 /\pril 1774. 
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trekboers to satisfy their own needs. The stated objective of the commando was to re-establish the 
colonists in "their" possessions and to maintain them, if necessary, by "de sterke hand". It was 
hoped that amicable peace negotiations would occur for assorted trinkets were to be taken along 
as well as the copper-headed staffs of office that the Company customarily dispensed to 
subjugated kraal captains. More ominously, leg-shackles and hand-cuffs were also issued. If the 
San were not disposed to accept peace proposals, "and should necessity thus demand that they 
should be entirely subdued and destroyed" it was pennissible to: 
attack and slay them in such a cautious manner, however, that our own 
inhabitants may be as little as possible exposed to danger, and not rashly led to 
slaughter; and also that no blood shall be spilled without absolute necessity, and 
that as much as shall be by any means possible, the women and defenceless 
males shall be spared.36 
The three sections of the General Conunando left, as plam1ed, between August and September in 
1774. These months had been chosen as most suitable for the campaign because in the summer 
there was not enough rain (an indication that most of the veldwagtmeesters came from winter 
rainfall areas) whilst in the winter it was too cold and many rivers were impassable. The situation 
in the Sneeuberg had become even more critical than the year before and Van Jaarsveld had 
reported in June that the colonists there were on the point of abandoning the area because of the 
incessant San attacks. He explained that if the Sneeuberg were abandoned the Camdeboo would 
have to be abandoned as well because the thick bush of the latter region provided excellent cover 
for the San. The best place to fight was therefore in the Sneeuberg and in order to prevent morale-
sapping retreats from the district the trekboers had compensated for individual stock losses by a 
system of group subscription. This policy of conununity assistance, though sorely tested in the 
years ahead, was to be the mainstay of the Sneeuberg fanners as they bore the brunt of San 
resistance.37 
The first section of the General Conunando to leave was that which was under the conunand of 
Nicolaas van der Merwe. It left the Bokkeveld with twenty-seven Europeans and thirty-eight 
Khoikhoi on 16 August. The conunando searched the Middle and Klein Roggeveld but went as 
far east as the Koup and Nieuweveld mountains and as far north as the Sak River. It returned to 
the Bokkeveld on 7 November having destroyed seventeen kraals, killed one hundred and forty-
36. lbi<l. 
37. Van Jaarsvclt to Oppcnnan, 2 June 1774; Van Jaarsvclt to Oppcnnan, 20 June 1774, in Moodie, 'f11e Record, 
!'rt. 111, p. 33, IL I; pp. 65-66, IL 2; Van <lcr Mcrwc, Noordwaartse Beweging, p.12. 
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two people and captured eighty-nine. Only one conunando member was killed, dying nine days 
after being hit by a poisoned arrow.38 
The second section, under the leadership of Gerrit van Wyk, assembled at the Vis River in the 
Roggeveld on 2 September and proceeded to search the region to the north and north-east of the 
Sak River, i.e. Buslunanland. This commando consisted of at least thirty-one Europeans and a 
slightly greater number of Khoikhoi. They killed ninety-six San and captured twenty-one. None of 
this conunando's members was killed though a "Bastaard" had come close to death when an arrow 
pierced his hat.39 
The third section, under Oppennan, left to crush resistance m the Sneeuberg, Camdeboo, 
Nieuweveld and Koup. It killed two hundred and sixty-five San and captured one hundred and 
twenty-nine. Some of the conunando members, including Opperman himself, were wounded but 
none fatally.40 
A closer analysis of these facts and figures is in order for the high ratio of killed to captured 
needs to be explained, particularly in view of the Company's instructions that no blood should be 
spilt without necessity. The insignificant number of colonial casualties also has to be accounted 
for. Similar body-count, casualty and captive ratios were conunon to nearly all subsequent 
commandos and in this respect the General Commando proved to be typical rather than 
exceptional. Most of those captured were women and children. It \\"Ould seem that the majority of 
captives, who were given as labourers to colonial masters, \\"ere children under the age of 
twelve.41 The women were either released or given as wives to the Khoikhoi conunando members. 
Very few men were captured and the inescapable conclusion is that they were killed. Why? 
In most cases the conunandos attacked individual kraals. If one analyses the figures given by 
Nicolaas van der Merwe it can be seen that the average number of people per kraal was just over 
thirteen (13.3). The smallest group consisted of six people and the largest of thirty. This is in 
conformity with an estimate, based on group portraits in the rock art of the south-western Cape, 
38. Report of the Fiel<l-Conunan<lant Nicolaas van <ler Merwe, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp. 35-37. 
39. Journal of the Couunaudo under the Orders ofGcrrit van Wyk, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.37-38. 
40. Extract from Journal Colonial 011ice, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.40. 
41. Sec for instance the list of San capti vcs with their ages an<l the name of the conunan<lo member with whom 
they arc to be placed, which is signed by Nicolaas van dcr Mcrwc an<l <lated I January 1775, addressed from the 
Bokkevcl<l. For some reason, however, it is tiled in CA, I/STD 10/162, Vcl<lwachtmccsters Rapporteu Over 
Boschcsmans Roovcrycn, 1785-1793. 
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of the average group size of a hunter-gatherer band.42 What this meant in military terms, 
however, was that a commando always enjoyed a numerical advantage. Thanks to their Khoikhoi 
scouts and spies, conunandos nearly always achieved the additional advantage of surprise 
through dawn attacks on sleeping encampments. There was, also, the inestimable advantage of 
firearms over stone age weapons and of horses over the umnounted. In these circumstances one 
would have expected rapid surrender but it became a conunonplace of the frontier that the San 
"have never been known to demand quarter in any situation" .43 The journal kept by the 
conunando under Gerrit van Wijk is undramatically explicit on this point. Because of the open 
nature of the country in which Van Wijk's conunando operated it was less easy to take the San by 
surprise for they took refuge amongst rocky koppies and: 
17 Sept...they shot briskly arrows and would not come out when called; shot five 
and took a child. 22 Sept...the Bushmen having ensconced themselves behind the 
fence of a kraal, shot Gerrit Bastert Minie through the hat, therefore shot 8; they 
would accept no peace ... the commandant marched up to the first fire that was 
perceived, and had them called out to make peace, but instead of answering they 
shot their arrows, therefore shot l O .44 
Attempts to find kraal captains with whom to negotiate a peace met with very little success, 
partly because the San did not have "captains" in the sense understood by the Europeans and 
partly because of a deep-rooted determination to reject unequal terms. Nicolaas van der Merwe 
did manage to persuade a certain Joris, from a kraal at the Sak River, to accept a staff of office 
but only after he had been captured.45 Gerrit van Wijk was unable to find any captains to 
negotiate with him since they had all fled into a part of the interior where, for lack of water, his 
conunando could not follow. Oppennan "appointed two Hottentots, who evinced a peaceful 
disposition, Captains over their kraals, giving each of them a copper-headed staff, and presenting 
them with some beads, copper rings and some pounds of tobacco". But peace was not to be 
bought so easily and Opperman must surely have found it ominous that he had to give over to 
Adriaan van Jaarsveld a prisoner whom he would have appointed as kraal captain "but he replied 
that he dared not undertake it, as his tribe would kill him" .46 
42. T. Maggs, "Some Observations on the Size of Human Groups During the Late Stone Age", in M.Schoonraad, 
(ed.), Rock Paintings of Sou them Aji-ica. South African Jou ma/ of Science, Special Issue 2, 1971, pp.49-53. 
43. Collins, Report on the I3osjesmen, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. V, p. 33. 
44. Moodie, The Reconl, Prt. 111, p. 37. 
45. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.37 and 40. 
46. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.37-38, n. pp. 38-39 and p. 40. 
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In most cases, therefore, San men spumed offers of peace and fought to the death, frequently 
displaying incredible heroism. "When a horde is surrounded by the farmers, and little chance is 
perceived by them of effecting an escape, they will fight it out most furiously so long as a man 
shall be left alive" wrote an emissary to the Sneeuberg San in 1797. 
It frequently happens on such occasions that a party will volunteer tl1e forlorn 
hope, by throwing themselves in the midst of the colonists in order to create 
confusion, and to give to their countrymen, concealed among the rocks or in the 
long grass, at the expense of their own lives, an opportunity of exercising more 
effectually their mortal weapons upon their enemies, and at the same time to 
facilitate the escape of their wives and children.47 
The question, however, remains: what was it tl1at provoked such suicidal resistance? On one level 
the intensity of resistance was probably a function of the desperate situation of the San. They 
must have realised that if they lost their country to the colonists their way of life was doomed. 
The more we learn about San culture the more evident it becomes that there was a profoundly 
spiritual connection between particular places and the systems of meaning that the San had 
constructed in order to explain their world. The stories, myths and legends which are contained in 
the Bleek-Lloyd archives bear testimony to the fact that the San's narrative representations of 
reality were,- in some ways, evoked by the landscape itself. Thus, to lose the land was to lose, 
literally, everything.48 On a more mundane level the San were already fighting in territory where 
the envirorunental balance was critical and where retreat could result in an irreplaceable loss of 
resources. The prospect of trekking into increasingly arid areas, or entering the hostile territory of 
Tswana or Xhosa societies, was unappealing. The Xhosa, in particular, were unlikely to 
acconunodate refugee San. "What happens to a Bosjesman-Hottentot who is captured by a 
Hottentot or a Caffer?" asked a Capetonian of a frontiersman in the 1770s, "Is he killed or must 
he work as a slave?". "They kill him, otherwise he would again run away" was the reply.49 
47. Barrow, Travels, p. 286. 
48. W.H.I. Bleek and L. Lloyd, Unpublished Manuscripts, 1866-1877, BC 151, Jagger Library, University of Cape 
Town. TI1e best guides to the symbolism and significance of this material is R.L. Hewitt, Stnicture, Meanings and 
Ritual in the narratives of the Southem San (Hamburg, 1986) and J.D. Lewis-Williams, Believing and Seeing: 
Symbolic meanings in South em San rock art (London, 1981 ). On the San sense of place sec Jolm Parkington, 
"//Kabbo's father's father's place it was: Perceptions of /Xam hunter-gatherers" in P. Skotnes, (ed.), Sound From The 
711i11ki11g Strings. Sec aso J. Deacon, "My Place is the I3itterpits", African Studies, 45: 2, 137-155. Brnce 
Chatwin's novel 11,e So11gli11es (London, 1987) explores the way in which landscape and legend, story and song arc 
interconnected in Aboriginal systems of thought. 
49. G.J Schulte, (ed.), 1Jriefwisseli11g Van Swelle11grebel, p.311. 
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It would be wrong to dismiss this observation concerning the relationship between Xhosa and San 
as being simply the inaccurate exaggeration of an ignorant trekboer. The colonists themselves 
thought that it was extremely difficult to keep a male San captive. 
Such as have been taken very young and well treated, have turned out most 
excellent servants; they have shown great talent, great activity, and great fidelity. 
An opposite treatment has been productive of a contrary effect; and the brutal 
conduct of most of the Dutch fam1ers towards those in their employ has already 
been noticed. The poor Hottentot bears it with patience, or sinks under it; but on 
the temper and the tum of mind of the Bosjesman it has a very different effect. 
He takes the first opportunity that offers of escaping to his countrymen, and 
contrives frequently to carry off with him a musquct, powder and ball. With tales 
of cruelty he excites them to revenge; he assists them in their plans of attack; 
tells them the strength of the whole, and of individuals; the number of their cattle, 
and the advantages and dangers that will occur in the attempt to carry them off; 
the manner in which expeditions are conducted against them; and, in short, every 
thing he knows respecting the colonists.50 
These perceptions of the unsuitability of San males as captive labourers, shared by both Xhosa 
and colonists, draw attention to the ancient animosity which existed between pastoralists (or agro-
pastoralists) and huntcr-gatherers.51 The San probably expected, and in many cases received, 
death rather than captivity from the trekboers who, in common with other pastoralist societies, 
would have found it impossible to force hostile hunter-gatherers into becoming herders against 
their will. Opportunities for escape and a return to the wild were too numerous. This is not to say 
that the San were incapable of working as herders for pastoralists (the Tswana, for instance, had 
San servants) but that it was not possible to force them to become pastoralists - except where the 
enviromnent was so harsh (such as the Kalahari) as to jeopardise their continued existence 
altogether if they failed to submit to the demands of the dominant society.52 Nor should the 
difficulties in making such a transition, even voluntarily, be minimised. It was not a case of 
making a simple economic adjustment but of being wrenched from a beloved homeland, losing 
one's kin and abandoning an ancient culture with its distinctive social and political systcms.53 
50. Barrow, Travels, p.236. 
51. For an extensive discussion of this topic see Pieter Jolly, "Strangers lo Brothers: Interaction between South-
Eastern San and Southern Nguni/Solho Communities" (M.A., University of Cape Town, 1993). 
52. For relationships between the Tswana and the San sec Edwin N. Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies; Barry 
Morton, "Servitude, Slave-Trading and Slavery in the Kalahari", in Eldredge and Morton (eds.), S/ave,y in South 
Aji-ica: Captive Labor 011 the lJ11tc!t f<i"011lier (I3ouldcr, l 994 ), pp.215-50. 
53. This is not lo suggest that the San were incapable of reacting to opportunities outside of the field of hunting 
and gathering. Wilmscn (sec note above) and Rob Gordon, in The B11shma11 Alyth (Chicago, 1993) have sho\\11 the 
San to be more adaptable than the simple stereotypical primitives of popualar preconception. Uut Andrew I3. 
Smith's work (sec p.22, n.(J2 above), which stresses the dilliculty of the transition from hunting and gathering to 
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The possibility exists, therefore, that many male San were never given the chance to surrender but 
were shot because, unlike the Khoikhoi, they had no economic role to play in the trekboer 
economy. Women, once they had lost the protection of their men folk, could· be incorporated into 
the trekboer economy either directly, as domestic drudges, or indirectly, by becoming the wives 
of Khoikhoi servants. Children, especially infants, were even more tractable and could be brought 
up to accept the life of an enslaved herder.54 In this case the term "slave" is perhaps not as 
anachronistic as it would be elsewhere. By exterminating the parent society of a San child the 
trekboers had achieved those necessary preconditions of enslavement: social death and natal 
alienation. Captive children in this condition could be "given" by one colonist to another, or even 
"ordered" as items to be acquired from commandos going into the field.55 The /anddrost of 
Stellenbosch himself, Hendrik Bletterman, was "given" two San children in April 1794 and 
another, by Veldwagtmeester Willem Adriaan Nel, in November.56 There arc no records of 
money changing hands for such "gifts" though this does not mean that it did not happen. Still, in 
the absence of a legal, visible market for San captives, it would be wrong to regard every 
commando as a razzia. 
The casualty lists of the General Command indicate that heartless attitudes towards the San were 
already in place but the escalating violence of the frontier led to even greater inhumanity before 
the century's end. San men were eventually perceived of as a type of vcnnin, fit only for 
extennination, but even women and children were expendable.57 Nicolaas van der Merwe, for 
instance, did not think it unreasonable during the course of the General Conunando to order 
pastoralism, cannot be ignore<l. We shoul<l also note the cmcial importance of context. The life an<l death stmggle 
in the eighteenth century Cape frontier zone was very <lilkrent from the less intense fonns of interaction in 
nineteenth or twentieth century Botswana or Namibia. 
54. Joshua Pem1y, a press-gange<l American sailor, <leserte<l from the British navy at the Cape shortly after the 
British conquest of 1795 an<l lle<l to the Koue Bokkevel<l. Here he lived amongst the fanners for several months. In 
his slightly unreliable memoirs he recounts having accompanie<l a Koue Bokkevel<l conunando in 1796. After a 
three week march the colonial force, "40 men exclusive of 50 or 60 Hottentots", attacke<l a San kraal. Once the 
shooting ha<l stoppe<l the colonists "foun<l in the hostile camp twenty or thirtv <lca<l bo<lies, and a woman with nine 
chil<lrcn. The woman was shot, because no prisoner can be a<lmitte<l into any settlement, over the age of eleven 
years ... We retume<l to Col<l Uokcvel<l with the nine captive chil<lren in baskets, slung on the oxen by a girth which 
passe<l roun<l the bo<lies five or six times, an<l <lrm\11 taut by two I lottcntots" The Life A11d Adve11t11res Of Joshua 
Penny (New York, 1815, reprint Cape Town, 1982), pp.20-21. 
55. Sec fi.ir instance p.247 below. 
56. CA, 1/STB 18/1 %, Miscellaneous lists boun<l in with Bos_1esmans lists. It is interesting to speculate whether 
Ncl's gill was a bribe for he was in great <lisfavour with the lwuldrosl al this l1111c. Sec chapter 9, p.J50 below. 
57. Sec Van dcr Mcrwe, Noord11·aarlse /Jcwcgi11g, pp.58-65. 
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wounded San women and children to be shot "in order that their death might not be still 
crueller" .58 In 1797 Barrow related how: 
A boor from Graaff Reynet being asked in the secretary's office, a few days 
before we left the town, if the savages were numerous or troublesome on the 
road, replied, he had only shot four, with as much composure and indifference as 
if he had been speaking of four partridges. I myself have heard one of the 
humane colonists boast of having destroyed with his own hands near three 
hundred of these unfortunate wretches.59 
It was not, however, merely the San's perceived lack of economic utility that provoked such 
cruelty towards them from the trekboers. The colonists had never had a high opinion of the 
Khoikhoi, whom they regarded as being far below themselves in civilised accomplishments, and 
they were even less likely to admire a people who seemed to live almost completely in a "wild" 
state.60 To European observers the San seemed to possess neither property, political structures, 
religion, houses, literacy, decency or even an intelligible language. Somatically, too, they were as 
far removed from the European nom1 as any people the Dutch had ever encountered. Conscious 
of the achievements of their own nation, and imbued with a sense of their own superiority under 
God's guidance, it was hardly surprising that the colonists should imagine the San to be 
completely "other" than themselves.61 Fear, contempt, hatred and the almost unrestrained licence 
to violence, provided by the context of a legitimate war on the furthest frontiers of European 
expansion, ensured that the war against the San would be marked by genocidal atrocities. 
58. Extracts from the Records of the Board of Landdrost and Militia Officers Stellenbosch, 13 June 1775, in 
Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.41-42. Van der Merwe's actions were considered to have been quite reasonable 
by the landdrost and officers of Stellenbosch, so reasonable, in fact, that his accuser, A.G. Schombie, was ordered 
to pay a fine of ten Rijksdaalders to "prevent the zeal and public spirit of the Field Corporals from being damped". 
59. Barrow, Travels, p. 85. 
60. The attitude of colonists towards the Khoikhoi is best inferred from the remarks of visitors to the Cape and 
from the evidence of mundane archival documents. There are no great colonial discourses (in the sense of 
discourses written by colonists) on lhe eighteenth century Khoik11oi. TI1e works of Kolbe, Mentzel, Timnberg, 
Spamnan, Le Vaillant and Barrow arc those of learned outsiders looking in. They reflect, no doubt, some of the 
colonial attitudes towards the Khoik11oi but are also shaped by the assumptions of the discourse of the 
Enlightenment. Even Gordon, who lived in the Cape for over twenty years, was more of an Enlightenment man 
than a typical colonist. (On this point see N. Pc1m, "Getting his Measure", review of Patrick Cullinan's Robert 
Jacob Gordon 1743-1795, in S. A. litera,y Review, Vol. 2, no. 4, Dec. 1992, pp. I0-12). The exlcnl to which 
colonists, especially those on the frontier, were aware of the Enlightenment, remains to be established. We may 
assume, however, that they had retained ideas about "the other" which had been prevalent in European society since 
the middle ages. 
61. Sec M. Guenther, "From 'Brutal Savages' lo 'Hannlcss People': Noles on the changing Western image of lhe 
!Jusluncn", Paideuma, 26, 1980, pp. 123-40. 
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The nature of the war waged against the San should not, however, lead us into believing that they 
were passive, unsuspecting victims of colonial aggression. The General Conunando was, after all, 
an attempt to crush a most threatening and no doubt concerted campaign of resistance. Nor was 
this resistance overcome by the General Commando. Although the great number of casualties 
suffered by the San and the negligible losses suffered by the colonists would seem to suggest that 
the conunando had been an overwhelming colonial success this was not, in fact, the case. The 
struggle was far from decided and for many years the colonists were unable to find a military 
solution to the most effective guerrilla war that was being waged against them. A repeat of the 
General Conunando would prove to be both impractical and impossible since San resistance was 
too widespread to be snuffed out in one fell swoop. Nor were the ad hoc conunandos raised by 
aggrieved farmers and local veldwagtmeesters an adequate response. At best such conunandos 
could hope to recover the stolen livestock and kill the people responsible for the robbery, but 
complete success was rare because of the tactics employed by the San. 
For the most part the San chose to attack at night, sometimes killing the Khoikhoi or slave 
shepherds and drovers who guarded the livestock. Reports of the cruelties which San were 
capable of inflicting on their victims may not all be colonial propaganda for it would be naive to 
think that the San would never have retaliated in kind to the atrocities inflicted upon them.62 
During the day the attackers would have to wait until the guard fell asleep or was overcome by 
the excessive use of tobacco or dagga - apparently a conunon occurrence - before creeping up and 
killing him.63 Increasingly there were attacks on the fannhouses or persons of the colonists 
themselves, but these were dangerous targets. Far more vulnerable were the sheep and cattle of 
the frontiersmen. It was reported that the San urged the livestock away by waving lion skins 
about, the scent of which caused the animals to flee precipitously.64 Their destination was usually 
higher or drier areas of the interior where the horses of the pursuing commando would find it 
difficult to follow. Many a conunando had to turn back because of lack of water for the horses or 
because the trail they were following disappeared in the stony mountains. The San were not 
hampered to the same extent by the scarcity of water for their stolen livestock. Their objective 
was not to conserve the stock, but to consume it at their leisure in a secure place. If they thought 
62. TI1e nonnally sympathetic l3arrow reports thus: "Should they seize a Hottentot guarding his master's cattle, not 
contented with putting him lo immediate death, they torture him by every means of crnelty that their invention can 
frame, as drawing out his bowels, tearing off his nails, scalping, and other acts equally savage". Travels, p. 286. 
63. 'll1ese, and other details concerning San tactics, may be found in Collins' Report on the Bosjcsmen, in Moodie, 
The Record, Prt. V, pp. 33-34. Many other writers, however, describe the resistance of the San, for example 
Barrow, Travels, pp.286-287; V.S. Forbes, (ed.), Anders Spar1111m1: A Voyage To The Cape Of Good Hope ... 1772-
1776, 2 vols., (Cape Tmm, 1975 ), Vol. 2, pp. I I 0- l l l; Lichlenslein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.57-66. 
64. Collins, Report, in Moodie, 71ie Record, Prl. V, p. 33. 
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they were in danger of being overtaken they would kill or maim the animals so as to deny them to 
the trekboers. By stealing animals they were not trying to set themselves up as pastoralists - for 
the most part an impossibility in their environment - but striking the colonists where they were 
most vulnerable.65 
On an open plain, mounted conunando members could keep a distance of a hundred to a hundred 
and fifty paces between them and their targets, dismount, and fire with fatal effect, well out of 
effective range of the San's arrows. It was estimated that a San could fire between five or six 
arrows a minute with accuracy up to eighty paces.66 The advantages which horses gave to the 
trekboers made horses a prime target and the San killed them whenever they could. Collins 
reported, however, that by 1809 the San of the Bamboes Berg had learnt how to use horses for 
pursuing eland and other game but that the San of Buslunanland had still not adopted the 
practice.67 Mountains offered the San a refuge place which nullified the power and speed of the 
dreaded horses. From their vantage points on high the San could spy the approach of a 
commando and take evasive action. Sometimes they would roll boulders down upon their 
enemies. If the worst came to the worst and the San had to fight, they preferred to do so from 
behind boulders or caves fortified with stone walls. Their poisoned arrows were not a match for 
muskets and the colonists protected themselves by wearing thick clothing or advancing behind a 
screen of animal hides. Nonetheless, few fanners relished the idea of advancing against a hidden 
enemy and dying a long, agonising death by poison.68 Usually they sent their Khoikhoi auxiliaries 
to prise the San out of their strongholds. The safest tactic of all was the dawn ambush of a 
sleeping kraal. Here again the skills of Khoikhoi conunando members were invaluable since it 
was they who were most adept at tracking the San whilst themselves remaining unseen. 
Both sides in the struggle came to gauge each other's strengths and weaknesses as the century 
progressed. The San soon realised when horse sickness had crippled the offensive capacity of 
their foes and became especially bold at such times. Periods of drought forced the San to steal 
from the colonists' livestock in order to survive, but drought was also a good time to attack 
because of the difficulties of keeping a conunando in the field. Periods of rain, on the other hand, 
washed away the livestock's spoor and caused the colonists' muskets to misfire. The colonists 
65. The San preference for consuming livestock almost at once, rather than tending it, is very well attested to in the 
records and suggests that the San were not simply proto-pastoralists who would have been Khoikhoi if only they 
had had catlle. See the references cited in note 63 above for some examples. 
66. Forbes, Sparrman, Vol. 2, pp.111-112 and 11. IO. 
67. Collins, in Moodie, The Record, l'rt. V, p. 3. 
68. See Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp. 246-250 for a description of the San's bows, arrows and poisons. 
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liked to campaign in early spring. There was good grazing for their horses in most areas and if it 
was cold the San often gave away their position by lighting fires. Farmers in the winter rainfall 
areas would have ploughed and planted their crops and were therefore free to wage war. In the 
winter it was too cold and wet for such fanners to relish commando duty. Roggeveld fanners 
frequently had to trek out of their region to escape the extreme cold and at such times the San 
broke into their abandoned fannhouses. Surprisingly they seldom burnt the houses but confined 
themselves, for the sake of warmth, to burning any furniture that might have been left behind.69 
Actions such as these suggest that, in the end, the defeat of the San owed as much to the 
inadequacy of their system of representation as it did to the military superiority of the colonists. 
There was, in fact, a remarkably long period of military stalemate when the trekboers were, if 
anytl1ing, on the retreat. The effectiveness of the San's guerrilla tactics in this respect cannot be 
doubted. What is more debatable, however, is whether the San were ever able to conceptualise, 
adequately, the nature of the forces that were overwhelming them.70 The stories and myths of the 
/Xam, which were collected by Bleck and Lloyd, suggest an essentially ahistorical understanding, 
where events and things were fitted into a conceptual grid of essentially mythic significance. 
Theirs was a reality which included dreams, trance, out of body travel, therianthropic forn1s, 
spirit possession and shamanistic powers. Ancient stories had great explanatory power. Certain 
animals had magical properties and were much easier to understand than strange white men. 
"They think we are lions", said Gordon, and here we should understand that sorcerers who 
worked evil at night were thought to assume the fonn of lions.71 None of this is meant to imply 
that the San's mental universe was inferior to, or more absurd than, that of a Dutch frontier 
farmer. It is merely to say that the focused drive of the Europeans, with a cluster of concepts 
based upon Christian certainties and a notion of power which derived from material gain, proved 
to be of greater utility, in the long struggle for survival on the Cape frontier, than a world view 
69. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.448-449. 
70. My argwnent here, though sketchily drawn, is inl1uenced by Todorov's explanation for the defeat of the Aztecs 
by the Spanish. Tzvetan Todorov, 11,e Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York, 1984). 
71. "They say we are evil and come in the night like wolves, and have hair like lions". Gordon, 12 Nov. 1778, in 
Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. I, p.194; Lions were naturally feared predators who were seen as being greedy 
and selfish with regard to food. Growing lion's hair was a metaphor for the dangerous state of possession into 
which shamans fell whilst in trance: " ... it was sometimes the case that a !gi:xa (shaman) would become violently 
possessed, beating the air and biting those attempting to restrain him. His jugular vein stood out rigid and the tiny 
hairs on his back became erect. These hairs were known as 'lion's hair', and, while the entranced !gi:xa was held 
down, fat was rubbed onto his neck to remove them. It was believed that if these measures were not taken to pacify 
him and return him to his senses he would tum into a lion and attack people". Hewitt, Southern San, pp.99-100, 




where potency derived from the spirit of a dying eland. Time would unfold the paradoxical truth 
that peace could be as dangerous as war, as far as the San were concerned, for in the fonner state 
the insidious ideas of the colonists penetrated the minds of the San more easily and contributed to 
the eventual extinction of an entire culture. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EASTERN FRONTIER 
The failure of the General Commando and the prospect of a long struggle became clear early in 
1775 for, although the Roggevcld San were reported to be quiet and peaceful, this was not the 
case further to the east.72 Oppem1an reported that between February and April the north-eastern 
districts had been subject to repeated San attacks. Some disheartened trekboers were beginning to 
leave the Snecuberg for beyond the Bruintjies Hoogte. In the Swartberg, in February, a 
conm1ando under the leadership of Van Jaarsveld and a certain A. van der Walt had succeeded in 
capturing eighty-two San. Since there had not been any hand-cuffs to secure the captives they had 
attempted to escape one night, attacking their captors and trying to recover their bows and 
arrows. Some escaped but nineteen were shot and twenty-one children recaptured. This incident 
prompted Van der Walt to request that in future no prisoners should be taken since it was too 
risky to try to confine them.73 The official response to this request is unknown but from this 
moment on men on conunando showed even less inclination to take adult male San prisoners. 
Between March and August well over 200 cattle and 500 sheep were stolen whilst additional 
livestock, including horses, was slaughtered. During the course of these attacks two herdsmen had 
been killed but over fifty San had been shot and thirteen of their children captured.74 
In order to pacify the Sneeuberg San it was deemed necessary to subdue the San of the Seekoei 
River. This river flows northwards from behind the Sneeuberg to the Orange River and was 
densely populated with San. It was thought, with much justification, that the Sneeuberg San were 
driving stolen cattle down the Seekoei River to the Orange River, far beyond the reach of the 
pursuing conunandos. There is evidence that some of this booty may have been given to, or 
bartered with, groups of Orange River Khoikhoi, perhaps as far to the west as Pella.75 
On I August 1775 seventy-seven men under the leadership of Adriaan van Jaarsvcld set out to 
destroy the San of the Scckoei River. Feigning friendship and pretending that the conunando was 
72. CJ\, l/STB I 0/162, W. Stccnkamp lo Landdrost, I Sept. 1775. 
73. Oppcnnan lo Landdrosl, I May 1775, in Moodie, T/1e Reco,~/, !'rt. 111, pp.67-68, 11. 
74. Ibid , ,dso Report or Oppcnnan, 15 J\ug. 1775, in Moodie, T/1el?ecord, Prt. 111, pp.42-43. 
75. Sec chapter 8, p.306 below. 
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intent simply on hunting, Van Jaarsveld's party shot a number of hippopotami and left the 
carcasses on the river bank. The commando then moved downstream and returned quietly that 
night where, as expected, a large number of San were feasting on the hippopotami. At dawn, in a 
surprise attack, Van Jaarsveld's men massacred one hundred and twenty-two of the San and took 
twenty-one prisoners. Only five escaped. It was an act of treachery that would not be forgotten 
and ensured that future peace negotiations would be soured by mistrust. 76 
Continuing operations in the mountains to the east of the Seekoei River, the Roode Bergen, the 
commando killed a further sixty-one San and captured fifteen. Thereafter, reports that large 
numbers of San were fleeing northwards, as well as news that more farms had been attacked 
whilst the commando had been in the field, encouraged the commando members to disband and 
return to their homes in September 1775. The foray down the Seekoei River had not, therefore, 
been an unqualified success for it was clear that commandos were powerless to prevent the 
infiltration of hostile San behind them. 77 
By March 1776 the Sneeubergers had lost a further 200 cattle and 500 sheep. Three shepherds 
had been killed and eight horses stolen. Five colonists had been forced to abandon their farms and 
only remained in the district because of the entreaties of their neighbours. Van Jaarsveld reported 
gloomily that despite three successive conunandos only twenty-three San had been shot: "Thus 
the conunandos, according to the times, are now in vain". To add insult to injury his own 
"captain", the man to whom he had entrusted his farm whilst on conunando, deserted "to his 
accomplices in the field" taking seventy-eight of Van Jaarsveld's sheep with him. With "sighs and 
prayers" the Sneeubergers petitioned the Company to send reinforcements in order to save them 
from "the great assemblages of these heathenish evil doers" who were now numbered in their 
thousands. Indeed, one of the conunandos had had the novel and unpleasant experience of having 
been surrounded by a group of San which so outnumbered them that they had been lucky to 
escape with their lives. 78 
76. Report of Field Corporal A<lriaan van Jaarsveld, Sneeuberg, 4 Sept. 1775, in Moodie, Tlie Record, Prt. 111, 
pp. 43-46. Van Jaarsvcld was to use a similar ruse against the Dange Xhosa in 1781 when he scattered tobacco 
amongst a hostile group and ordered his men to fire whilst the Xhosa were busy picking it up. Moodie, Tlie Record, 
Prt. 111, p.110. 
77. Ibid. 
78. Letter from nine Inhabitants or Sneeuberg lo Commandant Oppennan, 18 March 1776; Report of A. van 
Jaarsvcll, 18 March 1776, in Moodie, 71,e Record, Prt. l l l, pp. 53-54. 
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As far as the colonists were concerned these events contained some most disturbing signs. 
Khoikhoi servants were deserting their masters to swell the ranks of San resisters; horses were 
being stolen instead of killed, an indication that the thieves wished to ride them; and the San were 
joining their smaller groups into larger forces which could not therefore, be annihilated in a 
piecemeal fashion. 
The Sneeuberg was not the only area where San or Khoisan resistance was cause for alarm. In 
the Camdeboo and Swaarte Ruggens (to the south of the Can1deboo) a series of robberies 
between December 1775 and January 1776 provoked Veldkorporaal Hendrik Myntjes van der 
Bergh into leading a commando against the robbers. M.A. Bergh, the landdrost of Stellenbosch, 
was infonned that the stock losses had amounted to ninety-seven sheep and seventy-five cattle, 
while on the other hand Van der Bergh's conunando had killed forty-five Khoisan and taken 
thirty-six prisoners. These figures alanned the landdrost who wrote to Opperman and Van der 
Bergh requesting that "in such cases they should henceforth act with somewhat greater 
moderation, be less vindictive, and as much as possible avoid the shedding of so much human 
blood". Bergh further declared that in future no conunandos should be sent out without his 
express authorisation since so much unnecessary bloodshed drew down "the righteous vengeance 
of Heaven" on the country and its inhabitants. 79 
Such proposals, though highly creditable to the humanity of Landdrost Bergh, were completely 
unacceptable to the frontier fanners who were locked in a life or death struggle with the Khoisan. 
Soon after passing the above resolutions the landdrost was infonned that large numbers of hostile 
Khoisan were gathering in the vicinity of the Koup, the Sak River and the Nieuweveld where they 
were fortifying themselves in mountain retreats. There were also reports of banditry in the 
Swarteberg, far to the west. Oppennan, in his capacity as veld commandant, requested at least 
200 men, as well as large quantities of powder and shot, in order to mount a conunando. It was 
impossible, he reported, for local veldkorporaals to go to the assistance of any other district since 
they had barely enough men to defend their own.80 
In the Nieuweveld the situation of the trekboers became so desperate that they could not await the 
govcnuncnt's response to Opperman's plea. Over I 00 cattle and 400 sheep had been stolen whilst 
a shepherd had been killed. Jacob de Klerk, the local veldkorporaal, led a conunando against the 
79. CA, C 655, 5 March 1776; Moodie, Y'l,e Record, l'rl. 111, pp.52-53. 
80. Letters from Oppennan lo Landdrosl, 27 March, 1776 and 13 April 1776, in Moodie, 71,e Record, l'rt. 111, pp. 
54-55. 
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fortified caves of the bandits but was too weak to press the attack. In March he managed to 
persuade Veldkorporaal Zarel Marais from the Sneeuberg to send reinforcements from his 
district and the two conunandos shot dead 111 Khoisan. This success did not stop many 
trekboers from abandoning the Nieuweveld whilst the prevalence of horse distemper further 
weakened the position of the frontier farmers.SI 
Whilst Oppem1an continued to bombard the landdrost with requests for a commando, Khoisan 
attacks spread to the Swarteberg and the Roggeveld. After cattle thefts in the Klein Roggeveld in 
February 1776, Gerrit Putter led a conunando to the Sak River but he failed to find the robbers 
and spent most of his time looking for water.82 Slaves and Khoikhoi servants were being killed on 
farms throughout the Roggeveld and stock losses caused at least four farmers of the Onder 
Roggeveld to abandon the district. The local veldkorporaal, Willem Steenkamp, complained that 
neighbouring veldkorporaals had refused to come to his assistance.83 Further evidence for the 
growing unpopularity of conunando duty came from the Sneeuberg in April when Hendrik van 
der Bergh reported that he could not get any men in his district to go on conunando since they 
either refused or left the district. One of them, Hendrik Krugel, began to encourage those who had 
vacated the Nieuweveld and Sneeuberg for Agter Bruintjies Hoogte to place themselves under the 
drostdy of Swellendam, thereby avoiding having to do commando duty in the Stellenbosch 
district. He managed to gather forty-eight signatures and, in addition, accused Van der Bergh of 
inhuman treatment of the Khoisan. Although Krugel and his followers were ordered to submit to 
the authority of Stellenbosch, and although Krugel himself was open to a number of counter 
accusations (such as bartering with the Xhosa and kidnapping Khoikhoi servants from other 
colonists), it was quite clear that insubordination and dissent were on the increase. Even 
Oppennan began to complain about the severity of his duties.84 
At last, on 7 May 1776, the Landdrost and Krygsraad of Stellenbosch decided to respond to 
Oppennan's pleas for assistance. There was actually very little that the authorities could do apart 
from sending the much needed supplies of powder and shot. The landdrost was convinced that 
another General Conunando was necessary and authorised Oppennan to undertake one in the way 
he best saw fit. Since, however, he declined to send any reinforcements, believing that the number 
81. Ibid. 
82. CA, I/STU 10/162, G. Puller to Landdrost Bergh, 9 Feb. 1776. 
83. Report of Corporal W. Steinkamp to Landdrost, 29 April 1776, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.69, 11. 
84. Report of I-I.M. van den Berg [ sic J to Oppcnnan, 11 April I 776, in Moodie, The Reconl, !'rt. 11 I, p.69, n.; 
CA, C 655, 5 Nov. I 776; Report of Commandant Oppcnnan, I April I 777, in Moodie, 7/ie Record, !'rt. 111, 
pp.66-68; 68, 11. 
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of men already under the conunand of the thirteen frontier veldwagtmeesters was sufficient, the 
balance of power was unlikely to be altered. Oppennan was given leave to obtain material 
support from those who had farms on the frontier but did not themselves live there. He was also 
instructed, once again, to avoid the needless shedding of blood and to send out conunandos only 
when strictly necessary.85 
If anything these resolutions serve to suggest that the Company did not view the crisis on the 
frontier quite as seriously as did the trekboers. The lack of direction which the authorities 
displayed was no doubt due partly to impotence but also partly to complacency. The meat supply 
in 1776-1777 was both cheap and plentiful as a result of the increase in livestock (ascribed to the 
absence of diseases) and the increase in foreign shipping at the Cape (which had lowered the price 
of food by increasing consumption).86 The resolutions of 7 May also provide us with an insight 
into the way in which the Company officials, briefed no doubt by popular prejudice, explained the 
struggle on the frontier to themselves. To the official mind there was a clear dichotomy between 
"predatory Buslunen" (who were regarded as robbers to be destroyed) and the "good Hottentots" 
(the destroyers of the "Buslunen"). These "good Hottentots" had been expelled from their country, 
not by the Europeans but by the "Buslunen". Once the "Hottentots" had been expelled the 
"Bushmen", driven by their predatory instincts to find people to rob, fell on the European settlers. 
Their task was made easier by the fact that: 
in consequence of the progressive deterioration of the fanns and pastures in the 
nearer districts, our inhabitants are compelled, by necessity, from time to time, to 
seek better fanns at a distance, and with the approbation of our government, to 
settle in those grassy countries, whence the good aborigines or Hottentots, who 
always lived on good tenns with us, have been gradually ejected by the 
depredations of the Buslunen, although these do not, like the others, tum the 
country to any useful purpose.87 
The above "reasoning" served both to justify and excuse the activities of the trekboers by shifting 
all the blame onto the San. As for the Khoikhoi, they were portrayed as faithful but subservient 
allies who had forfeited their birth-right through their inability to defend themselves against the 
San. The clear implication was that the land belonged to the colonists both by default and because 
the San did not "tum the country to any useful purpose" .88 Given these assumptions it is 
85. CA, C 655, 7 May 1776; Extract Records of the I3oard of Landdrost and Militia Officers Stellenbosch, 7 May 
1776, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.55-57. 
86. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.50, 11. 
87. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.56. 
88. There arc dear parallels here with what has been tcnncd the "deficiency land-use doctrine" in America which 
justified the expulsion of American Indians from their land. Sec Robert F. Bcrkholcr, Jr. , The White Man's Indian: 
Images of the American Indicmfi·om Columbus lo the JJresenl (New York, 1979), pp. 131, 113, 120, 138 and 152. 
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somewhat surprising that the landdrost nevertheless continued to urge conunandos to behave 
moderately when attacking the San.89 
The Council of Policy only approved of the decision to forward supplies of powder and shot on 
11 June 1776. By this date Adriaan van Jaarsveld and his men had already been forced to 
abandon the Sneeuberg and retreat to the Camdeboo. This was largely as a consequence of the 
shortage of anununition although the unwillingness of men to serve on commandos was a 
contributory factor.90 The experiment of anning "faithful Hottentots or Bastaards" and allowing 
them to operate independently was not entirely succes~ful since they frequently joined the robbers 
or warned them of approaching conunandos.9I In addition, Veldkorporaal Van der Bergh was 
obliged to lead a commando against the kraal of a Khoikhoi captain to whom a staff of office had 
earlier been given.92 Attempts to reoccupy the Sneeuberg were not successful. In June the 
unfortunate Van Jaarsveld suffered the infuriating experience of having his livestock stolen, 
whilst away on commando, by the ex-captain who had deserted his service in March.93 The 
numbers of the hostile Khoisan had become so large that neither Van Jaarsveld's nor Chari 
Marais' conunandos could overcome them. Gordon, who visited the Sneeuberg in November 
1777, was taken to the site where a certain Van der Walt had been killed in June 1776. His report 
of the engagement, presumably one of scores like it, illuminates the social solidarity and simple 
life style of the Sneeuberg San: 
This battlefield was a rocky hill where they [the Khoi] had concealed themselves, 
and although the fanners shot many of them they could not take the hill. On it the 
Hottentots had piled up stones everywhere, to serve as fortifications. Each time 
they hit an enemy the one that did so yelled "Hoi ha!" We found their deserted 
village of about twelve or thirteen huts, but there was nothing to be seen but dry 
bushes in a semicircle, sheltered to the S, over which they hang mats, and open 
to the E. They were lying around next to these bushes. In one hut I counted eight 
sleeping places each of which was a shallow hollow in the ground, eight inches 
deep in the middle, all close together; each [sleeper] covered himself with his 
hide. I found some poorly baked potsherds which had been carved for 
ornamentation on the outside. Van der Walt had been shot from a distance of 
89. CA, C 655, I I June 1776. 
90. Oppennan to Lan<l<lrost, 17 May 1776 an<l Fiel<l Sergeant D.S. van <ler Merwe to Lan<ldrost, 5 June l 776, in 
Moodie, The Record, Prt. I 11, pp.57-58 an<l 70, 11. 
91. "I sent to the people in my district to tell them that those who had faithful Hottentots or 13astards that could 
use a gun, should sen<l them to me, which they <li<l, an<l this fellow was sent by J. <le Wegen with a gun to come to 
me; but instead of coming to me, he went to the robbers, an<l told them a conunan<lo was out against them, on which 
they lle<l". Oppennan to Lan<l<lrosl, 17 May, 1776, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 11 I, p.58. 
92. CA, CO 6127, Moo<lie's Lists, Second Supplement, Van <ler 13ergh to Lan<l<lrosl, I l April 1776. 
93. Ibid. , A. van Jaarsvcl<l to Lan<l<lrosl, 9 July l 776. 
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twenty-four paces. We saw no skeletons and only one grave, which was a round 
heap of stone. 94 
Dispirited and discouraged Van Jaarsveld decided to leave the Camdeboo and go to Agter 
Bruintjies Hoogte. His departure left the remaining Sneeubergers in desperate straits and exposed 
the Camdeboo to imminent attack.95 The Koup had already been abandoned because of drought 
and poor grazing so that, by the end of 1776, the frontier seemed to be retreating.96 In the 
Hantam there had been a detennined night attack by some San on the fann of Gerrit van Wijk. 
Several of his Khoikhoi servants had been killed or wounded and some cattle and goats were 
stolen. Similar murders and robberies were reported from the Roggeveld.97 What distinguished 
these attacks was that they were directed against the persons and dwellings of the fanners and not 
just their livestock. The struggle was intensifying. 
Despite the complacent attitude of the govenunent there were some influential men at the Cape 
who were becoming alanned by these developments. There were obviously many colonists from 
the south-western Cape who had fanning interests on the northern frontier for it was from the 
Tygerberg and Koeberg districts that the suggestion came for a pennanent frontier force to 
protect the farmers. It was envisaged that this force, or mounted guard, would consist of about 
thirty men who would be in the field for three or four consecutive months. Their pay and 
provisions would be provided by interested parties, both from the frontier and the Cape districts. 
The trouble with such a scheme, according to the landdrost, was that it would be difficult to 
administer and he reconunended that the principal initiator of the idea, the ex-lieutenant of the 
Cape District, N. Laubscher, should sort out the practical details. Laubscher agreed to do so but 
one must assume that the practicalities were too daunting for the scheme came to nothing.98 A 
suggestion from J.A. Louw, the newly appointed veldkorporaal of the Roggeveld, that men from 
the Olifants River district be obliged to assist conunandos in the Roggeveld, was sympathetically 
received by the authorities. But the men of the Olifants River took a different view of the matter 
94. Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.85. 
95. Letter from twenty-five Inhabitants of Snecubcrg, 17 Nov 1776, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 1 I 1, pp.60-61; 
Letters from Sare! Marais to Landdrost, 28 May 1776 and Field Sergeant Van der Merwe, 5 June 1776, in Moodie, 
The Record, Prt.111, p.70, 11.; P.J. Van der Merwe, Noordwacmlste Bewegi11g, p.13. 
96. CA, C 655, 5 Nov. 1776. 
97. G. van Wyk to A. van Zyl, [May] 1776; W. Stcenkamp to Landdrost, 9 July 1776; A van Zyl to Landdrost, 16 
May 1776, in Moodie, 11,e Record, Prt. I 11, pp.69, n. and 70, 11. Van Wyk's letter contains the poignant lines: "I 
infonn you that the I3usluncn attacked my fann last night, they surrounded and shot upon all the straw huts, they 
cruelly murdered three Hottentot children in the huts, and severely wounded my Witcbooy; the very dogs and the 
whole premises (wcrl) arc litll of arrows; we had to keep them off all night by !iring on them". 
98. CA, C 655, 3 Sept. 1776. 
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and refused to go.99 When it came to conunando duty it was proving to be extremely difficult to 
transcend regional interests. 
With Van Jaarsveld's departure to Agter Bruintjies Hoogte, the defence of the Sneeuberg fell to 
Carel van der Merwe and his brother, David Schalk van der Merwe, the veldwagtmeester of the 
Camdeboo. Since the security of the Camdeboo depended on that of the Sneeuberg, and since the 
two veldwagtmeesters were brothers, they collaborated together more enthusiastically than was 
usually the case when leaders from different districts took the field together. The brothers also 
appear to have been better educated and of a more religious bent than their peers for their reports 
(particularly David's) show a delight in detail and a tendency to be moved by Biblical 
exhortations. Following further murder and robbery in the Sneeuberg in December 1776 David 
decided to go to Carel's aid with a conunando. This fraternal solidarity did not necessarily mean 
that all of the men were happy to be on conunando. David experienced great difficulty in 
sununoning the Camdeboo colonists for duty and had to swallow some humorous insolence, as 
well as implausible excuses, from the men under his command. JOO It was becoming quite 
common to send a Khoikhoi or "Bastaard" servant on commando in one's place and this was a 
development that caused considerable resentment amongst both veldwagtmeesters and those who 
could not avoid their military duty. 
Between December 1776 and March 1777 David van der Merwe's conunando campaigned in the 
Sneeuberg. It consisted of a mere thirty Europeans and twenty-six Khoikhoi, hardly enough men 
to deal with the "hundreds and thousands" of enemies who, despite their large numbers, seemed 
able to make themselves remarkably scarce when a conunando was hunting them. More than 
seventy San were shot dead during these months but this was reckoned to be a frustratingly small 
total by those who had spent nearly four months trying to achieve a decisive victory. As had 
happened on previous occasions the commando returned to find that fam1s had been attacked, 
99. CA, C 655, 5 Nov. 1776 and 10 Dec. 1776. 
100. Amongst several choice insults C. Olivier, for instance, replied to D.S. van der Merwe as follows: "Good 
friend D.S. van der Merwe, I have received your letter, and learn from it that it will not tum out well; that you may 
think of it, I have sent the Hottentot early; for the rest, think well of it before you order me. My compliments to 
you." When Van der Merwe asked C. de Clerck to send his wagon on commando to carry provisions it arrived 
without the tilt. Van der Merwe wrote to request the tilt and gol the following reply: "You write me to send my 
wagon tilt tomorrow, which is impossible that I can do, as it is the bolster of my bed. I am not unwilling, if I had 
enough bed clothes, to give the tilt, but I am deficient in these. I remain, therefore, afler compliments, your friend, 
Cornelius de Clerk". Turning over the letter Van der Merwe discovered an additional note: "The tilt of which I 
write you, is the bolster for my head, am! my wife is my mallress; so if you claim the till by force, order the 
mallress with it, as cook." General Report of Field Scrjcant D.S. van dcr Mcrwc, I J March 1777, in Moodie, The 
Record, Prt. 111, pp. 62-64. 
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livestock robbed and herdsmen killed in regions closer to home. IOI March and April brought no 
respite. In the Can1deboo and lower Sneeuberg alone over 1600 sheep and 235 cattle were stolen. 
Retaliatory commandos managed to kill seventy-three of the robbers but no end to the fighting 
was in sight. Some idea of the number of Khoisan involved in resistance may be derived from the 
report of H.M. van der Bergh whose commando had encountered a group of over three hundred 
Khoisan. I 02 
The trekboers of the north-eastern frontier zone were desperate and had used up the anmmnition 
which the government had granted in June 1776. They thus appealed for urgent help from the 
Company and couched their request in terms which they knew would make an impact. They 
stressed their exceeding poverty and pointed out that they were unable to secure their own 
subsistence, much less pay the Company the arrears of rent for their loan-fanns.103 It was this 
request for remission of rent which galvanised the authorities into sending 1500 pounds of 
gunpowder, 3000 pounds of lead and 3000 flints to the veldwagtmeesters. The government did 
not, however, relax its injunction to treat captives, women and children humanely. In an attempt 
to prevent any further atrocities (the accusations of Krugel were no doubt fresh in their minds) it 
was now required that not only the veldwagtmeester should sign a written report after a 
conunando but all the men as well. It was hoped that this measure would enable the authorities to 
investigate any allegations of cruelty more thoroughly.104 
Despite the fact that the stage now seemed to be set for another round of detennined commando 
activity there was a surprising lull in fighting in the Camdeboo and Sneeuberg districts from mid 
1777 until the begi1111ing of 1779. Quite why this was so is uncertain though it may have had 
something to do with the visit of the conunander of the Cape garrison, Colonel Robert Jacob 
Gordon, to the north-eastern frontier zone at the end of 1777. Gordon's journey had, as one of its 
objectives, the making of peace with the "wild Buslunen". "I shall do all I can to confer with some 
of them and see if this savage war caimot be brought to an end." 105 It is safe to assume that this 
was a govenunent initiative and the frontier fanners must have known what Gordon's purpose 
was. They would, consequently, have been on their best behaviour and done nothing to jeopardise 
101. Ibid. 
I 02. Address to Oppemum, 15 March 1777; Reports of Conunandant Oppennan, I April I 777 and IO April 1777, 
in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.65-69. 
103. CA, C 655, 6 May 1777; Extract Records ofLanddrost and Militia Oflicers, Stellenbosch, 6 May 1777 and 5 
June 1777, in Moodie, The Record, Vol. 111, pp.69-71. 
104. CA, C 655, 16 June 1777; Extract Records Landdrost, Hcemraden, and Militia Officers Stellenbosch, 16 
June 1777, in Moodie, 71ie Record, l'rl. I l l, p. 71 
I 05. Gordon, 16 Dec. l 777, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. I, p.115. 
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peace efforts. When Gordon visited the Sneeuberg, Carel van der Merwe told him that 
"everything was at peace here with regard to the Bushmen" .106 It is possible, however, that this 
uncharacteristic state of affairs had other explanations and that a severe drought had caused 
many San to seek temporary succour at the Orange River. Gordon noted that the Seekoei River 
was almost dry in places and that "over this whole countryside, the Agter Sneeuberg, it has rained 
very little this year" .107 Another possible reason for the comparative calm of the Sneeuberg in 
late 1777 was that there were fewer trekboers in the region than before, many having fled to the 
Zuurveld or Agter Bruintjies Hoogte. Whatever the reasons, however, both sides were exhausted 
after four years of incessant war and were, in all probability, quietly intent on restoring their 
strength. The unvanquished resolution of the Sneeuberg San is evident in an extraordinary 
exchange which Gordon saw fit to record for posterity: 
These so called Bushmen or Chinese have a famous chief called Koerikei, or 
bullet-escaper. Veldwagtmeester Van der Merwen told me that, after an action 
which he had conunanded, this Koerikei, standing on a cliff out of range, shouted 
out to him: "What are you doing on my land? You have taken all the places 
where the eland and other game live. Why did you not stay where the sun goes 
down, where you first came from?" Van der Merwen asked why he did not live in 
peace as before, and why he did not go hunting with them, (He had been living 
with the farmers) and whether he did not have enough country as it was? He 
replied that he did not want to lose the country of his birth and that he would kill 
their herdsmen, and that he would chase them all away. As he went off he further 
said that it would be seen who would win. I 08 
Unfortunately Gordon was unable to make contact with a single San although he went "further 
into this region than any conunando even". 109 The San were obviously aware of Gordon's party 
since the smoke of their signal fires was observed and various traces of their presence were also 
discovered. Both the size and composition of Gordon's party, which included frontier farmers and 
must have looked like a conunando, dissuaded the San from approaching. It is hardly remarkable, 
therefore, that Gordon's peace initiative came to nothing but his visit to the north-eastern and 
eastern frontier districts did indicate that the govenunent was becoming increasingly concerned 
with events in these areas. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which the years 1777-1778 mark the inauguration of the official 
eastern frontier zone for in 1778 the governor himself, Van Plettenberg, made an unprecedented 
106. Gordon, 13Nov.1777,inRapcrandBouchcr,Gordo11, Vol.1,p.81. 
107. Gordon, 19 Nov. 1777, in Raper and 13ouchcr, Gordon, Vol. I, p.88. 
I 08. Gordon, 13 Nov. 1777, in Raper and 13oueher, Gordon, Vol. I, p.81. 
109. Gordon, 22 Nov. 1777, in Raper and Boucher, Gon/011, Vol. I, p.95. 
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visit to the eastern borders of the colony.110 The visit stenuned from the governor's desire to 
impose greater administrative control on a region that was becoming increasingly volatile. With 
the Sneeuberg closed to them, growing numbers of trekboers had entered the Bruintjies Hoogte, 
Bamboes Berg and Zuurveld areas and the first reports of disturbances in these districts began to 
reach the govenunent between 1777 and 1778.111 For the first time relationships between the 
Xhosa and the colonists loomed as large as those between the Khoisan and the colonists. The 
constant violence and insecurity of frontier life had seriously undennined govenunent authority. 
Oppennan wished to resign and the number of absentees from military drill was always high.112 
The distance of the frontier from Stellenbosch and Cape Town encouraged certain colonists to 
behave in ways which alanned both the authorities and their fellow frontiersmen. Thus it was that 
some of the more respectable inhabitants of the Camdeboo petitioned the governor for a 
clergyman and a landdrost in order to counter the growing Godlessness and insubordination of 
the district.113 
Van Plettenberg hoped, by a combination of discussion and decree, to establish boundaries 
beyond which disputing parties would not move. In the east he negotiated an agreement, with 
some minor Xhosa chieftains, that the Fish River should be recognised as the colonial boundary. 
None of the other Xhosa felt bound to accept this treaty and very few of the colonists chose to 
observe it either. In the Sneeuberg, noticing the paucity of European farmers, the governor 
suggested that the best way to defeat the San would be to increase the area's colonial population. 
Obliged to listen to numerous complaints of one colonist against another he remarked that whilst 
the inhabitants seemed well disposed towards him "if they had greater charity towards one 
another, they would surely live a happier lifc".J 14 Proceeding down the Seekoei River (which he 
renamed Van Plettenberg's River) the governor presided over the wanton slaughter of scores of 
hippopotami before reaching the point that Gordon had reached the year before. Here he erected a 
110. The journal of Van Plettenberg's expedition may be found in Godee Molsbergen (ed.), Reize11, Vol. 2, pp.61-
78, Vol. 4, pp.39-62; George McCall Thea!, comp., "Reis van den gouverneur Joachim van Pettenberg, 1778", in 
Bela11grijke Historische Dokume11te11 Verzameld in de Kaap Kolonie en Elders, Vol. 1 (Cape Town, 1896). 
111. The first mention of commandos in the Bamboes Berg is in Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment 
of the Native Inhabitants of Sou them Africa Within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Or Beyond the Frontier 
of That Colony, Part 1. Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 18 Marci, 1835 where the Resolution of I 
Dec. 1778 is cited: "The governor having returned from a journey to the interior as far as the Camdeboo district, 
conununicated to the council various interesting applications which had been made by the inhabitants. This gave 
rise to the establishment of a drostdy at Graaf Reynet, and several other measures; amongst which, the despatching 
of a large conunando to the Bamboes Bergen, in order to check the depredations of the Buslunen". 
112. CA, C 656, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1778-1781, 6 Jan. 1778. 
113. Petition oflnhabitants of Camdeboo, 24 March 1778, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p. 74. 
114. J.A. Van Plcttcnbcrg to Swcllcngrcbel, I Feb. 1779, in G . .T. Schutte, ( ed.), llriefwisseli11g Va11 Hendrik 
Swelle11grebel, p.308. 
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beacon whose purpose was to delimit the north-eastern boundary of the colony; but as soon as he 
departed the San lost no time in destroying this rather premature symbol of European 
authority.I IS 
Nothing in the governor's actions seems to mark his visit as being the watershed in frontier 
history which, in fact, it was.116 His visit signified, in a sense, official recognition of the vastly 
superior stock-raising potential of the eastern regions of the colony (in comparison to the northern 
regions) and the crucial significance of the meat supply to the Cape economy. It also marked tl1e 
point at which the northern and eastern frontiers became distinct. This was formally symbolised 
in 1785 with the establishment of a new drostdy in the district (which the inhabitants of the 
Camdeboo had been asking for since March 1778), that of Graaff-Reinet.117 Naturally the two 
frontier zones, the northern and the eastern, did not cease to be connected. Shocks experienced in 
one section of the frontier sent percussion waves along the entire frontier zone. The two frontier 
zones were also connected by a common hinge in the north-east: the Sneeuberg, Agter Bruintjies 
Hoogte and Bambocs Berg districts. Originally these north-eastern parts were almost exclusively 
occupied by the Khoisan and in this respect they shared some of the most important 
characteristics of the northern frontier zone. But from 1785 they fell under the jurisdiction of the 
landdrost of Graaff-Reinet and became more and more involved in the dynamics of the eastern 
frontier zone. It is for this reason that this study, which is primarily concerned with the northern 
frontier zone, will not pay as much attention to these north-eastern regions after 1785 - except 
where their story is inextricably linked to that of the northern frontier. 
THE YEARS OF ATTRITION, 1779-1789 
The immediate consequence of Van Plcttenbcrg's frontier visit was that the colonists were 
encouraged to renew their assaults on the San of the north-eastern regions. The Bamboes Berg 
was perceived to be an area where "the said robbers now harboured in great numbers" and the 
landdrost of Stellenbosch (who had accompanied the governor to the eastern districts), authorised 
115. See sources cited in note 110 above; Van <lcr Merwe, Noordwaartse Beweging, pp.14, 24; Gordon, 3 and 4 
Oct. 1778, in Raper an<l Boucher, Gordon, p.181. The beacon was raised about twenty-six kilometres due west of 
present <lay Colesburg. Fragments of it may be seen in the Cultural History Museum, Cape Town. 
116. For E. Walker's view that the visit of Van Plettenherg marked the beginning of the frontier tradition in South 
Africa sec chapter one, pp.5-6 above. 
117. The <late of the establishment of the district an<l drostdv of GraalT-Reinet seems to be a matter of some 
dispute. Papers Relati1·e, p.20 an<l .I.S. Bergh an<l J.C. Visagic in 'lJ,e Haslem Cape Vi·onfier Zone J 660-1980 
(Durban, 1985 ), p.12, cite the founding resolution as being 26 Aug. 1785 but Giliomce, in "The Eastern Frontier, 
1770-1812", p.465, n.54 has 178(,. The boundaries or the new district were proclaimed on 19 July 1786. 
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the despatch of a large conuuando to that vieinity.118 Although this was decided on in March 
1779 it was not until August that the commando set out. Rivalries amongst local 
veldwagtmeesters had become so intense that the leadership of the c01m11ando had to be decided 
on by the drawing of a lot whilst the number of absentees and shirkers seriously affected the 
conunando's strength. Eventually the Bamboes Berg commando had to return after having killed 
relatively few San, "for we were much too weak to surround and tum such a great number of 
robbers ... we found that such weak conu11andos rather embolden the robbers than impress them 
with fear" .119 
Both before and during the commando to the Bamboes Berg the San continued their attacks on 
colonial farms and 1779 was one of the worst as far as stock losses were concerned. The 
landdrost estimated that a total of 750 cattle and 3 062 sheep were stolen from the frontier 
fanuers of the north-east during this time and local commandos, though they shot dead large 
numbers of the San, could not check the almost continuous attacks.120 By November 1779 the 
fam1ers in the Camdeboo were complaining that: 
There has never been such an irruption of the Busluuen as now, for here we see 
Bushmen daily, and though we make every exertion, we ca1mot overtake them, 
the country is so rugged and hilly. They light fires in the mountain before our 
eyes; and as the Buslm1en have now such free access, please to see, sir, the 
number of cattle that have been carried off recently.121 
Part of the problem, according to Veldkorporaal Albertus van Jaarsvelt, was that some of the 
Sneeuberg fanuers had left the Sneeuberg to live at the Rhenosterberg, thus weakening the front 
line of defence and allowing the San to gain unimpeded access to the Camdeboo. Even more 
serious were reports that certain residents of the Agter Sneeuberg had struck a deal with the San 
whereby the latter would be allowed to pass safely through the district with cattle stolen from the 
Camdeboo provided that they left the Agter Sneeubergers in peace.122 Such allegations, though 
plausible, were difficult to prove and it may have been that the Camdeboo fanuers were simply 
easier targets than the Agter Sneeubergers. In any event the supposed San collaborators suffered 
118. CA, C 656, 9 March and 13 April 1779; Extract of Records of Militia Court, 9 March and 13 April 1779, 
Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp. 79-80. 
119. Report of Field Sergeant Chari Marais, 2 Sept. 1779; Report of Field Sergeant Carel van der Merwe, 3 Sept. 
1779; Report of Corporal A van Jaarsvelt, 3 Sept. 1779; Report of Field Sergeant D.S. van der Merwe, 4 Sept. 
1779; Reports of Field Sergeant H.M. van der Berg [ sic J and A van Jaarsvclt, 11 Sept. 1779; Report of Sergeant 
Josua Joubert, 29 Sept. 1779, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.81-86. 
120. Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.89, 11. 
121. Letter from A. van Jaarsvelt to Landdrost, 15 Nov. l 779, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, pp.86-87. 
122. Ibid. 
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severe stock losses, as well as the murder of their shepherds, less than a year later.123 111e settlers 
of Bruintjies Hoogte were also on the defensive at the end of 1779 with the San operating in such 
large groups that one commando had to fly in the face of the enemy. According to the 
veldkorporaal the "greater part of the men" had fled the district altogether.124 
As the 1780s commenced the strength of San resistance in the Sneeuberg seemed undiminished. 
On more and more occasions colonists were fired on by guns whilst fewer and fewer men heeded 
the summons to commando duty. "I get more excuses than men," complained David van der 
Merwe from the Camdeboo.125 The habit of sending a Khoikhoi servant in one's place seemed to 
herald a time, according to Carel van der Merwe of the Sneeuberg, when "I shall at last have to 
do commando with none but Hottentots, which cannot be".126 Robberies continued, San were 
killed and, all of the time, captives were taken. A letter which deserves quoting in full, since it 
combines the characteristic themes of the day, is that which Dirk Koetse wrote to Veldkorporaal 
AP. Burger: 
I beg that you will for this time be satisfied with a Hottentot, for I am lying here 
in the fields with my cattle, and my wife, because my cattle are dying; for I am 
daily driven away by W. Lubbe and P. Jacobs. I have desired my Hottentot to 
catch a little one for me, and I beg that if he gets one, he may be allowed to keep 
it, and that you will see that the Hottentot has victuals.127 
Lack of co-operation, individual and regional self-interest was bedevilling the prosecution of the 
war. In an attempt to co-ordinate military operations, and simplify the thirteen separate areas of 
conunand in the frontier zone, the authorities made one final attempt, before the creation of the 
new drostdy of Graaff-Reinet in 1785, to revive the principles of the General Conunando. In 
October and November 1780 the Krygsraad of Stellenbosch appointed a commandant of the 
Eastern Districts and a commandant of the Northern Districts.128 In a sense these offices became 
redundant in 1785 and it is debatable whether their existence helped to overcome any of the 
inherent difficulties of mobilising men in isolated and vulnerable conununities. The commandant 
of the North was to have conunand over the veldwagtmeesters of the Sneeubcrg, the Nieuweveld, 
the Koup, the Roggeveld and the Hantam. Chari Marais was the appointee and David de Villiers 
123. Report of Field Sergeant Carel van der Mcrwe, 25 August 1780, in Moodie, Tlie Record, Prt. 111, p.103. 
124. Report of Field Corporal C. Botma, 7 Dec 1779, in Moodie, Tlie Record, Prt. 111, p.88. 
125. Report of Field Sergeant D.S. van dcr Merwc, 5 Jan. 1780, in Moodie, Tlie Record, Prt. 111, p. l 02. 
126. Report of Field Sergeant Carel van dcr Mcrwc, 16 Sept. 1780, in Moodie, Tlie Record, Prt. 111, p. I 04. 
127. D. Koctse to A. Burger, 23 Aug. 1780, in Moodie, Tlie Reconl, Prt. 111, p.104, 11 Sec also CA 1/STB 10/ 
164, 23 Aug. 1780. 
128. CA, C 656, lO Oct. and 14 Nov. 1780. 
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his assistant. It may be seen that at this stage the Sneeuberg was considered to be part of the 
northern frontier whereas in 1785 it was attached to the eastern command of Graaff-Reinet. 
In practical terms the division of 1780 made little difference and the struggle continued to be 
fought at a local level. In April 1785 De Villiers, who had become commandant of the North, 
presented the Krygsraad of Stellenbosch with a summary of the losses suffered in his district 
during the last year: 779 cattle, 64 horses, 5 889 sheep and goats stolen; 17 shepherds murdered 
and 6 muskets carried off. He was forced to state his inability to raise commandos in the frontier 
districts because of the flight of the majority of inhabitants from Agter Hex River, the 
Swarteberg, the Roggeveld, the Koup, the Camdeboo and the Sneeuberg. Farn1S had been 
overrun, houses destroyed and the fear was that, before too long, the "roofzugtige natie ... tot 
naby de Breede Rivier en te Land van Waveren i1mickende ... ".129 
This was, with hindsight, a somewhat alanuist assessment of the situation for it was predicting a 
return to the colonial boundaries of 1700! There was, however, no doubt that the colonial frontier 
was on the retreat everywhere in the Northern Districts despite more than a decade of almost 
constant conuuando activity. The Khoisan were gaining the upper hand. The government was 
suitably panic stricken and issued instructions that all fanuers who had deserted their farms 
should return to them within four months or forfeit them. The resolution of 27 December 1775, 
that no colonist should cross the Great Fish River, was reiterated. In an extraordinary gesture of 
desperate generosity the govenuuent also agreed to grant loan-fanus free of charge for ten years, 
if the land lay between the Plettenberg (Seekoei) and Sak Rivers, so as to establish a protecting 
cordon of colonists against the incursions of the San. Finally, as usual, a commando was planned, 
but nothing distinguished it from the many inconclusive and undermanned expeditions that had 
gone before it.130 Though nearly 500 San were killed and 112 captured by commandos in the 
eastern districts between 1787 and 1788 it did not seem as though there was a military solution to 
the frontier war. 131 
THE ROGGEVELD, NIEUWEVELD AND HANTAM, 1777-1789 
The growing importance of the eastern frontier after 1777-1778 and the intensity of the struggle 
Ill the north-eastern mountains of the frontier zone docs not mean that the more westerly regions 
!29. CJ\ l/STB 10/164, l9April 1785. 
"\O. Ibid. 
i:, l. P.J. van Jcr Mcrwc, Noordwaarste Bewegi11g, pp.48-49. 
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of the interior escarpment enjoyed a respite. The impasse in the Sneeuberg increased tensions 
throughout the frontier zone, especially in the environmentally marginal fringes of the Roggeveld 
and Nieuweveld. Mounting pressures provoked renewed Khoisan resistance in these regions and it 
was clear that here too the trekboers were on the defensive. 
In August 1777 Veldwagtmeester Adriaan van Zyl reported to Stellenbosch that the San beyond 
the Roggeveld had made off with 300 cattle and 1 300 sheep. They had also attacked farmhouses 
and wounded the wife of W. van Wyk with an arrow. Van Zyl received permission to mount a 
commando in September, along with veldwagtmeesters G. Putter and W. Steenkamp.132 
Steenkamp reported back in February 1778 that the commando had had very limited success 
because a Khoikhoi captain of the Bokkeveld had given the San advance warning of the 
impending attack. Further San attacks had followed this disturbing example of collaboration 
between Khoikhoi and San.133 The new veldwagtmeester of the Klein and Middle Roggeveld, 
Carel Kruger, wrote in March that: 
it has never before been so as now, from January to the present time with 
stealing and surrounding the houses by night, and discharging arrows at them, so 
that the people dare not venture out to protect the cattle; and we cannot take the 
field with a commando because of the prevalence of the horse distemper, but 
must await a suitable season.134 
By November men of the Hantam district were refusing to go on conunando and there was a 
steady exodus of "Bastaards" and "Hottentots" towards Namaqualand and away from conunando 
service.135 A similar complaint was received from the Roggeveld in February 1779 as "the 
Bushmen come by night in 40 and 50 to lay waste the farms" .136 Eight months later the 
commando that was organised to deal with these San failed due to lack of support from the 
colonists.137 
News reached the demoralised trekboers of the Cape interior that there was a large concentration 
of San beyond the Sak River in the Karee Berg and that it was from this locality that the attacks 
132. CA, C 655, 5 Aug. 1777. 
133. CA, 1/STB 10/164, W. Steenkamp to Landdrost, 3 Feb. 1778. 
134. CA l/ST13 10/164, C. Kruger to Landdrost, 12 March 1778. On 4 Nov. 1777 il was reported lhal Hendrik 
Olivier had resigned as veldwagtmeester of the Middle Roggeveld at lhe same time as Gerrit Putter, 
veldwagtmeester of the Klein Roggeveld had lrekked away. It was decided to unite bolh areas under one 
veldwagtmeester, namley, Carel Kruger, fonner veldko,poraal of the Middle Roggevcld. CA, C 655, 4 Nov. 1777. 
135. Report of Field Sergeanl /\. van Zyl lo Landdrost, 2 Nov. 1778, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.77. 
136. CA, l/ST13 l 0/164, W. Sleenkamp lo Landdrost, 15 Feb. 1779. Steenkamp wished to resign from his post 
because he was loo fat lo sil comli.>rlably on his horse on long commandos. 
137. CA, l/ST13 10/164, C. Kruger to Landdrost, 12 Oct. 1779. 
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on their farms were launched. For the moment events in the Bamboes Berg were too critical to 
permit the despatch of a commando to the Karee Berg but the government promised some action 
in the future. 138 In the meantime, in July 1779, Cornelius van Wyk, together with eleven other 
colonists, had the courage to move back into the Nieuweveld.139 Intense fighting followed this 
somewhat premature move and, throughout 1780, San raids and colonial commando attacks spilt 
blood on the arid soil of the disputed territory.140 Nearby, in the Koup, there were substantial 
numbers of "Bastard-Hottentots" who were threatened with imprisonment if they refused to 
participate in commandos. Their reluctance, however, should be measured against that of the 
inhabitants of the Swarteberg, twelve of whom refused to obey their veldwagtmeester when he 
ordered them to undertake a commando in the Nieuweveld in September 1780.141 
The struggle for the Nieuweveld continued in 1781. In January Cornelius van Wyk led a 
commando which killed twenty-four San. In February the San stole 160 cattle and 100 sheep 
from Christoffel Smit. In March they stole 500 sheep and 35 cattle from Veldwagtmeester 
Hercules Viljoen and killed a shepherd.142 A pursuing c01mnando killed four of the San. In May 
another 28 cattle were taken and the San killed four colonial Khoikhoi. In June 400 sheep and 34 
cattle were taken and another two shepherds put to death. Viljoen was obliged to chase the 
robbers into the Roggeveld, along the Sak River, with a motley collection often Khoikhoi and one 
baptised "Bastaard" before any "Dutch" help was forthcoming.143 In August someone by the 
name of Augustus Klynveld was killed by the San and his gun, together with 900 sheep, was 
stolen. In September Cornelius van Wyk infom1ed the landdrost of Stellenbosch that nobody in 
his district could sell any cattle to the Company butchers because the San had stolen so much. 
There was a critical shortage of anununition and conunando activity was at a standstill as a 
result.144 By 1786 a combination of drought and San resistance had driven the colonists out of 
the Nieuweveld and the Koup altogether. These districts were only re-occupied in 1793 and their 
abandonment is further testimony to the intensity of San resistance and tl1e marginality of their 
natural resources.145 
138. CA, C 656, 11 May 1779. 
139. Letter from Cornelius van Wyk to Lan<l<lrost, 8 July 1779, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p.81. 
140. CA, 1/STB 10/164, C. van Wyk to Lan<l<lrost, 7 Oct. 1780. 
141. CA, C 656, 27 Dec. 1780; CA, 1/STB 10/164, W. llcrhol<lt to Lan<l<lrost, I Oct. 1780. 
142. CA, 1/STB 10/163, C. van Wyk to Lan<l<lrost, 2 Sept. 1781. 
143. CA, 1/STB 10/163, H. Viljoen to Lan<l<lrost, 11 April 178 l an<l 21 June 1781. 
144. CJ\, 1/STB 10/163, C. van Wyk to Lan<l<lrnst, 2 Sept. 1781. 
145. P.J. van <ler Merwe, Noordwaarlse llewegi11g, pp.16-19. 
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In the adjacent district of the Roggeveld the San were also committing "braaf kwaat". In late 
December of 1780 a group attacked the Khoikhoi women and children on the fann of the widow 
Erasmus and killed six of them. In such circumstances it seemed safe to send a retaliatory 
commando which consisted entirely of Khoikhoi. The result was that eight of the San were shot 
dead when they were overtaken in the Middle Roggeveld by the vengeful Khoikhoi men.146 In 
1786 some San managed to steal two muskets from the shepherds of Veldwagmeester Gerrit 
Maritz and the latter was furious when his nearest neighbours refused to help him chase the 
robbers.147 The next year Maritz asked that all Khoikhoi who were living in kraals be expelled 
from the district because he suspected that many of them were responsible, along with the San, 
for stealing livestock from the colonists.148 Then, in 1788, San robbers attacked Maritz's fann, 
"Poortegal" near the Sak River and stole virtually all of his sheep.149 In July 1789 the San 
attacked the Roggeveld farn1 of Cornelius Koet, killing three of his "volk" and destroying his 
possessions. Maritz led an unsuccessful commando after the San and complained bitterly about 
the surly, shirking behaviour of his men. Many had sent Khoikhoi servants in their place whilst 
Jan Snyder and Philip Snyman were threatening to give the veldwagtmeesters a hiding.150 In 
September of the same year a group of San, arn1ed with four muskets, stole Cornelius van Wyk's 
cattle and killed three of his servants. The "Bastaards" Gert Willemse and Matthys Scheffer had 
five of their horses killed as well as losing some cattle.151 
By this stage Maritz was ready to resign; because of the constant threat of San to his isolated 
fann behind the Roggeveld; because he was sick, and because he could not keep enough of his 
horses fit for action. His resignation was not accepted, but his desperation is indicative of the 
strength of San resistance in the Roggeveld at the end of the l 780s. l 52 The colonists of this 
district were on the defensive and badly demoralised. 
Throughout the length and breadth of the northern frontier zone, therefore, the 1770s and 1780s 
were years of intense struggle. It would have been remarkable if commando members had not 
carried back with them to their domestic units attitudes which had been acquired during the 
course of commando operations. The pervasive violence, the hatred and contempt of trekboers for 
146. CJ\, i/STll i0/163, I'. Jacobs lo Lan<l<lrosl, 28 Jan. 1781. 
147. CJ\, 1/STB IO/l(J2, G. Marilz lo Lan<l<lrosl, 23 May 1786. 
148. Sec p.275 above. 
149. CJ\, l/STB l0/l(i2, A.II. Krnkke an<l II. Scholtz lo Lan<l<lrosl, l l Nov. 1788; J. van <lcr Wcslhuizen an<l P. 
van <lcr Wcsthu\scn to Lan<l<lrosl, 20 Nov. 1788. 
150. CJ\, l/STll l0/162, Ci Marilz lo Lan<l<lrosl, 16 April 1789 an<l 9 Aug. 1789. 
151 CJ\, 1/STll 10/1(,2, .IA Ne! lo Lan<l<lrosl, IO Sept. 1789. 
152. CJ\, l /STll I 0/1 C,2, (i Marilz lo Lan<l<lrosl, 24 Sept. 1789 an<l 14 Nov. 1789. 
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San life and an ethos of unfree labour, encouraged white fam1ers to treat all non-whites who were 
not actually in the commandos with them as potential enemies or bondsmen. Even Khoikhoi, 
"Bastaard-Hottentot" and "Bastaard" conunando members, however, were not treated as being the 
equals of their white counterparts. It is with this theme - the influence of the conunando system on 
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UNFREE LABOUR AND THE COMMANDO SYSTEM 
The preparations for the General Conunando of 1774 were not solely concerned with deciding the 
fate of the San. They also mark a crucial stage in defining the status of Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" 
and "Bastaard-Hottentots" within the colonial boundaries. In a situation of widespread warfare 
and conunando activity it was very important to define the precise status of all groups within the 
frontier zone, for whoever was not clearly an ally could well be a foe. 
The preliminary meeting of 28 December 1773, on the eve of the General Conunando, was of 
great significance, for here it was realised, from the outset, that nothing could be achieved 
without the assistance of "good and faithful Hottentots".! The reasons for this were that the 
numbers of the colonists were small whereas the country in which they were fighting was vast, 
mountainous and unknown. If all European males were away on commando, large areas of the 
country would be exposed to attack from other groups of Khoisan or from slaves. Friendly 
Khoikhoi could also assist the conuuandos since they were more familiar with the country than 
the colonists and better at tracking down hostile bands in mountainous terrain. They were also 
more willing than the colonists to clamber up to engage these bands - a fact that had been well-
illustrated by the recent success of Captain Kees and his men in the Roggeveld.2 The landdrost 
therefore asked that at the next meeting of the Heemraden and Krygsraad, which the 
veldkorporaals would attend, he be supplied with written returns of the names of those Khoikhoi 
who could handle a firearn1 and who were considered to be trustworthy) 
This order was duly observed and at the next meeting, on 28 March 1774, the first item on the 
agenda was to establish the number of "such able Burghers and Bastard Hottentots" as could be 
employed on the expedition. It was established that "about 100 Europeans, or Christians, and 150 
Bastards and other Hottentots" could be counted on.4 Two things are of interest here: the fact that 
there had been a change in terminology from "Hottentots" to "Bastaard-Hottentots" (or 
"Bastaards and other Hottentots"); and the fact that the latter outnumbered the Europeans. The 
I. Meeting of the combined boards of Landdrost and Heemraden, and the Landdrost and Militia Officers of 
Stellenbosch, 28 Dec. 1773, in Moodie, The Reconi, Prl. III, p.20. 
2. See chapter 5 above. 
3. CJ\, C 655, 28 Dec. 1773. 
4. CJ\, C 655, 28 March 1774. 
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shift in tenninology is not a trivial point for it indicates that there was a growing realisation that 
there was a new social category to be accounted for at the Cape. In fact it would not be an 
exaggeration to state that it was the exigencies of military defence that prompted the official mind 
to attempt to conceptualise or categorise the phenomena of "Bastaards" or "Bastaard-Hottentots". 
The words are rarely found in the records before 1774 but are frequently used thereafter. It was 
important for the authorities to decide what military duties should be expected from - and what 
civic rights should be given to - people of mixed descent or illegitimate birth (either Khoikhoi-
European or Khoikhoi-slave), or both, who could shoot, ride, speak Dutch and profess 
Christianity. In view of the military crisis the authorities were quick to decide that "Bastaard-
Hottentots" and "Bastaards" were eligible for commando service but less quick to grant them 
equality with the Europeans.5 
Those "Bastaard-Hottentots" who served on the General Commando of 1774 in the hope that it 
would enhance their colonial status were speedily disillusioned. Their status was hardly that of 
trusted equals for the ninety muskets that were made available for their use on the conunando 
were "to be secured at night from the accompanying Hottentots" in locked chests.6 It is also 
evident that Khoikhoi or "Bastaard" auxiliaries were employed in the most dangerous situations 
on conunando.7 The consequences of the experience of the General Commando, as far as 
"Bastaards and Hottentots" were concerned, were profound for it meant that, 111 future, 
conunando duty would be perceived of as an onerous, perilous imposition rather than as a status-
enhancing opportunity.8 Despite these drawbacks many Khoikhoi or "Bastaards" continued to 
serve in conunandos after this date and for such people the conunando functioned as an institution 
of colonial acculturation and assimilation. It was better to be a low status member of a 
conunando than a defenceless object of its wrath. Participation in commandos ensured at least 
temporary possession of guns and horses and taught the participants the skills needed to master 
them.9 
5. Pellll, "Labour, land and livestock", p.16. 
6. CA, C 655, 19 April 1774. 
7. This is evident from the many accounts of conunandos which we have, from the casualties amongst commando 
members, and from the high regard in which British ofiicers held Khoikhoi troops when the latter served with 
British forces on the eastern frontier. 
8. In some regions, where Khoisan resistance was not perceived as too great a threat, "Bastaards" were not 
pennitted to join conunandos and suffered discrimination from white fanners. In the Swellendam district in 1780, 
for instance, U1e burghers Willem Plooy and Frederick Zeele refused to let their sons do commando duty on the 
grounds that "they were regarded as bastards and consequently, were not judged good enough to participate in this 
burgher duty". Guelke, "Two Frontier Communi tics", p.441 . 
9. Government orders and colonial prejudices prohibited the Khoikhoi from owning either guns or horses so as to 
prevent U1e111 from posing a threat to the colonists. Forbes, Span111c111, Vol. 1, pp.227-228. 
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There was also the future possibility of fanning independent conunando units beyond the colonial 
frontier. Only a few years after the General Conunando the ve/dwagtmeesters of the northern 
frontier were complaining that "all the Hottentots and Bastaards fit for conunandos are going 
away to the Namaqua country to evade service on conunandos".10 Many of these fugitives, 
however, took with them some of the knowledge and values acquired in the hard school of the 
commando. 
The northward movement of "Bastaards" and Khoikhoi away from the colonists was motivated by 
more than the desire to evade conunando service however. There was a deep fear and suspicion 
amongst them that having one's name recorded by the authorities was a prelude to being 
enslaved: 11 not without reason. For at the same time that the authorities decided that "Bastaard-
Hottentots" were a social category subject to military service they turned their attention towards 
defining their economic status. It was in the same year as the General Commando, 1774, that the 
question of whether "Bastaard-Hottentots" should carry passes was raised. The landdrost of 
Swellendam argued that deserted slaves were pretending to be "Bastaard-Hottentots" to evade 
recapture, and that "Bastaard-Hottentots" frequently deserted their masters as well as committed 
many thefts. The solution, he proposed, was that they should be made to carry passes.12 Although 
the Council of Policy postponed deciding on the issue that year, the resolutions passed by the 
Landdrost and Heemraden of Stellenbosch on 4 September 1775 put the status of "Bastaard-
Hottentots" beyond doubt. Referring to the latter as "swervende schepselen" the officials lamented 
the fact that the women frequently slept with slaves and the masters were obliged to feed the 
offspring. All too often, before the master could benefit from the child's labour, it was removed 
by the free parent to the great loss of its master. It was proposed that a child born of a slave 
father should, on reaching the age of one and a half, be bound to serve the master until the age of 
twenty-five. The only conditions were that such a child should be well cared for and that its name, 
its age, its mother's name and its father's name should be recorded.13 Significantly, all of these 
issues had been raised by some burghers of Stellenbosch in 1721, but had lain donnant until this 
10. CA, 1/STB 10/164, Briewe van Veldwagtmeesters en Private personc, W. Steenkamp to Landdrost, 3 Feb. 
1778; Moodie, The Record, Prt. 111, p. 77. 
11. See for instance the tunnoil caused in Namaqualand when the authorities tried to take a list of the local 
Khoikhoi in 1798. Chapter l O below. 
12. Extract of a letter from the Lan<ldrost and Heemra<lcn of Swcllen<lam to Governor Plettenberg, 25 Oct. 1774, 
Moodie, The Record, Prt. l l l, p.34. 
13. CA, C 655, 4 Sept. l 775. 
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moment.14 This was the origin of the "Ingeboekte Bastaard Hottentotten" and it is not surprising 
that "Bastaards" should have come to view the recording of their names with such fear.15 
As the military struggle intensified, increasing attempts were made by the govenunent to record 
the particulars of "Bastaards" and Khoikhoi. The "Rolle der Ingeschrewene Bastaard 
Inboorlinge", which were kept between 1775 and 1805, list a total of 371 such people for the 
Stellenbosch district.16 We must assume that there were many who were never listed but who 
were treated as if they were. In 1781 a resolution was passed that declared that since runaway 
slaves were still passing themselves off as Khoikhoi, the names of local Khoikhoi should be 
submitted ammally to the veldwagtmeesters. Later that year, when war broke out between 
England and Holland, it was announced that "Bastaards" and Khoikhoi could be called upon to 
defend the colony. After 1787 Khoikhoi had to carry passes whilst "Bastaard-Hottentots" not in 
service became liable to taxation and had to be placed on the opgaaf rol/en. Those "Bastaard-
Hottentots" who refused to participate in conunandos were to be arrested and brought to 
Stellenbosch.17 
The close com1cction between the social, economic and military status of non-European colonial 
subjects may thus be seen and the role of the General Commando in defining this status was 
crucial. Census taking, racial categorisation and conscription lists were all part of the same drive 
towards greater control by the state over potentially rebellious subjects. It is no coincidence that 
this attempt to "place" people, who had previously been rather loosely ordered, should occur at a 
time of intense military crisis. To be unlisted was to be an enemy. 
It is hardly surprising that certain colonists, brought up under the ethos of the conunando system, 
should come to regard the Khoikhoi as belonging to the same category as other fonns of unfree 
labour in the frontier zone. In theory the Khoikhoi were free to come and go as they pleased and 
14. Sec chapter 4, p. 16 l above. 
15. See Peter Delius an<l Stanley Trapi<lo, "lnboekselings an<l Oorlams: The Creation an<l Transfonnation of a 
Servile Class", in 13elin<la Bozzo Ii, (ed.), Town And Co1111tryside In Tlie Tra11svaal (Johannesburg, 1983 ), pp.53-88, 
frir a <liscussion of the survival of this system on the nineteenth century highvcld. Sec also V.C. Malherbe, 
"I11<lcnlurc<l and Unfrcc Labour in South Africa: Towar<ls an Un<lcrstan<ling", South Aji'ican Historical Joumal, 24, 
May 1991, pp.3-30. 
16. CA, l /STB 18/195, Rolle <lcr lngeschrewene Bastaar<l l11booringc. 
l 7. Resolutions of the Council of Policy. RcsoL 9 March l 781; RcsoL 4 an<l 2 April, and Public. 3 April 1781; 
ResoL 20 Nov. 1787, in Papers Relative to the Co11ditio11 and Treatment of the Native Inhabita11ts of Southem 
Aji'ica Withi11 tlie ( 'olo11y of the Cape of Good! lope. Or Bevond the Frontier of that Colony. Part I. Ordered by the 
/ louse of Commo11s to be Printed, l 8 March l 835; CA, C 655, 19 April l 774. ln May l 793 all "1-Iottcntots an<l 
Baslaar<ls" were again callc<l upon to <lo military service. 
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free to hire or withhold their labour at will, being bound only by their contractual agreements 
with their employers. In practice, however, it was hard to accord the subjugated Khoikhoi any 
greater rights than were given to the captive San, slaves or the "ingeboekte Bastaard-Hottentots". 
In the absence of written contracts, abuses were inevitable whilst processes of miscegenation 
amongst the subject labourers tended to blur their distinct economic status. In the eyes of the 
masters all non-whites belonged to a common pool of unfree labour. 
It is, however, important to be aware that there were different types of unfree labour within the 
frontier zone, ranging from chattel slavery to informal clientship, and we should be wary about 
regarding the labour practices applied to any particular group as being either static or inflexible. 
The frontier zone was an area where categories of status, race and personal identity were in a 
state of constant flux so it should not surprise us to learn that labour categories were also in a 
state of fluidity rather than fixity. On the whole though it is true to say that the labour status of 
those who were regarded as Khoikhoi, San, "Bastaard" or "Bastaard-Hottentot" deteriorated 
rapidly and irreversibly during the era of the commando - and that this process was itself largely 
due to the influence of the conunando. But we should not conclude from this that all fonns of 
compulsory labour were a fom1 of nascent slavery. There is a tendency in recent historical work, 
inspired by the revived debate about the nature and origins of the Mfecane, to see slavery, slave 
raiding and slave trading in places where these had not previously been thought to exist.18 Such 
preoccupations have led to a re-examination of the status of Khoikhoi and San labourers within 
the Cape economy and it is obviously important to reconsider the evidence from the northern 
Cape frontier zone very carefully. 
The Cape was a slave society and slaves were to be found within the frontier zone. But we should 
not, therefore, assume that it was either necessary or desirable to reduce all unfree labourers to 
the condition of slavery. Ideas about slavery certainly influenced the treatment of unfree 
labourers, particularly if they were non-European and thus, seemingly, of the same skin colour as 
slaves throughout the domain of European global colonisation. But there was little purpose in 
enslaving Khoikhoi and San if alternative institutions of unfree labour could be created which 
18. The work of Julian Cobbing suggests that U1c disruptions caused lo the social systems of the Highveld in the 
early nineteenth century were not so much caused by the explosive expansion of Zulu imperialism but by slave 
raiding and slave trading emanating from Delagoa Bay and the Cape colony. In order for this to be tl1e case the 
practice of slaving across the colonial frontier would have to have been well established, or semi-institutionalised, 
by the late eighteenth century. For Cobbing's views sec J. Cobbing, "The Mfccanc as Alibi: Thoughts on Dilhakong 
and Mbolompo", Joumal of Afi"ica11 llislot)', 29, 1988, pp.487-519. For further debate on the subject sec the 
essays in Elizabeth Eldredge and Fred Morton, (eds.), S/(ll'e,)' In S0111!, Aji-ica: Caplive [,abour 011 !he D111c/i 
Fron lier (I3oulder, 1994 ). 
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ensured the availability, affordability and docility of what became, in effect, a subject population. 
During the era of the conunando such institutions were created and the frontier farmers had little 
cause to defy the long standing Company ban on the enslavement of the Khoisan.19 
From the earliest years of the colony the authorities in the Netherlands had insisted, despite Van 
Riebeeck's pleas, that the Khoikhoi were not to be enslaved.20 The ostensible reason for this 
forbearance was that enslavement of the pastoralist Khoikhoi would antagonise them, thus 
imperilling the livestock trade and the security of the colony itself. The Dutch reluctance to 
enslaving the indigenous population was, in this instance, similar to the practice of other 
colonising powers who established settlements in foreign countries. It was usually counter-
productive to enslave a person from a geographically contiguous society since members of that 
society might thereby be provoked into exceptionally vigorous resistance. Captive slaves would 
also have a constant incentive to escape and return to the succour of their natal and neighbouring 
society. It is with pragmatic reasons like this in mind that the sociologist Orlando Patterson has 
proposed two important preconditions which need to be in existence before a person can be 
enslaved with any sense of security by another. The slave must, in a sense, be both "socially 
dead" and "natally alienated" .21 By "social death" Patterson means a condition whereby a person 
has lost all social rights and is, figuratively and symbolically, "dead", or at least a non-member of 
that society. Such a status (or lack of it) might be achieved by breaking a strict taboo within one's 
own society (such as by conunitting incest) or by being physically wrenched from the society of 
one's birth (by warfare or kidnapping) and placed as a rightless, kinless alien in a foreign society. 
This latter condition is known as "natal alienation" and implies that the deracinated person is 
"dead" to his natal society.22 
Quite clearly, these two circumstances did not apply to the Khoikhoi. They could not be regarded 
as being either "socially dead" or "natally alienated" since they continued to live in the land of 
their birth amongst their own people. The situation of captive San was, as we have seen, slightly 
different, since those San who became labourers on trekboer farms were frequently the only 
survivors of their natal society. But we may note that, in the strict sense of the word, neither the 
19. M.I. Finley has stated that one of the conditions for creating a demand for slaves is the unavailabity of an 
internal labour supply. M.l. Finley, Ancient Slavery and A!odem Ideology (London, 1980), p.86. Although 
Khoisan labour was considered to be in short supply in the Cape frontier zone it none the less existed, and the 
solution was not to enslave the Khoisan but to ensure their bondage by other means. 
20. Elphick, Khoik/10i, p.181. 
21. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparntive Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1982) pp.35-76. 
22. Ibid. 
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Khoikhoi nor the San were enslaved. Here it is instructive to follow the lead of M.I. Finley and 
the distinction which he made between slavery and other fonns of involuntary labour. For Finley 
the most important distinction is that: 
as a commodity, the slave is property ... some sociologists and historians have 
persistently tried to deny the significance of that simple fact, on the grounds that the 
slave is also a human being or that the owner's rights over a slave are restricted by 
the law. All this seems to me to be futile: the fact that a slave is a human being has 
no relevance to the question whether or not he is also property: it simply reveals that 
he is a peculiar property, Aristotle's "property with a soul".23 
The Khoikhoi and the San were not chattel slaves, nor property, for they could not be bought and 
sold on the market - at least not legally. There were some instances in which San, usually 
children, were treated as chattels and "given" by one person to another.24 Strictly speaking, 
however, such transactions were rare, illegal and cloaked in the guise of more characteristic 
fonns of unfree labour in the frontier zone. San captives were expected to be treated in the same 
way as "ingeboektc Bastaard-Hottentots" and were listed in a similar manner to that of the 
"Bastaard-Hottcntots" .25 The landdrost was supposed to grant permission for San to be placed 
with a colonist and though we can assume that this requirement was frequently ignored the legal 
situation was unambiguous: the Khoikhoi and San were not to be enslaved. 
But as the violence of the frontier became institutionalised and conummdos an almost everyday 
occurrence, the situation and treatment of all forms of unfrce labour within the frontier zone 
deteriorated. Conm1on perceptions were not as punctilious about legal niceties as the statute 
books. Even an educated visitor like Sparrman, who visited the Cape in the 1770s, might be 
excused for making the following remark: "In these times, when the Hottentots for the greater part 
are slaves, it is not to be wondered at, that their manners are subject to changes" .26 Thunberg, 
more accurately, observed that: 
The Hottentots arc considered as allies, and not suffered to be made slaves of; but 
such Hottentots as arc taken prisoner in war, especially if young, are for some time 
the property of the captor, and obliged to serve without wage, but are not to be 
disposed of to others. If any of the colonists take an Hottentot orphan to bring up, it 
must serve, it is true, without wages, till it is twenty-five years old; but, on arriving 
23. Finley. p.73. 
24. Sec below, p.229. 
25. CA, l/STB 18/196, Lyst dcr Sodanigc l'crsooncn dcwclkc volgcns pcnnissic van den Hccre Landdrost hunne 
bij hint woonagtig - Bosjcsmans I Iottcntotcn van sckcrc bcpaaldc jaarcn in haar dicnst mogcn houden. But sec 
pp.223 above. 
26. Forbes, Sparm1w1, Vol. I, p.322. 
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at that age, it is at liberty to go where it pleases, or to continue in service at a stated 
salary.27 
By the end of the eighteenth century Barrow, the most reliable of witnesses, believed that: 
By a resolution of the old govermnent, as unjust as it was inhuman, a peasant was 
allowed to claim as his property, till the age of five-and-twenty, all the children of 
the Hottentots in his service to whom he had given in their infancy a morsel of meat. 
At the expiration of this period the odds are ten to one that the slave is not 
emancipated. A Hottentot knows nothing of his age; "he takes no note of time". And 
though the spirit that dictated this humane law expanded its beneficence in favour of 
the Hottentot by directing the farmer to register the birth of such children as he may 
intend to make his slaves, yet it seldom happens, removed as many of them are to the 
distance of ten or twelve days' journey from the Drostdy, that the Hottentot has an 
opportunity of inquiring when his servitude will expire; and indeed it is a chance if 
he thinks upon or even knows the existence of such a resource. Should he be 
fortunate enough to escape at the end of this period, the best part of his life has been 
spent in profitless servitude, and he is turned adrift in the declines of life (for a 
Hottentot begins to grow old at thirty) without an earthly thing he can call his own 
except the sheep skin upon his back.28 
It is interesting to note how, according to Barrow, the status of "Bastaard-Hottentot" had been 
extended to all Khoikhoi children by the end of the century. Even if his is an exaggerated account 
its significance lies in the fact that he believed it to be true. Certainly, as we consider the 
available evidence more closely, we shall find little to contradict Barrow's impression of the 
declining status of the Khoikhoi. Since the situation of San, "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-
Hottcntots" has already received some attention it is now time to tum more detailed attention to 
the Khoikhoi.29 Although it is not always possible to distinguish between Khoikhoi and San (or, 
for that matter, between Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentots") within the frontier zone it is more 
convenient for our purposes to discuss the experience of Khoikhoi within the colony separately 
from the experience of San societies outside of the colony. It should be remembered, however, 
that the two were linked, particularly by that institution that operated both within and beyond the 
colonial boundaries: the commando. 
27. Forbes, 111111,berg, p.29 l. 
28. Uarrow, Travels, p.146. 
29. Sec pp. l 58-165 above for <lctails of the <lcdining status of "llastaar<ls" an<l "Bastaar<l-llottcntots". Sec also 
pp.288-295 below. 
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KHOIKHOI DURING THE COMMANDO ERA 
By the 1770s most of the Khoikhoi within the colony were working as labourers for white 
fanners. The best land within the winter rainfall area of the Cape was in white hands and the 
Khoikhoi were only allowed onto it if they were prepared to serve the new owners. Those 
Khoikhoi who continued to eke out an existence as independent pastoralists did so in marginal 
areas, with declining stock, and on sufferance from the more powerful colonists about them. They 
were, in most respects, a subject people, obliged to accept the terms which were imposed upon 
them and at the mercy of the colonists. 
Early in the eighteenth century the Company had come to accept the fact that, as conquered 
subjects, the Khoikhoi were entitled to a degree of colonial justice. Some of the initial efforts of 
the authorities at the Cape - to protect the Khoikhoi from violent excesses at the hands of lawless 
colonists - have already been described.30 Even after the frontier war of 1739 the official theory 
was that the Khoikhoi were to be attracted to work for the colonists by kindness rather than by 
coercion,31 but these good intentions, largely ineffectual at the best of times, became more 
difficult to implement once the colony's frontiers had expanded to the distant regions of 
Namaqualand and the Roggcvcld. Between 1740 and 1770 there are occasional instances of 
colonists being brought to book for the mistreatment of Khoikhoi labourers and the principle was 
accepted that the Khoikhoi ought to be paid, no matter how little, for their labour. Wages varied 
from contract to contract and cash and kine were equally acceptable by the middle of the century. 
Twelve Rijksdaalders a year is one example of a wage that \\'as offered in both 1749 and in the 
l 790s.32 Sparnnan records that Khoikhoi who worked on a Company farm in the 1770s received 
the yearly wages, besides food and tobacco, of "a ewe or two with lamb, or a heifer with calf, or 
else the value of them in money" ,33 Other fam1crs did not offer cash and as late as 1800, in the 
remote districts of the Roggcvcld and Bokkcvcld, Khoikhoi labourers could expect to be paid in 
an assortment of ewes (between one or six per person a year), clothes, beads and tinder-boxes for 
their labour. All too many appear to have received nothing except "kos en klcre", i.e., food and 
clothes.34 
30. Sec chapter 2, pp. 76-81 above. 
31. In 1748, for instance, Commissioner Nolthenius urged the Governor and his Council not to alienate the 
Khoikhoi but "door vriendeijkheid aangclokt werden om den boer sijn wcrk tc hcpen verigtcn door bchoorlijk 
loon". Quoted by Bocsckcn, "Ncderlandsc Konunissarisse", p.43. 
32. Ibid., p.77 and 11.14. 
33. Forbes, Sparrma11, Vol. I, p.181. 
34. The wages ol' a great many frontier Khoikhoi around the year 1800 nw\ lx: found listed in the opga<!f" lists 
contained in Cl\, 1/STB 10/150, lnkomcnde Bricwc van Vcldwagtmccstcrs cn l'nvatc Personc. 
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The Diedericks' case of 1763 is evidence that the Company did not feel it could tum a blind eye to 
the barbaric murder of Khoikhoi servants by sadistic frontiersmen.35 Dideriks was banished to 
Robben Island for twenty-five years and there arc several other examples from the 1760s where 
Dutch colonists were expelled from the Cape, and even sentenced to death, for the murder of a 
Khoikhoi.36 There is also evidence of the Company's concern for the rights of the Khoikhoi in the 
instructions which the Council of Policy sent to the landdrost of Swellendam in 1768. He was 
advised that he should not only be vigilant in acting against the mistreatment of the Khoikhoi but 
that he should also ensure that they were not prevented, by intimidation or hindrance, from 
presenting their grievances before the authorities.37 Such instructions were, of course, tacit 
recognition of the fact that Khoikhoi were being mistreated and prevented from seeking justice. 
The situation became much worse, however, during the period of protracted military crisis which 
began in the 1770s. 
We have already seen how almost continuous compulsory conm1ando service added to the 
hardships which Khoikhoi labourers had to bear.38 We have also noted how regulations and 
restrictions, which were first applied to "Bastaard-Hottentots" in order to ensure their military 
availability, were later applied to the Khoikhoi as well. A further influence which became 
apparent as the frontier zone became a war zone was that violence came to penneate every aspect 
of life, particularly the way in which the Khoikhoi were treated. 
It is difficult to quantify or qualify this statement precisely, even though the records bear 
testimony to an increase in both the number of incidents of violence and an intensification in the 
cruelty with which the Khoikhoi were treated. It might be argued that this impression is simply 
the result of better documentation for the years after 1770. It might also be argued that the real 
reason for this increased oppression was not simply the climate of ceaseless military struggle but 
a situation of economic distress which caused the colonists to increase the level of exploitation of 
their Khoikhoi labourers. At the most fundamental level military and economic aspects were 
certainly intertwined since prosperity, in a pastoralist society, was dependent on an expanding 
frontier. Once the frontier ceased to advance greater pressures would be placed upon all those 
reliant on gaining access to resources of land, labour and livestock. But the basic point to be 
35. Sec chapter 5 above. 
36. Boeseken, "Ne<lcrlan<lse Kommissarisse", p. 78. 
37. lbi<l., p.77. Sec also Wayne Dooling, Law and Community in a Slave Society: Stellenbosch District, South 
Aji-ica, c.1760-1820 (Cape Town, 1992 ), pp.29-40 an<l 63-64 for a discussion about the legal status of Khoikhoi and 
the cases in quc~lion. 
38. Sec chapter 5, p.20 I above. 
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made here is that increased levels of domestic violence were a concomitant of the escalation of 
military violence. 
One of the first examples which illustrates this inter-connection is that of the conduct of Carel 
Hendrik Buijtendag of the Koue Bokkeveld. At the same time as the General Commando was 
attempting to pacify the San, Buijtendag was busy treating his Khoikhoi labourers with the 
utmost brutality. He withheld their wages, prevented them from leaving his service and beat to 
death those he thought guilty of negligence.39 One cannot help thinking that Buijtendag was 
inspired to his acts of cruelty by the knowledge that people like his neighbour, Veldwagtmeester 
Nicolaas van der Merwe, were busy exterminating San with impunity on the General Commando. 
Ironically, Buijtendag would probably never have been brought to judgement were it not that he 
had antagonised Van der Merwe, and other burghers of the Koue Bokkeveld, by interfering with 
their own control over the Khoikhoi labourers of the district. Buijtendag was expelled from the 
Koue Bokkeveld but his expulsion did not mean that the lot of the Khoikhoi improved.40 Far from 
it. 
By far the most common complaint of Khoikhoi labourers in the frontier zone was that they could 
not leave the service of a white fanner once their period of contract had expired. They would 
sometimes suffer a crude fonn of physical restraint but a far more effective means of control was 
to prevent the departure of a man's wife and children. With his family held as hostage a man had 
little joy in freedom of movement. If a man was without family ties he might yet be reluctant to 
leave a master's employment when that master, as often happened, refused to pay him his wages -
unless he worked for a further term. By the end of the century this practice had become so 
prevalent as to be the nonn. Early in the nineteenth century Colonel Collins commented as such: 
A Hottentot can now seldom get away at the expiration of his tem1. If he should 
happen not to be in debt to his master, which he must have more caution than is 
characteristic of his race to prevent, he is not allowed to take his children, or he is 
detained under some frivolous pretence, such as that of cattle having died through 
his neglect, and he is not permitted to satisfy any demands of this nature otherwise 
than by personal service.41 
39. Sec N.G. Penn, "Anarchy and Authority in the Kouc Bokkcveld, 1739-1779: the Banishing of Carel 
Uuijtcndag", Kleio, XVI I, 1985, pp.24-43, for a full discussion of this case. 
40. Ibid. 
4 l. Collins, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. V, p.22. 
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The emphasis which colonial farmers placed on restricting the freedom of movement of the 
Khoikhoi suggests both that labour was scarce and very necessary to the trekboer economy.42 
We should not, however, believe that there was a simple correlation between the number of units 
of labour a fanner could command, the number of units of stock which could therefore be 
maintained, and the size of the profit which would thus be realised. To some extent this was the 
case but in African societies a man's status was frequently linked to the size of his following. 
Social and political power, not only economic power, flowed from the control of people.43 In this 
respect trekboers who sought to augment the numbers of their "volk" were motivated by the same 
impulses as those which had motivated the Khoikhoi chieftains whom they had replaced. The 
logic of the frontier was not always the same as the logic of the market. The competition of 
frontier fanners for Khoikhoi labour frequently contributed, paradoxically, to the instability of 
the labour supply. Khoikhoi were sometimes tempted to seek a better life elsewhere. Such a life 
was not always necessarily beyond the limits of the colony. There were occasions when a 
Khoikhoi labourer sought to leave a fanner simply in order to search for higher wages or better 
conditions of service. The fact that some farn1ers were in a position to offer these caused 
considerable confusion concerning the allegedly "free" status of the Khoikhoi. This is well 
illustrated in a letter which Veldkorporaal Botma wrote in 1779: 
I also request to be instructed how to act in such cases as this. Hottentots 
deserting from one person and going to another, and then the men come to me for 
my assistance to get back their servants, as has happened today with Antonie 
Botes, and the servant of Pieter van der By!, named J. Stols, who has a Hottentot 
of Botes, and Botes demands the Hottentot, and the said Stols will not give him 
up, and says they are a free people who may live where they will; and then I 
asked him if that was his reason for keeping the Hottentot? and he then said not 
exactly that, but we agreed together that I should keep the Hottentot.44 
In this instance the judgement that was passed concerning the allocation of Khoikhoi labour 
favoured the man who, by virtue of his control over the local commando, had the most power: 
the veldkorporaa/ himself. Indeed, as time went by the commando was not only used to acquire 
labour from beyond the colonial frontier. It was also used as a force within the colonial frontier, 
whose function it was to keep subjugated labourers docile and to ensure that the labour 
requirements of conunando members were met. An incident from 1792 illustrates both the 
42. A point made by l3arrow in his Travels, pp.162-163. 
43. This is a point made by many or those who have written on indigenous slavery in Africa. See for instance P.E. 
Lovejoy, Tra11s/ormalio11s in Slavery: A I lislory of Slavery in Afi'ica (Cambridge, 1991) and C. Meillassaux, n,e 
A111hropology o/Slaverv: !he Womb o(/ro11 and Goh! (Chicago, 1991 ). 
44. C. Botma to Landdrost, 7 Dec. 1779, in Moodie, '/'/,e Record, l'rt. 111, p.88. 
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declining status of Khoikhoi labourers and the way the commando system could be adapted to 
cater for the labour requirements of local frontier fanners. 
In July 1792 two Khoikhoi men, the cousins Piet Pieterse and Jantje Mattroos, were at a kraal on 
a farm belonging to Barend Pienaar. Pieterse had worked for Ve/dwagtmeester Pieter Jacobs for 
eight years but in 1791 had got permission from Jacobs to go and visit his brother. He took his 
entire family with him but returned after a few months to enquire of Jacobs' mother, the widow 
Jacobs, whether there was a farm for him to graze his stock. He was told that there was none to 
be had so he left, after a polite farewell, for Barend Pienaar's farm.45 Jantje Mattroos had been 
hired to work for a two year period by Jonathan Fourie of the Touw. After two and a half years 
he asked whether he could go and visit some friends. Fourie refused him permission but Mattroos 
left anyway, visiting another cousin of his, Maurits, on the fann of widow Jacobs. From here he 
went, with Pieterse and two other Khoikhoi named Cupido and Hendrik, to the kraal at Barend 
Pienaar's farm.46 
One morning at about eight o'clock a group of eight mounted men, led by Veldwagtmeester Pieter 
Jacobs, approached the kraal. There were four Europeans and four Khoikhoi. To Pieterse and 
Mattroos it looked exactly like a commando on the warpath. Mattroos panicked, fearful that it 
was coming to attack them instead of the San. He ran away and hid himself behind the kraal, but 
his flight was seen. One of the commando members, Stephanus Jacobs, hauled him out and drove 
him, with many blows of his sjambok, into the open. He then clubbed the elderly Mattroos to the 
ground with the butt of his flintlock, opening a large wound in the man's skull. On instructions 
from Veldwagtmeester Jacobs the four Khoikhoi conunando members held down Pieterse, 
Mattroos, Cupido and Hendrik whilst Pieter Jacobs and Philip Rasmus flogged them with a 
sjambok for a good half an hour. At the end of this beating Pieter Jacobs ordered Pieterse to lift 
up Mattroos, who was quite unable to stand, and declared that if he could not walk he would be 
tied behind his horse and dragged away. Rasmus gave Mattroos a piece of bread in order to 
encourage him but when the Khoikhoi could not take it he was given a kick and a further blow 
from the sjambok instead. The white masters then declared that Mattroos must be a "schelm" 
because he had tried to run away. In the end, though, they did not drag him off, perhaps because 
of his weakened condition. He had wounds about his head and left eye as well as a huge wound 
45. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Verklarings, Pleidooie en Interrogatoricn (Krimincel), 1786-1793, Relaas van Hottentot Piet 
l'ielcrse, 25 July, 1792. From the loan-fann records it would appear as though Barend Pienaar's fann was 
"Verkeerdc Valley" in the 13okkcvcld. Ci\, RLR 34, p.2. 
46. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hotlentot Janlje Matlroos, 25 July l 792. 
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on his back that was still visible two weeks later. He was, in addition, unable to use his fingers 
for in the past, whilst working for Jacobus Mijburg in the Roggeveld, a flintlock had exploded in 
his hands and shattered them. Cupido, however, was not so incapacitated and the commando took 
him away, forcing him to work for Stephanus Jacobs even though he was hired to someone else.47 
Shortly after this Pieter Jacobs seized two young children from Pieterse's wife when the latter was 
visiting her parents on Jacob's fann. This obliged the woman to stay on the fam1 as well. When 
Pieterse went to ask Jacobs when his wife and children would be freed the answer was: "When 
you hire yourself to Philip Rasmus". Since Pieterse was already hired to Barend Pienaar he did 
not know what to do and it was doubtless at the urging of Pienaar that he went before the 
landdrost to complain.48 
It may be seen from the above that commandos were sometimes used to keep Khoikhoi labourers 
from working for certain fanners and fim1ly bound to others. In this case the commando was 
dominated by the Jacobs family (tl1e Jacobses were related by marriage to the Rasmuses, or, 
Erasmuses)49 and served its interests. But even without the backing of a commando behind them 
fanners of the frontier zone were used to treating their Khoikhoi servants as though their 
contracts had limitless duration. The situation was particularly bad in the Roggeveld and 
Bokkeveld and it is no coincidence that these were districts in which there was constant 
conunando activity. Numerous examples could be cited to support this contention but a few will 
suffice. Two Khoikhoi servants of Willem Sterrenberg Pretorius had worked for him for over ten 
years. At the end of this period they were prevented from leaving with their wages despite having 
received the landdrost's pennission. Pretorius flogged them severely and withheld all but a 
fraction of their eamings.50 In March 1794 the authorities learnt of a young Khoikhoi lad, Jantje, 
who had been taken from his uncle at least five times, beaten and chained by Willem Steenkamp 
of the Roggeveld.51 That same year Toontje, who worked for Pieter Jooste of the Bokkeveld, 
wanted to leave and take his wife, Else, with him. Jooste infom1ed him that Else was "ingeboekt", 
or a "Bastaard-Hottentot" and could not leave. Toontje took the matter to the landdrost who 
confinned to Toontje that Else did indeed have to stay with Jooste. Toontje, though, was free, and 
47. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Piel Pieterse and Jantje Mattroos, 25 July 1792. 
48. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Piel Pieterse, 25 July 1792. 111e Jacobs family fann was "I-let 
Drogeland" in the Agler Bokkeveld. CA, RLR 37, p.62. 
49. De Villiers and Pama, Geslagsregisters, Vol. I, pp.354-355 and 204. Philip Rasmus's sister, Martha Francina, 
was married to Danie, brother of Pieter and Stephanus Jacobs. 
50. CA, 1/STB 3/13 Kriminecle Verklaaringen, 1793-1796, Rclaas van Hottentots Wildchut en Frederik Platje, 5 
March 1794. 
51. CA, I /STU 3/13, Rclaas van Hottentot Jantje, 24 March 1794. 
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he tried to get a nearby farmer, Wessel Pretorius, to hire him. When Jooste heard of Toontje's 
insolent initiative he attempted to tie him up and, after he broke free, shot at him. Fortunately 
Pretorius intervened and deflected the gun, but Jooste withheld twenty sheep and a horse that 
rightfully belonged to Toontje.52 
It was not only in the withholding of wages or the restriction of freedom of movement that ill 
treatment of Khoikhoi labourers was evident. Many instances have already been given of the 
savage punishments which were afflicted upon the Khoikhoi by their masters. Barrow remarked 
that: 
Beating and cutting with thongs of the hide of the sea-cow or rhinoceros, are only 
gentle punishments; though these sort of whips, which they call sjan1bocs, are most 
horrid instruments, being tough, pliant, and heavy almost as lead. Firing small shot 
into the legs and thighs of a Hottentot, is a punisment not unknown to these 
monsters ... Instant death is not unfrequenty the consequence of punishing these poor 
wretches in a moment of rage. This is of little consequence to the farmer; for though 
they are to all intents and purposes his slaves, yet they are not transferable property. 
It is this circumstance which, in his mind, makes their lives less valuable and their 
treatment more inhuman. 53 
The cruelties which Barrow describes (and which are well documented in the archival records) 
would seem to have been fuelled by an extraordinary animus. There was clearly more at issue 
here than the desire to screw the maximum amount of labour from a person. Unbridled economic 
exploitation does not necessarily entail the maiming or destruction of one's own labour force. The 
alleged idleness of the Khoikhoi, which had reached legendary proportions both within and 
beyond the colony, may have provoked some fanners into acts of savagery but, given the scarcity 
of Khoikhoi labour, such behaviour seems self-defeating.54 Barrow noted that the Khoikhoi were 
treated far worse than slaves and he was not the only observer to do so. This, indeed, is an 
instance where the non-slave status of the Khoikhoi counted against them for a slave, being 
property, had value whereas the Khoikhoi labourer, not being a slave, had less value. Andries 
Stockenstrom wrote perceptively on this point when questioned by the Aborigines Protection 
Society in 1835: 
52. CA, I/STU 3/13, Relaas van 1-Ioltcntotlin Caltryn en Relaas van llottcnlot Toontjc, 24 Nov. 1794. 
53. Barrow, Travels, p.145. 
54. For some of the many references lo idleness amongst the Khoikhoi sec Uarrow, Travels, pp.144 and 152; 
Forbes, Tl11111berg, pp.174 and 316; Forbes, Spanman, Vol. I, p.210. Sec also J.M. Coclzcc "Idleness in South 
Africa" in J.M. Coetzec, White Writing: Un the C11lt11re ojLetters in So11//, Africa (Sandton, 1988), pp.12-35. 
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... Hottentots ... were decidedly in a more degraded condition than the slaves, in every 
respect, except that they were not saleable, and this very advantage was itself the 
cause of that greater degradation. They were employed in every species of 
occupation in which slaves were employed, subject to the same description of 
coercion and punishment; they were certainly not so well fed as the slaves, and 
seldom clad; there was not that interest to render them comfortable which operated 
in favour of the slaves; the dangers and privation to which the slave owner would 
never think of exposing· the slave would be forced upon the Hottentot without 
scruple or hesitation.55 
But it was not simply their non-slave status which caused Khoikhoi to be treated so badly and the 
question remains: why were so many frontier fanners so cruel to their labourers? Susan Newton-
King has considered the plight of the Khoisan labourers of the eastern Cape frontier zone between 
the years 1760 and 1799 with a similar question in mind. In her pioneering and painstaking work 
she has conclusively proved the close connections which existed between the frontier farmers of 
the eastern Cape and the market economy based on Cape Town.56 She has demonstrated that, on 
the whole, during her period of enquiry, the majority of farn1ers were experiencing real difficulties 
in paying for the necessary commodities which bound them to the Cape Town market. Poverty 
and hardship were the order of the day and she speculates that economic pressures and financial 
insecurity were some of the main factors which caused frontier settlers to increase the level of 
exploitation of their Khoisan labourers.57 
Newton-King's detailed, statistical research into the economics of frontier life is certain to remain 
unassailable for many years to come and her picture of shrinking profit margins is no doubt 
correct. It is also, no doubt, possible to extrapolate such findings to the northern frontier zone of 
the Cape, for although this region was more marginal, and of smaller economic significance, than 
the eastern frontier zone the same economic forces would have applied. Indeed, the region's 
greater poverty and harsher environmental conditions might even have exacerbated the problems. 
It should, however, be noted that it is possible for historians to draw the conclusions of their 
choice from quite contradictory sets of data. If, for instance, Newton-King's research had shown a 
broadly based tendency to increasing prosperity in the eastern frontier regions it would not have 
been too difficult to argue that a logical response to such a boom period would have been for 
55. Captain A. Stockenstrom, Minutes Of Evidence Before Select Committee On Aborigines (British Settlements), 
28 Aug. 1835, in Report From The Select Commitlee On Aborigines (British Settlements), Imperial Blue Book, 1836 
nr VJ I, 538 Facsimile Reprint (Cape To\\11, 1966), p.153. 
56. Susan Newton-King, "The Enemy Within: The strnggle for ascendancy on the Cape Eastern frontier 1760-
1799" (PhD, University of London, 1992). 
57. Ibid., pp.315-356. 
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settlers to increase the level of exploitation of their labour. This is merely a hypothesis and should 
not suggest that Newton-King is wrong. It is simply a reminder to be cautious about interpreting 
and applying economic data and to be alert to the fact that the mistreatment of labour on the 
frontier might have more than one explanation. Newton-King is herself aware of these difficulties 
and suggests two other reasons, closely interlinked, to account for trekboer barbarities. The first 
of these is the notion that the frontier settlers regarded the Khoisan as a species of heathen 
"other", or "schepsel". The second is that the endemic violence of the frontier, with its almost 
continuous war between colonists and Khoisan, contributed to an atmosphere in which "the other" 
was also regarded as "the enemy".58 These interlinked concepts are ones that have long informed 
our understanding of the dynamics of the Cape frontier zone. They constitute, in fact, a 
cornerstone of the "frontier thesis" against which Legassick cautioned in the 1970s.59 They 
retain, however, great explanatory value and Newton-King is surely correct to stress them. Quite 
clearly there was a combination of forces contributing to the cruel treatment of the Khoisan: 
economic exploitation, "racist" ideology and a state of continuous warfare within the frontier 
zone. The institution of the conunando exemplified this trilogy and it is for this reason that it 
remains central to our concerns. 
By the 1780s and 1790s the pressures upon Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentots" within the 
colony had reached intolerable levels. Increasingly the oppressed labourers of the frontier zone 
sought to resist their bondage by flight, protest to the authorities or rebellion. Of these forms of 
resistance flight, or desertion, was the most conunon and the frontier farn1ers would sometimes 
sooner kill a Khoikhoi labourer than pennit him to escape. This was particularly likely if the 
farmers suspected that the absconding servant was going to complain to the authorities. Since 
most of our knowledge about the abuse of Khoikhoi labourers is derived from the testimony of 
Khoikhoi who did succeed in reaching the Stellenbosch drostdy to complain it is clear that not all 
complainants were prevented from seeking justice. A study of court records from the 1770s until 
the begi1ming of the nineteenth century suggests that a Khoikhoi complainant frequently had a 
white farmer behind him who had urged him to report his grievances.60 Such support usually 
meant that a particular fanner or veldwagtmeester had had enough of the anti-social behaviour of 
one of his neighbours, particularly if this interfered with his own claims to Khoikhoi labour or 
58. Ibid., sec especially chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
59. Newton-King discusses this point in her postscript, p.392. 
60. For instance, when the children of the female Khoikhoi Callryn were taken from her by force by some 
Uokkcvcld fanners the widow Prclorius, with whom she was staying, insisted that they needed written orders from 
the govenunenl. When they kidnapped them regardless the widow urged Cattryn to go lo the authorities. CA, 
I/STU 3/13, Rclaas van Hottentolin Catlryn, 22 May 1794. 
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undennined his authority. This was clearly the case in the Buijtendag trial of the 1770s and it was 
also the case with Jochem Scholtz, whose humiliation of the veldwagtmeesters or veld cornets of 
the Roggeveld brought him under official scrutiny towards the turn of the century.61 
It is significant that the number of Khoikhoi whose complaints were recorded at Stellenbosch 
increased from about 1792 onwards. This could either mean that brutality was on the increase or 
that the Khoikhoi were encouraged by rumours of reform (attendant on the arrival of 
Conunissioners Nederburgh and Frijkenius in 1792 and the enquiries into crimes against the 
Khoikhoi initiated by Commissioner Sluysken in 1793 )62 to bring their complaints before the 
authorities. In fact, a combination of both increased brutality and official vigilance is the most 
likely reason for the upsurge in recorded Khoikhoi complaints after 1792. We should also note 
that the late 1780s and early 1790s were years of economic crisis at the Cape and this would 
seem to support Newton-King's argument about the correlation between economic hardship and 
greater oppression of the labour force.63 After the British occupation in 1795, and an economic 
boom, there was a renewed emphasis on more humane treatment for the Khoikhoi and the 
govenunent urged for greater vigilance from the frontier officials and landdrosts. The 
exasperation of Landdrost van der Riet of Stellenbosch, in a letter which he wrote to the veld 
cornet of the Middle Roggevcld in 1799, is testimony to the new spirit of official concern for 
Khoikhoi rights by that date. It was also a long overdue attempt to clarify the legal status of the 
Khoikhoi: 
Ik kan ook niet om heer myn verwondering u. w. te betuigen, waar een zoodanig 
ordre van daan komt dat een Hottentot een pas hebben moet, dit versta ik 
volstrekt niet, zy zyn vrij, en as zy hun tydt hebben uijtgedient begeer ik dat zy 
gaan zullen, waar en ziy wie zy willen.64 
In this instance, the chief cause of the landdrost's wrath was Jochem Scholtz of the Roggeveld.65 
Scholtz had the reputation of being one of the biggest trouble-makers in the Roggeveld, and not 
61. For Buijtcn<lag sec Penn, "I3uijten<lag" an<l for Scholtz sec below pp.270-272, 427. 
62. Boeseken, "Ne<lcrlan<lsc Kommissarissc", pp. 85-92. 
63. For the i<lea of a wi<lesprea<l colonial crisis at this time sec An<lre du Toil an<l Hennann Giliomce, Afrikaner 
Political Thought: Analysis and Documents, Vol. I 1780-1850 (Cape To\\11, 1983 ), pp.28-39. For a more specific 
consideration of the financial and administrative chaos of the colony on the eve of the British occupation see M. 
Boucher an<l N. Penn ( e<ls. ), Britain at the Cape l 795-1803 (Johannesburg, 1992 ), pp.125-133. 
64. CA, l/STI3 20/30, Uitgaan<lc Bricwc van Lan<l<lrosts, Nov. 1795-Dcc. 1801, Land<lrosl to F. Visser, 10 Jan. 
1799. "I also cannot help expressing my surprise to you about where such an or<ler came from that a Hottentot 
must have a pass, I <lo not un<lcrstan<l that al all; they arc free, an<l my wish is that, if they have scrvc<l their time, 
they shoul<l bc allowc<l to go whcrcvcr they wish." 
65. For Scholtz sec Penn, "!)roster Gangs", pp.20-40. 
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just because of his bulk. He was, as it happened, "a man of inunense size, so much so that he 
could not wear the usual articles of clothing; his daily dress was a night gown and a shirt" .66 By 
the 1790s Scholtz had registered three fam1s along the Riet River in the Roggeveld and at least 
one other in the Skurweberg.67 His father had farmed in the district since 175668 and his brother, 
Hennanus, was nearby to lend a hand.69 The two brothers had a history of mistreatment of their 
labour and were plagued by desertions. 70 In 1799 Scholtz had employed a certain Cupido Jantje 
for thirteen years but would not release him, his wife, his children nor his livestock. Van der Riet 
threatened to send dragoons to force Scholtz to comply with his orders.71 But, for the most part, 
official action against those who had withheld Khoikhoi wages or restricted their freedom of 
movement amounted to a letter from the landdrost ordering them to rectify their error 
inunediately. If this letter was ignored the local veldwagtmeester might be asked to intervene and 
if his authority was challenged there was frequently an impasse. Scholtz, for instance, actually 
struck veld cornet Gerrit Maritz in 1801 after repeated official complaints about the way in 
which Scholtz treated his labourers and ignored hunting restrictions.72 Since Scholtz was of 
gigantic proportions there was little that Maritz could do except to decline the offer to continue 
66. These arc the observations of Petms Borchardus Borcher<ls who encountered Scholtz whilst travelling through 
the Skurwebcrg in March 1802. P.B. Borcher<ls, An Autobiographical Memoir (Cape Town, 1861 ), p. l 07. 
67. Scholtz's frmns were "<le Een<le Kuijl - agter de Roggeveld aan de Riel Rivier", "<le Elandsberg - agter de 
Roggcvel<l aan <le Riel Rivier" and "de Baviaans Drill - agler op de Roggevcl<l aan <le Riet Rivier". CA, RLR 34, 
28 Feb. 1786, p.154 and 24 July 1785; RLR 36, 6 July 1790, p.232. "Elan<lsberg" and "Een<lekuijl" were taken 
over by the Olivier family in 1787 and 1788. Borchcr<ls described Scholtz's fannhouse in the Skurweberg in 1802. 
(See note 66 above). 
68. Scholtz was known as Jochem (or Joachim) the younger since his father, Jan Joachim, was also called Jochem. 
Jochem senior registered "Roggccloor' in the Roggevcld on 9 Sept. 1756 (CA, RLR 14, p.180). It is probable that 
he retired from limning in 1784 when his current fann, "Droogelan<l", was taken over by Dan Jacobs (CA, RLR 31, 
p.86). See De Villiers and Pama, Ges/agsregisters, Vol. 2, p.856 for the Scholtz family genealogy. 
69. Hennanus registered "<le Matjes Cloof aan de Klipfontein geleegen<l in Mi<l<lclslc Roggcveld" in 1776 (CA, 
IUJR 24, p.75). He was eight years older than Jochcm. 
70. See Pctm, "Drosler Gangs" for an account of the adventures of Adam, the droster slave who fled from Jochem 
Scholtz in 1793. In 1792 a group of Khoikhoi deserted from Hennanus Scholtz and were so afraid of being 
recaptured that they killed one of their own babies to slop it from crying and thereby giving away their hiding place. 
Pcm1, "Droslcr Gangs", pp.22-23; CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Jan Swart, 22 June 1793. 
71. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Lan<l<lrosl to Scholtz, IO Jan. 1799. On this occasion the /a11ddrost delivered the following 
significant remarks: "lk kan my nict gcuocg (?] <leser <lat men by u in hcl veld mil ccn i<lcc bchccll is als of een 
Ilollcnlol ccns by ejman<l in <licnsl verhuurt is, vcrplig is gc<luuren<le zyn lcelly<l le blyven <liencn". (I cmmot 
contcnl myscir with the knowledge that there are men in the field with you who have the idea that a Hottentot, once 
hired by somebody, is compelled to keep serving for a lilctime). Scholtz's outraged reply lo the accusations of the 
"schclm Hottentot" (who, according to Scholtz, had not only stolen guns, horses and o:,.;cn from him whilst deserting 
but abandoned his real wife for a whore) may be read in CA, I/STU 10/150, Briewc van Vcldkomelle en Private 
l'ersonc, 1787-180 I, Scholtz lo Lan<ldrosl, 15 Oct. 1799. 
72. Sec p.427 below for the context of this incident. 
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the fight out of sight of witnesses. The "gewelt hebber in moetwillige rust verstoorder" actually 
had the audacity to write to the landdrost telling him to keep his "veldwagters" off his farm.73 
Scholtz's strength and distance from the drostdy of Stellenbosch seem to have enabled him to do 
as he pleased. It would be a long time before the authorities in Cape Town or Stellenbosch would 
be able to protect the unfree labourers of the frontier zone from the cruelties of their masters and 
for many it was much too late. Not all Khoikhoi either dared to, or succeeded in, registering their 
grievances with the landdrost. The story of Claas Cupido is a grim reminder of the fate of other, 
less fortunate supplicants. 
Cupido had worked for Frederik Spangenberg in the Hantam for four years. In 1794, at the end 
of his period of service, he wanted to leave so that he could hire himself to Joseph Spangenberg 
for higher wages. On leaving Frederik Spangenberg Cupido was owed four sheep and an ox, but 
these were withheld from him. Taking his wife and children with him he decided to go and 
complain to the authorities. About an hour after leaving Frederik Spangenberg's fann Cupido and 
his family were stopped by some horsemen. There were three men, Andries Gous, Hannes Gous 
and their Khoikhoi servant Constapel. All had guns. Andries Gous asked Cupido where he was 
going and he replied that he was going "naar boven de Groot Baas"(to the big boss).74 
"What are you going to do there?" asked Andries Gous. 
"You know yourself Baas how it is with me, that Spangenberg won't give me my livestock." 
The three men climbed off their horses and Hannes Gous said to Constapel: "Toe, schiet klon." 
As Cupido heard these words the moisture left his throat ("die damp uit de keel vlieg"). 
"Dit is lcelyk Baas om mak volk te scheeten," protested the unhappy Constapel. 
"Hottentot schiet, of ik sal jouw ribben met de kogel sniessen," Gous replied mercilessly. 
Whilst Constapel reluctantly loaded his gun he contrived to let it off harmlessly. The impatient 
Hannes Gous then took his own musket and, loading deliberately, said: "Wagt Hottentot nou sal 
ik jou schieten want myn snelden is goet" .75 
He fired. The bullet passed through Cupido's body without dropping him. Gous reloaded and shot 
again. This time the bullet went through Cupido's right leg and he fell to earth. The Gouses and 
73. CA, 1/STB 10/153, IJricwc van Veld Kometten en Private Personen, 1801-1802, C. Esterlmijse, N. Olivier 
and A. Olivier to Landdrost, 15 Feb. 180 I; G. Maritz to Landdrost, 15 Feb. 180 I; G. Maritz to Landdrost, 13 
August 180 I. Maritz referred to Scholtz as a "tyrant and mischievous disturber of the peace". 
74. CA, 1/STIJ 3/13 Rclaas of Hottentot Claus Cupido, 24 Nov. 1794. 
75. The English translation of the Dutch is as follows: "Right, shoot klon." (A "klonkic" is a vulgar expression for 
a coloured boy). "It is ugly, Boss, lo shoot lame people." "Ilollcnlol shoot or I'll cul your ribs with a bullet." "Wail 
I-Iollcnlol, now I'll shoot you because my aim is good." 
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Constapel rode away, leaving Cupido to be tended by his family. Miraculously he recovered 
sufficiently to make the long journey southwards to tell his tale.76 
Quite why it was the Gouses (and not Frederik Spangenberg) who tried to kill Cupido is not clear 
for their relationship with Spangenberg cannot be established. Their actions, however, were 
obviously aimed at preventing Cupido from testifying and their scant respect for Khoikhoi life 
was an indication that the distinctions between "mak", or "tame" Khoikhoi and "wilde", or "wild" 
Khoikhoi had broken down. This distinction, and that between "Bastaards" and independent (and 
therefore potentially dangerous) Khoikhoi had already been wearing thin in the early 1770s - as 
the evidence for the causes of the Roggeveld rebellion reveals.77 Frontier farmers obviously felt 
that it was quite legitimate to regard any troublesome Khoikhoi as an enemy and that they could 
therefore be dealt with as a commando would have dealt with a foe. The incident suggests that 
there must have been many Khoikhoi who were murdered, in order to silence them, and whose 
stories, consequently, never were told. 
In the face of such treatment it is hardly surprising that some Khoikhoi began to contemplate 
fonns of resistance less passive than flight or the registering of a complaint before the authorities. 
There were frequent complaints by colonists about the reluctance of Khoikhoi to enter service, 
and periodic waves of fear would sweep the countryside when rumours of a Khoikhoi uprising 
went from district to district. In October 1788, for instance, there was an extraordinary 
disturbance amongst the Khoikhoi of the Overberg region. A Khoikhoi by the name of Jan Pare!, 
who styled himself as "Onse Liewe Heer", began to preach a message of millenarian import. Pare! 
instructed his followers to bum their European clothes, slaughter all of their white cattle and 
build new straw huts with two doors. They were then to take up their traditional weapons of 
bows, arrows and assegais and gather at the kraals of Oude Dally and Willem Stompe at 
Riviersonderend. 78 
It is not exactly certain what events were supposed to result from compliance with these 
instructions but when local farmers saw hundreds of Khoikhoi assembling in the neighbourhood 
they anticipated an attack on the Swcllendam drostdy. The movement was well supported by 
Khoikhoi women and also attracted slave adhcrents.79 Simultaneous disturbances amongst the 
76. His new employer, An<lrics Gouscn, whose wile ha<l assiste<l with tcn<ling his woun<ls, gave him three weeks 
off work to lodge his complaint. CA, I/STI3 3/13, Relaas van Hottentot Claas Cupi<lo, 24 Nov. 1794. 
77. Sec chapter 5 above. 
78. Viljocn, "Khoisan Labour Relations In The Ovcrberg Districts", pp.208-15. 
79. Ibid., p.211-12. 
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Khoikhoi of Soetendals Valley, the Olifants River and the Hex River seemed to point to a 
Khoikhoi conspiracy.80 There were rumours that Captain Kees was about to march from the 
Roggeveld with 200 Khoikhoi to lend his support to "Onse Liewe Heer". The landdrost of 
Swellendam called out the local farmers to defend the drostdy and to form commandos in order 
apprehend suspicious Khoikhoi and to stifle the uprising at its birth.81 The result of this 
forewarned vigilance was that the expected attack never took place and Jan Pare! was arrested. 
Significantly, however, he was not executed which would suggest that there was very little real 
evidence that he had attempted to incite a rebellion.82 
Millenarian movements invariably occur amongst societies undergoing rapid social, political and 
economic transformations - particularly whilst being colonised and, simultaneously, exposed to 
the precepts of Christianity for the first time. Such movements are both reactionary, in that they 
try to regain the lost purity of an imagined pre-colonial past, and forward-looking, in that they 
anticipate a future in which imperfections and suffering have been banished. They are thus highly 
syncretic and a testament to processes of both rapid acculturation and intolerable exploitation by 
the dominant colonial power. They are, above all, a fonn of protest most typically undertaken by 
pre-capitalist societies experiencing forcible integration into the modem world.83 It is significant 
that such a movement should occur amongst the Khoikhoi of the Riviersonderend district for it 
was here that the first, abortive, Christian mission to the Khoikhoi took place and it was here, in 
the exploitative labour envirornnent of the more settled agricultural districts of the southern Cape, 
that the influence of colonial culture was strong, stronger, perhaps, than in the frontier zone.84 
We should not underestimate, however, the ability of ideas to circulate from one district to 
80. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Veldwachtmeeslers Rapporten Over Boschjesmans Rooveryen, 1785-1793. Mathys 
Lourens, veldwagtmeester Soetendalsvalley lo Lan<l<lrosl, 14 Oct. 1788; Jacobus Mouton, Johannes Lubbe and 
Barend Vorster, Olifants River, 17 Oct. 1788; Du Toit, veldwaglmeester Hex River, 21 Oct. 1788. 
81. Marthinus Theunissen, Company sergeant at the post ofZoetemelksvlei near Baviaanskloof, told the Moravian 
missionaries who came to the area in 1792 that he had prevented the local fanuers from destroying the Khoikhoi 
some years earlier. He explained that: "Some time ago, a rnmour had spread among the Hottentots that the end of 
the world was at hand, causing them to cease working for the fanners and lo butcher their cattle. The enraged 
fanners had pretended that the Hottentots were about to rise against the Colonists. A conunando of filly fanuers 
had gathered but he, 111eunissen, had turned them back. Since that <lay, the fanners called him the god of the 
Hottentots". In Bernhard Krngcr, T!te Pear Tree Blossoms: T!te Histo,y of the Aloravian Church in South Africa 
1737-1869 (Genadendal, 1966), p.52. 
82. Viljoen, pp.213-15. 
83. See Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: !vfillenarian Protest Movements Against the European Colonial 
Order, (Cambridge, 1979) for an analysis of millenarian movements. Viljoen is incorrect to stale that Jan Parel's 
movement was "a defiance of the process of acculturation" (Viljoen, p.211) since millenarian movements arc 
themselves symptoms of the process of acculturation. 
84. See chapter 12 below for a discussion of early missionary activity amongst the Khoikhoi. 
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another and the widespread disturbances amongst the Khoikhoi in 1788 are an indication that new 
fonns of protest and religious awakening were stirring amongst the subjugated population. 
Another serious alarm occurred in 1793 when the various veldwagtmeesters of the western Cape 
were fully expecting a three-pronged attack by the Khoikhoi and "oorlaamse Hottentots" of 
Swellendam, the Hex River and Namaqualand.85 In 1798 there actually was a large scale 
uprising in Namaqualand, provoked by ill-treatment and the fear that the Khoikhoi were about to 
be enslaved.86 At the same time the "kraal dwelling" Khoikhoi of the Roggeveld and Bokkeveld 
refused to submit their names to the local veldwagtmeester.87 Then, in 1799, came the Khoikhoi 
rebellion of the eastern Cape which, though outside the scope of this study, certainly drew from 
the same wellsprings of bitterness as those drunk by the Khoikhoi of the northern frontier zone.88 
Fearful of the rebellious potential of the Khoikhoi, the frontier colonists sought even tighter 
controls. In 1787 Gerrit Maritz, the veldwagtmeester of the Roggeveld, requested that all 
Khoikhoi kraals, of which there were several between the Bokkeveld and the Roggeveld, be 
expelled from the district. He suspected that many of the Khoikhoi dwelling in these kraals were 
responsible, along with the San, for stealing livestock from the colonists. Though they had no 
livestock of their own they had guns. There were also some "Bastaards" who were roaming the 
district with fireanns and Maritz feared that if such undesirables were allowed to gather together 
there might be a recurrence of the Teutman affair.89 
It is interesting that Teutman's murder should be so fresh in Maritz's memory. It is also 
interesting that the veldwagtmeester should fear that Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" and San were, 
potentially, close to the point that they might become allies. This is an indication that the 
perception existed, at least in the minds of members of the dominant class, that a community of 
interest was coming into being among the non-European oppressed of the frontier zone. This was 
not just a paranoid fantasy for there is indeed evidence that Khoikhoi, "Bastaard-Hottentots" and 
San were forging alliances of defence and aggression against the hated colonists. 
85. Sec chapter 9, pp.349-355 below. 
86. See chapter 10, pp.361-374 below. 
87. See chapter 10, p.364 below. 
88. For details of this rebellion sec J.S. Marais, Alaynier and tlie First Boer Republic (Cape Town, 1962); S. 
Newton-King and V.C. Malhcrbc, Tlie Kl10ikl10i Rebellion !11 The Eastem Cape (l 799-1803) (Cape Town, 1981 ); 
H. Giliomcc, Die Kaap tyde11s die h'erste Brit~e 13ewi11d (Cape Town, 1975 ), pp.300-326. 
89. CJ\, l/STB l 0/l (,2, G. Marilz and thirty other inhabitants of Roggcvcld lo Landdrosl, 3 March 1787. See also 
p.25 l above. 
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In the first place, there were increasing complaints by veldwagtmeesters that Khoikhoi servants 
were deserting their masters, often with guns and horses, to join other groups of malcontents. 
Numbers of Khoikhoi, "Bastaard-Hottentot" and slave deserters - or drosters - had, for some time 
been joining themselves together in fugitive gangs, especially in the mountainous regions of the 
Cedarberg and Bokkeveld.90 These droster gangs were evidence of a growing conununity of 
consciousness, forged at the level of lived experience, which united the unfree labourers of the 
frontier zone against their unbearable conditions of service. Not all of these drosters chose to flee 
to the dubious sanctuary of the wild mountains of the western Cape. Some fled beyond the 
outern1ost limits of the colony, to join the Oorlan1 groups of the Orange River,91 or to survive as 
best as they could in the arid expanses of Buslunanland. In November 1801, for instance, Veld 
cornet Barend Lubbe, of the Olifants River district, reported that the Khoikhoi and "Bastaards" 
of the area were refusing to enter service for less than fifty Rijksdaalders per annum and that they 
were gathering together in arn1ed groups in order to trek beyond the Hantam where they would, 
no doubt, get up to no good. 92 
In December 1801 Maritz's forebodings about a repeat of the Teutman murder seemed to come 
true as there was indeed a very similar incident in the Roggeveld. A large group, consisting of 
some seventy Khoikhoi and slaves, attacked the family of the wealthy Roggeveld farmer, 
Cornelius Koetse. Koetse, two of his sons, his knecht and a visiting butcher were murdered. The 
farn1house was thoroughly plundered and Koetse's daughter-in-law was abducted by the 
murderers, who were, it seemed, Koetse's own "volk". After pursuing the group and engaging in 
an exchange of fire a conunando recovered the woman alive, along with over 900 sheep, 100 
cattle, 9 horses, 9 guns and 27 000 guilders. The conunando killed two slaves and captured sixty-
two other members of the group, most of whom were Khoikhoi but whose number also included 
some "Bastaards". 93 Here was clear proof that conditions of service tended to unify the subject 
groups of the frontier zone into conunon opposition to the white fanners of the region. There was 
also growing evidence that some Khoikhoi deserters were joining the San. 
90. Sec Perm, "Droster Gangs". 
91. See chapters nine and ten below. 
92. CA, First British Occupation (henceforth BO) 58, Letters Received from Stellenbosch, 1801-1802, Lubbe to 
Van der Riel, 23 Nov. 1801, p.79. Lubbe expressed the usual request that kraals of independent Khoikhoi with 
fireanns should not be pennitted in his district. By Febrnary 1802 the Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" groups had indeed 
trekked to beyond the Hantam. Sec CA, 1/STB 10/153, Lubbe to Landdrost, I Feb. 1802. 
93. CA, 1/STB 10/153, Snyman to Van <ler Riel, 17 Dec. 1801; Maritz to Landdrost, 22 Dec. 1801. Maritz 
described the group he arrested as consisting of "bastarts 8, Klyn en Groot slaaven 22, Klyn en Grool llotlenlols 29, 
Klyn en Groot en de principaalsle moordenaars 3 jongens in 7 hottentols mil geweers". 
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This was a move fraught with uncertainty for we can be sure that not all drosters would have 
appeared, to the San, as potential allies. Accustomed to viewing all who came from the colony as 
hostile, the San had to be wary about welcoming strangers. But, from the 1790s onwards, more 
and more Khoikhoi drosters began to link up with San resisters north and east of the 
Roggeveld.In December 1791 Veldwagtmeester Maritz reported the desertion of a group of 
Khoikhoi, from the colonists to the San, taking muskets with them. 94 In August 1795 Johannes 
Karstens reported from the Roggeveld that "Bastaard-Hottentots" were leaving almost daily to 
join the San and that no fewer than eleven had recently absconded with muskets.95 Three years 
later Jacob Kruger reported from the san1e area that he had sent a commando after a "complot 
drossende Hottentots" in July, shooting one and capturing a woman and two children. In August 
he had been obliged to track down drosters who were stealing horses and riding away to the 
Koup. He had also taken the precaution of putting the "bosiman meyt" of Gert Victor in chains to 
see if this would "tame" her, the reason being that she had been responsible for the death of two 
Khoikhoi males who, on separate occasions, she had persuaded to desert with her and who had 
then been shot dead.96 Further complications were caused when Khoikhoi men or women married 
captive San women or men for one spouse was bound to stay with the "owners" whereas the other 
sometimes sought to move to new employers.97 
Such incidents draw attention to the fact that the divisions between Khoikhoi and San were 
becoming more and more indistinct as the frontier struggle raged indiscriminately within and 
beyond colonial boundaries. With individual San amongst the colonial labour force and groups of 
Khoikhoi drosters amongst the San resisters the frontier farmers were inclined to regard all 
Khoisan as enemies who ought to be either killed or subjugated and bound into service. The 
conunando was the instrument which had helped to bring this situation into being, both creating 
and controlling unfree labourers. Increasingly, conunandos were sununoned to track down 
drosters, or to confront rebellious Khoisan within the colony instead of simply attacking San 
resisters outside of it. In these circumstances it was hard to detem1ine where the frontier zone 
ended or began. Thus, a European visitor to the village of Tulbagh (hardly within the frontier 
zone one would have thought) marvelled in 1806 that: 
94. CA, l/STI3 10/162, Maritz to Lan<l<lrost, 26 Dec. 1791. 
95. CA, 1/STB 10/151, Karstens to Lan<l<lrost, 15 Aug. 1795. 
96. CA, l/STI3 10/165, Krnger to Lan<l<lrost, 18 Aug. 1798. 
97. CA, l/STl3 10/152, J.S. Hugo to Lan<l<lrost, 13 Nov. 1798. Hugo's wife ha<l a San servant who had been 
brought from the Seekoei River when he was a chilli. The boy had been raised by Hugo's wife's first husband and 
on reaching a<lulthoo<l had commenced a relationship with a female servant of Jacobus Jooste. Jooste wanted his 
mai<l back but I lugo knew that once the maid lcll his San servant woul<l <leserl lo be with her. 
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When one considers that one is here, in this part of Africa, surrounded by the 
already mentioned wild and savage beasts; that there are also a multitude of 
poisonous creatures and plants; that one is served by slaves of a sly and ill-natured 
disposition, at times blood-thirsty and vindictive, who with a poisonous plant within 
reach at their feet can eliminate a whole family; when one thinks of the numerous 
slaves wandering around in great numbers, who having left their master, live in the 
wilderness and turn to robbery, theft and murder; finally, that a few hours from here 
the real wild people of Africa roam the country, who could never be brought to a 
settled communal way of life, namely the so-called Bushmen who murder all that is 
European; thinking of all this one caimot but be astonished that a person can live 
here so calmly and without fear. But so great is the power of the civilised and 
cultured ingenuity of man, that not only is he capable of defending himself against 
all these dangers, but that he can also prescribe the law for all living things and can 
keep them in check no matter how infinitely greater their strength might be than 
his.98 
The frontier, in other words, was ubiquitous and the effort to defend oneself against its dangers 
and prescribe the law for all living things within it was not, as the author of the above passage 
claimed, without a cost. Fear penneates the above description, just as it penneated Cape society, 
even though "the real wild people of Africa" were several hours away from Tulbagh, along the 
long line of the interior escarpment where the frontier of "civilised and cultured ingenuity" had 
ceased to advance. 
There was, however, one area of the colonial frontier zone that continued to move. At about the 
same time that colonial expansion ceased in the north-east it gained momentum further to the 
north-west. As numbers of "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" sought to evade commando 
duty they headed for the distant retreat of Namaqualand and the Orange River. The Khoisan of 
these marginal regions soon found themselves facing an invasion of people who themselves 
occupied a marginal position in colonial society. Though many of the "Bastaard" and "Bastaard-
Hottentot" pioneers of the north-west were refugees or deserters from the colonial commandos 
they inadvertently brought the commando system with them. They were products of the frontier 
zone and bore the mark of its major institution. It is time now to turn our attention to these dry 
and distant lands of the north-western frontier. 
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The North-Western Frontier Zone, 1700-1802 
'n Handvol gruis uit die Hantam -
My liewe, lekker Hantam-wyk 
'n Handvol gruis en gedroogde blare 
Waboom-blare, ghnarrabos-blare ! 
Arm was ek gister, en nou is ek ryk. 
C. Louis Leipoldt 
Het is voor my even so goed als of ik een blad van een boom trek en de 
Heeren vraagen niet een na een Hottentot. 
Adriaan van Zijl 
Chapter Eight 
Societies of the Orange River, 1700-1780 
NAMAQUALAND, THE NAMAQUA AND THE LOWER ORANGE RIVER 
1700-1780 
The area now known as Namaqualand was, in the eighteenth century, generally referred to as the 
home of the Little Namaqua (Klein Namaqua) or Little Namaqualand (Klein Namaqualand).l 
Great Namaqualand (Groot Namaqualand), the home of the Great Namaqua, was across the 
river. Today it is known as Namaland. The exact nature and extent of the relationship between 
these two pastoralist groups is difficult to assess though we may state that the Great Namaqua, as 
the name implies, were the senior branch.2 Prior to the eighteenth century both the Great and 
Little Namaqua were accustomed to ranging far beyond their home territories. Both groups, for 
instance, at times visited the settlement at Table Bay. Further evidence of the vast extent of their 
movements is that they were noted south of the Olifants River in 1661 and in Griqualand West in 
1795.3 
In 1661 Pieter van Meerhof encountered a group of some 700 Little Namaqua in the vicinity of 
present day Van Rhynsdorp. They had about 4 000 cattle and 300 sheep with them and their 
settlement comprised of seventy-three huts.4 Such numbers were to wither away rapidly, 
however, as the colony expanded. In July 1779, when Gordon visited the kraal of the Little 
Namaqua captain, Wildschut, in the Kamiesberg, he was infom1ed by the resident Little 
Nan1aqua that they and the Great Namaqua were the same people who numbered, in total, about 
400 men, women and children. According to Gordon's infom1ants there were, apart from 
I. See Nienaber, Stamname, pp.722-738 for origin of tenu "Namaqua". I believe Nienaber is incorrect to think 
that there was a third group, south of the Little Namaqua, called the Amatuas. I have preferred to use the slightly 
archaic "Namaqua" rather than "Nama" because I am principally concerned with the inhabitants of Little 
Namaqualand and not witl1 those of what is now known as "Namaland" in Namibia. 
2. When Gordon asked tl1e Little Namaqua about tl1eir origins he was given the following account: "To tl1e 
question whetl1er tl1e ancestors of tl1e Little Namaqua had always been in this country or where they came from, the 
answer was: tl1ere was an old but sprightly woman from Great Namaqualand who had strayed from her c01mtry 
looking for food. She was named kouws who then lived alone and sought her food in tl1e veld. TI1en, long 
afterwards an old but sprightly man strayed from his cow1try in the same maimer and found that woman and tl1en 
married her. ·n1e man's name was Koebeseeb and all the Little Namaquas are descended from them and all Little 
Namaquas were called afier them, one half Koebbebequa and the otl1er kaus kw(a} afier the woman." AB. Smith 
and R. Pheiller, "Gordon's Notes On TI1e Khoikhoi", p.18. 
3. See Extracts from Journal of P. Meerhof, March-April 1661, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. I, pp.228-234; 
Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.305. 
4. Moodie, The Reconl, Prt. I, p.233. 
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Wildschut, four other captains.5 Three of these, presumably, were the heads of the various sub-
sections of the Great Namaqua: the !Gami-=nun, Gaminus or Bondelswarts near Warmbad; the 
Gei-// Khaun, Geikhaun or Red Nation of Hoachanas; and the //Haboben, Haboben or 
Veldskoendraers north of the Karas Mountains. 6 In the 1770s the Great Namaqua were reported 
to be rich in cattle though prone to fighting among themselves in order to acquire more cattle. On 
the whole, however, relationships between the Great and Little Namaqua were cordial with 
friends and relatives linking the two groups across the river.? Amongst the women of the Little 
Namaqua Gordon noted that there were two from the Great Namaqua who were married to 
Kamiesberg men. Further evidence of the contact between the two groups was that some elderly 
Namaqua, who had smallpox, claimed that they had caught the affliction in Great Namaqualand.8 
Wikar mentions the Little Namaqua as engaging in trade with the Great Namaqua, exchanging 
cattle for beads and tobacco which came from the north, via the Ovambo and Tswana. 9 
Relationships with the San and other Khoikhoi groups were not, however, so straightforward. 
The Little Nan1aqua had been accustomed, before competition from colonists prevented them 
from doing so, to graze their livestock in the Olifants River valley and the Sandveld of the West 
coast to the north of the Piketberg.10 Here, in pre-colonial times, they encountered both San and 
Grigriqua. The Grigriqua, came under the patronage and protection of the Namaqua, but, by the 
early eighteenth century, were experiencing rapid social disintegration. Those who survived the 
raids and robberies of the colonists, the 1713 epidemic of smallpox and the subsequent drought 
and stock disease, were either forced to work as servants for the Europeans or to trek away to the 
north. I I In time these survivors fonned the nucleus of the Griqua and played an important role in 
the vicinity of the Orange River. There were doubtless some, however, who attached themselves 
as servants (!gan) or herdsmen (!gaisan) to their erstwhile protectors the Namaqua.12 
5. Gordon, 29 July 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.253. 
6. These are the names used in Wikar's journal. See E.E. Mossop, (ed.) The Joumals of Wikar (1779), Coetse 
(1760) and w: van Reenen, (1791), (Cape Town, 1935) p.13. See especially the chapter in this book by J.A. 
Engelbrecht, "The Tribes ofWikar's Journal", pp.221-237. Wikar, a Swedish born deserter from the VOC, left an 
account of his travels along the Orange River between September 1778 and September 1779. 
7. Mossop, Wikar, pp.23 and 29. 
8. Gordon, 27 July 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.252. 
9. Mossop, Wikar, pp.75-81. 
I 0. I. Schapera, The Khoisan peoples of South Afi-ica, p.45; R. El phi ck, Kl,oik/,oi and the founding of White South 
Africa, pp.121 and 226. See also chapter 2 above. 
I I. Sec chapter 2 above. 
12. Schapera, p.234. 
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The Sandveld San also seem to have acted as clients of the Little Namaqua.13 Not all of the San 
in close proximity to the Namaqua, however, regarded themselves as being clients of the 
Khoikhoi. The San of Bushmanland, to the east of Little Namaqualand, were, according to 
Gordon, in enmity with the Little Namaqua. Gordon encountered several "Bushmen" (his 
description) in his journey between the Kamiesberg and Sandfontein (near the Orange River at 
present day Pella) in September 1779. One of these kraals had stolen twenty head of stock, 
including a milk cow, from the Little Namaqua. Gordon stated that "These Bushmen were very 
friendly, but were great enemies of the Nan1aquas, stole stock from them and said it was because 
they had come into their country to graze stock".14 It was not only the Little Namaqua who were 
at war with the San of Bushmanland for Gordon was told, by one of the latter, of a bloody battle 
which had taken place the year before with the !Gami-=nun or Bondelswarts of the Great 
Namaqua. The San had journeyed three days north of the river, stealing cattle and killing a young 
Khoikhoi man. This, it was claimed, was in revenge for the death of a San in an earlier fight. The 
Bondelswarts had retaliated and, using their shields to advantage, forced the San into the river 
where fifteen died from arrow wounds or drowning.15 
Whether this enmity between the Namaqua and the Bushmanland San was endemic, sporadic or 
fairly recent is not clear. The Little Nanmqua were quite accustomed to moving their livestock 
from the winter rainfall area of the Kan1iesberg into the summer rainfall area of Bushmanland 
when the grazing and water were attractive enough to warrant it.16 It is unlikely that this was a 
recent practice but it is possible that such incursions were gaining in proportion as colonial 
pastoralists began to appropriate Kl10i pasturage and water in the Kamiesberg. That the 
Bushmanland San were able to come to tern1s with other pastoralists is clear from their dealings 
with the Einiqua and, initially, some of the colonists. In this respect Gordon noted that: "These 
Bushmen serve our farn1ers and are good herdsmen but they do not tolerate bad treatment." The 
Namaqua, who had found it possible to reach a modus vivendi with the Sandveld San of the West 
13. See chapters 2 and 3 below. 
14. Gordon, 26 and 27 Sept. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.296-299. Gordon asked a Little Namaqua 
i.nfonuant called Kaasap who it was who had taught them the difference between good and evil. Kaasap replied 
"that their ancestors had taught them to do good towards those who did good to them, and not to hanu anyone who 
had not hanued them. But for them the Bushmen were wild beasts, and therefore he could not do any good towards 
him, because he harassed them too much". AB. Smith and R. Pheiffer, "Gordon's Notes On 111e K.hoikhoi", p.22. 
15. Gordon, I Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.303. Wikar corroborates this story in his journal, see 
Mossop, Wikar, p.65. 




coast, were perhaps not able to induce the "proud and haughty" Bushmanlanders to accept similar 
terms.17 
We do not know a great deal about the territory between Goodhouse and the Orange River mouth 
at this time, but it does not seem to have been the home of a particular Khoi social group. Though 
there are pastoralists in the Richtersveld today who can support flocks on the region's poor 
grazing, it is unlikely that the arid lands north and south of the lower Orange were a frequent 
haunt of the Namaqua. The San were probably the area's chief inhabitants. When Gordon visited 
the river's mouth in 1779 he found a settlement of people who lacked livestock, lived off marine 
resources, and who numbered a mere seventy men, women and children.18 
To the north-west, according to Wikar, the Great Namaqua, especially the Gei// Khaun under 
their captain Kendelaar were said to be "constantly waging war with the Zambdama (Bergdamara 
living near the sea) and the Hottentots who dwell along the Fish River and towards the coast" .19 
In the east, tl1e most powerful neighbours with whom the Little Namaqua had to contend, were 
tl1e Einiqua. They were also Khoikhoi, and their language was almost the same as the 
Namaqua's.20 Though there was contact between the two groups they were not really contiguous 
to each other. The Little Nan1aqua did not often go further east up the river than Pella. This was 
San territory and the Busluuanland San, though on good tenns with tl1e Einiqua, did not welcome 
tl1e Namaqua to the river. Away from the river Buslunanland was, except after the rains, 
enviroruuentally unattractive to pastoralists. The Einiqua settlements only really began near the 
Augrabies Falls and there was thus about a hundred kilometre stretch of river between tl1e 
Namaqua and them. This may help to explain why neither Wikar or Gordon mention any conflict 
between the two groups. Busluuanland acted as a cordon sanitaire between them. Coetzee, 
however, declared that "these Enequas live in continuous eruuity with the Amacquas", though it is 
clear that he meant the Great Namaqua rather than the Little Namaqua.21 
17. Gordon, 27 Sept., and I Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.299 and 303-304. 
18. Gordon, 20 Aug. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.269-273. 
19. Mossop, Wikar, p.29. 
20. Gordon, 28 Sept. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.299. 
21. Jacobus Coetzee, "A narrative supplied by order of the Right Honourable Ryk Tubagh ... concerning the 
Journey made by him in an<l through the Land of the Great Amaquas", in Mossop, Wikar, p.287. Jacobus Coetzee 
journeyed to Great Namaqualand in 1760. 
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Brink reported how, in 1761, Coetzee found that the Namaqua were unwilling to guide him to the 
Einiqua "except on the condition that they attacked the Einiquas as enemies".22 These too were 
probably Great Namaqua, and it is likely that more frequent contact between the groups north of 
the river had resulted in greater enmity between them. 
Though Bushmanland acted as a buffer, Namaqualand was the southern gateway to the Orange 
River and it was through this region that the first colonists had to come. Namaqualand has been 
aptly described as a semi-desert surrounded by a desert.23 This relative abundance made it seem 
an oasis in the midst of aridity for there were waterless wastes around it to the north, south, east 
and west. Amidst the round granite mountains of the Kamiesberg were perennial springs of fresh 
water, whilst its comparatively high elevation (I 200-1 800 m) made it cooler than its 
surroundings, attracted greater precipitation and gave it good grazing. All these advantages had 
made it a focal point for pastoralists who were able to practice a type of transhumance by 
exploiting the variations of Namaqualand's three geographical zones: the Sandveld or desert 
coastal belt; the mountain belt; and Bushmanland or the inland plateau to the east. Of these three 
zones the Naniaqua preferred the mountains which, in addition to being cooler, were the best 
watered parts, receiving 200-350 mm of rain a year. Rain fell mainly in the winter, during which 
time it was frequently possible to graze in the Sandveld to the west and escape the colder weather 
(and occasional snow) of the Kamiesberg. In the summer, if the rains fell in Bushmanland, there 
would be good grazing and enough surface water to graze livestock to the east of the 
mountains.24 
From the earliest days of Dutch settlement at the Cape the colonists had known of the existence of 
the Naniaqua, having been inforn1ed about them by the Khoikoi closer to the Cape. Indeed, the 
object of the first Company journeys of exploration into the interior was to establish contact with 
the people, for it was thought that they might be valuable trading partners in addition to holding 
the key to the fabled river of Vigiti Magna and the empire of Monomotapa. Between 1659 and 
1664 five major expeditions were sent northwards for this purpose and those of Cruijthoff and 
Meerhoff, although they did not penetrate the Kamiesberg, did at least make contact with the 
Namaqua. It was only in 1685, however, that Commander Simon van der Ste! led the first 
Europeans to the heart of the Namaqualand, enticed there by reports of copper. Though copper 
22. E.E. Mossop (ed.) The Joumals of Brink (1761-2) and Rhenius (1724) (Cape Town, 1947), p.59. 
23. Heese, "Namakwaland", p.5. 
24. Heese, "Namakwaiand", pp.9-15; L. E. Webley, "Seltiemenl Studies Among Descendenls ofNama Herders: 
An Elimo-Archaeoogical Approach", Klwisis, 3, I 982; H. Krolme and L. Sleyn, Grondgebmik i11 Namakwaland 
(Cape Town, 1990), pp. I 1-26. 
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was found it was not feasible to exploit it but the Company now had a better idea of 
Namaqualand. They learnt that the Namaqua, though cattle rich, were not populous - Van der 
Ste! mentions that there were only eight or nine kraals.25 Though Van der Ste! asserted company 
sovereignty over the Namaqua this was rather a hollow gesture which did nothing but cause ill 
will amongst them.26 The Namaqua were left alone until the beginning of the eighteenth century 
when the simultaneous opening of the cattle trade to freeburghers and the settlement of colonists 
in the Land ofWaveren began a new phase of expansion in the Colony's history.27 
By the end of 1740 the Dutch were in complete control of the lands to the south of Namaqualand 
where all kraal captains had to accept a VOC staff office - a symbol of Dutch overlordship. It 
could be that Coetzee was not entirely wrong when he said of some Namaqua, whom he 
encountered in 1760 four days north of the Orange River near Wannbad in Namibia, that they 
"used to live on this side of the Great River, but [who] about 20 years ago betook themselves 
across the River, deeper inland" .28 This date coincides with the heavy fighting of 1738-39 and it 
is a distinct possibility that large groups ofNamaqua had indeed trekked northwards at this stage. 
In these circumstances it was only a matter of time before emboldened colonists began to 
encroach even further on the Namaqua and press onwards to exploit the resources of the Orange 
River. 
The first Europeans to settle in Namaqualand, instead of simply visiting it as ivory hunters or 
livestock traders and raiders, did so in about 1750. In February and March of that year Jan 
Overholster, Jan Meyer and Jan Venter registered loan-fam1s which they had claimed at "de 
Leliefontein" and "Groene Rivier", the fonner place being described as "over the Oliphants en 
Doom Rivier". Only a year later Rudolph Brits registered the loan-fann "Schoenmakersfont" at 
"de Leeuwen Valley" which, according to Heese, is the present day farm "Henkies" near 
Goodhouse at the Orange River. We can be sure that these farms were registered some time after 
the actual occupation of them and that they represented only a fraction of the presence of 
European trekboers in the vicinity.29 
25. P.L. Scholtz, "Die Historiese Ontwikkeling Van Die Onder-Olifantsrivier 1660-1902 ", Archives Year Book for 
S.A. Histo,y, 1966 Prt. 2., pp.7-21; G. Waterhouse, Simon van der Stet's Jormwl of his Expedition to 
Namaq11ala11d, 1685-6, (London, 1932 ). 
26. Elphick, Khoikhoi, p.137. 
27. See chapter 2 above. 
28. Mossop, Wikar, p.281. 
29. CA, RLR 12, 3 Feb. 1750, p.115; 6 Feb. 1750, p.116; 21 March 1750, p.124; 6 March 1751, p.193. Heese, 
in "Namakwaland", p.40, says that it was Johannes Zwanepoel who acquired 'De Schoenmakersfontein' but the RLR 
records state it was Rudolph Brits. It is interesting to speculate that the "fontein" might have been mnnc<l after the 
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Ten years passed before there is evidence of a new spate of loan-farm registration in 
Narnaqualand. In February 1761 Jan van Aarden registered "de Esels Jagt" and "de Leelie 
fontein" both places described as "over de Oliphants Rivier aan de groene Rivier boven op die 
berg". In March Gerrit Cloete Jacobsz and Gerrit Cloete Gerritsz registered "de Welkom" and 
"Avontuur", both farms "booven de groene Rivier op de Kemisberg" (Kamiesberg). In April, 
Hendrik Beukes registered "de tweefontein" and "de vuijtkomst", the first "boven" and the second 
"onder de Kamiesberg". By 1771 several more fanns had been registered. "Silverfontein aan de 
Kamiesbogen over de Groene Rivier" was taken by Nicolaas Smit; "Modderfontein" in the 
Kamiesberg by Hendrik Beukes; "Renosterfontein" at the mouth of the "Couse" or Buffalo River 
by Petrus Johannes Van den Heever; "Tweefontein" beyond the Groene River by Justus 
Engelbrecht; "Uitkomst", between the Groene and Spoeg Rivers, by Hermanus Engelbrecht; 
"Avontuur", on the Spoeg River by Jasper Cloete and "Vredelust" in "Pedros Cloof' in the 
Kamiesberg by Pieter van den Heever the younger.30 
The interesting thing about "Esels Jagt" and "Leliefontein" is that, by October 1771, they had 
been granted to Hermanus Engelbrecht (though "Esels Jagt" had now become "Eselsfontein"). 
Governor Plettenberg, however, was informed that "Eselsfontein" had already been granted to 
Dirk Coetzee (there is no mention of this in the RLR records) whilst "Leliefontein" was where the 
kraal of "the Hottentot Captain Wildschut" lay. Engelbrecht was therefore instructed to vacate 
these two Kan1iesberg fanns (he already had a fam1 at Uijtkoms), leaving Coetzee and Wildschut 
in possession) I This is one of the very few examples of the colonial authorities recognising the 
rights of the Khoikhoi to remain on land which had always been theirs. It suggests that the 
Company valued the goodwill of the Namaqua, though it is unlikely that this attitude stemmed 
from a perception of the vulnerability of the colonial position in the far north-west. It is possible 
that it was the growing number of trekboers in the area that was responsible for a displacement 
of some of the Namaqua population hinted at by Jacobus Coetzee who, in search of ivory, 
Gennan Volkert Schumacher who was fanning at the Orange River, near to the junction of the Leeuwe River, when 
Gordon visited the area in December 1779. See Gordon, 7 Dec 1779 and 15 Dec 1779, in Raper and Boucher, 
Gordon, p.364 and p.371; Mossop, Wikar, p.115. For Schumacher see J. Hoge, "Personalia of the Gennans at the 
Cape, 1652-1806", in Archives Year Book/or South African Hist01y, 1946, p.381. 
30. CA, RLR 16, 17 Feb. 1761, pp.129-130; I April 1761, pp.143-144; RLR 19, 24 March 1766, p.112; RLR 
20, 20 April 1768, p.35; 22 Oct. 1768, p.87; 16 Feb. 1769, p.119; 27 Feb. 1769, p.121; RLR 21, 22 Feb. 1771, 
p.160; 50ct.1771,pp.228-229; 70ct.1771,p.230. 
31. D. Moodie, The Record, Prt. ill, Letter from Plettenberg to Landdrost of Stellenbosch, 31 Jan. 1772, pp.10-11 
and p.72 n.l. Captain Wildschut was the chief of the Little Namaqua and his real name was "Noebee" (Gordon, 25 
July, 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.250). Heese, "Namakwaland", p.27 refers to him as "Haimaap" and 
says that the colonists called him Jantjic Wildschut. Sec also CA, RLR Vol. 21, 5 Oct. 1771, pp.228-229, for 
details of the allocation of "Leliefontein". 
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travelled across the Orange as far as the Busenberg in 1760. He remarked that on his return 
journey he had not met "the Little Amaquas who had five years ago trekked from the Groene 
River to across the Cous River" .32 
By 1761, when the expedition of Captain Hendrik Hop passed through Little Namaqualand to 
explore the north of the river, its official journalist, Carel Brink, recorded that: "the aforesaid 
Little Namaquas who inhabit this land are of a nature most lazy and timorous. Owning few cattle, 
they live in great poverty, but not withstanding this, are continually harassed by the Bosjesmans 
who rob them of their stock. In this way, this people becomes weaker and poorer from time to 
time. It is to be feared that in course (sic) of a few years they will at last be extirpated by the said 
robbers" .33 
"BASTAARDS", OORLAMS AND "BASTAARD-HOTTENTOTS" 
When Gordon was in Na.ma.qua.land in 1779 he observed that: "From Groene River there are 
nineteen stock farms in Namaqualand. Of these there are five married fanners; the rest mostly 
take a Hottentot woman or two which, so I hear, they marry according to their custom" .34 What 
Gordon was noticing, was not only the fact that miscegenation was taking place in the north-
western frontier zone of the Cape, but that it was the rule rather than the exception. We have 
already seen how Willem van Wyk, in 1738, had also taken to wife "Hottentot fashion" a near 
relative of Captain Gal of the Great Namaqua.35 That the Namaqua women were attractive to 
European men is also confinned by Gordon, who confessed to his journal on 17 September 1779 
(watching a dance) - "This was one of the prettiest Hottentot women that I have ever seen. She 
was almost white and although she had a Hottentot face, she had fine features."36 
The great distance and comparative isolation of Namaqualand and the Orange River from Cape 
Town, seems to have encouraged behaviour which would not norn1ally have been socially 
acceptable in Cape society. This is not to say that miscegenation did not take place in Cape 
Town - it did - but that the majority of the white male community in Namaqualand should be 
married outside of the church, to Khoikhoi women, went against the grain.37 
32. Mossop, Wikar, p.289. 
33. Mossop, Brink, p.29. 
34. Gordon, 23 Sept. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.274. He describes this custom in some detail. 
35. Sec chapter 3, p.98 above. 
36. Gordon, 17 Sept. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.287. 
37. Sec Elphick and Shell, "Intergroup relations" for details of sexual mores in the Cape. Sec also discussion in 
chapter four above. 1-lccsc, "Nmnakwaland", pp.80-85 has more infonnation on the situation in Namaqualand. 
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The extensive intermarriage between Namaqua and European colonists must have had a profound 
influence on the social, political and economic structures of both communities. Two distinct 
pastoralist communities were being bound together by ties of kinship. We simply do not know the 
extent to which trekboers regarded their Khoi-in-laws as fan1ily - or vice versa. We would be 
wrong to think that such marriages implied any sort of recognition by the Dutch or that the 
Khoikhoi were now regarded as social equals who were bound to them by ties of blood and 
reciprocal social obligations. But, on the other hand, it would have been surprising if some sense 
of shared community was entirely lacking.38 Certainly, the offspring of such unions could not be 
ignored though the precise status of these children was hard to define and underwent constant 
redefinition - usually for the worse - throughout the century. The fact that so many of these 
"Bastaard" (as they were called) children bore the surnames of their fathers is testimony to the 
fact that their parentage was acknowledged. How many of these children entered "white society" 
and how many forn1ed the nucleus of a separate "Bastaard" society, cannot be determined. It 
would, however, seem that few entered Khoikoi society, for the aspiration of these products of 
cross-culturation was towards the dominant culture and away from the subordinate one. In time 
too the Namaqua were to fall victim to "Bastaard" as well as to Dutch colonists, so that 
ultimately miscegenation brought their society very few benefits. 
Though the status of "Bastaards" was initially superior to that of Khoikhoi or San the tendency 
was for it to decline - economically, politically and socially - throughout Cape society during the 
eighteenth century. This process was first experienced in areas of high white population density 
close to Cape Town, where mixed marriages became less and less socially acceptable and where 
it became more and more difficult for "Bastaards" to acquire loan-fanns.39 For a time distant 
Namaqualand and its sparsely populated surroundings were congenial to "Bastaards" who were 
able to acquire fanns there. Thus farn1S had been taken out by "gedoopte bastaards" Kok, 
Diederiks, Owies, Brand and Meyer by 1793 whilst "Bastaard" sons of white fathers were able to 
occupy their father's fanns quite unobtrusively in their father's name. Typical "Bastaard" 
surnames were also those of typical Namaqualand trekboers: Engelbrecht, Beukes, Cloete, 
38. Gonion (23 Sept. 1779, in Raper and 13oucher, Gordon, p.294) explains how a Namaqua would usually give 
his parents-in-law a gill of beads and ten heifers upon marrying their daughter. Nine of these heifers would be on 
loan and be paid back to the young man aller three or four years. We do not know whether this practice - which 
bound the two families together with material ties - was observed by white men and their Namaqua in-laws. 
Wikar's account is similar to Gordon's but he slates that the suitor gave his mother-in-law two milk cows and his 
father "cattle", "but for these he gels just about as many in return". The married couple also got "household goods 
comprising 6 or IO poles for the hut, 2 or 3 mats and a painted skin bag made of springbuck hide and containing 
buchu". Mossop, 1/'ikar, p.89-90. 
39. See chapter 4, pp.158-163 above. 
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Mostert, Bok, Brand, Meyer, Morton, Rossouw, Van Rooyen and Bezuidenhout for instance. A 
less exalted class of whites in Nan1aqualand - consisting of deserters and knechts - also lent their 
nan1es to their. "Bastaard" progeny: Bensch, Clause, Diergaardt, Diederiks, Eyman, Korter, 
Model, Owies, Otto and Zaal.40 
As the century progressed however, the frontier began to close on the "Bastaards" - even in 
Namaqualand. The escalating fighting against Khoisan resisters along the northern frontier meant 
that "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" were increasingly being expected to render service on 
commandos. This was particularly irksome since it occurred at a time when land was becoming 
harder to acquire within the colonial frontier and the social status of "Bastaards" was 
deteriorating. In addition the status of "Bastaard-Hottentots" was plunging rapidly as these 
individuals found themselves being treated like slaves, having to work for a period of 20-25 years 
without any pay for their "master" and having their names registered or "ingeboekt". For this 
reason from the mid l 770's onwards streams of "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" began to 
trek out of the colony, beyond the Cape frontier, at first to Namaqualand but later into 
Bushmanland and the Orange River.41 
A clear indication of this process is found in a letter from Veldwagtmeester Adriaan van Zyl, of 
the Bokkeveld over the Doom River district, in 1778. He wrote to the landdrost of Stellenbosch 
to complain that "all the Hottentots and Bastaards fit for conunandos are going away to the 
Nan1aqua country to evade serving on Conunandos" and his request was that the 
veldwagtmeester ofNamaqualand be advised to "order out all the Hottentots and Bastaards every 
year in the month of March, for our relief who must always be upon conunando. This would be 
better than trafficking with the Namaquas ... ". Enclosed in the letter was a touching note from one 
of the servants of Nicolaas Laubscher, one Samuel Roussouw, a "Baptised Bastaard" who 
pleaded that his master could not spare him from commando duty and that "all the pleasure that I 
have had in this country, has ceased for the last three years, and I have now nothing but sorrow: 
if you are disposed to drive me into further trouble, you may do so. I do not know what I have 
done to you." Needless to say, Van Zyl was not impressed by such requests and the northwards 
trek of dissatisfied servants continued.42 In February 1779, for instance, Willem Steenkamp, the 
veldkorporaa/ of Onder Roggeveld, complained to the authorities that it was impossible to mount 
40. Heese, "Namakwaan<l", pp.80-85; Henry Lichtenstein, Travels Vol. II, pp.303-304; J.S. Marais, Tlte Cape 
Coloured people 1652-1937 (London, 1939) pp. 9-13. 
41. Sec chapters 5 an<l 6 above. 
42. Report of Field Sergeant A<lriaan van Zyl, 2 Nov. 1778, in Moodie, Tlte Record, Prt. 111, p. 77. 
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conunandos because "the Hottentots who were in my district have gone away to the Namaqua 
country, and those who have not gone yet, are quitting the Dutch and going thither also".43 It is 
significant that Ve/dwagtmeester Van Zyl should have mentioned the "trafficking and bartering 
with the Namaquas", for there was doubtless a brisk trade in ivory, cattle, sheep, firearms, 
anununition and other colonial goods taking place.44 
Nan1aqualand and the Orange River were thus not just the crucible where different races were 
mixed; they were also the haven of opportunity, a destination for people of mixed race or lowly 
social status from other parts of tl1e colony. This was a mixed blessing. For every runaway slave 
or deserted soldier who wanted nothing more than a chance to lead an independent existence there 
was another who saw the freedom of tl1e frontier as a licence to violence against his fellows. For 
each "Bastaard", "Bastaard-Hottentot" or Oorlam who sought the opportunity to become a 
successful pastoralist, free from the increasing racial discrimination of the southern Cape, there 
were others who perceived their best career opportunities to lie in hunting, robbing and raiding. 
By the 1770's such people were beginning to make an impact on the Khoisan societies of 
Nan1aqualand and the Orange River. 
One of the first indications we have that the activities of "Bastaards" or Oorlams were adversely 
affecting the Little Namaqua dates from I June 1777. On that date Governor O.M. Berg wrote to 
the landdrost of Stellenbosch to report tl1at he had received as complainants two captains of the 
Little Namaqua known as Wildschut and Grootvogel. These two men had been attacked and 
robbed of some of their cattle by the "Bosjeman Hottentots" whom, they claimed, had been 
invited to do so by "the Bastard Adam Boer". Adam Boer was a knecht at "one of the farn1s of 
the burgher Pieter van den Heever, situated between the Great River and the Copper Mountains. 
"The stolen cattle were bartered from the San by two European sergeants of the VOC, namely 
Matthys and Schoenmaker Volkers (sic). Berg instructed the landdrost to restore the cattle to 
Wildschut and Grootvogel and to question Adam Boer and the Volkers. We do not know the 
outcome of this investigation but the incident is revealing about the fluid nature of social 
relationships in Namaqualand at this time. That a "Bastaard" working for a European should be 
in cahoots with the San against the Namaqua is interesting, though not necessarily typical. The 
43. Report of Field Sergeant W. Steinkamp, 15 Feb. 1779, in Moodie, The Record, Prt. I I I, p.77 and n. l. 
44. As late as August 1779 it was still possible to hunt elephant in Little Namaqualand. Gordon reported tl1e 
spoor of many elephant near the mouth of the Kouwsies River, as well as several <lead elephant. He remarked that 
"there has been a Bastard Hottentot here for some time who has shot elephant at this spot". At the site of Pieter van 
<ler Heever's deserted fann, "Renosterfontein", near the river mouth, Gordon's party saw twenty elephant. Gordon, 
6 Aug. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.257. 
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two Little Namaqua chiefs were themselves accompanied to the governor by another "Bastaard" 
(presumably an ally) and another Nan1aqua who could speak Dutch. Significantly, this was not 
the first time (nor the last) that the Cape authorities had taken steps to protect the interests of 
Captain Wildschut of the Namaqua.45 
One of the most influential of the Oorlam groups by the end of the eighteenth century was that of 
the Griqua - initially known simply as "Bastaards" and descended from remnants of the original 
Grigriqua Khoikhoi of the Western Cape coastal belt. The founding father of the Griqua was 
Adam Kok I who, traditionally, was believed to have been a manumitted slave who bought his 
freedom from his master, N. Laubscher, and established himself as a farmer at the farn1 
"Stinkfontein" in the Piketberg district.46 There is evidence in the Oude Wildschutteboeken, 
where he is described as a "Hottentot", that he left his farn1 in 1771.47 It is however, plausible to 
suggest that Kok was not simply a Grigriqua Khoikhoi and that he was descended from a 
runaway slave. In 1713 a slave by the name of Claas Kok was reported to have been among a 
group of slaves who managed to reach the Grigriqua without being recaptured. 48 The Grigriqua, 
at this date, had a reputation for harbouring and assimilating escaped slaves and it is possible that 
Claas Kok took a Khoikhoi wife and becan1e accepted as a Grigriqua. The mention of the 
"Hottentot Claas Kok" comes in 1735 when he and several other Khoisan servants of colonists 
from the Piketberg and Sandveld district were deeply implicated in the fateful expedition to the 
Orange River in that year. Indeed, Claas Kok is specifically mentioned as having killed Arys, the 
brother of Captain Gal of the Great Namaqua, and of having taken part in the attacks on the 
Little Namaqua. That a "Hottentot" called Adam Kok should subsequently own a farm near the 
Piketberg and have great influence amongst the Grigriqua would suggest, most strongly, that he 
was Claas Kok's son.49 
When Adam Kok I left "Stinkfontein" in 1771 he went to the Orange River with the intention of 
setting up as a hunter witl1 his sons Cornelius and Soloman. He did not take out a loan-farm 
himself, but Cornelius rented the fann "Elandsfontein" behind the Coperberg in Namaqualand in 
1776. At a later date Cornelius was to own at least five farms and became a pillar of 
45. Moodie, The Record, Prt. Ill, p.72. Schoenmaker Volkers is obviously the same person as Volkers 
Schoemnaker (see note 29 above). 
46. See Legassick, "Northern Frontier", p.414 n. l 09; R. Ross, Adam Kok's Griquas: A Study in the development 
o/Stratijicatio11 in South /ifhca (Cambridge, 1976), p.14; Heese, "Namakwaland" pp.76-77. 
47. CA, RLR 21, 23 April 1771, p.196. Hugo Lambregts register "Stinkfontein over de Berg Rivier aan de hoek 
Villi de Bosjesmans Kloof. Voorige persoon Adam Kok". 
48. Ross, Cape o/Torme11ts, p.89. 
49. CA, LM 49, Res., 13 March 1739, p.263. 
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Namaqualand society. Soloman was to acquire a farm near the Coperberg but in the l 770's the 
major activity of the Koks was hunting ivory along and beyond the river. The Koks were, 
however, rich in livestock and had many followers. By the time Adam Kok I died in 1795, the 
Koks were a powerful and widespread force as far east as present day Griqualand West.SO 
Another "Bastaard" family which, like the Koks, was to achieve a degree of wealth and status 
along the Orange River was that of the Barends or Berends. The founders of this particular 
family were Claas and his brother Piet Barend. Claas was sometimes (somewhat confusingly) 
referred to by Wikar as "Claas Bastaard" or "the Hottentot, Class Barend, a Goeyeman Hottentot 
from the neighbourhood of the Cape". This uncertainty about Barends name is probably a sign 
that, like Kok, he was of mixed Khoikhoi and slave origin. Claas Barend accompanied Coetzee on 
his journey to Great Namaqualand in 1760 and, subsequently joined Wikar and Gordon on their 
trails along the Orange.SI By 1778 Claas had a farm at the junction of the Dabenoris and Orange 
River (just east of Goodhouse) from which he traded with the Great Namaqua or went on hunting 
expeditions,52 whilst in 1784 a Klaas Bastard was described as the "regent" on Sebastiaan van 
Reenen's farm in the Hantam.53 
Another equally influential, though far less welcome (as far as the authorities were concerned), 
Oorlam group in the region were the Afrikaners under their leader Klaas Afrikaner. Klaas was, in 
all probability, the brother of a man named Afrikaner and the son of one Oude Ram. These men, 
the founders of the soon to be notorious Afrikaner Oorlam group, first attracted official attention 
in 1761. They were, according to Vedder, a people of mixed slave and Griqua origins. This 
would give them the same antecedents as the Koks and, indeed, it was their relationship with the 
Koks that first caused their name to be recorded. In 1761 Adrian van Schoor, an official of the 
50. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Verklarings, Pleidooie en Interrogatorien (Krimineel), 1786-1793, Relaas van Cornelis Kok, 
14 Nov 1790; RLR 24, 18 May 1776, p.144; RLR 36, 21 April 1790, p.218; Heese, "Namakwaland" p.76; J. 
Campbell, Travels in South Aji'ica undertaken al the request of the London Missiona,y Society, Second Joumey 
(London, 1822; reprint Cape Town, 1974) pp. 267, 359. 
51. Mossop, JVikar, p.23. "The head of the party was the Hottentot, Claas Barend, a Goeyeman Hottentot from 
the neighbourhood of the Cape, who had previously been on an expedition with Jae Koetzee to the Great 
Namacquaas and was now living here". Coetzee does not mention Claas Barend. Claas and a certain Piet Baster 
went with Wikar to the extent of his journey upstream. (Mossop, Wikar, pp.170-173 ). Gordon (28 Sept 1779, in 
Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.300) described Claas and Piet Bastart "as living on Picnaar's fann (i.e. 'Sandfontein') 
and later referred to "A holtentot and good shot called Klaas Barend" (8 Oct 1779, p.310). See also Legassick, 
"Northern Frontier", p.410 n.48; pp.112-115; I.D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa. Historical, 
Experimental and Psychological Studies (Johmmesburg, 1937) p.80; F. Le Vaillant, New Travels into the Interior 
Parts of Afi'ica by way of the Cape of Good Hope in the Years 1783, 1784, 1785 (London, 1796) pp.150-151. 
52. Mossop, 1/'ikar, p.25. 
53. CA, l/STI3 10/163, Letters from Vel<lwagtmeeslers 1773-1795, J. Van Zijl lo Lan<l<lrosl, 6 Aug. 1784. 
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VOC, complained to the governor about the behaviour of the "Bosjemans Hottentotten Captain 
Claas en Afrikaner". These individuals, Van Schoor stated, had assaulted Adam Kok and 
attempted to murder him. Since this occurred before Kok had trekked to the Orange River, there 
is a likelihood that the events were close to Kok's fann "Stinkfontein" in the Piketberg. No reason 
was given for this attack though Van Schoor described Afrikaner as an "arrogant man" with an 
"evil disposition" who, if left to his own devices would, along with his father Oude Ram, invite 
the more rapacious Khoisan of the district to rebel against the Cape authorities. In order to 
prevent this and to protect Kok, Van Schoor reconm1ended that Afrikaner and Oude Ram be 
banished to Robben Island. In the case of Afrikaner this sentence was carried out in September 
1761 though Oude Ram was not committed - perhaps exempted by his age or his death. Nor was 
Klaas imprisoned since it was found that he had not been involved in the crime. Afrikaner died, 
on the island, on 15 June 1777.54 
It can thus be seen that the chosen paths of the Koks and Afrikaners diverged at an early date, the 
Koks attracting official support and the Afrikaners official anger. Klaas Afrikaner, like Adam 
Kok, made his way up to the Orange River before the 1770s. There he worked for one of the most 
prominent of the white frontiersmen on the Northern frontier, Petrus Pienaar.55 Together with 
Claas and Pict Barend he accompanied Gordon for some of the stages of his journey along the 
Orange River and was described as being "our best shot" .56 The chances are excellent that Klaas 
was the same man as /Garuxameb, the father of Jager and Titus Afrikaner, and the grandfather of 
Jonker Afrikaner - all future leaders of the Afrikaner Oorlams. 
One further example of a "Bastaard" or Oorlam bandit who was to have an early impact on the 
Khoisan societies of the Orange River should be mentioned. Wikar records that in the 1770s the 
Khoisan of the Middle Orange River had been terrorised by a "Bastard-Hottentot" named Cupido 
Roggevelt. This individual had raided a large "Bushman" kraal at the ominously named site Gei-
l/ob, "Big Death", on the Orange River, and stolen their cattle. Cupido Roggevelt, whose name 
reflects both his possible slave origins as well as his habitual locum operandi had also attacked 
the Namnykoa or Kaross-wearcrs at Paardcn Island, east of the Augrabies Falls. The fearful 
54. J. du Bruyn, "The Oorlams Afrikaners: From Dependence to Dominance, c.1760-1823" (Paper delivered to the 
S.A. Historical Society Conference, Durban, July 1981 ); I-I. Vedder, Sou//, West Africa in the Early Days (Berlin, 
1934; reprint 1966) p.179; CA, C 139, 13 Jan. 1761, pp. 60-62; 8 Sept 1761, pp.416-420; CJ 3189 (Lists of 
Convicts sent to Robben Island, 1758-1802) pp.37, 152 and 174. Nienaber, Stamname, pp. 93-98. 
55. For Pienaar sec chapter 9 above. 
56. Gordon, 27 Nov. 1779, 8 Dec. 1779, IO Dec. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.362, 364, 367. 
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memory of his visit was still fresh in their minds when Wikar visited them in 1779. 57 Though 
Cupido Roggevelt seems to have been captured by colonial authorities and imprisoned on Robben 
Island,58 his attacks were an ominous sign that the relative peace and stability of the Khoisan 
societies of the Middle Orange River were about to disappear. 
THE EINIQUA, SAN AND KORANA OF THE MIDDLE ORANGE RIVER, C.1700-
1780 
The principal Khoikhoi inhabitants of the Middle Orange River were the Einiqua.59 Too great a 
distinction between Einiqua, Namaqua and Korana should not, however, be made since it has 
been shown that they all belong to the same language group, namely the Orange River 
Khoikhoi.60 This language group may be split into two primary dialects - Nama to the west and 
!Kora to the east. The Einiqua, (who were divided into a number of subgroups occupying 
different regions of the middle Orange) should thus be seen as falling between the two principal 
dialects with their various subgroups displaying similarities to other N amaqua or Korana, 
depending on their location. 61 The most westerly of the Einiqua subgroups, and hence the closest 
to the Namaqua, were the Nanmykoa.62 
These people were more truly riverine than either the Namaqua to the west or the Korana to the 
east, though they remained, nonetheless, essentially pastoralist. The Nanmykoa were divided into 
three kraals, two of which were on Paarden Eiland above the Augrabies Falls and the third on 
another island an hour's journey further upstream. Wikar estimated their settlements to consist of 
40 huts with over 300 sheep and goats.and 150 cattle (with a lot more hidden away on the far side 
of the river). Their stock was the "best and fattest" Wikar had ever seen.63 The islands were 
57. Mossop, Wikar, pp.47, 123-125. 
58. CA, C 163 (Resolutions of Council of Policy: Marginalia) p.678; CJ 3189, pp.53, 237. These documents 
indicate that Cupido Roggeveld was imprisoned on Robben Island on 10 June 1772 and released, died or escaped 
on 25 June 1782. 
59. "Einiqua" was a tenn based on a San word for the Orange River, "(')ein", "(T)Ein" or "Ein," and means, 
literally, "People of the River". See Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.320-328. 
60. C. Ehret, "111e First Spread of Food Production to Southern Africa" in C. Ehret and M. Posnansky (eds.), The 
Archaeological and linguistic Reco11st111ctio11 of African llisl01y (Berkeley, 1982) p.159; Gordon stated that the 
Einiqua "are all I-lotlenlots and speak slightly di!Terently from the Namaquas", 28 Sept 1779, in Raper and Boucher, 
Gordon, p.299. 
61. Ehret, "FoodProduclion",p.159. 
62. The Nanmykoa or Nanmequa were also known as the "Kaross Wearers" (Krosdragers, kroshebers) and, in 
1779, were lo be found in the vicinity of the Augrabies Falls. Mossop, Wikar, p.31, 119-121; Gordon, 16 Oct. 
1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.323-4; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp. 741-744. 
63. Mossop, Wikar, pp.121-125. 
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covered with luxuriant grasses, and wild cucumbers, but although the soil was very fertile the 
only crop to be grown by the Namnykoa was dagga.64 These riches were protected by a series of 
streams, islands and dense bushes. Additional resources could be obtained by fishing in the river 
or by hunting the plentiful game along its banks. 
The Namnykoa were quite at home in the river, being skilled at swimming across it with the aid 
of swimming sticks, or floating their possessions across on rafts. According to Wikar, as soon as 
the children began to walk "their playful occupation (was) to be in the water all day" .65 
Members from the various kraals did not feel constrained to stay within their group's particular 
territory and, unless they were at war with another group (as was the case in the l 770's between 
the Namnykoa and the Gyziqua) wandered fairly freely along the river, socialising with both 
Khoikhoi and San societies. The smaller kraals would often move some kilometres upstream or 
downstream from their old position if they deemed such a move favourable or necessary. A rise in 
the river's water level, for instance, was often a strong incentive to pack up the reed-mat huts and 
move to a higher location. The fluidity of these groups is further demonstrated by the existence of 
Khoikhoi who were living with San, and Great Namaqua who lived with the Kaukoa.66 
In so far as relationships with other groups were concerned the Narnnykoa "had war" with their 
Einiqua neighbours, the Kaukoa, (also known as the Kauk Eijs, Cutting Kraal or Snijersvolk) 
who lived on the Skanskop and other islands west of Keimoes.67 A similar state of affairs existed 
with the Aukokoa (Narrow Cheeks or Nouwangen) of Canon Island and the other islands to the 
east of Keimoes.68 Even further to the east were the Gyzikoa (or Twin Kraal people) with whom 
64. Gordon, 18 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.326. "lliis they got from the Namaquas, and they 
from us". Mossop, Wikar, p.121-123. 
65. Mossop, IVikar, p.129. 
66. Gordon, 28 Sept., 15 Oct., and 26 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.299, 322-3, 336, 338. 
67. Mossop, Wikar, pp.14 and 137; Gordon, 28 Sept., and 24 Oct. 1779 in Raper m1d Boucher, Gordon, pp.335 
and 300; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.588-590, speculates that their name "cutting kraal" derives from their custom of 
excising a testicle. A noteworthy custom, conunon to many Einiqua (including kraals like the Husingais or Spider 
Kraal who were, strictly speaking, Korana) was the removal, by surgery, of one of a man's testicles, or else the 
amputation of the first joint of the ring finger; st:e Gordon, 28 Sepl. 1779, in Raper mid Boucher, Gordon, p.299. 
68. Wikar, mid following him, Mossop (Wikar, pp.14, 137-8, 227) identify the Aukokoa as the Nouwange or the 
Narrow Checks. Gordon, however, refers to them as the Ogokwa (18 Oct. 1779 and 25 Oct. 1779, in Raper and 
Boucher, Gordon, p.327, 335-6). Engelbrecht ("Tribes ofWikar", p.227 n.3) and Nienaber, Stamname, pp.265-274 
speculate that the Ogokwa were, originally, the Cochoqua of the Cape who trekked northwards sometime during the 
eighteenth century and that they were thus "Groot Koranas". This theory is, in my opinion, unlikely, but see 
following pages for conuncntary. We should note, however, that Wikar noted that the Aukuoa "received me very 
well, because I was the first Dutclunan they had ever seen. I and my horse were a source of the greatest wonder to 
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the Narnnykoa were also at war. The Gyzikoa, though a mixture of Korana and Ba Tlaping, were 
also considered to be Einiqua.69 Such fighting as took place involved the theft of livestock from 
one another and some loss of human life. The picture that emerges is that before 1780 there 
existed a fairly low intensity, virtually institutionalised, practice of raiding by one riverine group 
upon another. This did not, it seems, unduly disturb the balance of power along the river, for if 
the Narnnykoa captured a great many cattle one year the Gyzikoa retook them the next.70 
The Narnnykoa enjoyed slightly better relationships with the local San, some of whom were their 
clients. The Anoe eijs (Heldere or Bright Kraal people) for instance, who lived at the Augrabies 
Falls, were described by Gordon as being "cattle-less Bushmen or of the Namneyqua who do not 
have cattle". In another entry he calls them "Eniquas who because of a quarrel with the 
Narnnykoa Kraal have lost all their stock but they are once more good friends".71 The Anoe eijs 
numbered about 100 and lived by catching fish (in wicker traps), hunting and digging pits to trap 
hippopotami, elephant and rhinoceros. Those San, who were found along the river between 
Goodhouse and the Augrabies Falls were described, by Wikar, as being, for the most part, on 
friendly terms with the Einiqua, but enemies of the Namaqua.72 Gordon found them to be very 
friendly and helpful and distinguished two main branches - the River and the Sandveld San -
though he acknowledged them to be one people. 73 Wikar's names for these people - Chaboup and 
Samgomomkoa - mean, simply San or Bushmen in Nama.74 They had a few cattle and yet were 
them, and they were more afraid of a horse than of a rhino or a ferocious wild animal," (Mossop, Wikar, p.139). 
l11is is hardly an appropriate response from a group purported to be colonial fugitives. 
69. Mossop, Wikar, p.31; Gordon, 26 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.336-341, notes that they 
were also called "Combecoe" or "Combcqca". Nienaber, Stan111ame, pp.455-6. l11ey were not, as Nienaber (p.364) 
suggests, a branch of the Tswana that had inter-married with Korana and Ogoqua but, as Gordon's account makes 
clear, a branch of the Khoikhoi who had inter-married with some Tswana. l11ey made huts like the other Einiqua, 
milked cattle and danced like Namaqua. 
70. As Gordon travelled down the river from one group to the next he noted: "thus one kraal complains about the 
other" and warned him to be on his guard against other K110i "saying that they were treacherous". Also: "They were 
bad friends with their neighbours, according to their custom" (Gordon, 26 Oct., 19 Oct., 28 Oct. 1779, in Raper and 
Boucher, Gordon, pp.336, 328 and 341-2). See also Wikar, in Mossop, Wikar, pp.31, 127. 
71. Gordon, 15 and 16 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.322, 324. Wikar conunented, on visiting the 
Gyzikoa, that: "l11cre was a large Buslunan kraal here; they were the Gyzikoas' Buslunen, for every tribe that O\Vlls 
cattle also has a number of Buslunen under its protection ... " (Mossop, Wikar, p.16 ). 
72. Mossop, lVikar, p.31. 
73. Gordon, 28 Sept., I Oct. 1799, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.299, 303. Gordon made the following 
observation about the San of the Orange River, "I am amazed at the Busluncn, for although everything is lying 
around freely witi1i11 reach, they will not touch anything to take it away; and although we are so weak in U1is distant 
land full of wild animals, we are as much at ease, although on our guard, as in the heart of the Cape. In comparing 
U1is with the descriptions given by those who find all sorts of danger even in the vicinity of U1e Cape, one realises 
how little real danger there is, except in people's minds." 15 Oct. 1779, Gord 011, p. 323. 
74. Mossop, IVikar, pp.14-15, 30-31; Nienaber, Stan111ame, pp.231-2; 829-8. 
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called San, as were the Nanningai (Mountain climbers), a San group with cattle on the northern 
side of the Orange, opposite Pella. 75 Further groups of San called the Noe Eis and Ei Eis lived to 
the north of the Augrabies Falls whilst, to the east, (i.e. near Kakamas) were the Keio Eis San.76 
Along the Hartebees River which flowed,occasionally, from the interior of Bushmanland to the 
south lived the Canunagakoa San (Canunagakoa being the San word for the people of the 
Hartebees River). Further to the south this river was called the Sak River because it disappeared 
into the sand, before re-emerging as the Hartebees River near present day Kenlmrdt. There were 
pools of water and even hippopotami to be found along the Hartebees River and the Canunagakoa 
were quite used to travelling to and from the Orange by way of the Hartebees River. 77 To the east 
of the Canunagakoa San, and south of Keimoes dwelt the Au Nameiqua San, whilst to the north 
of the Aukokoa were the Nou Ei Koa and Hoekeikoe San. The San in the vicinity of present day 
Upington were known as the Koun ei Na. 78 
The closest Einiqua to the Nanu1ykoa were the Kaukoa (Cutting Kraal) of Skanskop Island. This 
community numbered a total of twenty huts and was, of course, in enmity with its neighbours, 
especially the Aukokoa further east. Although they had some livestock much had been lost to the 
Aukokoa and their principal activity was fishing. 79 
The Aukokoa, who lived only three hours journey eastwards from the Kaukoa, rated the Gyzikoa 
as their major enemy though they had also been attacked by the Korana. These foes, according to 
the Aukokoa, took no prisoners, not even women and children, killing all who fell into their 
hands. Despite these ferocious eastern neighbours the Aukokoa seemed to be quite well off in the 
1770s, situated as they were on Canon Island and its adjacent islets. This position, combined with 
the forests of the river bank, gave them excellent protection, whilst the very fine grazing beyond 
the river allowed their flocks and herds to prosper. The islands were seldom flooded and such 
favourable circumstances supported about 100 mcn,women and children in more than 23 huts. 
The Aukokoa were also in regular contact with the Ba Thlaping, having friends among them, but 
75. Mossop, Wikar, p.36; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.744-745. 
76. Gordon, 16 Oct., 23 Oct., 30 Oct., 7 Nov., 11 Nov. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.324, 333, 335, 
343, 351, 354; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.749-750; 320-328·, 597-598. 
77. Gordon, 20 Oct., 23 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, 328, 333. 
78. Gordon, 26-27 Oct. 1779, in Raper and 13ouchcr, Gordon, pp.336, 338-9. 
79. Gordon, 25 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, p.335. 
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an outbreak of smallpox an10ngst the latter had somewhat restricted the development of further 
relationships. 80 
The Gyzikoa themselves, who seemed to have been at war with all the other Einiqua, lived about 
a seven and half hour march upstream from the Aukokoa. Gordon found them to be completely 
friendly, numbering about 200 strong and living in two kraals with a combined total of 
approximately thirty-seven huts. In appearance and nature they seemed to be a mixture of 
Tswana and Khoikhoi, with the latter influence predominant. Gordon was able to identify some 
Tswana an10ngst them who understood the Xhosa with which he addressed them but, in most 
respects, the Gyzikoa were Einiqua. The Gyzikoa claimed that the Tswana had once lived there 
but had been driven away by them and the Korana.81 
To the east of the Gyzikoa, in the vicinity of Kheis, lived the first of the Korana groups; the 
Kouringeis (Little Korana, Hoogstanders or Proud People).82 Wikar described them as having 
three kraals (only one of which he counted, having 49 huts) and much livestock. "These 
Kouringgais are the first of the little Korakkoa we met, for the greater part resembling the 
Eynikkoa in build and dress, yet they are an entirely different tribe, for they knew little of the 
tribes lower down. "83 As far as Gordon was concerned the Einiqua and the Korana were the same 
people - as indeed they were since they were both Khoikhoi and members of the same language 
group. Some of the Kouringeis, like the Gyzikoa, displayed Tswana influences in their 
physiognomy. They were divided into two kraals of about 20 huts each and, though well provided 
with livestock, were a lot less generous with it than their neighbours to the west, failing to provide 
Gordon and his party with any. As allies or clients they had the Moncoboo San who were more 
hostile (and ugly) than any others met by Gordon on his journey along the river.84 
80. Gordon, 26 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.336-338; Wikar (Mossop, Wikar, pp.137-139) 
estimated that they had 300 cattle and 400 or 500 sheep. He also states that they had 40 huts and that the Kaukoa 
were subordinate to them. Perhaps Gordon only saw one half of the kraal. 
81. Gordon, 27 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.339-342. See note 78 above. Engelbrecht (in 
Korana, pp.76-78) believes the Gyzikoa were a mixture of Korana and Ba 1lllaping instead of Einiqua and Ba 
1l1laping. 
82. L.F. Maingard, "Studies in Korana history, customs and language", Bantu Studies, Vol. VI, 1932, pp. I I I, 
believed that the Kouringeis were the same people as the Gorinaiqua, mentioned by Van Riebeeck in 1657, and 
known to the Dutch as the Capemen. Engelbrecht, Kora11a, p.5, agreed and Nienaber presents evidence to support 
the theory (Stanmame, pp.410-421 ). The reasons for my disagreement with these scholars (whose knowledge of 
Khoisan and K,iana societies I cannot pretend to approach) will be found between pp.301-307 below. 
83. Mossop, 1/"ikar, p.165. 
84. Gordon, 1-3 Nov. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.344, 346, 347. 
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East of the Kouringais lived the Hoeking Eis (Scorpion Kraal), 85 a kraal of about 20 huts. They 
were a branch of the Great Korana who lived in the vicinity of present day Koegas Bridge, north-
west of Prieska, and were thus distinct from the Kouringeis, who were Little Korana. These were 
the most easterly of the groups visited by Wikar in 1779 but Gordon, who journeyed further, 
encountered the Nokukeis Kraal, whose people "had never seen anyone from our colony and were 
very afraid". They numbered over a hundred strong and Gordon referred to them as a second 
section of the Hoeking Eis. Amongst them were two Briqua or Tswana, whilst the presence of 
large numbers of Tswana karosses and skins was further evidence of contact between the two 
people.86 
Beyond the Hoeking Eis, east of present day Prieska, were various groups of Korana who 
inhabited the regions both north and south of the Orange River. The questions of their origins, as 
noted above, is a vexed one, and does not allow for definitive pronouncements. It is, however, 
necessary to say something about these, the most easterly of the riverine Khoisan. Paradoxically, 
though they were the last to be visited by the colonists in the eighteenth century they were, it 
seems, one of the first to have been affected by colonial expansion. Despite this early disruption, 
and despite the violent upheavals of the late eighteenth century, the Korana survived, and were 
strong enough to fight two anti-colonial wars between 1868 and 1879 before they were crushed. 
Evidence for early colonial pressure on the Korana is closely linked to the debate concerning their 
origins. This in turn, is related to the debate concerning the origins of the Khoikoi as a whole. 
Before proceeding further, therefore, these topics will have to be investigated. 
At present the most widely accepted model concerning Khoikhoi origins is the synthesis proposed 
by Elphick.87 Somewhere in the north-east of present day Botswana a group of San, at an 
unknown time and over a period of indetenninate duration, acquired both sufficient livestock and 
the necessary set of attitudes to enable them to become pastoralists. Having become pastoralists 
(without, however, losing the skills or ignoring the resources of hunting and gathering) these 
proto-Khoikhoi, their livestock and their culture arrived at the Orange River in the vicinity, 
possibly, of the Vaal River's confluence. From here a dispersal of pastoralism and people took 
85. Gordon, 4 Nov. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.347-8; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.498-501. 
86. Gordon, 4-7 Nov. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, pp.347-351; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.749-750; 
Engelbrecht, "Tribes ofWikar", p.231; Konma, p.27. It was at this point that Gordon turned back, a site identified 
by AB. Smith as near Knypgat se Berg, south of Debecrskloof (290J2.5'S : 220l 7.5'E). This is just downriver from 
K.ocgasbmg. Sec A.13. Smith, "In U1c Footsteps of Gordon", Quarterly ll11lleti11 of the S.A. Librwy, 1991. 
87. Elphick, Klwikhoi, pp.3-22. 
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place. Some Khoikhoi moved southwards roughly parallel to the Seekoei River and on reaching 
the Sunday's River, a gradual westerly expansion took place until the south-western Cape was 
reached. (Easterly expansion was restricted by the presence of agro-pastoralist, Bantu speaking 
groups who inhabited the better-watered Eastern regions). Khoikhoi pastoralists also dispersed, 
naturally, down the Orange River to the West coast. This line of advance then bifurcated into a 
northern (Great Nan1aqua) and southern section. Those Little Namaqua who continued south 
found themselves contesting the resources of the south-western Cape with the vanguard of the 
Southern Khoikhoi, thus closing the circle of Khoikhoi dispersal. The arid or mountainous parts 
of the interior were left, largely, to the San. 
The above explanation of the expansion routes of the Khoikhoi has come under increasing critical 
scrutiny. Doubt has been expressed as to whether the north-east of Botswana was the core area of 
origin for Khoikhoi pastoralists whilst the early and extensive sequence of dates for pastoral 
activity from archaeological sites in the southern Cape suggests an extremely rapid dispersal of 
livestock. Greater clarity will, doubtless, emerge, once more archaeological research is done but, 
for the time being, the present model of Khoikhoi expansion is the most plausible available.88 
However one of the most contentious details within the larger structure of the model is the precise 
placing of the Korana. 
Their situation at the junction of the Vaal and Orange River, is most significant, for this was the 
region from which the major southerly and westerly dispersal of the Khoikhoi allegedly occurred. 
But this factor docs not necessarily give the Korana a primacy of place nor antiquity amongst 
Khoikhoi groups. The region was a frontier zone between Tswana, Khoikhoi and San, as well as 
between pastoralism, agriculture and hunting. Its human composition was thus subject to a 
variety of enviromucntal, cultural and ethnic influences. 
It should be stressed that our knowledge of this section of the River during the eighteenth century 
is extremely limited since we lack the detailed observations of a Wikar or a Gordon for these 
regions. Gordon did, in fact, visit the Orange River at the confluence of the Calcdon in December 
1777, and can1e close to its banks whilst travelling up the Scckoci River in November 1777 and 
88. See AB. Smith, "The Origins and Demise of the Khoikhoi: 1l1e Debate", S.A. Historical Joumal 23, 1990, 
pp.3-14; and "On Becoming Herders: Khoik.hoi and San Ethnicity in Southern Africa", African Studies 50, I, 
1991, for conunents on the Elphick model. Also H.J. Deacon, Janette Deacon, Mary Brooker and M.L. Wilson, 
"The Evidence for Herding at Boomplaas Cave in the Southern Cape, South AFrica", S.A. Archaeological Bulletin, 
Vol. XXXIII, ( 127), June 1978, and M.L. Wilson, "The Problem of the Origin of the Khoikhoi", 711e Digging Stick 
6 (I), April 1989. 
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October 1778. The observations he made here are most illuminating (and will be discussed 
below) but the vital section of the river with which we are concerned here, namely, that which 
was occupied by the Korana and which stretched roughly, from Prieska to the Seekoei River, was 
not visited by record-leaving travellers until the beginning of the nineteenth century. By this time 
this section of the river was in turmoil and the various Korana groups, apart from having 
experienced radical disruption and displacement, consisted not only of Korana, but of other Kl10i, 
San, "Bastaards" and Oorlam members. 
This inherent volatility was complicated by the fact that, historically, the area served as a place of 
refuge for groups of Khoikhoi who were fleeing from the Dutch colonists. Those authorities who 
have written detailed studies on the Korana point to the fact that it is necessary to regard them as 
the product of a) the original Kl1oikhoi groups of the area and b) later migrations of Khoikhoi 
groups from the south.89 Though this latter view has been dismissed by Ehret as "an historian's 
fantasy",90 there is too much evidence in support of the idea of a "reverse migration" to dismiss it 
this lightly and since this evidence has a direct bearing on the subject of the colonial disruptions 
of the Kl1oisan societies of the Orange River it is far from irrelevant. 
The first recorded tradition to suggest that some of the Korana may have had their origins in the 
southern Cape was made in 1836 when Hanto, a Taaibosch chief of the Umpukani Korana, told 
tl1e missionary Arbousset tl1at "eight generations ago there lived in the neighbourhood of the Cape 
of Good Hope a chief named Kora, who had given his name to the tribe of the Korannas".91 
Engelbrecht argues that "the chief of the senior clan, which perpetuated his name, was also the 
chief of the whole tribe, which might likewise be called after him". Thus, assuming that there was 
a chief !Ora, the people of his clan would be !Ora -//?eis, and the people in general would be 
called !Orana.92 Stow, aware of this tradition, writing some thirty years before Engelbrecht, 
believed that the Gorachouqua, or Tobacco Thieves, mentioned in Van Riebeeck's diary were the 
ancestors of the Korana, and that Kora had derived his name from the chief of the Gorachouqua 
who was called Goro or Choro. 93 According to Hanto's account Kora's son, Eikomo, retreated 
89. See in particular, L.F. Maingar<l, "The lost tribes of the Cape", S.A. Joumal of Science, XXVIII, Nov. 1931, 
pp.487-504; Maingard, "Studies in Korana History"; Engelbrecht, Korana; and Nienaber, Stanmame. 
90. Ehret, "Food Production", p.159. 
91. Maingard, "The lost tribes of U1e Cape", South African Joumal of Science, XXVill, Nov. 1931, p.503. 
92. Engelbrecht, Korana, pp.13-14. 
93. G. W. Slow, The Native Races of South Ajf'ica (London 1905; reprint, Cape Town 1964 ), p.268. 
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from the encroachments of the Europeans, first to the Brak and later to the Orange River. Here 
they reached an agreement with the San and settled in the vicinity of present day Griquatown.94 
This tradition was supported by evidence from another Taaibosch chief, Massouw Rijt 
Taaibosch, chief of the Mamusa branch of Korana, in 1869. Massouw explained that the Korana 
had come from Cape Town and that their chief had been Kora. After trouble with the whites they 
had fled into the Hottentots-Holland mountains and from there to the Koup, through the 
Nieuweveld range of mountains, then to Spitzkop, then up the course of the Great Brak river and 
thus to the south banks of the Orange River at Sandrift. Further support for this tradition comes 
from the Gennan missionary Wangemann who worked amongst the Katse (/Hoa-1/?eis) Korana in 
the nineteenth century. He recorded that the Katse left the vicinity of Cape Town in the eighteenth 
century under pressure from the Europeans and trekked through the Swartberge, across the Koup, 
across the rivers Gamka and Tweke, between the Nieuweveld mountains and the Winterberge 
until, between Schietfontein and Victoria West, they crossed the Praamberge. Eventually they 
reached the Orange River where, not without considerable conflict from the San, they dispersed 
into smaller units.95 Engelbrecht is able to cite two further recorded instances of the above 
tradition and his own interviews with three Katse informants reinforces the general impression 
that there was a northward migration of Korana to the Orange River in the eighteenth century.96 
Apart from the oral traditions of the Korana, which have been cited above, there is other evidence 
which suggests that sections of the Korana, were to be found in the Eastern Cape in the early 
eighteenth century. Gordon, who was travelling just west of the Sneeuberg in 1777, passed a 
large mound of stones, twenty feet in diameter. He remarked that: 
it is the grave of one of the chiefs of the Camdebo Hottentots ( called the Koranna 
People). He was killed by an elephant. There are none of these people here any 
more, except a few with the fanners.97 
Further to the east he commented that there were some Khoikhoi on the Sneeuberg and the Fish 
River with both the trekboers and the Xhosa who "call themselves there nothing but Cora - thus 
94. Engelbrecht, Korana, pp.3-4; 13-14; Stow, Native Races, p.269; T. Strauss, War along the Orange: The 
Korana and the Northem Border Wars of 1868-9 and 1878-9 (Cape Town, 1979), p.2. One of Engelbrecht's 
infonnants, Benjamin Kats, had heard old people say that Kora's son was named !GeiXam which Engelbrecht 
believes is the same as Eikomer. 
95. Maingard, "Studies in Korana History", p.107; Engelbrecht, Korc111a, pp.14-15; Strauss, War Alo11g the 
Orange, pp.2-3. 
96. Engelbrecht, Konma, p.17. 
97. Gordon, 13 Nov. 1777, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. I, p.79. 
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Coranas in the plural".98 From this it would appear that some time before 1770 a group of 
Khoikhoi called Korana lived south and east of the Nieuweveld before they dispersed, some to 
seek employment with the colonists and Xhosa whilst others, no doubt, went north to the Orange 
River. 
It has been necessary to go into considerable detail concerning the evidence for the southern 
origins of some of the Korana groups for several reasons. Although none of the details by 
themselves amount to conclusive proof of a northern migration by Korana to the Orange River, 
taken together they cannot be ignored. There was definitely a considerable immigration of 
southern Khoikhoi groups to the eastern Orange River in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Strauss is surely correct to argue that: 
With so much uncertainty about the general pattern of Khoikhoi migration, it is 
extremely difficult to arrive at any certain conclusion on the more specific issue of 
Korana origins ... and in the face of so many varied and contradictory oral traditions 
any reconstruction regarding origins and migration routes must necessarily remain 
speculation. However, there is no reason to question the claim that the ancestors of 
some of them had lived at the Cape in the 17th century and had later moved 
northwards in scattered groups and at different times, reaching the Orange at various 
points.99 
We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that not all Korana were comparatively recent 
arrivals to the Orange River. In a hurried footnote, added as his book was going to press, 
Engelbrecht explained that he had come to the conclusion that there were two large divisions of 
Korana: (1) that of the Right Hand, or the Great Korana; and (2) that of the Left Hand division 
with the Links tribe. Engelbrecht admitted that "as the above conclusions assumed definite fon11 
only at the time of going to the press, the author regrets that he has not been able to apply them in 
these pages with a view of classifying the different Kora tribes and units more adequately". I 00 It 
is significant though that all of the traditions of a migration from the south came from Great 
Konma or Korana of the right hand (e.g. Taaibosch) whereas no such traditions were found 
amongst the Links (Left Hand or the Little Korana). This is but one of the reasons why 
Engelbrecht's attempts to prove that the Goringhaiqua (Capemen or Peninsulars) of Van 
Riebeeck's time at the Cape were the same people as the Kouringais (Little Korana) of the 
Orange River are unconvincing. Had he had the time he might well have revised his ideas since 
his evidence here is based not on oral tradition but on the apparent similarity of the names. It is 
98. Gordon, 16 Dec. 1779, in Raper and Uouchcr, Gordo11, Vol. I, p.114. 
99. Strauss, War Along the Orange, p.6. 
100. Engelbrecht, Konma, p.25. 
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far more sensible to assume that the Little Korana were that branch of the Korana who had not 
travelled, either to or from the Cape, but who had remained at the River. If this is the case how 
could both groups be considered "Korana"? What was the connection between the Great and 
Little Korana? 
It should be stressed that "Korana" is somewhat of a catch-all term which, in the nineteenth 
century, was used to describe a great hotchpotch of diverse and fragmented peoples.IOI It would 
be wrong to think that there was such a entity, with finite boundaries, as the outmoded term 
Korana "tribe". Rather, we should think of "Korana" as a word which was applied to groups of 
predominantly (but not exclusively) Khoikhoi origin who had, indeed, been severely dislocated by 
the expansion of the colonial frontier. As these groups moved northwards to the Orange, they 
became absorbtionist rather than exclusivist, incorporating the shattered remnants of other 
fugitive groups, or else exercising a type of hegemony over weaker neighbours. In the chaotic 
border area of the Vaal-Orange confluence they began to dominate the weaker Einiqua groups 
(themselves an1algamations of diverse riverine peoples) to the west, and to force the Tswana to 
withdraw to the north. I 02 It is very likely then that the "Little Korana" were, in fact, Einiqua 
groups which had been partially absorbed into the loose associations of the intrusive "Great 
Korana". Evidence will be presented below that this process of intrusion accelerated between 
1779 and 1786 as the "Great Korana" put more and more pressure on the Einiqua. After 1786, 
however, Korana expansion was, to an extent, deflected by the increasingly disruptive colonial 
presence along the river. In the face of this combined assault Einiqua identity disappeared and the 
Khoikhoi "people of the river" merged into the Korana. 
There is additional evidence in support of the hypothesis that the "Little Korana" were originally 
Einiqua who had been at the Orange River for longer than the "Great Korana". It is to be found in 
the close and cordial relationships which existed between the Hoesing eis (Spider Kraal) Little 
Korana and the San of the Agter Sneeuberg/Seekoei River area to the east. 
Eighteentl1 century Dutch colonists called the San of the eastern Cape interior "Chinese" or 
"Sneeuberg" Bushmen. These San called themselves the Swy eis, but they were also known as the 
IO I. This is a point that both Engelbrecht and Nienaber make, stressing that the tenn "Korana" includes many 
sub-divisions, not all of which are known, and whose precise relationship to each other is obscure. See 
Engelbrecht, Korana, Part I and Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.647-698. 
102. See for instance Gordon's remark that Tswana had once inhabited that part of the river which, in 1779, w.is 
occupied by the Gyzikoa but that "the Coraqua and Einiqua have driven U1em from here". Gordon, 28 Oct. 1779, in 
Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.341. 
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Oesjswana or Saana.103 When Gordon first encountered the Hoesing eis (or Spider Kraal) near 
the present site of Pella, far to the west of the Sneeuberg, the Little Korana claimed to be "good 
friends of the Bushmen who fight with the Sneeuberg farmers". Gordon also stated that they (the 
Hoesing eis) were to be found "almost behind the Sneeuberg on the side of the River and own 
many cattle. The Coraqua are situated a little further up on the other side of the river" .104 What 
emerges from this account despite some understandable geographical vagueness on Gordon's part 
is that a) the Hoesing eis were friendly with the Swy eis; b) they (the Hoesing eis) were 
accustomed to travelling vast distances up the River (following the river from Pella to the Seekoe 
River is over 800 km); and c) that they were distinct from the Korana to the north-east of them. It 
is highly unlikely that the Hoesing eis had a permanent base behind the Sneeuberg (since this, as 
Gordon's two journeys up the Seekoei River in 1777, proved, was undoubtedly Swy ei territory) 
but probable that they were accustomed, with the approval of the Swy eis, to graze their cattle far 
up the river. 
This evidence, as well as the evidence cited earlier concerning an1icable relationships enjoyed 
between the Einiqua and the San, contrasts dramatically with the inforn1ation we have concerning 
relationships between the Great Konma and the San. A significant feature of all of the Great 
Korana traditions of migration from the south is that they mention bitter fighting and hostility 
with the San (and this situation does not seem to have improved by the 19th century). The oral 
traditions speak of having to come to tenns with the local San - not with the local Khoikhoi - and 
the violent contestations that are remembered would be in keeping with the sudden intrusion of 
refugee groups into an area where, previously, a well-regulated arrangement of sharing resources 
between Khoikhoi and San had existed.105 
The San were, at any rate, a more powerful presence in the east than they were elsewhere along 
the river. This was particularly true of the Swy eis of the Sneeuberg who managed (with the help 
of the terrain of their locality) to check the expansion of the trekboers for over half a century. 
How much more of an obstacle must they have presented to the Great Korana? The significance 
of the route taken by the migrating Korana of the south in order to reach the Orange River is that 
103. Gordon, 13 Nov. 1777 and 12 Nov. 1778, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 1, pp.79 and 194. Raper and 
Boucher read Gordon's writing as "Sunei", whereas Patrick Cullinan reads "Swy e'i". In his entry in Klwekhoense 
Stamname (p.251) Nienaber has the spelling "Swe'ei though the date has been incorrectly copied as 12.11.1777 
instead of 12.11.1778. See also V.S. Forbes (ed.,) Anders Sparmwn, A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope ... from 
the year 1772-1776 (Cape Town, reprint 1975, 1977) Vol. 1, p.219, Vol. 2, p.113. 
104. Gordon, 28 Sept. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. II, p.300. Wikar also slates that the "Gyzikoa's 
Buslunen ... spoke the Finch or Chinese language just like the Buslunen of the Sneeuberg", Mossop, Wikar, p.161. 
105. Sec for instance Engelbrecht, Korana, pp.16-19. 
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it skirted the Swy eis in the east whilst attempting to avoid the low rainfall, harsh enviromnent 
and hostile San of the interior north-west of the Nieuweveld escarpment. This route was not 
however that attractive to the trekboers of the eastern frontier when they entered the region in the 
1770s. They preferred to fight for the richer pasture and better rainfall of the areas occupied by 
the Swy eis. The result was that in the east their arrival at the Orange River was delayed until the 
next century. Consequently tl1e major colonial threat to the Khoisan societies of the river in the 
eighteenth century came from the south-west and, having completed our survey of these societies, 





Reivers Across the River, 1770-1797 
THE HANT AM AND THE VAN ZIJLS 
The other frontier district which by the 1770s was beginning to impinge directly on the Orange 
River was that which was called the Hantam. The Hantam derives its name from the solitary 
mountain which lies at the north-westerly end of the Onder Roggeveld.l To the south-west lay the 
Bokkeveld mountains, to the north-west, Namaqualand, and to the north - between it and the 
Orange River - lay miles and miles of Bushmanland. Its position, as well as certain environmental 
features, made it a key region in the north-western frontier zone.2 Strategically it formed a link 
between the distant outpost of Namaqualand and the rest of the colonial frontier. Remote though 
the Hantam was, it was tied far more tightly than was Namaqualand to the production and 
exchange networks which linked Cape Town to the pastoralists of the interior. This fact may be 
demonstrated by the presence, or influence, in the Hantam of some of the richest agriculturalists 
in the colony. One such man was Servaas van Breda, who, in 1783, owned five farms in the 
Onder Bokkeveld (putting him in the Hantam district) and two in Namaqualand. Van Breda was 
not actually resident in the Hantam (being a Burger-Lieutenant in Cape Town) but employed 
Coert or Jacobus Ryk to look after his business in the district.3 Another notable was Sebastiaan 
Valentyn van Reenen, a member of the rich and powerful Van Reenen fan1ily which owned 
extensive property throughout the colony and had the meat contract in its possession. Sebastiaan, 
(who's wife was a sister of Servaas van Breda's wife) owned four farms in the area in his name 
but one of his brothers, Jacobus Arnoldus, owned two, while another brother, Jacob, owned 
another. It is of interest to note that Sebastiaan's "regent" or overseer was Claas Bastart, very 
likely the same Claas Bastart who was known to Wikar and Gordon, and who had worked for 
Petrus Pienaar.4 
I. TI1e Hantam is named after the edible tuber of the plant Heyntame, Pclargonium bifolium, which shows a red 
colour in cross section, hence - the mountain of the red bulb. C.A. Smith, Common names of South Af rica11 Plants 
(Pretoria, 1966) p.247; Nienaber and Raper, Topo11ymica Hotte11totica A** (Pretoria, 1977) pp.519-521. 
2. Not only was the Han tam better watered than its surroundings but the grazing on top of the mountain was good 
and free from the reach of horse sickness. See E.C. Godee-Molsbergen, Reize11 i11 Zuid-Afrika i11 de Holla11dse tijd, 
4 volumes (The Hague, 1916-1932) p.180, note I. 
3. CA, RLR 30, 16 April 1783, pp.24-28; RLR 31, 17 Oct. 1783, p.7; CA, 1/STB 10/163, J. van Zijl to 
Landdrost, 6 Aug. 1784; C.C. <le Villiers and C. Pama, Geslagsregisters Va11 Die Ou Kaapse Families, 2 vols., 
(Cape Town, 1981) p. 97. 
4. CA, RLR 31, 17 Oct. 1783, pp.8-10, 16; De Villiers and Pama, p.764; CA 1/S'IB 10/163, J. van Zijl to 
Lan<ldrost, 6 Aug. 1784. Sebastiaan van Recnen went with Paterson and Gordon on their trip to the Orange River 
mouth in 1779. Raper and I3oucher, Gonion, Vol. 2, pp.241, 250. Jacobus van Reenen, Scbasliaan's elder brother, 
also joined the group. He was described by Gordon as having just returned from the Great River and by Paterson as 
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Claas Bastart was not the only "Bastaard" in the region, for the local Veldwagtmeester Van Zijl 
complained that Van Reenen and the widow of Schalk Burger did not have "christen" (or white) 
knechts on their farms. In Van Zijl's view this caused the farms to become overpopulated with 
thieving "jongens en hottentots" who were up to no good.5 
Whilst men like Van Breda and the Van Reenens controlled many and the best of the farms in the 
Hantam they did not seem to pull their weight when it came to fighting in or provisioning 
commandos. Nor did their servants heed the orders to participate in commandos, claiming that the 
veldwagtmeester had no authority to order them to join.6 This caused considerable resentment 
amongst the less wealthy inhabitants of the district and turned Veldwagtmeester, Johannes van 
Zijl, against them. It was he who voiced the discontent of the poorer white farmers, and drew 
attention to disparities in wealth which existed in I 784. Van Zijl referred to poor and young 
begim1ers in the district who had a mere 300 to 400 sheep. Some had even less than this number 
so that, in reality, what they had was as good as nothing. Van Zijl suggested that those with many 
fanns should be obliged to supply proportionately more towards the Company's needs than those 
who were poor, thereby affording the less fortunate some relief.7 
Van Zijl's letter to the authorities not only draws attention to the fact that it was hard for 
trekboers to establish themselves in the northern frontier districts in the face of rich and powerful 
fanners, it also highlights the constant and continuous necessity of commando duty in a region 
where the Khoisan were still violently resisting trekboer expansion. Hardly a year elapsed 
between 1774 (the year of the General Commando) and 1784 when Khoisan attacks had not 
provoked a vengeful commando to campaign beyond the Hantan1 into Bushmanland. In 1776, for 
instance the Krygsraad of Stellenbosch seriously considered the appointment of a pennanent 
force of men - "a Ruijterwagt" - to patrol the Hantam and Bokkeveld district in order to counter 
Khoisan attacks. In August 1777 the veldwagtmeester of the Bokkeveld over the Doom River 
and the Hantan1, Adriaan van Zijl, reported extensive Khoisan attacks in the district. In 1778 
can1e disturbing news tl1at the Bokkeveld and the Roggeveld Khoisan were in alliance against the 
colonists whilst further attacks occurred in the Onder Bokkeveld-Hantam district. The situation 
having been "eastward to shoot elephants". V.S. Forbes and J. Rourke (eds.), Paterson's Cape Travels, 1777-1779, 
(Johannesburg, 1980) p.154. 
5. CA, 1/STB 10/163, J. van Zijl to Landdrost, 6 Aug. 1784. 
6. For example Coert Ryk, Van Bre<la's fann supervisor, refused to go on conunando on the grounds that his boss 
had forbidden him to <lo so. CA, 1/STB 10/163 A. van Zijl to Landdrost, 7 Oct. 1785. See also Report of Field 
Sergeant A<lriaan van Zyl, 2 Nov. 1778, in Moodie, The Reconi, Prt. 111, p.77. 
7. CA, 1/STB 10/163, J. van Zijl to Lan<l<lrost, 6 Aug. 1784. 
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remained as dangerous in 1779, 1780 and 1781 necessitating continual commandos in these 
years. In the neighbouring Roggeveld Khoisan resistance was even fiercer and commandos from 
this district ventured far beyond the Sak River in attempts to extirpate the hostile Khoisan.8 
By 1784, however, fanners in the Hantam felt themselves to be too threatened by the San to the 
north to be able to lend assistance to their fellows in the east. The Hantam men had even been 
obliged to join commandos in the distant Sneeuberg, a task that was deeply resented, given the 
ever present threat posed by the San closer to home. 9 
The military situation declined dramatically in 1785 with the north-eastern frontier being rolled 
back by Khoisan attacks. Frightened trekboers in the Sneeuberg, Camdeboo, Koup and 
Roggeveld abandoned their farms whilst in the Hantam the locals refused to go on commando.IO 
By 1786 the crisis was as severe in the Hantam as it was elsewhere and on 22 July of that year 
Veldwagtmeester Johannes van Zijl wrote to the landdrost of Stellenbosch to tender his 
resignation. The reason he gave was that his health was poor and that his farm was too far 
removed from the outlying districts where the San were most active. The San, he reported, were 
continuing with murder and robbery, having recently stolen 148 cattle and some guns from Paul 
Karsten as well as murdering the cattle drover. He suggested to the authorities that they appoint 
the intelligent, literate thirty-year old Willem Adriaan Ne! as the new veldwagtmeester.1 I 
This choice was obviously acceptable to the authorities for W.A. Ne! wrote to them later that 
year, in his capacity as veldwagtmeester, and including a petition signed by seventeen others in 
the district. The gist of this communication was that many of the farmers in the Hantam had been 
obliged to abandon their farms because of the murder and robbery of the San. Should the 
situation fail to improve, warned Nel, the Hantam would become as desolate as the Sak River and 
Kamieskou areas. He urgently requested tl1erefore, that the veldwagtmeester of the Olifant and 
Doorn Rivers send help; he also asked for help from Little Namaqualand, specifically mentioning 
the many "bastes en hottentotten" of the district as well as the great numbers of them present at 
the "Groote rivier" (Orange), where they lived as an independent people. If part of these men 
8. CA, C655, Dag Register van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1771-1779, 3 Sept. 1776; 5 Aug. 1777; CA, 1/STB 
10/164, W. Stecnkamp to Landdrost, 3 Feb. 1778; Moodie, The Record, Prt. III, p.84 note. See also chapter 6 
above. 
9. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Van Zijl to Landdrost, 7 Aug. 1784. 
10. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Memoranda from Resolution of the Krygsraad of Stellenbosch, 19 April 1785 and 6 Sept. 
1785. Sec also chaplcr 6 above. 
11. CA, I/STU 10/162, J Van Zijl to Landdrost, 22 July 1786. 
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could be made to go on conunando once a year then the San could be dealt with to the great 
benefit of fanners, not only in the Hantam, but in the Bokkeveld and the entire Roggeveld. This 
would give the colonists more space to expand and be to the Company's ultimate advantage.12 
On the evidence of the details contained in the letters which have been quoted above there was 
clearly an economic, military and environmental crisis in the Hantam by 1786. There was a 
decrease in environmental resources such as water and grazing, and less land was available for 
white, Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" trekboers for, as their numbers grew, the control of the wealthier 
fanners over loan-fanns was increasing. At the san1e time the escalating attacks of the San were 
preventing trekboer expansion throughout the frontier and, indeed, causing the retreat and 
abandonment of many previously occupied areas. The constant and irksome duties of being on 
commando were also causing hardship and discontent amongst a number of frontiersmen. One of 
the consequences of this general crisis was the departure of many "Bastaards" and K110i to the 
Orange River. But they were not the only ones to be tempted by the verdant banks of the river. 
Though the first loan-fann at the Orange had been registered in 1751, very few European fanners 
bothered to record their occupancy of sites along the river since these were probably only visited 
on a seasonal basis. The Company's ability to legitimise grazing rights or enforce payment for 
loan-farms so far from its power base, was virtually non-existent. In any case, before the 1780s, 
there were simply not that many trekboers who dared to graze their livestock so far to the north. 
Petrus Pienaar was one such man but references to other· trekboers at the river were few. 
Matthias Model, a Gennan pasganger and a fonner servant of Jacobus Biennan, was reported to 
be fanning at "Canunas", barely an hour from the river and only two and a quarter miles from 
"Sandfontein", Pienaar's legplaats. Slightly further to the west, downstream from "Sandfontein", 
another Gennan, Volkert Schoemacher, had a legplaats. We also know that a certain colonist 
named Barend Vry lived along the river, whilst Pienaar's overseer at "Sandfontein" was yet 
another Gennan, a deserted sailor called Jan Bloem. I 3 Apart from these semi-pennanent colonial 
12. CA, 1/STB 10/162, W.A. Nel to Lan<ldrost, undate<l. 
13. Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.301, 305,364,371; Mossop, JVikar, p.I 15. Before 13iennan "Cammas" 
had been registered in the name of Coenraad Hendrik Feijt in I 776. CA, RLR 24, 4 March I 776, p. I 90. 
"Canunas" is at the present site of Pella (see Mossop, Brink, p.ix). Sec also CA, RLR 24, 21 Nov. 1776 which 
states that "Jae Lourens Bicnnan" registered "Jabiesiefontein" at the Klein Pella Rivicr "aan hct Groot Rivier", 
(p.214). RLR 25, 22 Oct.1777, p.128; "Cmnmasfontcin" was taken over by "Joh Fred Wijsman" on 29 Sept.1786, 
RLR 35, p.44. Barcnd V1y is mentioned by Gordon on 26 Nov.1779 (in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, 
p.362 ). J<'or Jan Bloem, see pp.318-9, 355-56 below. 
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residents at the river were, increasingly, groups of hunters, who, as will be seen, were not 
exclusively interested in ivory. 
On 13 April Adriaan van Zijl, the veldwagtmeester of the Hantam, wrote to the governor to 
request permission to go inland with some volunteers for the purpose of elephant hunting. This 
request was refused since the governor thought that Van Zijl should not go off hunting at a time 
when he might be required to lead a commando against San raiders. This was a particularly 
reasonable assumption because Van Zijl himself, a short while before, had impressed upon the 
Krygsraad of Stellenbosch how serious the need was for a conunando in his district. For this 
purpose he had been given powder, shot, horses and provisions. But he did not use them for a 
commando.14 
On 6 July 1786 Van Zijl set out for the north with two wagons. Ostensibly, his purpose was to 
attack the San who had stolen Paul Karsten's cattle. The fact that he took along a chest full of 
beads and knives suggested that at least some bartering was envisaged. With him went two of his 
sons, Petrus and Andries, as well as a colonist called Jan Wiese, Adriaan's brother-in-law. There 
were four Khoikhoi servants with them - Klyn Piet Eyland, Piet Namaqua, Andries and Ruyter -
as well as four "Bastaard-Hottentots" - Paul, Gert, Stoffel and Gerrit Beer.15 The latter 
individual lived with Van Zijl, whereas the other "Bastaard-Hottentots" seem to have been more 
at home in Namaqualand. According to the 1834 account of Andrew Smith, Paul and Gert were 
bastard sons of the burgher Willem Engelbrecht of the Kamiesberg by a Khoikhoi woman.16 The 
14. At times it is difficult to state whether there were one or two veldwagtmeesters in the Hantam. Some times the 
veldwagtmeester of the Bokkeveld over the Doom River, i.e. the Onder Bokkeveld, was also described as being in 
the Hantam. 1l1is was the case with Adriaan van Zijl who had fanns in both the Bokkeveld and the Hantam. In 
1786 both W.A. Ne! and Adriaan van Zijl were addressed as veldwagtmeester of the Hantam. A further confusion 
is that Adriaan's brother, Johannes van Zijl, had also been veldwagtmeester of the Hantam and resigned only on 22 
July 1786 (to be replaced by Ne!). 1l1e evidence suggests that even though Adriaan van Zijl had the fann 
"Akerendam" (site of present Calvinia) at the Hantamsberg; and even though his wife was considered to be in Net's 
district, i.e. the Hantam; and even though the authorities referred to him as ve/dwagtmeester of the Hantam he was, 
strictly speaking, a veldwagtmeester of "over de Doom enden Hantam". CA, 1/STB 10/163, A. van Zijl to 
Landdrost, 7 Oct. 1785; 1/STB 10/162, W. Ncl to Landdrost, undated; CA, 1/STB 10/162, J. Van Zijl to 
Land<lrost, 22 July 1786; CA, CJ 429, A. Van Zijl to Governor, 28 April, 1786, pp.70-72; Strauss to A. Van Zijl, 8 
Aug.1785, p.77; A Van Zijl to Hantamers, 15 Dec.1785, p.79; Strauss to Landdrost, 15 Jan.1786, pp.81-83; A 
Van Zijl to Strauss, undated, pp.85; Extract from Resolutions ofKrygsraad, 6 June 1786, p.87. 
15. ·n1e details of Van Zijl's expedition to the Orange River have been pieced together from the court proceedings 
in CA, CJ 429, pp.29-235; CA, CJ 70,71, 72; and CA, C 187. Adriaan was married to Wiese's sister, Sara 
Johmma. De Villiers and Pama, Vol. II, p.1168, 1133. 
16. Percival R. Kirby, ( ed.), Tl,e Diaty of Doctor Andrew Smit/,, Director of tl,e "E1:peditio11 for Ei:ploring Central 
Aji-ica", 1834-1836, 2 vols (Cape Town, 1939, 1940) pp.202-4. 
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party made its way to Great Namaqualand where Van Zijl hired some trek oxen in exchange for 
beads, knives and other provisions. He then revealed to the Khoikhoi servants that they were not 
actually going to shoot San, but elephants; in order to supply the Company with ivory. There 
would, of course, Van Zijl assured them, be enough ivory for everyone. At this, Piet Eyland 
demurred somewhat, being anxious about leaving his livestock in the Hantam unprotected, but 
Van Zijl forced him to accompany the rest of them along the river. 
Here they spent about one and half months about their business. Andries and a Khoikhoi called 
Tas were then left to look after the wagons, whilst the rest of the group prepared to go further 
upstream. The "Bastaard-Hottentots" Paul, Gert and Stoffel did not, however, wish to go any 
further, fearing that their boss was up to no good. Gert Engelbrecht pretended sickness and the 
others prayed to be allowed to remain in charge of him. Paul covered Gert up with karosses and 
got him into a state of perspiration so as to fool van Zijl.17 The veldwagtmeester and his 
remaining followers then continued up the river without them, shooting hippopotami as they went, 
and encountering three Khoikhoi kraals in succession. The first two kraals were described as 
being about three day's journey from the riverl8 but the last of these groups was at the river itself. 
It numbered about 400 people and Van Zijl was to describe them as being called the "Coracoose" 
or the "Kaalkoppen", i.e. Korana.19 According to Van Zijl's later evidence they asked him to 
assist them against a neighbouring group of thieving Khoi, similar to Namaqua, called the 
Nuncquinqua. 
The Nuncquinqua were probably the Naim1eikwa or Namnykoa people, a11 Einiqua group who 
were also known as the "Karosdraers" or "Karoshebbers" .20 When Gordon and Wikar 
encountered the Nuncquinqua in 1779 they were described as living on the islands above the 
17. Ibid. 
18. CA,C 187,p.41. 
19. CA, CJ 429, pp.55, 156, 157; CA, C 187, p.34. Engelbrecht, Konma, p.2, believes that the "Coracoose" 
were Korana. He explains that according to Kronlein, "the able Numa scholar", the etymology of Korana comes 
from !gora, meaning (to be) bare. His list of derivatives from that stem includes !gora-tanas, a bald headed person, 
therefore, Engelbrecht concludes, the Kaalkoppen were Korana. TI1is is undoubtedly tme but Engelbrecht does not 
seem to have realised that, in the account which he consulted (the Resolutions of the Council of Policy, 4 May 1790 
- 29 Jw1e 1790) i.e. CA, C 187, the "Coracoose" and "Kaalkoppen" were synonymous (he did not consult CA, CJ 
429 which might have enlightened him). He treats them as though they were two different groups. 
20. See chapter eight, note 62 above. Engelbrecht did not see that the Nuncquinqua of CA, C 187 were the same 
people as Wikar's Nanmykoa (/Nam/neikwa). Mossop, Wikar, p.30; Engelbrecht, "Tribes of Wikar's Journal", 
p.227. Nienaber confuses the matter by classifying the Nanmcikwa (as he calls them) as Korana (Nienaber, 
Stanmame, pp.741-744; 698) whereas Wikar is quite specific that they are Einiqua. Van Zijl described them as "cen 
soort van nmnacqua hottentots" CA, C 187, p.42. 
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Augrabies Falls,21 although, from the evidence of the court records, they do not seem to have 
been there in 1786. According to the Van Zijls, after being hired by the "Kaalkoppen", they 
journeyed a further fifteen days up-river to where a tributary, called "de geel rivier", joined it. 
There they encountered the Nuncquinqua. This was in all probability the Vaal River,22 and the 
Nuncquinqua were therefore a long way from their 1786 position. Such a move need not surprise 
us, for both the Einiqua and the Konma were a highly mobile people and the times were 
particularly volatile. The "Kaalkoppen" told the Van Zijls that the Nuncquinqua had stolen their 
cattle. Whether or not this was true, the two groups were at war with each other (just as the 
Nuncquinqua had been at war with the Gyziqua in 1779) and the Nuncquinqua might have been 
evicted from the Augrabies area by their enemies. On the other hand they might simply have been 
trying to avoid the "Kaalkoppen" by putting a considerable distance between them. Unfortunately 
they had not bargained on the visit from the Van Zijls. 
Adriaan van Zijl was later to argue that he had gone to the Nuncquinquas out of fear of the 
"Kaalkoppen". He added, however, that they had told him that amongst the Nuncquinqua's cattle 
were some which the San had stolen from the colonists and passed on to the Einiqua.23 Adriaan's 
son Petrus, who was at the time a boy of fourteen, was told by the "Kaalkoppen" that the 
Nuncquinqua were also known as "hounsakkes" (or "hounsakken") and that in Dutch their name 
meant "Christemense bosjesmans" .24 Although this latter term was probably no more than an 
insult, "housakken" may provide further clues to the Nuncquinqua's identity.25 The 
"Kaalkoppen", for their part, were likely to have been the Kei!orana or Great Korana. This 
conclusion is based on Smith's 1834 infonnation that it was a Taaibosch chief who urged the Van 
Zijls to attack the Nuncquinqua.26 
21. See chapter eight, note 62 above. 
22. The Khoikhoi name for the Vaal River was Heigariep. As Burchell explains in his book Travels in the Interior 
of Sou them Africa, 2 vols (London, 1822-1834; reprint London 1953) p.272: "111e name Gariep, is applied only to 
that part of the river below the confluence; while the branch which begins at the place where we were now 
stationed, is called the Tky-gariep or Ky-gariep, by the natives, and the Vaal River by the Klaarwater Hottentots; 
which in English may here be rendered by Yellow River." See Nienaber and Raper, Toponymica Hottentotica A**. 
See also Mossop, Brink, p.54-55, n.49. 
23. CA, CJ 429 pp.156, 160,209. 
24. CA,CJ429pp.174, 184,56. 
25. "Houwsakken" may have some connection with either; a) a subsection of the "Kaross wearers", the names of 
which were Ansakua or !Amsakwa (Korana for "preparers of skins"; Nienaber, Stanmame, p.698); or b) "TI1e 
//I-lo:-//?eikwa or Sak (l3ag) people. About them nothing further is k.il0\\11". Engelbrecht, Korana, p.41. 
26. Kirby, Andrew Smith Diary, Vol. I, p.203. 
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It was about eight in the morning when the Van Zijl party approached the Nuncquinqua kraal. 
The Khoikhoi were on the south side of the river so the colonists, who were on the northern bank, 
crossed over. Hurriedly the Nuncquinqua began to drive their cattle onto an island, fearful of the 
approach of arn1ed and mounted strangers. Without saying a word the Europeans jumped from 
their horses and opened fire. Their horrified servants, Klyn Piet Eyland, Piet Namaqua, Andries 
Ruyter and Gerrit Beer, stood by until Adriaan van Zijl turned on them with his musket, beating 
them with the stock and shouting "Verdoemde Goed naarom schiet juluij niet? Set jij niet dat ik 
schiet en als jij lieden niet scheit, dan sal jij heij van de sche sop krijen" .27 
Thus threatened the Khoikhoi servants fired over the heads of the Nuncquinqua whilst the bullets 
of the Van Zijls and Wiese found human targets. The Nuncquinqua offered no resistance but 
dragged their dead and wounded into the bushes. Then Van Zijl ordered the shooting to stop and 
instructed his servants to cross the river and round up the Nuncquinqua's cattle. Because the 
shooting had frightened the cattle they could only bring 262 across the river.28 They found eight 
dead Nuncquinqua but a surviving woman told them that there were yet more killed and wounded. 
Two women and two children flung themselves into the river in fear as the aggressors 
approached. The woman who had remained asked the Khoikhoi servants if it was customary for 
the Dutch to kill people in such a murderous fashion. They could only reply that not all the Dutch 
did so, but that Van Zijl was a violent man. When Piet Eyland remonstrated with Van Zijl, saying 
that many Khoikhoi had been killed he replied: "Het is voor my even so goed als of ik een blad 
van een boom trek en de Heeren vraagen niet een na een Hottentot" .29 
After spending the night at the scene of the slaughter, the Hantamers returned to the 
"Kaalkoppen", giving them beads and tobacco, but no cattle. Returning the way that they had 
come they discovered the "Bastaard-Hottentots", Stoffel, Paul and Gerrit, staying at the second 
Khoikhoi kraal they had passed on their way from Namaqualand.30 According to Petrus van Zijl, 
these were the "Linkse" .3 I This is a further valuable clue to the disposition of Khoikhoi groups 
27. "Danmed things why aren't you shooting? Can't you see that I'm shooting and if you don't shoot you'll get the 
same treatment". CA, C 187, p.43. 
28. CA, C 187, p.44. A SmiU1 reports that I 200 cattle were stolen. Kirby, Andrew Smith Diary, Vol. I, p.203. 
29. "To me it's like pulling a leaf from a tree and "de Heeren" [from the context probably the govenuucnt] couldn't 
care less about a Hottentot." CA, C 187, p.45. 
30. This "Namaqualand" was actually Great Namaqualand for when Van Zijl was asked whether he'd gone to 
Namaqualand he replied: "Dat daar gccn Namaqualand wis maar we! over de groote rivier gegaantc zeijn". Later 
he elaborated: "Ja over de groolc rivicr in scgt dat die Streck sig noemt Am1iquas, synde de bastaard hottentotten 
die daar van tyd lot tyd na toe trekkcn". CA, CJ 429, pp. I 50, 155. 
31. CA, CJ 429, pp. I 74, 184. 
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along the Orange in 1786, for the Links were a Korana group whose Khoikhoi name was //? Are-
ma-1/?eis or the Karemankies.32 According to Engelbrecht they, along with the Kei!orana (or 
Taaibosch), had been in the vanguard of the main group of Korana which left the Cape and 
arrived at the Orange River in the middle of the eighteenth century.33 When Gordon first heard of 
them in 1779 their nan1e was connected with the Toupkwa (or Hartenaars) and both groups were 
reported to be in the vicinity of the confluence of the Vaal and Harts rivers.34 Just like the 
Kei!orana ("Kaalkoppen" or Taaibosch) they seem to have moved a long way downstream by 
1786 before returning to the east and north after this date. Proof for this assertion is to be found 
in an observation of Andrew Smith in 1834: 
our Coranna guide ... an aged man who had spent his younger days in the territory 
of a Coranna tribe ... It appeared from his account, which we had no reason to doubt, 
that the Anninize (author's note: i.e. the Karema.nkies or Links) (of which tribe he 
was by birth a member) previous to the last 42 years occupied a district immediately 
to the east of Pella, on the Orange River. About the year 1792, John Bloom, the 
colonist, arrived in the country ... He ... plundered the Bituana tribes, who were then 
residing in the direction of Latacoo... The result was to excite great consternation ... 
causing them to retire inland... Of this retrocession the Corannas availed 
themselves, and by degrees, advanced towards the situations thus left unoccupied.35 
Here again is evidence that, between 1779 and 1786, Korana groups had taken occupation of 
parts of the river which had been the site of Einiqua kraals when Wikar and Gordon travelled the 
area. They no doubt contributed inunensely to the rapid destabilisation of Einiqua societies, but in 
this, as the Van Zijl expedition illustrates, they were not alone. Nor were they immune to 
disruption themselves, for Van Zijl's next move was to order his servants to attack the "Linkse". 
He was no doubt as keen to incriminate the "Bastaard-Hottentots" who had not been involved in 
the attack on the Nuncquinqua (in order to seal their lips) as he was to acquire more cattle. He 
therefore conunanded his servants to accompany Stoffel, Paul and Gerrit in an attack to take all 
the cattle and kill all of the Khoikhoi. When Paul objected to these orders Van Zijl shouted that 
all the "hottentots" in that part of the world were "schelms" and that if he did not do as he was 
told he would get the same treatment. The reluctant servants therefore carried out the attack but 
must have done so rather half-heartedly for they succeeded in capturing a mere fifteen cattle.36 
32. Engelbrecht, Korana, pp.31-47. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Nienaber, Stamname, pp.584-5; 878, 697. 
35. W.F Lye, ( ed.), Andrew Smit/,: Jou ma/ of liis expedition into tl,e interior of Sou ti, Aji'ica 1834-1836 (Cape 
Town, l 975), p.128. 
36. CA, C l 87, pp.46-48. 
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Although the Van Zijls were unlikely to have been the first colonial party to have left its mark on 
the riverine societies, they do seem to have inaugurated a chain reaction of violence which lasted 
for decades and which was, as Andrew Smith noted, closely linked with the name of Jan Bloem. 
In fact the paths of the Van Zijls and Bloem crossed each other on this very occasion. 
Since the "Linkse" had all fled, the disgusted Van Zijl had no option but to return to the colony. 
He, his companions, their servants and a large herd of stolen cattle therefore trekked westwards, 
along the river, until they reached Andries and the wagons. Soon afterwards they approached the 
farm of Petrus Pienaar called "Hartebeesterivier", situated at the Orange River and under the 
management of Jan Bloem.37 This farm was, no doubt, at the junction of the Hartebeest and 
Orange rivers. The Hartebeest River is in effect the continuation of the Sak River further to the 
south, for that river disappears into the sand north of the present day Brandvlei and re-emerges as 
the Hartebeest, around present day Kenhardt. Although it sometimes dries up completely, the 
Hartebeest river is the most likely place to find water in Buslunanland and it was therefore, the 
best route between the Orange and the southern interior. The Van Zijls were probably therefore 
about to cross Buslunanland by following the Hartebeest southwards first, however, they camped 
for the night near Pienaar's fann. 
Next morning a number of the cattle were missing and Van Zijl's response was to thrash the 
Khoikhoi drovers with such severity that over a year later they still bore the scars. Wiese then 
mounted his horse and followed behind Ruiter and Tas as, bleeding and beaten, the two came to 
Jan Bloem's kraal, the place where the cattle spoor led. Before proceeding any further Adriaan 
van Zijl was summoned to lend his authority to the delicate negotiations which were about to 
ensue.38 
Bloem had first arrived in the northern frontier zone as a fugitive from justice. He was, 
apparently, a Gennan from Thuringia who had deserted from a ship in Cape Town in 1780. At 
some stage he must have acquired a wife for it was reported that he had murdered her and fled to 
the Orange River. Here he was employed by Petrus Pienaar of the Hantam to advance his not 
always legitimate interests. Though Bloem had not, in 1786, attained the notoriety which he was 
to acquire at a later date, he was no doubt, quietly consolidating his position along the river at the 
time of the Van Zijls' visit. He was, eventually, to have between ten and twelve wives, who 
37. CA, CJ 429, Rclaas van Ilollenlol Andries, pp.119-127. 
38. CA, CJ 429, pp.119-121. 
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included Konma women of the Kats and Springbok clans.39 The chances are that he was already 
a fairly influential force in the district and, perceiving that the Van Zijls had a lot of dubiously 
acquired cattle, did not scruple to help himself to some of them. 
Van Zijl and Wiese were not, however, to be trifled with. Dismounting from their horses, but 
retaining their muskets, they approached the Gennan in a confrontational mood. Wiese asked 
Bloem where their cattle were and Bloem replied in words which are typical of his character. 
Since they are the only recorded words he ever uttered they have a brutal poignancy fitting, 
almost, to be his epitaph: "Bin ik jou beestewagter? - Am I your cattle's keeper?" 
This answer was not appreciated by Wiese who knocked Bloem unconscious, leaving his body 
lying senseless on the veld whilst the Van Zijl gang rounded up their missing cattle and rode 
off.40 
The journey back to the Hantam was uneventful. It was November by the time the Van Zijls 
returned to their home base and their greatest concern was now to conceal their crimes. The 
Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentot" servants were threatened with death if they so much as 
uttered a word about the expedition. The cattle were divided between Van Zijl, his sons and 
Wiese, but there was nothing for the servants. Petrus van Zijl did not completely trust Piet Eyland 
for he complained to his father that "de hottentot sal ons in 't verdriet bringen zoo als hy 
Engelbrecht in 't verdriet gebragt heeft". Quite what this previous betrayal had been is not known 
but Adriaan van Zijl thought it prudent to offer Piet Eyland three cattle to keep him quiet. Eyland 
refused.41 
It was hard enough, even without the threat of infonners, to hide the evidence of the expedition 
from neighbouring fanners for there were at least 260 new cattle in the district. Wiese quickly 
sold some of his share of 80 cattle to Paul Karstens and one cow to Christiaan Bok. Van Zijl, 
realising that it was common knowledge that his followers had returned with cattle, decided to 
"confess" to the landdrost that he had, in fact, made a journey to barter or buy some oxen. He 
had, however, ( or so he claimed) managed to get a mere six or eight cattle from the "Coracoose" 
in exchange for attempting to help them against a group of thieving Kl10i. These robbers, 
39. Legassick, "Northern Frontier", p.369; ,,.ll1e Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries", pp.133-37, 251. 
40. CA,CJ429,pp.205, 119-121. 





according to Van Zijl, had fled into the caves and kloofs of the mountains so that he had not been 
able to attack them.42 
Unfortunately, this story did not tally with that of Sebastiaan Valentyn van Reenen. He 
complained that Van Zijl had brought 280 cattle to the Hantam from the land of the Great 
Namaqua and that these cattle, moreover, were straying onto his land and eating the grass.43 
Even more alarming was the evidence of David Frederick Straus of the Hantam who, in 1787, 
was visited by the aggrieved Jan Bloem. Bloem reported that a group of about 400 "Namaqua" 
had been on their way to attack Van Zijl. They had only been dissuaded from this course of 
action when Bloem had told them that Van Zijl lived too far inland to be easily reached, and that 
many fam1s and fanners lay between him and the Orange River.44 
Obviously these "Namaqua" were Van Zijl's victims seeking their revenge. With the evidence 
against Van Zijl mounting up, the landdrost decided to begin a rigorous enquiry into the incident 
and for this purpose sununoned the Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentot" servants to give evidence 
before him. Piet Eyland, Paul and Gert Engelbrecht, Andries and Ruyter eventually testified 
between October and November 1787. It took them considerable courage to do so since they 
feared not only Van Zijl, but the Dutch in general. Since he was a close relative of Adriaan van 
Zijl, Veldwagtmeester Willem Adriaan Nel had, in fact, done his best to obstruct proceedings by 
preventing Gerrit Beer from going to give evidence. Instead, Beer, along with others who had not 
been included, fled for his life to Namaqualand. Andries and Ruyter had been similarly han1pered 
and harassed by Wiese and Van Zijl, but had eventually run away to Stellenbosch where they 
threw themselves on the mercy of the landdrost. They begged that they would never have to 
return to "die Kant van 't land" and expressed themselves willing to work for the rest of their lives 
in Stellenbosch for food alone.45 
By 6 November the landdrost had heard enough to order the arrest of the Van Zijls and Wiese. 
On 7 February 1788 their imprisonment was confirmed and, later that month, they were cross-
examined.46 There was, however, one absentee: Andries. It was his youth that spared him for he 
was even younger than his brother Petrus. When Andrew Smith heard the story in 1834 it was 
42. CA, C 187, pp.34; CA, CA, CJ 429, p.35. 
43. CA, C 187, pp. 35-36; CA, CJ.429, p.36. 
44. CA, C 187, pp.53-54. 
45. CA, C 187 p.37; CA, CJ 429, pp.124, 38-39. 
46. CA, CJ 429, pp.50-52. 
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stated that: "Petrus, in consequence of being married was considered from under the control of his 
father. .. Andries, not being married, was regarded as being subject to obey the orders of his father 
and was dismissed". There is a slight anomaly here because, according to De Villiers and Pan1a, 
Petrus only married in November 1787, i.e. after his return from the Orange River. The same 
source states that Petrus was christened in 17 6 7. This would mean that he was at least nineteen in 
1786 and not fourteen, as he claimed in court. In any event he was considered to be responsible 
for his actions whereas Andries was not. Andries was however expected to appear in court but he 
refused to obey the landdrost's summons.47 
The authorities were, in fact, more interested in cross-examining another of Van Zijl's sons, 
Willem, for once the Khoikhoi began to testify, evidence of another barbarous atrocity came to 
light. According to Andries, Willem had murdered his (Andries') daughter Antje by stringing her 
up from a tree, flogging her with a sjambok, shooting her twice in the head and then finishing her 
off by smashing her with stones.48 A summons was duly sent to Willem van Zijl but neither he 
nor his brother Andries deemed it wise to join Petrus, Wiese and their father in prison for 
developments at the trial were far from encouraging.49 
Adriaan's defence was that he had gone northwards in order to look for fanns for his sons. He had 
been forced into helping the "Kaalkoppen" in what was, in any case, a legitimate raid since the 
Nuncquinqua were receivers of cattle stolen by the San from the colonists. It was the 
Nuncquinqua who had fired on them first with bows and arrows so they had been forced to 
retaliate. Petrus pleaded that he had been ordered to do what he had done by his father whilst 
Wiese followed Adriaan van Zijl's story. He added, however, that he did not think there was 
anything wrong in shooting "Bosjesmans Hottentotten" or in taking their cattle.SO 
Sentence was passed on 27 March 1788. Adriaan van Zijl and Jan Wiese were to be banished 
from the colony to the Fatherland whilst Petrus was to spend two years on Robben Island. These 
sentences were nowhere near as severe as the original judgement: that the two adults should be 
executed and Petrus condenmed to twenty-five years on the island.51 Mild though the final 
sentences were there is reason to doubt that the banislunents were indefinite for how else does one 
47. Kirby,A11drewSmithDiwy, Vol. i,p.204; De Villiers and Pama, Vol. ll,pp.1168-1169. 
48. CA, CJ 429, pp.122-125, 189-90. 
49. CA, CJ 70, pp.26 and IOI; CA, CJ 70, pp.126-7. 
50. CA, CJ 429, pp.147-209. 
51. CA, C 187, pp.71-73; CA, CJ 70, pp.37-39. 
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account for the fact that Wiese and his wife begat seven children in the colony between 1791 and 
1804?52 Petrus, at least, served his sentence on Robben Island.53 In his absence, however, his 
younger brother, Andries, seduced his wife, Margaretha Johanna van Schalkwyk (to whom he 
had been married for a mere three months) and continued to roam the Hantam in freedom along 
with his fugitive brother Willem.54 The Council of Justice also ordered that Willem Adriaan Nel 
should confiscate 160 cattle from Wiese and Van Zijl's herds and bring them to the Company at 
the Cape. This task however proved to be impossible because the condemned men had had the 
foresight to disperse their herds an10ngst those of friends and relatives before going to trial. Their 
wives pleaded poverty and hardship, taking care to keep their remaining livestock out of the 
clutches of the authorities, whilst Veldwagtmeester Nel was happily most ineffectual in 
implementing his instructions.55 
In many ways the Van Zijl expedition of 1786 is a most revealing episode, particularly if one 
compares it to the attack made by Picketburgers on the Great Namaqua in 1738. In both cases a 
group of colonists engaged in illegal elephant hunting and cattle bartering decided to take 
advantage of the vulnerability of the Khoikhoi societies of the Orange River and attack them. In 
neither of these incidents of unprovoked violence did the Khoikhoi victims receive protection or 
compensation; nor were the guilty parties punished at all severely. In both incidents Khoisan or 
"Bastaard-Hottentot" servants had played major, if unwilling roles in the murderous robbery, 
without however, receiving much for their pains. In 1738 the aggrieved servants had triggered off 
a major frontier war as they sought compensation for their troubles, but in 1786 the situation was 
different. The coercive power of frontier fanncrs over their servants now seemed to be much 
greater, and options for resistance were correspondingly less. Indeed, it is difficult to judge 
whether the Van Zijl's servants or the Nuncquinqua were most in need of colonial protection. In 
both 1738 and 1786 the governn1ent's ability to impose its will on the frontier zone was limited 
52. De Villiers and Pama, Vol. II, p.1133. Adriaan, described as old and lame, was back in the Hantam in 1790. 
See CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Comas van Mozambique, 19 July 1790; Relaas van Lea, 19 July 1790. 
53. CA, CJ 3189, p.277. Petrus van Zijl imprisoned April 1788, released 18 March 1790. 
54. Kirby, Andrew Smith Diary, Vol. 1, p.204; De Villiers and Pruna, Vol. II, p.1169. Willem was eventually 
banished in absentia. On 6 Feb.1790 he and Andries wrote to TI1enius, the president of the Council of Justice, to 
ask for pardon. Willem claimed that he had shot Antje one night when it was dark and on hearing a suspicious 
noise in the kraal. He was too young, he argued, to be held accountable for his actions. His case was discussed in 
January 1793 and he was released from banislunent. Andries also pleaded his youth as a mitigating factor and was, 
presumably, pardoned before 1793. He married Petrus' wife and sired seven children. CA, CJ 70, pp.215-6; CA, 
CJ 72, pp.359-63; CA, CJ 74, pp.412-415; CA, CJ 75, pp.8-11, 18-19. He was a dmnken witness to the murder of 
Christina Ne! by her <lmnken husband, Albert, in U1e Bantam in 1789, sec CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Comas van 
Mozambique, 19 July 1790. 
55. CA, CJ 70, pp.28-31, 50; CA, CJ 71, pp.143-145, 198-200, 251-255; CA, CJ 429, pp.122-124. 
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although, to its credit, attempts were made to investigate complaints of unbridled violence against 
innocent Khoikhoi. It cannot, however, be said that the punishment meted out to the Van Zijls 
acted as a deterrent. Indeed, far from signalling the fact that murderous conduct would not be 
tolerated, their expedition heralded the arrival of a new, intensive era of disruption for the 
Khoisan societies of the Orange River. 
"SCHELMEN, KANALJIES EN DR0STERS"56 
The Van Zijl expedition had demonstrated that, by 1786, groups of colonists were able to 
terrorise the Khoisan societies of the Orange River almost at will and, at the same time, cow and 
control their own servants closer to home. The floodgates of colonial violence had thus opened to 
the Orange and it seemed as if white settlement would now swamp the banks of the river. This did 
not happen. The number of whites visiting the river certainly increased after 1786 but, 
significantly, so too did the number of Khoisan or "Bastaard-Hottentots" from the colony. We 
have already seen that there were appreciable numbers of these people at the Orange before 1786 
for the veldwagtmeesters of the northern frontier had begun to express their disquiet about their 
presence there as early as the l 770s.57 Some of these Khoisan or "Bastaard-Hottentots", 
following earlier precedent, had doubtless arrived at the river as obedient henchmen, doing the 
dirty work of hunting, trading and raiding for their white masters. Other, increasingly, found their 
own way to the river and formed themselves into independent groups. These Oorlams, as they 
became known, were, in the eyes of the colonists, nothing more than drosters. Many indeed were 
fleeing from oppression and exploitation in the colony for, as the Van Zijl case had but recently 
reiterated, the lot of Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentot" servants within the northern frontier zone 
was not a happy one. Flight, or strict compliance with the commands of their masters, seemed the 
only options. The prospect of joining the cattleless Khoisan resisters of the arid interior of 
Bushmanland cannot have been attractive to those whose lives centred on livestock. In these 
circumstances the best alternative to a life of servitude, provided one was prepared to contest for 
resources with the resident Khoisan, was to live the life of an independent pastoralist along the 
Orange River. 
56. "Rogues, Rabble and Deserters": the words of Landdrost Blettennan when moved to describe certain colonists 
living north of the Orange River. Sec p.334 below. 
57. Sec p.290 above. 
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In time, these Oorlam groups would become strong enough to deter all but the most hardy 
trekboers from establishing themselves at the river, and the result was that the frontier of colonial 
settlement remained much where it was. In its stead there developed a zone of violence and 
insecurity where raiding and robbery becan1e institutionalised and the commando system was 
adapted to meet the needs of non-productive, predatory and parasitic societies who preyed off 
each other and their weaker neighbours. This was, of course, what many trekboers, Khoikhoi and 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" had been doing on a small scale before l 786 but after this date the volume 
of traffic to and from the river became positively alam1ing. 
In 1788 some of the white inhabitants of the Bokkeveld complained about what was obviously an 
increasingly conunon occurrence. Groups of Khoikhoi were trekking to and from the Orange 
River with herds and flocks of livestock, doubtless in search of good grazing and water, but in 
such a way as to threaten the security of the colonial farmers. In the first place, though some of 
the Khoikhoi were acting as shepherds or drovers for white masters, the fact that they were 
provided with firearms was seen, by certain upholders of the law, as being dangerous. In 
September 1788, Willem Adriaan Nel the veldwagtmeester of the Bokkeveld, complained that a 
group of Khoikhoi, in the service of Philip Snyman, had been returning from the Great River with 
some cattle and a gun when, close to the Hantam they had been attacked by San and robbed of 
both livestock and the fireann. The very next day, according to Nel, the San attacked his servants 
and shot at them with a gun. Nel's conclusion was that Khoikhoi should not be pennitted to 
wander about with fireanns, since inevitably, the weapons ended up in the wrong hands.58 
Another (and more overt) threat posed by groups of Khoikhoi travelling backwards and forwards 
from Namaqualand was that they often swept up livestock that did not belong to them as they 
trekked northwards. This, at least, was the view of Veldwagtmeester Petrus Lodewicus Theron 
and twelve other men from the Bokkeveld. They wrote that those Khoikhoi from the Bokkeveld 
who journeyed to Namaqualand did not themselves have much livestock but that on their way 
there they stole large amounts of cattle from the colonists. Theron suggested that those Khoikhoi 
who lived in Namaqualand should stay there while those who did not should be prohibited from 
roving about and obliged to work in the service of the colonists.59 
58. CA, 1/STB 10/162, W.A. Nel to Lan<ldrost, 30 Sept. 1788. 111e year before Ncl had reported that robberies 
were still taking place in the district and that he ha<l shot <lead "vier hottentots rovers", CA, 1/STB 10/167, W.A. 
Nel to Lan<l<lrost, 20 Sept. 1787. 
59. CA, l/STI3 10/162, W.A. Ne! to Lan<ldrost, 11 Oct. 1789. 
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In the meantime incessant attacks by the Khoisan on the trekboers of the Hantam district 
continued. Willem Adriaan Nel reported on 11 October 1789 that he had led a commando which 
had killed or captured twenty-four San,60 but several of the farmers did not consider this to be an 
adequate response. Petrus Pienaar emerged as the spokesman of the dissatisfied Hantamers. Since 
he was to play an important role along the Orange River and the northern Cape frontier zone it 
will be necessary to provide some details about him. 
From an early date the life of Petrus Pienaar was closely linked to both the Afrikaner Oorlams 
and the Orange River. Pienaar, who was born in 1750, farmed in the vicinity of the Tulbagh 
district in the 1770s, during which period Klaas Afrikaner and his family entered his service as 
herders. It is likely that some time before 1779 Pienaar and the Afrikaners - Klaas and his sons 
Jager and Titus - had visited the Orange River, either as hunters, or in search of grazing for their 
stock. According to the missionary Campbell, Pienaar had, at some stage, had a farn1 at the 
Olifants River.61 But like other frontier fanners he realised that seasonal migrations to the 
Orange River were a feasibility and, with the remote vastness of the northern districts to wander 
in, was not overly punctilious about registering loan-fanns. By 1779, when Pienaar (together with 
Sebastiaan and Paul van Reenen) attached himself to Gordon and Paterson's expedition to the 
Orange River mouth, he was obviously regarded as being one of the best guides to the river. 
Significantly, at this stage he was described as being "a burgher of the Rodesand", which implies 
that he had not made his pennanent residence too far to the north. He did, however, possess a 
/egplaats called "Sandfontein" which was nine kilometres west of Klein Pella and about fifteen 
kilometres from the south bank of the river.62 On Gordon's expedition to the Orange River, 
Pienaar and his Khoikhoi companions acted as the party's hunters. One incident that reveals that 
Pienaar was capable of great physical endurance occurred when he and his men went off ahead to 
hunt on 11 August 1779. They rejoined the main party on 18 August after having had a period of 
three and half days without water. The group looked "dreadfully ill, having travelled through 
sultry desarts (sic) over sandy hills and rocky mountains without tasting food or swallowing a 
drop of water". Pienaar, however, appeared to Paterson to be "much less injured by his 
60. CA, 1/STB 10/162, W.A. Ne! to Landdrost, 11 Oct. 1789. 
61. John Campbell, Travels in South Africa (London, 1815; reprint Cape Town) p.376; Du Bmyn, "Oorlams", p.3; 
E. Bradlow, "Pctrns Pienaar-Ruffian or Courageous Pioneer", Q11arterly B111/eti11 of the SA libraty, Vol. 3, 1980, 
pp.94-99; De Villiers and Pama, Vol. II, p.692. Sec also chapter 7 above. 
62. Raper and 13oucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, pp.241, 298. l'ienaar had also registered the Cann "Elands Drill" at the 
Doom River on 15 April 1779, CA, RLR 26, p.58. 
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unfortunate expedition than the Hottentots".63 That these "Hottentots" probably included people 
such as the Afrikaners is suggested by an entry in Gordon's journal made over three months later: 
"I found Pinar and his Hottentots still at Sandfontein ... Some of Pinar's Hottentots were ill from 
the hard walking in the heat... At the request of our best shot, Afrikaander, I gave him some 
medicine since he wants to accompany me to Namaqualand".64 Other interesting associates of 
Petrus Pienaar who were described as being resident at "Sandfontein" in 1779 were the Barends 
(or Bastart or Baster) brothers, Claas and Piet. Claas, like Afrikaander (probably Klaas 
Afrikaner) was also a good shot and it is remarkable how these accomplished hunters gravitated 
towards Pienaar.65 
Little is known of Pienaar's activities in the 1780s, though it is probable that he used his farm 
"Elands Drift" at tl1e Doom river as a base for trips to the Orange River. No doubt the Afrikaners 
and the Barends continued to act as his herders or hunters in a mutually advantageous 
relationship. They could look after his livestock and supply him with ivory whilst building up 
flocks and herds of their own. Pienaar could, on the other hand, supply them with guns, powder, 
shot and other useful commodities. When Francois le Vaillant travelled to the north in 1783, the 
two men met each other. Despite the fact that Pienaar had tl1e reputation of being a brave and 
renowned hunter, Le Vaillant declined to accept his services as a guide, instead, he left a rather 
unflattering description of the frontiersman, characterising him as a drunken nuisance. It is clear 
from Le Vaillant's (albeit not always reliable) testimony that Pienaar was not above a bit of 
active trading himself, for whilst ostensibly on a hunting trip, he had a wagon load of brandy, 
trinkets and tobacco for bartering.66 When Gordon met Pienaar again, in 1785 in the vicinity of 
63. W. Paterson, A Narrative of Four Joumeys into the Country of the Hottentots and CajJ,-aria (London, 1790) 
pp.113-114; Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.268. If the Pienaar mentioned in Gordon's 1785 journal is the 
same Petrus Pienaar he seems to have lost his ability to endure thirst (Gordon, 22 Nov. 1785, in Raper and 
Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.390). "Pienaar wanted to take us along a <liflerent route from the ordinary one (N.B. 
this ravine is called 'De He!'), the better to reach the top of an abrupt peak which seemed to be the highest in the 
Rodesand, but we got lost over an<l in some very difficult ravines, so that Pienaar and Meyer (who drank water at 
each brook) were completely exhausted by perspiring so heavily on their arduous walk and Pienaar remained lying 
at a brook and afterwards returned home". 
64. Gordon, 27 Nov. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.362. 
65. Gordon, 28 Sept. and 8 Oct. 1779, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, pp.300, 310. See also note 61. 
66. F. Le Vaillant, New Travels into the Interior Parts of Africa in the Years 1783-1785 (London, 1796) Vol. I, 
pp.147-8; Vol. II, pp.68-73, 216-224; Vol. III, pp.369-370. See also J.L.M. Franken, Duminy-Dagboek (Cape 
Town, 1938) pp.229-233. An amusing note to Le Vaillant's travels is found in a loose page in the manuscript of 
Gordon's fourth journey. Gordon was told by Pienaar and by Claas Baslert (both of whom accompanied Le 
Vaillanl) that it was Barend Vrij who shot the giraffo which Le Vaillant claimed to have shot. In fact Le Vaillant 
took Vrij's horse for a girafle, stalked it an<l very nearly shot il by mistake. Gordon Journals, translation and 
manuscript of Patrick Cullinan. 
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the Winterhoek, he reported that Pienaar had just returned from a journey to the Koebieskou, or 
Kubiskou, a range of hills north-west of the Hantam.67 It is also known that Jan Bloem was 
acting as overseer on one of Pienaar's legplaatsen on the Hartebeest River in 1786. Quite clearly, 
therefore, Pienaar's activities were both diverse and extensive. 
It is hardly surprising that by 1790 he was one of the most influential men on the northern 
frontier. In March of that year he registered three new farms in his nan1e - "de Groote Vlakte over 
de Oliphants Rivier"; "de Houwhoek aan de Hantams River"; "de Vaderlandse Riet Valley over 
de Oliphants en Doorn River"68 - and obviously felt strong enough to challenge the authority of 
the local veldwagtmeester, Willem Adriaan Ne!. 
In June 1790 Pienaar wrote a letter to the landdrost of Stellenbosch, outlining the current crisis in 
the Hantam and suggesting measures which should be taken in order to rectify the situation. 69 Its 
contents are an important, detailed depiction of the situation in the Hantam in 1790 and are 
worthy of consideration. According to Pienaar the San had made ten attacks on Hantam farms 
since December, driving off livestock, murdering KI10i shepherds and stealing guns. The 
veldwagtmeester, Willem Adriaan Ne!, had undertaken four commandos but all to no avail and 
with negligible results. Only the week before Ne! had been off on a commando in the veld whilst 
the San were busy attacking three Hantam households, firing on the inhabitants with four guns. 
On another occasion just as Ne! had returned home, the San had launched a raid on the Hantam 
mountain, taking Johannes Gous's cattle and Steenkamp's sheep. Those who attempted to follow 
were obliged to retire once the San began to fire at tl1em - with bullets. Part of the problem, 
according to Pienaar, was that Veldwagtmeester Ne! and Veldkorporaal Karstens had abandoned 
their fanns in the Hantam - because of the San - and based themselves in the Bokkeveld: From 
this position it took between ten and twelve days to mobilise a commando and arrive in the 
Hantam. But unless a commando could pursue robbers within two days of a raid, all was lost. 
The reluctance of men to go on conunando did not help matters but prompt attendance was not 
likely to occur if one first had to go to the Bokkeveld in order to alert the veldwagtmeester. As it 
was, fourteen fanns had been deserted because of the San. 
67. Gordon, 22 Nov. 1785, in Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, p.390. 
68. CA, RLR 36, pp.191, 192, 193. 
69. CA, I/STU 10/162, P. Pienaar to Landdrost, 3 June 1790. 
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Pienaar's suggestions were that fireanns and anununition should be more liberally provisioned 
than they had been, firstly to the veldwagtmeester but secondly, and more importantly, to the 
outlying farmers. In addition, the farmers from districts far removed from the dangers of San 
attack should be compelled to undertake a conunando at least once a year. These men should 
include the many "basters so gedoopte als ongedoopte" who lived along the Olifants River and in 
the "Koude of Seder gebergte". The "groote rivier" was also "opgepropt van basjtaars en oorlanse 
Hottentotte" who would, if Pienaar was in charge, be sent on commando. In this way the 
Kareeberge and the country to the east of the Sak and Vis Rivers in Bushmanland could once 
more be inhabited by colonists. Pienaar concluded his letter by boasting that "ik heeft honderde 
van bosjemans helpe verslaan" and that this was accomplished in ways quite different to the 
"regte kinder werk en spele" which characterised the present attempts to defeat the San in the 
Hantam. In this way, whilst not exactly accusing Nel of incompetence, Pienaar was hinting to the 
authorities that if they gave him tl1e tools, he, Pienaar, could finish the job.70 
That Nel was not unaware of this challenge to his authority and Pienaar's criticism of his 
leadership may be gathered from a letter he wrote to the landdrost on 23 July 1790. In this he 
reported on a series of raids by San, anned with guns, on Coert Ryk's livestock. Nel was only 
able to raise four men to join him on commando and they had so little powder and shot that it was 
not prudent to follow the robbers into the mountains. No sooner had this unsuccessful sortie 
returned than the cattle of Johannes Gous were driven off. This time only one man answered the 
sununons to conunando duty and the San, left unpunished, returned to drive away Johannes 
Karsten's sheep, firing guns at tl1e people within his farm house. Nel could only suppose that the 
refusal of the colonists to undertake conunandos stenuned from their perception that they 
remained unpunished since the /anddrost and Krygsraad did nothing to enforce their authority. 
Without the backing of this authority a veldwagtmeester's ability to conunand was non-existent. 
Ne!, like Pienaar, stressed the need for lavish supplies of powder and shot. He hoped that the 
authorities would send 200 pounds of the fonner and 400 pounds of the latter with his 
veldkorporaal, Karsten, so that a conunando could be assembled before the end of August. Also, 
as Pienaar had suggested, Ne! asked the authorities to conunand the veldwagtmeester of the 
Bidouw to bring out the "bastaards en Hottentotte" of the "Kou we Bergen" on commando.71 
70. [bid. 
7 I. CA, 1/STB 10/162; WA Ne! to Lan<ldrost, 23 July 1790. 
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It is not known whether Nel's proposed commando actually took place in August 1790, although 
there was a great deal of commando activity in the Roggeveld at this time. 72 But in October and 
November of that year disturbing infonnation began to reach the landdrost at Stellenbosch about 
events in Great Namaqualand and in other regions across the Orange River. These events, which 
dated back to about 1786 (the year of the Van Zijl expedition) were to suggest to the authorities 
that Pienaar's offer of assistance could not be ignored. 
On 5 October 1790 Augustus van den Heever, the veldkorporaal of Little Namaqualand, 
reported that about three or four years previously, a group of colonists had trekked over, "den 
grote rivier synde de grenschijding tuschen de Christernin en Namaqua Hottentotten".73 These 
colonists, who included the burgers Matthias Esterhuysen, Pieter Besuydenhout, Isaac Bosman 
the younger, Guilliam Visagie, David Vry and Johannes Frederik Wietsman, settled in Great 
Nan1aqualand, despite the fact that the VOC had not given them loan-farn1s there and that 
crossing over the river was forbidden. These men had acquired large quantities of livestock, 
which they had bartered from the Nan1aqua, and which they herded along the river and down to 
the Hantam. This example had been followed by the "Bastaard-Hottentots" of the area who 
numbered (according to the reports of others) about four hundred strong. Van den Heever hin1self 
was prepared to vouch for the fact that there were at least two hundred of them and that they 
were equipped with guns and ammunition. 
Alarmed by this situation, and equipped with governmental authority to confiscate firearms from 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" who did not have written pern1ission to possess guns, Van den Heever had 
attempted, in about 1789, to disanu "die Hottentot Claas Bastaart, Adan1 Kok de klyne, Cornelis 
Kok" and those of their company who had muskets. Claas Bastaart had responded to this by 
saying "met de tromp van het snaphaan hom te moeten worden afgenomen want so lange hy van 
kruijd en lood was voorsien tot den laasten kogel op de christcne te sullen [verdeede]" .74 
Such an attitude created great unease among the few white inhabitants of the district whilst 
information received by Van den Heever - that the kraal of "die Hottentot Taveboer" had been 
72. See for instance the veldwagtmeester's reports for 1790 in CA, I /STB 10/162. 
73. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Rclaas van J.A. van den Heever, 5 Oct. 1790. ll is of considerable interest to note that the 
colonists of the north-western Cape perceived the Orange River to be the boundary between the Christians (whites) 
and Namaquas even though the northern boundary of the colony had not yet been proclaimed. 
74. Ibid. "To l1y lo lake it away with the ban-cl of a gun because as long as he had powder and lead he'd defend 
himself against the Christians lo the last bullet". 
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attacked by "bastart Hottentotten" and ten people shot dead - did nothing to calm the situation. 
Van den Heever was convinced that, unless the authorities took precautionary measures, those 
who entered loan-farms in Little Namaqualand would follow the example of those who had gone 
to settle in Great Namaqualand. This would result in the Great Namaqua being driven from their 
grazing areas across the Orange River and their livestock being acquired by the colonists. The 
consequences of this would be an outbreak of plundering, robbery and violence similar to the 
attacks by the San as the Namaqua sought to recover their animals. All of this, concluded Van 
den Heever, should be seen against the background of the great fear felt by the loan-farming 
trekboers in the face of the presence of ten times as many "bastaars Hottentotten" anned with 
guns.75 
This was the view of the veldkorporaal of Little Namaqualand. The landdrost of Stellenbosch 
was, however, provided with a different perspective when he received a letter from Cornelius Kok 
just over a month later. Cornelius obviously felt obliged to defend his right to possess both land 
and fireanns for he explained that he had been living on the legplaats of his father, "der Hottentot 
Captain Adam Kok". This fann, called "Spitskopje", lay over the Orange River and had been 
given to Adam Kok by the Governor Tulbagh twenty years before. Cornelius had acquired five 
muskets in order to protect his livestock. Three of these he had bought from colonists (the prices 
ranged from twenty to thirty Rijksdaalders), one of them he had bartered from "den Hottentot 
Swart Booij" for two heifers, and the fifth, for which he had paid three oxen, he had acquired 
from no less a person than the veldkorporaal of the Kamiesberg, Johannes Augustus van den 
Heever! In addition to these firearn1s his father, Adam Kok, had had two muskets whilst two of 
Cornelius' brothers, Cupido and Jager, had one apiece. They did not know how many fireanns his 
other brothers - Adam Kok junior and Soloman Kok - had in their possession. 76 
With regards to the events which Van den Heever had described Cornelius stated that, about four 
years ago, the burghers Barend Vry, Pieter Bezuydenhout, Matthias Esterhuysen and Guilliam 
Visagie had come to settle, sometimes on this side, sometimes on the other side, of the Orange 
River. With them had been Isaac Bosman the younger, but he had subsequently died on the other 
side of the river. All of these men had been engaged in bartering livestock. It was remarkable that 
Bezuydenhout and Esterhuysen had been crossing the river for four years, each time with only 
enough oxen to pull their three wagons. Each time they returned however, they had huge 
75. CA, 1/STB 3/12, 5 Oct. 1790. Sec also evidence of Johannes Hendrik Bcukes, 29 Sept. 1791. 
76. CJ\, 1/STB 3/12, !Maas van Comelis Kok, 14 Nov. 1790. 
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quantities of livestock with them. Jan Bloem was another like them. He had first settled on the 
south side of the river about seven years before, on the farm of Petrus Pienaar. He then settled for 
three years on the other side of the river and had come to acquire large amounts of stock. 
Cornelius Kok was certain that these had been taken from others and that Bloem was in 
partnership with the Hantam farn1er Christiaan Bok and his son Michiel.77 
In contrast to this behaviour, Cornelius assured the landdrost that he, and his father and brothers, 
had engaged in the peaceful activity of stock raising and had never done anything to harm any of 
the Khoikhoi groups whatsoever. Instead they had shot elephants, in order to sell the tusks to the 
Company, and sold their stock to the contracted butchers. Certainly they had never acted like the 
ex-veldwagtmeester of the Hantam, Adriaan van Zijl who, together with his companions, had 
terrorised the "Coraqua Hottentots". Van Zijl's victims had simply recouped their losses by 
stealing the cattle of the "Caffers". Indeed, the "naauwangers, Tweelinge en Crosdragers" (the 
Einiqua) had informed Cornelius Kok that they had often seen groups of "bastaart Hottentotten", 
anned with muskets, trekking to beyond the Spionberg to the "Caffers". They had returned with 
livestock, although it is not certain how this had been obtained. There was, however, a certain 
"Bastaard-Hottentot" called Donderbos who had returned from north of the Orange three years 
before with livestock which he and his Khoikhoi followers had stolen from the "Caffers". These in 
turn, were then stolen by "die Hottentotten Captain Africaander", before Adam Kok senior had 
returned the sheep to the "Caffers". Cornelius had heard that the roaming Khoikhoi and 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" had acquired their guns from the colonists in exchange for livestock.78 
Even more explicit evidence of the state of violent insecurity which was beginning to develop 
along the Orange was provided by some Great Namaqua who were living in the Kamiesberg 
kraals of the Little Nanmqua. These Khoikhoi - Oude Links, Cupido Links, Jantjie Schapewagter, 
Jantjie Gouws and Zwaarte Booij - testified on 3 February 1791 that, the year before, they had 
travelled two weeks journey north of the river to a kraal of the Great Namaqua. Once there they 
learnt from certain of their family that the kraal had been attacked by the burghers Guilliam 
Visagie, Matthias Esterhuysen, Barend Vry, Pieter Brand and Isaak Bosman the younger. The 
colonists had lived for several years across the river with the "Bastaard-Hottentots" Adria.an, 
Gerrit de Beer, Haantjie, Mattheui, Casper, Jan Zuige and the Khoikhoi "Cobus Broekhand, 





these men had attacked their kraals, killed several Namaqua and stolen a great part of their 
livestock. Three of the Great Namaqua at the kraal which the Kamiesberg Khoikhoi were visiting 
still bore bullet wounds from the attack. 79 
After spending several days at the kraal with their family Oude Links and his companions 
exchanged tobacco, dagga and beads for 107 sheep. They then proposed to return to their home in 
Little Namaqualand but on their way back, whilst still in Great Nan1aqualand, they encountered 
the "Bastaard" Adriaan. Adrian had a large amount of stock with him and he boasted that it was 
he who, with one bullet had wounded a Great Namaqua in both affilS. On receiving this· 
information Oude Links told Adrian that it was his family he had attacked and that he was 
resolved to recover any livestock which bore his family's mark in order to hand it over to 
Veldkorporaal Van den Heever pending an enquiry. Oude Links succeeded in recovering the 
cattle but when he and his group were within four days of the river, as they slept beside their 
sheep and just as day was breaking, they were attacked by Visagie and his gang. Without uttering 
a word the robbers opened fire killing two men and a young woman as well as wounding a second 
woman. The Khoikhoi fled back to Great Namaqualand whilst Visagie stole all their stock.80 
It is not certain whether the kraal that Oude Links had visited was the same as that over which the 
"Hottentot Kaptein Caib [Tkauab]" presided, but the evidence of this man, given on 29 
September 1791, suggests tlmt it was in the same vicinity.SI If it was the same kraal it was not 
the same attack which Tkauab described to the landdrost, even though some of the details and 
characters sounded very similar to those which had occurred in the spring of 1790. Tkauab had 
travelled all the way from Great Namaqualand, nine days north of the river, to Stellenbosch. Witl1 
him was another Namaqua called Oortman who lived closer to the river. The two of them had 
been escorted to the landdrost by a concerned burgher of the Kamiesburg, Johannes Beukes. 
Tkauab's complaint was that he and his people had been harassed and attacked for several years 
by a group of whites and "Bastart Hottentots" who took their livestock and obliged them, at 
times, to retreat far inland. Shortly before the last rains Estcrhuiscn and some "Bastaard -
Hottentots" attacked them, killing fourteen and wounding twelve. All of their stock was stolen. 
79. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Namaqua Holtentotten Ou<le Links, Cupi<lo Links, Jantje Schapenwagter, Jantjc 
Lowis, Zwaarte Booij, 3 Feb. 1791. 
80. lbi<l. 
81. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Tkaub, 29 Sept. 1791. 
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Tkauab had fled to Oortman and together, both of them desperate to put an end to their violent 
victimisation, they had trekked southwards to find justice. 82 
The government could hardly ignore this accumulating evidence of lawlessness from the north-
western frontier, particularly since Visagie already had a criminal record,83 and in March 1791 
the landdrost of Stellenbosch had been ordered to summon Visagie and his companions before 
him.84 Since this summons was ignored, orders for the arrest of Piet Bezuydenhout, Johannes 
Frederik Weitsman, Matthias Esterhuyzen, Barend Vry, Pieter Brand and Guilliam Visagie were 
issued on 29 September 1791, the san1e day on which Captain Tkaub gave his evidence. 85 Once 
again this elicited no response, but, as luck would have it, the wife of Guilliam Visagie happened 
to be in the Cape. 
Elsabe (Elsie) Visagie, nee Ras had trekked down from the Orange River with some Khoikhoi 
servants, some cattle and two wagon-loads of goods (doubtless ivory) in order to sell her wares 
and buy supplies.86 She had arrived at the Cape on 20 July, but was still about her business, and 
her husband's, on 1 October when the Assistant Fiscal, J .A. Truter, and the landdrost of 
Stellenbosch, Blcttennan, summoned her for questioning. They wanted to know how many cattle 
she had brought and how many young oxen she had sold. She answered that she did not know for 
certain, but that there had not been any stolen cattle an1ongst them. The officials then demanded 
to inspect her "schild brieven" (debentures), from which they could see that she had been dealing 
with some respectable burghers, and sent a slave to sununon those Kl10i who had given evidence 
against her husband. Oude Links and his group had, presumably, been waiting since February for 
the chance to testify, but, unfortunately, they could not be found at that moment. Mrs. Visagie 
82. Ibid; and Rclaas van Johannes Hendrik Beukes, 29 Sept 1791. 
83. In 1780 Visagie had a fann at Koekenaap near the northern bend of the Olifants River. He dismissed a family 
of five Kl10i labourers from his fann and, suspecting that they were departing for Namaqualand with one of his 
oxen, gave chase with his neighbour Josua Joubert. At Droogekraal Joubert shot and wounded the K110i Andries 
and Visagie shot and wounded Claas. Whilst Visagie chased Claas, Joubert killed Louis, the aged father of 
Andries. Andries and Claas survived to lay charges a year later. l11e two colonists were tried between December 
1783 and February 1784 and Joubert was sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island. Visagie, who had been 
in prison for some time, was confined to his fann for six months. For Details see Mossop (1947) pp.112-115. l11e 
original case is in CA, CJ 346, pp.337-449. 
84. CA, CJ 73, 17 March 1791, pp.94-95. 
85. CA,CJ73,29Sept.1791,p.300. 
86. In 1779 Gordon was told (probably by Pienaar who had just shot the first giratTe Gordon had seen) that 
Visagie's wife "was once chased on her horse close to a herd and having come near two of them, t11ey were neit11er 
shy nor aggressive, but looked at her with great curiosity, since "the woman had striped clothes on". Raper and 
Boucher, (eds), Gordon, Vol. 2, p.316. 
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then delivered herself of the forceful opinion that it was because they did not dare to appear 
before her with their unfounded allegations. She demanded that Truter and Bletterman punish the 
Khoikhoi for their trouble making and insisted on a letter to this effect.87 
Unfortunately she seems to have over-played her hand in this instance because when the 
landdrost ordered her to appear before him two days later it was not so that he could deliver the 
expected letter, but so that he could confront her with her Khoikhoi accusers. To her horror, 
Cupido Links had the temerity to point his finger at her and, in the presence of the landdrost, 
pronounce the words "Oat lieg jy". This was obviously a shocking affront to her dignity as a 
white woman, but worse was to follow. Blctterman, no doubt frustrated by his inability to lay his 
hands on Guillian1 Visagie, vented his anger on Visagie's wife.: 
Weet u wel waar u man geweest is, en so lang als jijluj schelmen, kanaljies en 
drosters in 't veld gewoond hebben zyn en klagten gekomen, en daar jou man 
gevonden word, zat hy opgepakt gevleugeld, na de Kaap gebragt en aan lyf en leeven 
gestraft worden. 88 
A few days later, still smarting from this insult, Elsabe, unwisely, went to visit J.A. Truter about 
his "promise" to punish her accusers. For her pains she succeeded in getting her Khoikhoi 
servants, Adriaan and Andreas, flung into jail. This left her without assistance, for though she 
had her son Are, with her he was only about thirteen years old. The consequences of this were 
that on her return from Trutcr she and Arc were attacked by unknown persons in the darkness of 
the night. In order to save their lives they had to hand over all their possessions, including their 
clothes. Since Mrs. Visagie was approaching her sixtieth birthday it is not surprising that this 
rough treatment caused her to become sick. To add to her misery, as she lay recuperating on the 
fann of Michiel Eksteen, she was placed under arrest on 24 October. This was probably a type of 
"house arrest" for she was not allowed to depart with her oxen or wagons. In any event her oxen 
were now succumbing to "lamziekte" and it was only on 22 December that she was pem1itted to 
present her case to the Council of Justicc.89 Since no charges had ever been laid against her the 
proceedings which had taken place were judged to have been illegal and the unfortunate woman 
87. CA, CJ 73, pp.352, 376-380. 
88. "Do you know where your husband is? Complaints have been coming in ever since you rogues, scum and 
deserters have been in the veld, and when your husband is found he'll be brought to the Cape and ptmished with life 
and limb". CA, CJ 73, pp.376-380. 
89. CA, CJ 73, pp.376-380; De Villiers and Pama, Vol. II, p.753. 
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was allowed to go. She was told, however, to tell her husband to come and answer the charges 
against him. 90 
Eight months later, in August 1792, there was still no sign that Visagie and his companions 
planned to expose themselves to the judgement of the court. They had, however, condescended to 
infonn the authorities that they had not been able to come to the Cape because they had been too 
busy assisting Willem van Reenen on an expedition.91 At this stage, silently and subtly, the 
powerful influence of the Van Reenen fan1ily began to permeate the court room, convincing the 
officials that the activities of the Visagie gang should be viewed in a different light. Although the 
nature of Willem van Reenen's expedition was supposedly a secret, highly placed members of the 
government were in the know and avaricious fantasies were beginning to unbalance the scales of 
justice. 
Willem van Reenen had, with the fore knowledge of the government, undertaken a journey north 
of the Orange River in order to find gold. Van Reenen was convinced that he knew where a gold 
mine was which, he claimed, the English explorer Paterson had discovered during the course of 
his travels in 1778. Since two of Willem's brothers, Jacobus and Sebastiaan, had accompanied 
Paterson on large sections of his inland travels (and since Willem was undertaking to pay all 
costs himself), the govenunent saw no reason why they should not endorse the expedition.92 
Willem conunenced his journey on 17 September 1791 and returned to his fann on the Olifants 
River on 21 June 1792 with one thousand pounds in weight of ore. Things looked decidedly 
promising. 93 
Reading through Willem van Reenen's report, Governor Rhenius, and the Commissioners 
Nederburg and Frykenius, could not help but be impressed by the invaluable assistance which 
Barend Vry, Frederik Wysman (or Weitsman), Pieter Brand and Guilliam Visagie had given to 
the quest for gold.94 In Little Namaqualand, Van Reenen had been joined by the "Bastaard" 
Klaas van der Westhuysen and Frederik Wysman, both with oxen and wagons. Across the 
Orange, at Wann Bad in present-day Namibia, Barend Vry (or Freyn) and Pieter Brand had 
90. CA, CJ 73, p.380. 
91. CA, CJ 74, 13 Aug. 1792, pp.237-9. 
92. Willem van Rccncn's journal is in E.E. Mossop ( c<l) The Journal of llendrik Jacob /Vikar (1779) and The 
Joumals a/Jacobus Coetse Ja11sz: (1760) and Willem vcm Ree11en (1791) (Cape To\\11 1935) pp.292-323, 9-11. 
Sec also J.L.M. Franken, Duminy-Dagboek (Cape Town, 1938) pp.189-207. 
93. Mossop (1935) pp.323, 292-3, note la. 
94. Ne<lcrburg an<l Frykenius' response is in Franken ( 1938) pp.194-203. 
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joined the group with wagons and oxen. Vry, it seems, was accustomed to pasturing his cattle in 
this part of the world. At Modderfontein, the site of present-day Keetmanshoop, Guilliam Visagie 
had his fann where he treated Van Reenen most kindly, entertaining him for a month and 
providing him with Khoikhoi servants.95 On Van Reenen's return from his destination (probably 
the present day Rehoboth),96 he was forced to throw himself on Visagie's hospitality again since 
most of his oxen had either died or been plundered. Visagie would gladly have supplied him with 
fresh oxen had it not been for the fact that his own "were thin and in poor condition because his 
wife had taken nine months on the journey from the Modderfontein to the Cape and back home 
again".97 As it was he and his "Bastaard" followers gave Van Reenen twenty-one cattle and 
twenty sheep when, over five weeks later, he resumed his journey. Between Modderfontein and 
Warn1 Bad Solomon Kok assisted him with trek oxen until, once more, Barend Vry came to the 
rescue, accompanying Van Reenen as far as the Kamiesberg.98 
The authorities could thus clearly sec that if there was a gold mine north of the Orange the key to 
its development lay in the hands of those very frontiersmen they were so anxious to arrest. 
The ore still had to be tested but, in the meantime, Sebastiaan van Reenen came before the 
govenunent to give them his personal assurance that it was gold-bearing. He could vouch for this, 
he urged, since he had personally accompanied Paterson to the mine in 1778 and had 
subsequently sent samples of ore to Amsterdam where they had been favourably assessed by an 
expert. His proposal was that the government should finance an expedition to investigate the 
viability of reaching the mine from the vicinity of Walvis Bay. Such an expedition, he argued, 
should comprise two sections; a sea-borne detaclunent which would link up with a group 
travelling overland from the south. The task of the overland group would be to ensure the friendly 
assistance of the local Kl10i and it would, of necessity, be led by Barend Vry and Frederik 
Wysman.99 
With these developments in mind the Council of Justice gave evidence of a remarkable change in 
attitude when next, in August 1792, they discussed the Visagie affair. JOO They decided that they 
95. Mossop ( 1935) pp.292-307. See note 2, pp.306-7 for derivation of Modderfontein. 
96. Mossop (1935) pp.310-311, n.37. 
97. Mossop (1935) pp.317-319. 
98. Mossop ( 1935) pp.319-323. 
99. Franken, pp. l 89-207. 
100. CA,CJ74, 15Aug 1792,pp.241-2. 
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could proceed against the defendants even though they were in absentia. Attorney Wagenaer, 
acting for the defendants, maintained that there was no law which forbade colonists from crossing 
the Orange River. The plakkaat of 16 June 1774 mentioned the Fish River of the eastern frontier 
as being a boundary beyond which colonists should not go but said nothing about the Orange or 
Groote River. Though this same plakkaat mentioned that fanners should not go beyond the limits 
of their loan-farms, Wagenaer argued that the defendants had been completely ignorant of this 
ruling and had, in any case, been obliged to seek pasture for their livestock on account of the 
severe drought. As far as the graver charges of trading with, and attacking the Khoikhoi, were 
concerned the defendants strenuously denied all such allegations, maintaining that they had never 
harn1ed anyone from "den Hottentots Natien". In support of this they could offer the evidence of 
Willem van Reenen, who had just returned from a journey to their district and had had the 
opportunity to meet with the neighbouring Khoikhoi.101 
After considering this defence the Council of Justice decided to drop the issue, confining itself to 
the platitudinous remarks that the defendants should, in future, sta:y on their farn1S and conduct 
themselves in a law abiding marmer.102 One cam10t but speculate that the authorities had their 
minds on gold and on Sebastiaan van Reenen's proposals. The prospect of discovering gold mines 
north of the Orange may also help to explain why the government did not, at this stage, seek to 
define the north-western boundaries of the colony. There is no question that, had gold been found, 
the boundary would have been shifted northwards to include the mines within the domain of the 
voe. 
Sebastiaan van Reenen's expedition did, in fact, take place between January and April 1793. It 
was somewhat of a fiasco, largely because the overland expedition of Vry and Wysman did not 
succeed in reaching the sea-borne participants at Walvis Bay. This failure was no doubt due to 
the terrible drought in southern Namibia although there is an element of mystery surrounding the 
entire affair. !03 Sebastiaan had taken with him his brother, Dirk, and that seasoned veteran of 
the northern frontier zone, Petrus Pienaar, but between them they did little more than engage in 
some pleasant hunting up the Swakop River. Pienaar, who walked up the river for twelve days, 
IOI. CA, CJ 74, 16 Aug. 1792, pp.245-247. 
102. CA, CJ 74, 16 Aug. 1792, pp.246-247. 
I 03. V.S. Forbes, in Pioneer Travellers in So11/li Afi-ica, pp.82-83, mentions the fact that Paterson, the alleged 
discoverer of the gold, had not gone anywhere near the site of Willem van Reenen's mine <luring his travels of 1778-
1779 and Willem could not, therefore, have received directions from him. Sebastiaan, who accompanied Paterson, 
would have knom1 this and it is unlikely that he would have sent Willem on a wild goose chase. Forbes speculates 
that perhaps Duminy was right in assuming that the expedition was really interested in ivory. 
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was told by some Khoikhoi that the mine which Willem van Reenen had visited was another 
twelve or fourteen days journey to the south-east. He and his party did not, however, venture to 
go further, partly because relations with the local Khoikhoi were not on a sound footing, and 
partly because it had not rained in those parts for five years and there would therefore be no 
water, and partly because of the failure of Vry and Wysman to reach them. These two were 
supposed to have ensured that the Khoikhoi Captain Tremond, near whose kraal the mine was, 
would be well-disposed towards the expedition; but since there was no guarantee that they had 
achieved their goal the mission was aborted. Duminy, who had captained the expedition's ship to 
Walvis Bay, was inclined to believe that the Van Reenens had been deceiving the govenunent and 
that the real purpose of the trip had been "that these gentlemen believed that they would be able to 
procure for themselves two hundred elephants' tusks! That is certainly worth a mine".104 If this 
was in fact the Van Reenens' objective - and Sebastiaan had asked for pennission to shoot 
elephant - then the expedition was a failure on this account too. Pienaar shot a mere three 
elephants (though he shot twenty rhinoceros) for although the Swakopriver valley was teeming 
with game - "he had never seen a more beautiful dry river" - there was no wagon to carry 
ivory.105 
Willem van Reenen's ore had, in the meantime been analysed and found to be copper bearing. It is 
possible that Sebastiaan's earlier samples had, indeed, been gold bearing for some gold was 
subsequently discovered in the Rehoboth area.106 Sebastiaan certainly believed in his mine 
strongly enough to urge the govenunent to undertake another expedition but the matter was 
dropped. The VOC had, at least, taken possession of five bays (including Walvis Bay) up the 
Namibian coast during the course of Duminy's voyage so the venture had not been entirely 
fruitless.107 They had not, however, done anything to check the burgeoning anarchy of the 
northern frontier zone and, as they would soon discover, they had not heard the last of the 
Visagies. 
PETRUS PIENAAR AND THE AFRIKANERS 
Whilst the authorities had been pre-occupied with the activities of the Visagies and the Van 
Reenens the military situation as a whole, along the entire northern frontier, had been 
104. Franken, p.295. 
105. Franken, p.316. 
106. Mossop (1935) p.11; Forbes, p.82. 
I 07. Franken, pp.189-207. 
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deteriorating. In 1790 the veldwagtmeester of the Roggeveld was predicting the loss of that 
district and by 1791 farn1ers were abandoning their farms in the Hantam. A commando had been 
ordered to the Hantam in June 1791, 108 but it is doubtful whether it was mobilised for, two years 
later, Petrus Pienaar - just back from his excursion to Walvis Bay - was bewailing the fact that 
no help had ever been received from the· veldwagtmeesters of the Olifants River, Bidouw or 
Namaqualand.109 
The heart of W.A. Ne!, the veldwagtmeester of the Hantam, was clearly not in his duties for 
earlier, in April, he had written to request pennission to resign his post since his farm was too far 
away from San attacks for him to raise a commando in time.110 He also pleaded sickness and 
weakness of body as a reason to be relieved from his responsibilities. It is interesting to note that 
Nel himself had come to endorse Pienaar's criticisms of his command. In fact, Pienaar was 
amongst those whom Ne! recommended as a possible replacement as veldwagtmeester. But Nel's 
request was not immediately heeded for in November 1791 he had to write along the same lines 
again, explaining that he was no longer resident in the Hantam but fifteen hours journey away. If, 
Ne! concluded, none of the people he had previously reconunended was considered to be a 
suitable replacement for him, he would like to propose William Burger for the position of 
veldwagtmeester.111 
This latter appointment was made, no doubt to Pienaar's chagrin, as he considered himself to be 
the most suitable candidate. Before 1792 there had been little evidence to link Pienaar to the 
illegal livestock raids taking place along and beyond the Orange River. Cornelius Kok had 
testified (to Landdrost Blettcnnan) that Captain Afrikaner had stolen ill-gotten livestock from the 
"Bastaard-Hottentot" Donderbos, probably in 1787, but this, in itself, did not incriminate 
Pienaar.112 Afrikaner was, however, being used by Pienaar as a semi-official scourge of 
malefactors on the northern frontier. 
108. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz to Landdrost, 15 Oct. 1790; CA, 1/STB 10/163 (Notes in front of volume) 7 June 
1791. 
109. CA, 1/STB 10/162, PienaartoLanddrost, 3 June 1793. 
110. CA, 1/STB 10/166, W.A.Nel to Landdrost, 20 April 1791. 
111. CA, 1/STB 10/167, W.A. Nel to Landdrost, 15 Nov. 1791. Bradlow is mistaken to believe that Pienaar was 
appointed as veldwagtmeester between June and October 1790 (Bradlow "Petrns Pienaar", p.97, n.27). Titis 
mistake has arisen because of a misreading of the date on a document. ·111e document in question is CA 1/STB 
10/163, Pienaar to Landdrost, 29 Oct. 1794 not 1790. 
112. CA, 1/STB 3/12 Rclaas van Cornelius Kok, 14 Nov. 1790. 
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In 1792 Pienaar had decided to act independently of Veldwagtmeester Burger and use the restless 
energy of Afrikaner and his followers to harry the San of Bushmanland.113 Despite the fact that 
Pienaar was not the official veldwagtmeester of the Hantam he could claim that, by arming 
Afrikaner and unleashing him against the enemies of the VOC, he was acting both legitimately 
and commendably. It was at about this time that Company officials were busy thinking up new 
approaches to the problems of military security on the colonial frontier. The old idea of a 
standing force or permanent conunando was suggested but dismissed as being too expensive.114 
In July 1792 the Council of Policy had approved a suggestion that a reward of 15 Ryksdaalders 
per head should be paid to the person who was responsible for taking captive such San, 
"Bastaards" or "Hottentots" who had been responsible for attacks on colonial life or livestock -
provided that such a capture was made on an officially authorised commando.115 This resolution 
was inspired by two seemingly contradictory motives: to inspire greater enthusiasm for 
conunando service; and to prevent the complete extirpation of the San. Captives were to be sent 
to Robben Island or put to work in chains at the public works of the Company for the rest of their 
lives. A further stipulation was that the sale of fireanns to "Bastaards" and Khoikhoi was strictly 
forbidden.116 
It is hardly surprising that there should have been some who failed to appreciate the spirit in 
which the above resolutions concerning rewards for captives had been passed. One of these was 
Petrus Pienaar who, early in 1794, offered to undertake conunandos at his own expense provided 
that he received the promised bounty of 15 Rds per adult San. As a further mark of his goodwill 
he stated himself to be prepared to accept the reduced rate of l O Rds per child San captured. The 
Council of Policy hastened to explain to Pienaar that the bounty had been offered in the hope that 
the "naturellen" would be taken as prisoners of war, not to encourage a trade, and that the 
resolution had been motivated solely by the humanitarian desire, to avoid the spilling of human 
blood. They feared that the greatest confusion would arise if the inhabitants were allowed to take 
"die schepselen" into captivity.117 lt is unlikely that Pienaar was aware of these financial 
incentives before November 1792 for shortly after passing these resolutions, the authorities 
113. CA, C 209, 20 Nov. 1792, pp.245-250. 
114. See Resolutions of 31 Aug. 1791 and 13 July 1792. Significantly, in the light of Afrikaner's activities, the 
proposal was to employ twenty-live "Bastaar<l-Hottentots" at 5 Rijksdaal<lers per month. Papers Relative, p.21; 
CA, Accessions (hereafter A) 1657, Vol. 25. 
115. P.J. van <ler Mcrwc, Noorwaartse Bewegi11g, pp.44-9. 
116. Plakkaat I Oct 1792, in Papers Uelative, p.21. 
117. CA, C 221, 11 Jan. 1794, pp. 96-100. 
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received news from Pienaar of the exploits of the "Hottentot captain Africaner" in Bushmanland 
which must have both gratified and alanned them. 
Afrikaner and his men had succeeded in killing 113 San and taking 20 prisoners in the vicinity of 
the Sak River. Though such slaughter seemed contrary to the new resolution (which encouraged 
the capture rather than the extermination of resisters), and might not have occurred if Pienaar had 
known of the offer of bounty, it was, if nothing else, evidence of efficiency. The Council of Policy 
was infonned, moreover, that even greater results might have been achieved if gunpowder and 
shot had been supplied to Pienaar, who guaranteed that he could tame and stop the "woedende 
natie" once and for all. Afrikaner himself appears to have made the journey to Cape Town in 
order to procure guns and ammunition in the nan1e of his director, Pienaar. The Councillors were 
sufficiently impressed to agree to his request, and Afrikaaner was provided with powder and shot 
on the condition tl1at Pienaar and his veldwagtmeester supervised the use to which he would 
employ them. It was instructed that the prisoners be brought to the Cape.118 
Afrikaner's conunando had been a triumph for both the Afrikaners and Pienaar. At a time when 
the access of the "Bastaards and Hottentots" to guns and ammunition was becoming more and 
more difficult the Afrikaners had govenunent guaranteed supplies. Pienaar, for his part, had 
demonstrated that he was the de facto military conunander of the northern frontier zone, whatever 
Burger's official pretensions might be. 
In 1793, just as with W.A. Nel in 1790, Pienaar began to take steps to discredit Willem Burger in 
the eyes of the authorities and supplant him as veldwagtmeester. His strategy consisted of 
sending letters of complaint to the landdrost and in this he was assisted by his friend Christiaan 
Bok of the Hantam. In a letter written in January 1793, Bok complained of having his sheep 
stolen (and slaughtered) for the second time and his shepherd killed. ll1ese robberies by the San 
he blamed on the negligence of Veldwagtmeester Burger. Fanns were being deserted and if 
Burger continued as velcf.wagtmeester, concluded Bok with spiteful humour, he would find lone in 
the Hantam before two years had elapsed.119 In May Burger was able to report in his defence 
that, although there had been attacks on four farms within a short space of time, and although 
stock had been stolen, he had managed to shoot dead thirteen robbers.120 
118. CA, C 209, 20 Nov. 1792, pp.245-250. 
119. CJ\, l/STI3 I 0/163, Notes in front of volume, C Bok lo Land<lrosl, 26 Jan. 1793. 
120. CJ\, l/STI3 10/163, Notes in front of volume, W. I3urger lo Laml<lrosl, 18 May 17. 
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But this was quite clearly not enough as far as Pienaar was concerned, for in June, after returning 
from his trip with the Van Reneens, he sent two remarkable letters to Landdrost Blettennan in 
which he criticised Burger in personal and colourful tenns. In the first letter Pienaar claimed that 
no commando had been organised to deal with the San because of the negligence and 
incompetence of Willem Burger. He had been urged most strongly to raise a conm1ando last 
August and September but in vain, as he had stupidly done nothing. When the cattle of the widow 
Ryk, Willem Nel and Paul Karsten had been stolen; indeed when Pienaar's own sheep had been 
stolen, Burger had replied to a request to raise a conunando by telling Pienaar to raise one 
himself. Pienaar had, in fact, managed to recover some of the stolen livestock even though he only 
had seven men to help him. Not long after this, however, the San had stolen I 200 sheep from 
Pienaar's neighbour, Michiel Bok. Thanks to Pienaar's quick response some of these were 
recovered and two of the thieves shot dead, but no assistance was forthcoming from Burger, apart 
from a few men. No anununition and no Khoikhoi commando members were sent to help Pienaar 
and, when he (Pienaar) saw San spoor in the vicinity, Burger refused to give him the support 
necessary to follow these. Pienaar was certain that the Krygsraad could appreciate that one could 
not appoint as conunander a youngster who had just arrived in the district, especially if it was full 
of San who were cmming and prepared for war. The man in question had never before fired a 
shot in anger. Pienaar requested, therefore, that they be sent enough powder and shot to defend 
themselves and the veldwagtmeester could then stay at home exercising his authority over 
children.121 
Less than a month later Pienaar found himself obliged to write another letter of complaint, again 
prompted by Burger's incompetence. The San had once more stolen and destroyed his sheep - the 
third time - and Christian Bok's sheep - the second time. Between them both they had lost 900 
cattle but when one mentioned a commando to Burger he walked away, or said that he would get 
round to it soon, but in any event, did nothing. Pienaar estimated that he had now asked Burger 
seven times to raise a conunando but that he had only received an answer to the last of these 
requests and that the answer was that Burger was sick of such letters. Twenty of the best fanns in 
the Hantam were now deserted and Pienaar requested that a competent veldwagtmeester be 
appointed, one who was brave and knowledgeable, who had gone on many conunandos and who 
was a good soldier; not like Burger who had never (and this time Pienaar refined the insult of his 
previous letter) shot a gun in his life. Quite clearly Pienaar was hinting that he met all these 
requirements and the post script added to the letter drove home the point - "Wy denke drie 
12 l. CJ\, 1/STB 10/162, Pienaar to Lan<l<lrost, 3 June 1793. 
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bosjeman agter het gerooft vee hebbe dood geschote". Christiaan Bok, had already weighed in 
with another letter along the same lines as Pienaar, in which he berated Burger's inactivity.122 
As the written onslaught against Burger gained momentum the continuing activities of Afrikaner, 
to the north of the Orange River, brought further credit to his patron, Pienaar. On 23 July 1793 
the Council of Policy received a letter from Bletterman, the landdrost of Stellenbosch, in which 
he reported that Captain "Africander" had handed over six muskets to him. These, Blettennan 
reported, had been captured by Afrikaner from the "bastaart Hottentotten" who continually stole 
the cattle of the Namaqua.123 
In fact Afrikaner's attack had been launched on Guilliam Visagie and we are fortunate that we 
have two accounts of the incident; one from Afrikaner and one from a Khoikhoi by the name of 
Kiewit Kiewit.124 
In the winter of 1790 Kiewit was asked by a Khoikhoi called Donderbos Pokkebaas whether he 
~ould accompany him and a Khoikhoi called Viool to Namaqualand in order to try to reclaim 
some cattle which had been stolen from him by the "Hottentot Captain Africaaner". Donderbos 
Pokkebaas was undoubtedly the same man whom Cornelius Kok had described in 1790, referring 
to him as the "Bastaard-Hottentot Donderbosh" who had stolen livestock from the Tswana in 
1787 before these were, in tum, stolen from him by Afrikaner.125 Donderbos was now 
detennined to revenge himself and for this purpose had acquired a musket. Having recruited 
Viool and Kiewit he then visited a certain Jacob Tas, south of the Doom River, to borrow another 
flint-lock. Next they were joined by another two Khoikhoi men and the group, like so many before 
them, set off for Namaqualand. They crossed the Great River and decided to throw in their lot 
with the group of men gathered about Guilliam Visagie at his fam1 "Qallooras Fontijn" .126 These 
included both "Bastaard-Hottentots" and Khoikhoi; men such as Jan Seewert, Adriaan 
122. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Pienaar to Lanc.klrost, 29 June 1793. "We think we shot dead three Bushmen following 
the stolen cattle". Also Bok to Landdrost, 11 June 1793. 
123. CA, C 217, 7 Aug. 1793, pp.206-208. 
124. CA, C 217, 7 Aug. 1793, pp.206-208 and CA 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Kiewit Kiewit, 5 Oct. 1793. 
125. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Rclaas van Comelis Kok, 14 Nov. 1790. 
126. CA, 1/STB 3/12, Relaas van Hottentot Kiewiet Kiewit, 5 Ocl. 1793. It is not clear where "Qalloras Fontijn" 
was, though presumably it was in the vicinity of "Modderfontein" or Keetmanshoop in Namibia. 
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Beestehoorn, Brander, Willem Mallegaas, Booij, Cupido Wessel, Cobus Booij, Daris, Casper, his 
brother Jantjie, Marthenis and his brother Robbert.127 
Many of these Khoikhoi were probably Namaqua from the south of the river, i.e. they were not 
Great Namaqua. There was, indeed, a special term, noted by Willem van Reenen in 1792, that the 
Great Namaqua applied to these southern interlopers: Goedonsie. The likelihood is that this was a 
Khoikhoi word with the same meaning as "oorlamme" and it is evident that at this stage relations 
between the Goedonsic and Gei-//khaum (the Red Nation) were far from cordial.128 
The Visagie group centred around a herd of about 600 cattle, half of which belonged to Visagie 
and the other half to the so-called "oorlamse en Namacqua hottentotts" .129 Kiewit claimed that 
Visagie had acquired these by trading with trinkets and tobacco but the evidence of Visagie's past 
victims should not be forgotten. Willem van Reenen had noted in 1792 that the Namaqua or 
Goedonsie of Southern Namibia were in striking distance of the Herero, a people who were so 
helpless that both they and their cattle were the easiest of prcy.130 It would have been 
extraordinary if Visagie's men had not availed themselves of the opportunity to exploit their 
feeble northern neighbours for there is good evidence that they had no qualms about robbing the 
stronger Great Namaqua.131 Cornelius Kok's report that the Visagies had driven large herds of 
cattle south of the Orangel32 should also alert us to the fact that the herd of 600 which Kiewit 
described was probably only a basic minimum needed for the groups' survival. Any surplus cattle 
would be sold in the colony, very likely to the Van Recncns themselves. 
One day, around July 1793, Kiewit was sent by Visagie's wife to find the carcasses of three 
quagga, which had been shot in the veld by Booij, and to load their flesh onto an ox. On his return 
the next day, Kiewit found that the kraal had been attacked by Klaas Afrikaner and his gang who 
127. Kiewiet also mentioned that in addition to Barend Vry other colonists in the vicinity were Andries van Zijl 
an<l his (or his brother's) wife. 
128. Mossop, Wikar, Willem van Reencn's Journal, pp.311-313, n.39; p.321; Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.371-373. 
129. These arc Kiewiet's words. 
130. Mossop, Brink, Willem van Reencn's Journal, pp.315-317. "The Damraas, and even the Numaquas 
themselves gave us to understand that if the Numaquas wish to obtain cattle they go to the Commaka Damcrassen 
and barter or steal as many as they want or can manage to take away. When Pienaar returned from his trip up the 
Swartkop River in 1793, Duminy noted sourly that he "brought a little black boy and a little Damara negress, whom 
he says he received as a present from their mother and accepted them for the sake of humanity rather than to let 
them die of starvation! It appears that his kind heart is fairly at one with his interest". Franken, D11mi11y-Dagboek, 
p.294. 
131. Sec the evidence in CJ\, I /STB 3/12. For rclcrcnccs sec pp.331-333 above. 
132. CJ\, 1/STB 3/12, 14 Nov. 1790. 
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were, at that moment, fleeing precipitously. What seems to have happened is that Mrs. Visagie, 
who had been riding on a wagon with Casper, had the misfortune to bump into Klaas Afrikaner 
and his "zoo genaan1de soldaaten" (so-called soldiers). The two had narrowly escaped but they 
had to leave the wagon in flames behind them. They found their way back to the fann and warned 
Guilliam and the others that the Afrikaners were near. 
Next morning Afrikaner attacked but Visagie was well prepared. Most of his men were provided 
with flint-locks and they opened fire as soon as Afrikaner approached. Three or four of 
Afrikaner's men were shot dead whilst two of Visagie's followers were wounded. Somehow, 
despite their losses, the Afrikaners managed to capture six of the Visagies' fireanns and drive 
away 300 of their cattle. In the flurry and fury however, Afrikaner lost his staff of office and was, 
as he admitted, lucky to escape.133 Soon afterwards the Visagies, the Van Zijls and Barend Vry 
moved back south of the river, not so much because of this reversal, however, but because of the 
terrible drought afflicting southern Namibia.134 
Landdrost Blettennan was delighted with Afrikaner's news, a clear indication that the authorities 
were no longer concerned with cultivating the Visagies. The landdrost reminded the governor that 
it was Afrikaner who, the year before, had shot dead a great number of San. He was therefore 
authorising Afrikaner to deliver the captured muskets to the annoury at the Cape where, it was 
hoped, they could be repaired and utilised by the "Hottentot Corps". In addition, Blettennan asked 
the governor to replace Afrikaner's staff of office and provide him with the necessary pass to 
ensure his safe return.135 
It seems unlikely that Pienaar would have authorised this attack by his subordinate on people 
with whom he had been co-operating a bare three months before. Perhaps he did. But it is more 
likely that Afrikaner acted on his own initiative. In this he had done well to identify himself with 
the govenunent's interests. Indeed his activities should be seen against the background of 
increasing attempts by the colonial authorities to restrict the freedom of Khoisan and "Bastaards" 
within the colony. The obligation of "Bastaard-Hottentots" to carry passes has already been 
mentioned, so too has the imposition of the "Inboek" system for "Bastaard-Hottentots" in 1775, in 
addition to compulsory participation in commandos. "Bastaard-Hottentots" were required, by 
133. CA, I/STl3 3/12, Rclaas van Hottentot Kiewiet Kiewiet, 5 Oct. 1793; CA, C2 I 7, 7 Aug. 1793. 
134. CA, 1/STB 3/12, 5 Oct. 1793. 
135. CA, C 217, 7 Aug. 1793. 
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law, in 1781, to assist in the armed defence of the Cape against foreign invasion. This law was 
extended to Khoikhoi and reiterated for "Bastaards" in 1793. After 1787 "Bastaard-Hottentots" 
not in service were required to pay taxation and had to be placed on opgaafrollen .136 All of these 
restrictions, as well as the 1792 prohibition on selling arms or ammunition to Khoikhoi and 
"Bastaard-Hottentots", served to limit the independence of "Bastaard-Hottentots" and the 
Afrikaners had chosen a path of co-operation which gave them more freedom than their fellows. 
The price that they paid was that they were regarded as being members of the VOC "police force" 
whilst Klaas Afrikaner was registered in the Hottentot Corps as a Khoikhoi chief in August 
1793.137 
The collaborationist behaviour of Klaas Afrikaner and his followers in this instance might 
surprise and embarrass those who prefer to see the Afrikaners as they were portrayed by SW APO 
in the 1960s - as proto-Namibian nationalist resisters of white South African colonialism. The 
Afrikaners did indeed become both colonial resisters and the rulers of much of central and 
southern Namibia in the nineteenth century but their earlier co-operation with Petrus Pienaar is 
quite consistent with what we know about other examples of African resistance to colonialism. 
One of the most important insights to emerge from the rich historiography on African resistance 
(a burgeoning field of study from the 1960s onwards) was that "the entire attempt to divide 
'resisters' from 'collaborators', as if they were mutually exclusive categories, was, in many 
instances a meaningless exercise".138 As Ranger phrased it: "A historian has indeed a difficult 
task in deciding whether a specific society should be described as 'resistant' or as 'collaborative' 
over any given period of time. Many societies began in one camp and ended in the other." 139 
Wieskel explains that resistance and collaboration have to be studied jointly in any given society. 
They also have to be seen against the background of local political traditions and in the economic 
context of the region. Just as the Baule of the Ivory Coast collaborated with the French when it 
136. Resolutions of lhe Council of Policy. Resolution 9 March 1781; Resolution 2 and 4 April 1781; Resolution 
20 Nov 1787; Plakkaat of 2 May 1793, in Papers Relative 
137. Du Bmyn, "Oorlams", p. 7. Il is interesting lo note that in August and September 1793 "Jonker Africaander", 
Klaas' son went on conunan<lo with Veldwagtmee.ster Gerrit Maritz to the Karasberg. See CA, 1/STB I0/164, 
Journal ofConunan<lo by G. Marilz, 20 Aug. 1793. 
138. Timothy Weiskcl, "Changing Perspectives on African Resistance Movements and the Case of the Baulc 
Peoples", in R.E. Dumelt and B.K. Swartz, (eds.), We.st African Culture Dynamics: Archaeological and Historical 
Perspectives (Hague, 1981 ), p.549. See also Terence Ranger, "Connections between 'primary resistance' movements 
and modem mass nationalism in East and Central Africa", Joumal of African Hi.story, 9, 1968, pp.437-454, 631-
642; T. Ranger, "Resistance in Africa: From Nationalist Revolt lo Agrarian Protest", in Gary Y. Okihiro, (ed.), /11 
Resistance: Studies in Aji·ica11, Carribbew1 and ,,!fi·o-America11 ! lis/01)1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1986 ). 
139. Quoted by Wieskcl, sec note above. 
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suited them and opposed the French when they felt that vital political and economic interests were 
being threatened, so too did the Afrikaners act in accordance with their own interests.140 
In the northern Cape frontier zone the most powerful political and military force was the 
commando. Economic power, in the forn1 of control over labour, land and livestock, flowed from 
the commando. Whoever controlled the most powerful commando was, ipso facto, the most 
powerful, both politically and economically. This was the context of the 1790s when, it seemed 
clear, Petrus Pienaar was pre-eminent. His power was based on the fact that he had created the 
most efficient fighting machine in the frontier zone. He had the necessary drive and ambition to be 
a good leader; he had the necessary contacts and knowledge to exploit the region's full potential; 
he had a state-approved supply of arn1s and ammunition; and he had the highly motivated service 
of the followers of Klaas Afrikaner. The Afrikaners, of course, fought in Pienaar's commando 
because it was in their best interests to do so. Their power rose with that of their patron. Their 
strategy should thus be viewed neither as collaboration nor resistance but as the maximisation of 
self-interest in the commando dominated context of the frontier zone. For as long as their interests 
were being met they would serve Pienaar and grow powerful. The moment they became more 
powerful than Picnaar, or thought themselves to be exploited rather than promoted, they would 
review their options. 
It is important to note that although the Afrikaners subsequently became the most notorious and 
successful of all Oorlam groups their early history, before Pienaar's rise to prominence, did little 
to distinguish them from other, similar groups of "Bastaard-Hottentot" or Khoikhoi frontiersmen. 
Like them they were brought up to serve white masters and educated in the hard school of the 
commando. Like them they learnt to ride horses, handle fireanns, speak Dutch and value 
European commodities. Like other "Bastaard-Hottentots" or Khoikhoi in white employment they 
gradually became aware of their distinctive identity, for their partial assimilation of European 
culture had set them apart from less acculturated Khoisan without granting them equal entry into 
white society. Like others before, and after them, there came a time to escape from colonial 
authority even whilst they maintained or developed their Oorlam identity and the sustaining 
structures of the conunando system. The Afrikaners, then, shared a common background with 
many other Oorlams of the frontier zone, such as the Koks, the Barends or men like Donderbos 
Pokkebaas. What set them apart was that, thanks to Pienaar, they became the most powerful 
conunando group of the northern frontier. They could equally, however, have ended up as the 
140. Wicskcl, pp.545-61. 
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proteges of one of the other colonists who, like Picnaar, led private commandos on hunting, 
raiding or trading expeditions. The parallel careers of men like Adriaan van Zyl and Guilliam 
Visagie should alert us to the fact that just as the Afrikaners were one group amongst many, so 
too was Pienaar one man (albeit outstanding) amongst several other frontier colonists engaged in 
similar pursuits. Together, however, the combination of Picnaar and the Afrikaners proved to be 
virtually unbeatable.141 
It is hardly surprising that the power, privileges and relative independence of the Afrikaners 
should have been viewed in an alanning light by certain white farmers of the northern frontier. 
Particularly affected were the veldwagtmeesters who saw the existence of an officially approved, 
quasi-independent group of armed and mounted "Bastaard-Hottentots" as a threat to their 
authority. Even more disturbing was the fact that the Afrikaners seemed answerable only to 
Petrus Pienaar, a man of dubious contacts and forceful ambitions, who had proved that he was 
quite prepared to go over the heads of the local government appointees in order to increase his 
growing influence. The veldwagtmeester who was most threatened by the Afrikaner-Pienaar 
alliance was Willem Burger of the Hantam. He must have realised that his only hope of remaining 
in favour with the government was to prove Pienaar's accusations false by taking more vigorous 
action against the San. So, on 1 August he wrote to Landdrost Bletterman announcing his 
intention to go on conunando in September. He asked for powder, shot, guns and reinforcements 
from the Olifants River but, to no avail.142 On 23 September Landdrost Blettennan dismissed 
Willem Burger from the office of veldwagtmeester, giving as his reason for doing so the evidence 
141. There arc certain similarities between Pienaar and the Afrikaners and the Prazeros and the Chikunda of the 
Zambezi River. The Prazeros were powerful political rulers, of Portuguese origin, in the Zambezi Valley of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Chikunda were their private annies of warrior slaves, sometimes 
numbering up to 15 000 men. The Chikunda would engage in hunting, trading and raiding for their Prazeros, 
e1tjoying considerable independence. Inevitably, some groups of Chikunda broke away from their masters and 
established themselves independently. They were responsible for introducing new fonns of military and political 
organisation, as well as new cultural infiucnccs, to the societies of southern Central Africa, thus playing a very 
similar role to the Oorlams. There are obvious differences of scale. The Prazeros also became far more Africanised 
than Pienaar, or most other white frontiersmen of the northern Cape, ever did. Thus Picnaar was not, strictly 
speaking, a "transfronticrsman" (that is, someone who has crossed the frontier of their own culture area to take up a 
new way of life) like the Prazeros were. It is perhaps the Oorlams themselves who were the transfrontiersmen. Sec 
Allen lsaacman, "The origin, fonnation and early history of the Chikunda", Jo11mal of Afi"iccm Hist01y, XII, 3, 
1972, pp.443-61; Allen and Barbara Isaacman, "The Prazeros as Trans-frontiersmen", !11te111atio11al Jo11111al of 
African I listorical St11dies, VIII, I, 1975, pp.1-39; T.l. Mathews, "Portuguese, Chikunda and Peoples of the 
Gwembe Valley: The Impact of the 'Lower Zambezi Complex' on Southern Zambia", Jo11111al of Afi"ica11 History, 
XXI!, 1981, pp.23-41. 
142. CA, I/STU 10/162, W. Burger to Land<lrost, 14 Aug. 1793. 
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in the letters of Pienaar and Bok as well as "many complaints of the same nature against Burger" 
which he had received.143 
The Afrikaners were not the only "Bastaard-Hottentots" to threaten the control normally 
exercised by veldwagtmeesters through officially sanctioned conunandos. Nor was Burger the 
only veldwagtmeester to feel dangerously insecure. An extraordinary wave of fear, directed at 
independent Khoikhoi or "Bastaard-Hottentot" groups, swept through the western and northern 
Cape frontier zones in 1793. On 7 September Piet Joubert, the veldwagtmeester of Swellendam, 
believed that he had discovered a conspiracy amongst the Khoikhoi of his district and the Hex 
River to join forces with the Khoikhoi and "Bastaard-Hottentots" ofNamaqualand in order attack 
the colony. Joubert had captured a Khoikhoi by the name of Klaas Kees, son of Captain Kees. 
Klaas revealed that he (and his two companions who had also been captured) was engaged in 
preparing the local Kl1oikhoi to rise up against the colonists. The insurrection involved the 
simultaneous attack by Donderbos Pokkerbaas and 400 of his followers, anned with guns, in 
Namaqualand whilst "Ruijter Besie" would have the responsibility of marshalling his followers at 
"Branderivier". A K11oikhoi by the name of Barent, who had passed through Kogmanskloof to 
Riviersonderend on 20 July, was on his way, together with five men and thirty women and 
children, to Namaqualand. There they pla1med to leave the women and children before returning, 
equipped for war, to spread rebellion in the district of Riviersonderend with the help of Captain 
Kees. Joubert urged that his letter should be circulated from veldwagtmeester to 
veldwagtmeester so that Barent and his followers could be caught before getting beyond the 
Witsenberg and reaching Namaqualand. According to Klaas Kees there were already forty armed 
men, waiting at the kraal of Captain Kees in the mountains (twenty with guns, twenty with bows 
and arrows), and ready to strike.144 This exciting infonnation from the Roodezand was indeed 
passed from veldwagtmeester to veldwagtmeester from the Olifants River to the Bokkeveld, as 
far as the Roggeveld and Hantam. Barent and his group had been seen crossing the Berg River at 
the pont on 9 September - (hardly the actions of one seeking secrecy) whilst "de schelm 
dondebos" was believed to be trekking through the Bokkeveld having been seen in the Bidomv.145 
Johannes Lubbe veldwagtmeester of the Olifants River, began to comb the Olifants River 
Mountains, proclaiming that "'t is hoog tyt om onse lant te behouden en te swijgen voor de swart 
143. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Noles in front of volume, 12 Sept. 1793. 
144. CA, 1/STB 10/162, From l'. Joubert an<l U. van Bilion, 7 Sept. l 793; Penn, "Labour, land and livestock", 
pp. 15 and 18. 
145. CA, 1/STB 10/162, From B. van Bilion, 10 Sept. 1793; I'. Jacobs, 15 Sept. 1793. 
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nasie want 't schyn of sy alle opgemaakt is weest gewapent en gereed" .146 In the eyes of 
Veldwagtmeester Pieter Jacobs the conspiracy was one by "oorlamse hottentots" who wished to 
launch a three pronged attack over the country.147 
It was Lubbe who, very likely, caught up with Barent's party. Quite how he handled them is not 
certain but on the 27 September the Council of Policy noted that they had received a letter from 
Bletterman, the /anddrost of Stellenbosch, "representing the gross ill-treatment of a horde of 
innocent Hottentots, who had been made prisoners by one Mr. Lubbe and other inhabitants".148 
Blettennan had become aware that the fears of a Khoikhoi-Oorlam conspiracy were grossly 
exaggerated. There were also indications that certain veldwagtmeesters were using the climate of 
terror to licence aggressive action against Khoikhoi or Oorlam groups in their districts. Lubbe's 
overzealous behaviour was but one example of this for, on 27 October, Blettemmn received the 
unwelcome intelligence that Veldwagtmeester Jacobus Nel of the Roggeveld, together with ex-
Veldwagtmeester Willem Burger, had seen fit to try and arrest Klaas Afrikaner whom, they 
believed, was connected to the conspiracy. Blettennan icily observed that, Burger was 110 longer a 
veldwagtmeester and that Afrikaner had departed from Stellenbosch at the begi1ming of August at 
his, Blettennan's express command. The landdrost warned Nel that he had better be able to prove 
that Afrikaner was pla1ming to do, or had done, some mischief, for if he failed to satisfy him he 
would be forced to proceed against the veldwagtmeester. B1ettem1an reminded Nel that he had 
failed to go on conunando recently, despite having been provided with anununition, and cautioned 
him to appear before the Krygsraad on 3 December. In conclusion Bletterman instructed Ne! to 
comply with the written instructions which had been sent to him on 21 September, namely not to 
molest a single Khoikhoi who was peaceful and well-behaved or to send any as captives without 
evidence of their misdeeds.149 
This letter must have reached Ne! only after he, along with Willem Burger and three other 
trekboers, had ridden to Pienaar's farm some time in October. According to Burger, Jacobus Nel, 
along with Willem Burger and three other men from the Roggeveld had ridden to Pienaar's fann. 
Nel ordered Pienaar to hand over Afrikaner so that he could be arrested and sent to the Cape but 
146. CA, 1/STB 10/162, From J. Lubbe, 16 Sept. 1793. "It is high time that we save our country and (not) 
succumb to the black nation, for it seems as if they have all been incited; be anned and ready". 
147. CA, 1/STB I0/162, From l'iclcr Jacobs 15 Sept. 1793. 
148. Resolutions or Council or Policy, Res. 27 Sept. 1793, in Papers Relative. 
149. CA, I/STU 10/162, Blettennan to J. Ncl, 22 Oct. 1793; 10/163, Noles in front or volume, 20 Oct. 1793. 
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Pienaar refused to do so. When Nel threatened to report Pienaar to the landdrost Pienaar said 
that he himself would send Afrikaner to the Cape with a letter. As the frustrated burgers mounted 
their horses to ride away, Pienaar asked Nel whether he had done his duty. Nel replied that he had 
not because Pienaar had prevented him from arresting Afrikaner. He added that "Pienaar so slegt 
was als de hottentot om reden dat hy de hotten so sterk mantineerd". To which Pienaar replied 
that Nel was "die Grootste schelm die op de Artboodem loop".150 
It is highly unlikely that Nel and Burger confined themselves to this simple exchange of 
pleasantries for on 4 March 1794 the dismissal of Burger as veldwagtmeester was confirmed by 
the Krygsraad of Stellenbosch for the following reasons: "in having with the commando under his 
orders attacked some Hottentots kraals and killed and wounded the Hottentots instead of pursuing 
the Busluuen".151 Some of the pressure to dismiss Burger had no doubt come from Blettern1an 
and Commissioner Sluysken, who had been presented with disturbing news from the district of 
Swellendam. During the recent outbreak of panic the colonists of that district were convinced that 
Captain Kees was the co-ordinator of a Khoikhoi-Oorlam conspiracy and was about to launch an 
attack on the Swellendam Drostdy, after which he would rampage through the district killing all 
the Christians. It was also rumoured that he had been involved in the previous murder of two 
fanuers, Casper Labuschagne and Jan Oosthuisen. A c01muando was thus despatched to capture 
the Khoikhoi captain and he and eighteen of his followers were sent to Cape Town for 
interrogation.152 
After considering the evidence Conuuissioner Sluysken thought the entire conspiracy to be 
"chimericq", invented by the Swellendanm1ers so as to avoid having to do conuuando service on 
the eastern frontier. He implied that the Swellendam fanners were jealous of Kees, but they were 
also, no doubt fearful. Since Kees had recently been given twenty-six muskets by P.A. Meyburg, 
the ex-Heemraden member and Captain of the Stellenbosch citizen force. Sluysken found all the 
prisoners - save four - i1mocent, and released them so that they might return to the service of their 
masters. The four detainees were suspected of having been involved in the murder of 
Labuschagne and Oosthuisen and were confined in the Company slave lodge pending further 
enquiries. Kees, despite his i1moccnce, was not allowed to return home immediately but kept in a 
150. CA, 1/STB 10/167, W. l3urgcr to Lan<l<lrosl, 24 Nov. 1793. "Picnaar was as bad as the Hottentots because he 
supported them so strongly"; " ... the biggest rogue walking on earth". 
15 l. CA, l/STI3 l 0/163, Noles in front of volume, 4 March l 794. 
152. Viljocn, "Khoisan Labour Relations In The Ovcrberg", pp.216-7 
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room at the Castle "tot dat de landlieden van haar schrik hersteld sijn". He was still there when 
the British captured the Castle two years later! 153 
Sluysken, like Blettennan, was deeply disgusted by the motives and actions of the conspiracy 
theorists. He learnt that certain veldwagtmeesters and veldkorporaals had not hesitated to round 
up the wives and children of innocent Khoikhoi and then distributed them amongst themselves as 
labourers. He therefore wrote to the landdrosts of Stellenbosch and Swellendam ordering them to 
ensure the release of the women and children. They were also to investigate the "onmenschelyke 
gedrag" of the veldwagtmeesters and conduct an enquiry into the "verfoeilijke mishandelingen 
over welke eenige van deese onschuldige schepzelen hebben geklaagd".154 
This, then, was the context of Burger's dismissal. On 3 December 1793 he had been ordered to 
attend the Krygsraad and on 10 December several inhabitants of the Hantam had sent Bletterman 
a letter in Burger's support.155 Their letter confined itself to defending Burger against the "lying" 
allegations which Pienaar had made concerning Burger's incompetence as a veldwagtmeester. It 
does not throw any light on the crimes alluded to by the Stellenbosch Krygsraad in March 1794 
but it serves as an invaluable corrective to the picture which Pienaar had given of the sorry state 
of affairs in the Hantam. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the letter is that at least twenty-
nine Hantan1ers were prepared to express their support for Burger and their opposition to 
Pienaar. Johannes Carstens maintained that Pienaar had told the greatest lies when he claimed 
that the San were getting the upper hand in the district and gaining more and more land. The 
present situation was, in fact, better than it had been before when livestock was stolen from farms 
deep within the colony. The signatories to the letter also dismissed allegations that Burger had 
been unwilling to raise conunandos, explaining that commandos could only be mounted if the 
horses were in a fit state and anmmnition was provided. Within these limitations Burger had done 
his best with the pitifully few men at his disposal. When Bok's sheep had been stolen in May 
I 793, it had been because he had been grazing them beyond everyone else without informing the 
veldwagtmeester, at the abandoned fann of the late Sara Johaima van Zijl. This farm had been 
abandoned years before by Sara van Zijl precisely because of its dangerous position. On this 
occasion Bok had only infonned Burger of the robbery after four days and the horses were not fit 
153. I3oeseken, "N ederlandse Konunissarisse", pp. 86-7. 
154. CA, C 698, Report ofSluysken lo Nederburgh an<l Frykenius, 6 Dec. 1793, p.149-51. "Inhuman conduct. 
abominable mishandling about which some of these innocent creatures have complained". 
155. Ci\, 1/STB I 0/162, Letter from .I.A. Louw, J.P. Carstens an<l others from I-Ian tam lo Landdrosl, IO Dec. 
1793. 
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for a four day journey. When Pienaar's sheep had been stolen Burger could not lead a conunando 
himself because he was tending one of his children who lay dying at home, but he had authorised 
Pienaar to raise a commando himself. The fmal point of the Hantamers was that since some of 
them, W.A. Nel and Carstens, had recovered their stolen cattle by setting off immediately after 
the departing San, they had not found it necessary to appeal to Burger who could not, therefore, 
be charged with negligence. They hoped, in fact, that Burger would be reinstated.156 
He was not. Pienaar was appointed in his place, gaining the position which he had coveted for so 
long.157 In June 1794 Pienaar was given pennission to raise a commando in his district and at 
last seemed to have the free hand necessary for the extension of his personal empire in the 
north.158 It is possible that he was slightly disappointed at the Council of Policy having put a 
damper on his plans to go bounty hunting; and if he had thought that on becoming 
veldwagtmeester he would be able to conunand the obedient service of his neighbours he was 
quickly disillusioned. In a long letter, which Pienaar wrote to Bletterman on 29 October 1794, he 
complained bitterly about the reluctance, or resistance, of the farn1ers in his district to undertake 
commando service or to provision the participants with supplies.159 He stated that on his first 
attempt to raise a conunando, in September, he mustered a mere six men with a further nine 
Khoikhoi, not all of whom were suitable. Half of the group then voted to return so nothing had 
been achieved. When sununoned to appear at a certain place on a certain date, nobody arrived. If 
one went to fetch a man personally he would plead that he first had to slaughter a sheep to make a 
blanket, or kill a buck to make velschoene. When I 500 sheep were stolen and the shepherds 
murdered, nobody obeyed the call to pursue the robbers. Eight days later a similar request 
brought a similar response. Willem Adriaan Ne! had to take some men himself to chase his stolen 
stock to the Vis River; Jan van Zijl had been obliged to buy slaughter stock to provision himself 
before undertaking a commando to secure his stock. When Johannes Gous had stock stolen only 
one man arrived anned for the conunando; when a general commando was planned, and twenty-
four men given three months notice, only four men arrived on the appointed day. Pienaar, who 
had been obliged to provide his own wagon and oxen for the commando, then concentrated on 
getting at least six men to go with him. The first was Floris Koetse, who fanned with Lukas 
Visagic. He had asked to be excused on the grounds that he had to look after the fann, but 
Pienaar denied his request. Meanwhile Visagic wandered about from fann to fann, without 
156. Ibid. 
157. Sec note 111 above. 
158. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Notes in front of volume, 3 June 1794. 
159. CJ\, 1/STB 10/163, Pienaar to Lan<l<lrost, 29 Oct. 1794. 
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acknowledging Pienaar's smnn1ons, until he finally arrived on 29 September. Johannes Petrus 
Gous was supposedly exempted from duty by his boss but his boss (Spanneberg) spent his time 
hunting eland - not just for his own pot either. Andries Gous, supposedly also indispensable to his 
boss Spanneberg, was seen on someone else's farm and was nothing but a shirker. Willem 
Burger, (who lived together with Carel van der Merwe) had not initially been asked to go on 
conunando (so that it did not seem that Pienaar was highlighting his triumph over him) but was 
asked to provide six sheep. Instead Pienaar received a reply that, he stated, would shame the 
mouth of anyone and could certainly not be put down on paper. Pienaar therefore conunanded 
Burger and Van der Merwe to accompany him but Burger and the Gous brothers then journeyed 
far beyond the Sak River to shoot eland. Ostensibly this was to provision the commando. Pienaar 
had told them to be back before the 3rd October, since that was the date when those required for 
annual drill at the Cape would have to leave. If there was drill those who were going would also 
require bi/tong. But on the date when drill took place, 16 October, Burger was still far beyond the 
Sak River.160 
Pienaar had still not been able to get Burger out on c01nn1ando by 10 August 1795 when he wrote 
to complain once more to Blettennan. He urged most strongly that Blettern1an take measures to 
punish those unwilling to go on commando, especially since the San were still active in the area 
and there had recently been three night attacks on fanns. Pienaar's own trek oxen had been stolen 
and had not been recovered, despite a hot pursuit by five men which left their horses weak from 
thirst.161 
The letter is testimony to both Pienaar's diligence and his frustration. The duties attendant on 
being a veldwagtmeester were clearly more irksome than Pienaar had anticipated whilst the 
selfish and divisive spirit present amongst the Hantam trekboers meant that they only participated 
in conunandos when their own interests were at stake. It is likely that Pienaar's official duties kept 
him close to the Hantam in 1794 although his control over supplies of powder and shot would 
have allowed him to allocate anununition to his associations further north. These associates, 
were, respectively, the Afrikaners and Jan Bloem. They had enjoyed the sponsorship of Pienaar 
for several years, and in exchange had provided him with cattle and ivory. From about 1794 
onwards, however, both of these men began to pursue more independent and aggressive careers 
along the Orange River. There had already been inklings of evidence, as far as the authorities 
160. lbi<l. 
161. CJ\, I/STI3 10/163, Picuaar to Lan<l<lrost, 10 J\ug.1795. 
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were concerned, that Afrikaner did not always act as a docile subordinate. Such evidence began 
to increase. 
In February 1794 a Khoikhoi by the name of Peter Joubert told the authorities that, about a year 
before, he had been informed by a Khoikhoi woman, Freyn Lynae, that she and her husband, 
Oude Michie!, had been attacked by Afrikaner. It is not clear whether the attack took place in 
1793 or 1792 but it occurred at a place seven days north of the Orange River. Afrikaner had hit 
and killed Oude Michie! and stolen all his cattlc.162 A similar incident was reported in January 
1796 when a Khoikhoi, Jan Michie!, reported how, about a year before then, he had been with his 
father (also called Jan Michie!), Witbooij and Klaas Roos. In the evening Afrikaner and his 
followers arrived. Jan Michiel ran away in fear and only returned next morning when they left. 
His father had been beaten to death with kieries. Afrikaner's men took all the livestock and 
departed to the Great River whilst Jan Michiel sought refuge at Claas Bastard's kraal.163 
Jan Bloem also seems to have begun to play a more independent role around 1794 becoming, in 
his own right, a powerfully disruptive force amongst the societies around the eastern and middle 
sections of the Orange River. Pienaar supplied him with anununition and Bloem in tum, built up 
a following of deracinated San and Khoikhoi, principally Korana, who were later identified as 
constituting the Springbok clan. Bloem and his followers began to raid other Korana groups and, 
in the 1790s, extended their sphere of operations to attack conununities of Sotho-Tswana to the 
north. It was alleged by nineteenth century observers that he sent some of the cattle he had looted 
to Pienaar, in exchange for anus and anununition. It was also alleged that Pienaar and the 
Afrikaners actually participated in these raids, the most famous of which was an attack against 
the BaThlaping at Kuruman in about 1794. In this attack many of the Tswana were shot and they 
lost all of their cattle, sheep and goats. At various times Bloem and the Springboks - who 
included many San adherents - lived at Khies, the Langeberg, Blinkklip and finally, Lekatlong. In 
1799, however, Bloem's career came to an end. He and his "multi-ethnic unit" mounted an 
expedition against the BaNgwaketc which failed and, on his return, Bloem was poisoned.164 
162. CA, 1/STB 3/13, Crimineele Verklaaringen 1793-1796, Relaas van Hottentot Pict Joubert, 4 Feb. 1794. 
163. CA, 1/STB 3/13, Relaas van Hottentot Jan Michie!, 26 Jan. 1796. 
164. Lye, Andrew Smith Joumal, 27 Feb 1835, p.178. "Our infonnant (an elderly San living with some Griqua) 
with many others of his fellow-countrymen, was invited, nay compelled to join in a conunando fonned by Jolm 
Bloom about 1794 for the purpose of attacking the I3ituanas, and proceeded with it to the Kooroman where the 
Callres were attacked, many of them shot, and all their cattle, sheep and goats taken, and with which the victors 
proceeded towards the colony". In Smith's Diary p.203, he writes: "This was the same Pict l'ienaar who with Jan 
Bloom took the cattle from the CafTers at Langcberg. Africancr on that occasion was with him". Sec Du Bmyn, 
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In many ways Bloem's activities in the area east of the confluence of the Hartebeest and Orange 
River were a mirror image of Afrikaner's activities to the west. Like Afrikaner he established a 
group which survived the death of its founding father, presided over by his personal descendants. 
Like Afrikaner, too, he spread the "firearm zone" far to the north of the Orange River, destroying 
some groups and encouraging the coalition of others. It would be fascinating to know more about 
the reasons for the sudden appearance of about 300 "Hottentots, Coraanes" from the north into 
the Roggeveld district in May 1797. These people had no cattle with them and Veldcornet Visser 
feared "mischief'' even though they stated that they wished to dwell with the Christians. The 
landdrost of Stellenbosch told Visser to deal tactfully with them and to tell them to go home 
which, presumably, they did. We can only speculate that their arrival, without cattle, had 
something to do with Bloem's raiding parties to the north but the records cannot confirm this.165 
Whilst Bloem's impact on the societies adjacent to the Orange River is not always clearly 
recorded the Afrikaners managed, in the last years of the eighteenth century, to make an indelible 
impression, not only on the lives of those they encountered, but also in the colonial records of the 
time. In the early nineteenth century travellers and missionaries in the northern frontier districts 
recorded further details, based on the folk memory of local residents, pertaining to the fearsome 
exploits of the Afrikaners. There is thus a good deal of evidence, not all of it consistent, which 
can be used to illuminate the violent severing of the ties between Pienaar and the Afrikaners. It 
was this event which inaugurated the Afrikaners' dominance of the Middle Orange River and 
heralded the arrival of a period of unprecedented banditry and terror. 
At the beginning of March 1796 Michie! Bok, Pienaar's friend and Bloem's accomplice, was 
informed by his Khoikhoi drovers that a group of fourteen Khoisan robbers had stolen his cattle 
from his farm "Diepe Kloof1' in the Hantam. Bok and his knecht, Barend, quickly mounted their 
horses and followed the spoor of the "schelms", sending word, meanwhile, to Veldwagtmeester 
Pienaar. The next day the Khoisan robbers were discovered on Spioen Kop with Bok's cattle but 
"Oorlams", p.8; J. Campbell, Travels, p.378-379; Legassick, "l11e Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the 
missionaries", pp.133-137; R. Moffat, Alissionwy Labours and Scenes in Soutl,em Afi·ica (London, 1842 ), p.214; 
Engelbrecht, Korana, pp.56-58. 
I 65. CA, British Occupation (hereatler 130) 149, Ross to Van der Riet, 29 May 1797; CA, J /STB 20/30, Van der 
Riel to Macartney, 26 May 1797. Lye, Andrew Smit/, Joumal, 27 Feb. 1835, p.178 states that atler I3loem's 1794 
raid "The Cormmas, who fonned a very considerable proportion of this plundering band, with a small share of the 
booty which was ceded to them, preferred seeking a new abode to returning to the one they had !ell, and for that 
purpose dircled their course up the Orange River, leaving I3loom and his own adherents to pursue their course in 
nearly an opposite direction to return to that part of the colony in which he resided". 
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nothing could be done until Pienaar arrived with help. He did not, however, arrive, so Bok and 
Barend rode to Pienaar's fann to see what it was that was detaining him. On their arrival at the 
fann they found the doors and windows shut. Bok ordered Barend to look in the wagon shed to 
see if Pienaar had perhaps trekked away somewhere, but the wagon was there. Bok must have 
sensed that something was wrong for instead of entering the house he rode around it and, about 
l 000 yards away found two of Pienaar's children lying in the veld. Mietje had five wounds to her 
head but she was able to talk to Bok. Jacob had three wounds to his head and was beyond reason. 
In answer to Bok's questions the girl told him that Captain Afrikaner and some other Khoikhoi 
had shot dead their father and beaten to death their mother and sister. Bok and Barend picked up 
both children and put them on their horses. Still without entering the house they rode back to 
Bok's fann and then put the children on an ox wagon to take them to Frederik Straus's farm. 
Straus spread the news to Jacob Straus, Jacobus Forsters, Jan Goosen and two of Pienaar's sons -
Arnoldus and Jan. Only the next day did Bok, Barend and the others return to Pienaar's fann. 
Pienaar's slave, Maart, told them that Afrikaner and some other Khoikhoi had shot dead his 
master, mishandled and beaten to death Pienaar's wife and beaten to death three of the children. 
Maart did not know that Mietje and Jacob had been found. But inside the house lay Pienaar, shot 
through the left breast. His wife and daughter, Leente, were also dead with various wounds to the 
head. The bodies were buried on the fann.166 
Why had the Afrikaners turned their guns and kierries on the Pienaar family? The most popular 
explanation, and one which is advanced by the majority of missionaries and travellers who wrote 
about the Afrikaners, was that Pienaar and his son Arnoldus were "in the habit of cohabiting with 
the wives" of Klaas Afrikaner's sons. Campbell reports that "suspicions, from some 
circumstances, rose in the minds of Afrikaner and his sons that their employer behaved 
improperly to their wives during their absence; and his sending them more frequently from home, 
confinned their suspicions; they refused therefore to go any more on such expeditions".167 In 
1834 Andrew Smith recounted that it was not Klaas himself (who counselled against the deed) 
but his sons who had killed Pienaar. Klaas had fled from the farn1 before the murder but was 
overtaken by his sons in their flight from the Hantam. Together they all went to the Orange 
River.168 Whether or not this was true, the incident docs seem to have heralded the rise of Klaas' 
son Jager. As Burchell commented in I 811, the name "Africaandcr ... has been rendered more 
166. CA, l/STI3 3/13, Michicl Bok, 9 Aug 1796. 
167. Campbell, Tmvels, p.376. 
168. Kirby, Andrew Smith Diary, pp.202-203. 
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formidable by its collecting into a single history the deeds of two men equally worthless, the 
father and son".169 
Robert Moffat, a missionary who had a lot to do with Jager Afrikaner at a later date, confinns the 
above explanation and was, in fact, probably the originator of the tradition of Pienaar's sexual 
impropriety. Since his chief infonnant was Jager Afrikaner we should regard this story with 
caution as Jager was no doubt taking pains to convince the missionary that he had killed the 
Pienaars in an understandable outburst of rage after evidence of matrimonial trespass. Moffat 
added, as a reason for the murder, the fact that Pienaar ill-treated the Afrikaners.170 Although we 
cannot, with certainty, dismiss the stories of Pienaar's improper attentions to the wives of his 
employees, the more likely explanation for the Afrikaners' resentment was that they were tired of 
being sent on commando by Pienaar. There is, at least, circumstantial evidence in support of this 
interpretation. In the years before Pienaar's appointment as ve/dwagtmeester the Afrikaners had 
certainly been kept busy on both official or quasi-official conunandos and on illegal cattle raiding 
expeditions. Though they had benefited from these activities it was clear to them that they would 
benefit even more if Pienaar's controlling influence was removed. It is likely that after Pienaar's 
appointment to office, he was increasingly tempted to employ the Afrikaners on official (and 
hence less lucrative) conunandos, particularly since the local fanners were so reluctant to 
undertake such duty themselves and since it was especially important for the new 
veldwagtmeester to convey an impression of vigorous success. Was it simply a coincidence that 
Pienaar was murdered shortly after receiving Bok's request to mount another commando? It is 
possible that Pienaar's orders to the Afrikaners to ride to Bok's assistance provoked them to rebel 
and rid themselves of their onerous servitude. In this respect Campbell's account of the reasons 
for the Afrikaners' rebellion is significant for it refers to both sexual anxiety and unhappiness 
over conunand duty. "Information having come to Piemaar (sic), that the Buslunan had carried 
off some cattle from a boor belonging to the district over which he was Field Comet, he, in his 
official character, conunanded them to pursue the Bushmen, in order to recapture the cattle. This 
order they positively refused to obey, alleging that his only motive for sending them on such an 
expedition was, that they might be murdered, and he might thereby get possession of their 
wives".171 
169. Burchell, Travels. Vol. I, p.191. 
170. Moffat, Alissionmy labours, pp.73-76; Kirby, Andrew Smith Diary, Vol. I, pp.202, 257. Sec also Du 
Bruyn, "Oorlams", pp.8-9; Franken, pp.213-234; Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. I, p.173; Vol. II, pp.283-284. 
171. Campbell, Travels, p.376. 
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As the Afrikaners fled to the Orange River it is possible that they killed another family of 
trekboers, the Van der Westhuisens, for this was the information received by the authorities in 
June 1796. Veldwagtmeesters Frans Lubbe, Johannes Karsten and Tilman Nieuwoud were 
ordered to lead a conuuando against the Afrikaner gang but since this only departed on 27 August 
1796 it was far from being a hot pursuit operation. In fact, the commando· allowed itself to be 
diverted from the task in hand in order to follow fresh San spoor. The trail led them over the Vis 
River and the Sak River, deep into Busluuanland. Needless to say there was no sign of the 
Afrikaners and, after killing a couple of San, the commando returned, beaten by thirst.172 Truth 
to tell there cannot have been much enthusiasm for a deadly confrontation with the armed, 
mounted and vastly experienced Afrikaner gang. 
Subsequent conuuandos which were despatched to deal with them displayed a similar lack of 
application to the task and, as time passed, more disaffected Oorlams, Khoikhoi and "Bastaards" 
joined the Afrikaners ranks, or, at least, emulated their attitude of aggressive independence. Thus 
in February 1797, Veldwagtmeester Frans Lubbe asked pennission to resign from an increasingly 
difficult job. Certain Khoikhoi in his district had guns which they claimed to have obtained from 
"de groot volk" and with which they threatened to shoot him, Lubbe, dead, on his own fanu. Two 
"Bastaards" with guns had threatened the aged Hendrik Smit in his own house. Everywhere the 
Khoikhoi were behaving in such a manner that, if they were not checked soon "sal beet net so 
gaan asl bij Pienaar braaf geweers op saamel en dan namakwasland waar alle schelme heen 
gaad".173 
172. CA, I/STI3 I 0/163, Notes in front of volume, 7 June 1796; CA 1/STB 10/165, J. Karsten to Lan<l<lrosl, 8 
Oct 1796. 
173. CA, I/STI3 10/165, Lubbe lo Lan<l<lrosl, 14 Feb. 1797. "Things will tum out like they <lid with Pienaar; good 
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REVOLT IN NAMAQUALAND 
A great many "schelme", or rogues, were indeed to be found in Namaqualand. But so too were 
many Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" who had been driven there by the 
increasing intolerance and persecution of whites in the rest of the colony. The recent outbreak of 
paranoia amongst the burghers of Swellendam, and the attacks on innocent Oorlam and K.hoikhoi 
groups within the colony (which had been led by many of the local veldwagtmeesters), cannot 
have been reassuring for those who were not white fanners. Many independently-minded 
Khoikhoi or Oorlams therefore headed for the remote regions of Namaqualand where there still 
seemed to be the possibility of a life free from exploitation. 
In the 1790s the colonial presence in Namaqualand seemed a lot less overbearing than elsewhere. 
True, white farmers had seized the choicest land, but there were comparatively few of them and 
many lived like the Namaqua themselves, in hemispheric huts of reed matting with very few signs 
of wealth and many of poverty. Indeed, not only did Namaqualand trekboers live like the 
Khoikhoi, they frequently lived with the Khoikhoi, sharing their huts with Namaqua women and 
their farms with other Namaqua families. I Namaqualand could not, however, remain inuuune to 
the sort of pressures being felt in the rest of the colony and, inevitably, processes of closure began 
to be felt here too. Tensions mounted. In part this was precipitated by the great influx of Oorlams 
or "Bastaards" into the area. Some of the white fanners began to feel threatened by this invasion, 
aware of the fact that they were convincingly outnumbered by groups of well-anued men who had 
no reason to love the colonial system. As land hunger grew in N amaqualand there was a 
movement into more marginal land and a displacement of weaker groups. Thus incoming Oorlam 
groups displaced Khoikhoi groups who in tum displaced the San. The result was growing conflict 
which the local upholders of govenunent authority found all too easy to blame on, what was to 
them, the clearest threat, namely, armed Oorlams. In their attempts to assert colonial authority 
and make Namaqualand safe for the white man they succeeded in provoking a widespread revolt 
which, temporarily, united Khoikhoi, Oorlams and San against the local white farmers. 
The first signs of the growing unrest in Namaqualand came in July 1796 when Veldcornet 
Joha1rncs Cornelius van der Westhuysen wrote to the landdrost of Stellenbosch to describe the 
I. Sec for instance I3arrow's <lcscription of the colonists of Namaqualan<l in his Trm·els, Vol. I, pp.283-7. 
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events in that district.2 Although details arc sparse (since no copy of the letter has been found) 
the essentials may be gathered from a sunuuary contained in a letter from General Craig (the 
British conuuander at the Cape) to Landdrost Van der Riet. Craig had been infonued that: 
the inhabitants of the Namaqua Country have been exposed to plunder and 
devastation by a party of lawless vagrants consisting of wild Bosjesmens and 
Hottentots, who have stolen their cattle, burnt their houses and forced them to retire 
as far as the Green River.3 
Most surprisingly the leaders of this upnsmg were "Class and Peter Bastards" though 
frustratingly, nothing further is known about their involvement in this incident. We can only 
speculate that the murder of Pienaar and the flight of the Afrikaners had had a disturbing effect 
throughout the northern frontier zone. It is possible, particularly in the light of later development, 
that some over-zealous local official had attempted to curb the Barends so as to prevent them 
from becoming like the Afrikaners, that is, a threat to white dominance. All we can say with 
certainty, however, is that General Craig urged that every effort be made to settle the affair 
amicably. The landdrost was authorised to despatch a conuuando but Craig was insistent that a 
regular account of its proceedings be kept and that "no-one shall attempt to retain or enslave any 
of the men either Bosjemen or Hottentots that may be taken on this expedition" .4 Unfortunately, 
no record of this conuuando's activities has survived although, presumably, it did take place for 
in August the landdrost conuuanded Van der Westhuyzen and a certain Andries Craaij of the 
Kamiesberg to raise the men in their district.5 Whatever had happened in 1796 did not, however, 
prevent a recurrence of unrest in Namaqualand. 
In July 1797 an aggrieved colonist of the Kamiesberg, J.A. van den Heever, wrote to Andries 
Craaij in tones of bitter disrespect. He complained that he had been driven from his farm by the 
"Bossiemans", and unless a conuuando was despatched it would be pointless to return to the 
Kamiesberg since all he could look forward to was ruin and the death of his family. His farm had 
been burnt and if things continued this year as they had last year he and his family would have to 
leave. "I am extremely puzzled," continued Van den Heever, "that whilst you have been appointed 
as veldwagtmeester by our govermnent and also supplied with powder and shot to pacify the 
veld, that you find it so difficult to go on conunando, sitting very still at the Beukeses ( who 
provide you with your food) and scarcely ever stirring." The letter concluded with Van den 
2. CA, LM 48, Letters Received from Landdrosts etc., 1796-1801, 8 July 1796, No. 72; I Aug. I 796, No 71. 
3. CA, 130 147, Craig to Van der Riel, 5 Aug. 1796. 
4. Ibid. 
5. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Landdrost to Craaij and Van der Westhuizen IO Aug. 1796. 
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Heever threatening to report Craaij to the authorities if he failed to respond. 6 Other Kamiesberg 
colonists had also been driven from their fanns and Craaij was clearly under some pressure to 
react. 7 In fact, he had already been very busy making the situation worse. 
According to Craaij's own account he had been appointed as veldwagtmeester of Namaqualand 
on 26 October 1796 by Landdrost Van der Riet.8 Much of the subsequent turn1oil in 
Nanmqualand may be explained by the fact that the colonists of that region did not consider 
Craaij to be either a suitable or a legitimate appointment to that position. He had been born in the 
Netherlands and served his country as a sailor before arriving at the Cape. He was not, however, 
considered to be a burgher, perhaps because he had not been formally discharged from the 
service, even though his wages had been stopped. Quite when he arrived in the Kamiesberg is 
uncertain but he was not considered to be a Namaqualander by the locals and, indeed, prided 
himself on being a European. He had a loan-fann behind the Kamiesberg - "Tweefonteinen 
gelegen aan de Danze Kraal" - but the authorities were subsequently to dispute its legitimacy. All 
in all he was a strange choice for a veldwagtmeester and when officials of the Batavian 
government discussed his case in 1803 they concluded that his appointment, under the authority 
of the English government, had been "voorbeeldeloos"(unexampled).9 
Whatever the qualities were which had elevated Craaij to a position of authority in the 
Kamiesberg they did not include good sense, nor an understanding of the situation in 
Namaqualand. Convinced that the government's order to prevent guns and anununition from 
getting into Khoikhoi hands should be taken literally, Craaij proceeded to stir up a hornet's nest 
amongst the Namaqua of Little Namaqualand. Since November 1796 the newly appointed 
veldwagtmeester had been visiting Namaqua kraals and, with the help of other colonists (one of 
whom was Andries van Zijl), had been confiscating fire-anns. In one kraal of about thirty people 
Craaij took over six flint-locks and forced the inhabitants to move out of the area on pain of 
death. JO It is hardly surprising that by March 1797 the veldwagtmeester was complaining about 
6. CA, 1/STB 10/150, VandenHeevertoCraaij, 7 July 1797. 
7. J.A. van der Merwe of Namaqualand wrote to complain that "murderers" had burnt down his fann "de twee 
fontynen and prevented him from using his second fann "de silver fonteyn" for the past two years. CA, 1/STB 
10/165, J. van der Merwe to Landdrost, 18 July 1798. 
8. CA, Bataafse Republiek (henceforth BR) 276, Craaij to Conunissioner General, 4 March 1803, pp. I 00-108. 
9. CA, BR 276, pp.100-198; L. Bergh to Conunissioner General, 11 May 1803, pp.105-7. 
10. CA, 1/STB 10/9, Undated deposition of Namaqua Khoikhoi; bound in years 1800 but, from context, is the 
enclosure retcrred to by I3amard in letter to Van der Riel, CA, BO 150, 27 Oct. 1797: "I send to you the enclosed 
depositions of some Hottentots, who declare that they have been compelled to leave their kraal and their property in 




the surly attitude of Khoikhoi in his district. I I Nor that by October 1797 several Namaqua had 
in turn, complained to the governor about the ill treatment they had been receiving from Craaij.12 
Actions such as these were helping to create a climate of insecurity but it was not until December 
1798 that matters came to a head. 
Given the growing unrest in Namaqualand and the widespread rebelliousness of the Khoikhoi, 
"Bastaards" and Oorlams throughout the frontier, the government renewed its efforts to record the 
names of those falling under colonial jurisdiction, but living in independent kraals, i.e. not 
working for white fanners. In August 1798, Veldwagtmeester Visser of the Roggeveld reported 
that kraal-dwelling Khoikhoi were refusing to give him their names.13 Opposition in 
Namaqualand, however, was far more dramatic. On 10 December 1798 Veldcornet van der 
Westhuysen of Little Namaqualand wrote a desperate letter to Landdrost van der Riet of 
Stellenbosch. When Veldwagtmeester Andries Craaij had instructed the kraal-dwelling Khoi of 
Little Namaqualand to allow him to record their names they had interpreted this in the most 
sinister - and for the authorities, unfortunate - light. The kraals had gathered together and 
launched an attack on five fanns in order to plunder muskets, powder, shot and livestock. On the 
fann of the widow Nicolaas van der Westhuysen, the overseer, Hendrik Hiewes (or Hibert), had, 
it was reported, been killed and a total of twenty-one guns had been acquired by the Khoikhoi, as 
well as quantities of ammunition. This sudden uprising had been prompted by the belief that their 
names were being recorded preparatory to their being taken into slavery. The Khoikhoi reasoned 
that "diewyl sy een vry gebooren Na.tie syn, soo willen se sig liewers tot het laaste verdeedigen en 
vlugten a.ls een slaaf te syn" .14 
The veldwagtmeester and other trekboers had attempted to convince the Na.ma.qua that they were 
mistaken, that they would remain free in the future and that the taking of names had nothing to do 
with enslavement, but to no avail. Van der Wcsthuysen had contemplated mounting a conunando 
in order to subdue the troublemakers. On second thoughts, however, he had realised that, since 
the Khoikhoi numbered in their hundreds, and since the rebels, in their mountain retreats, sought 
to encourage the docile labourers of the trekboers to join their ranks, it would be most unwise to 
11. CA, I/SIB 10/165, Craaij and Bezuidenhout to Landdrost, March 1797. 
12. See note IO above. 
13. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Visser to Landdrost, 15 Aug. 1798. 
14. CA, 1/STB 10/151, J.C. van dcr Westhuyscn to Landdrost, 10 Dec. 1798. "As long as they were a freeborn 
nation they would defend themselves to the last or t1ee rather than be made a slave". Heese says that the murder of 
Hendrik I-hewers ( or Stieber[ as he calls him) gave Socbatsfontcin its name: "Die naam is aan die pick gegec 
omdal die knegt, Hendrik Stiebcrt, so emstig om sy lcwe gesmck het." "Namakwaland", p.21. 
364 
The North-Western Frontier Zone, 1796-1802 
leave any fanns unprotected. The Namaqua had threatened to drive the Europeans over the 
Olifants River and if the Khoikhoi servants were to join them there would be very few 
"Christians" left. The situation could deteriorate in the wink of an eye, cautioned Van der 
Westhuysen, whilst those farmers who had grouped together for greater security were in a 
precarious position as the veld could not support so much livestock in one place and water 
supplies were insufficient. He pleaded, therefore, for the immediate despatch of a powerful force 
to suppress the rebellion as there were too few men in Namaqualand to do so. Without such help, 
Van der Westhuisen concluded, it would be impossible to save "our women and children and our 
provisions ... our lives, yes, everything would be lost".15 
The authorities responded to this plea on 20 December, promising that help was on its way and 
advising Van der Westhuysen, in the company of other veldwagtmeesters, to investigate the cause 
of the uprising. 
A great deal of blame was already attaching itself to Craaij who, it was reported, had actually 
told the Namaqua that they would be enslaved. Another report maintained that Craaij's wife had 
spread the rumour. Doubts were now being expressed that Craaij was a veldwagtmeester (or 
veldcornet) at all since he had deceived the government about his credentials. It also seems that 
he had exceeded his instructions by trying to record the names of independent Khoikhoi, his brief 
having been to confine his enquiries to those Khoikhoi or "Bastaards" living with colonists.16 As 
letters were sent out to other veldcornets the British authorities took pains to impress upon them 
the need to be as merciful as possible; they should attempt to convince the rebels that they would 
not be enslaved and that they would avoid violence if they returned the stolen goods. Peaceful 
negotiations were the priority .17 General Dundas, detennined to stamp the mark of British 
authority on the colony, issued the following stern statement to the Landdrost and Heemraaden. 
I most sincerely wish that this unfortunate disturbance may be quelled without the 
effusion of any more human blood, or the exertion of that disgraceful degree of 
savage revenge, which too often has been found to exist, and in order to secure the 
future peace between such parties, it is my intention, with the utmost rigour to 
15. CA, 1/STB 10/151, J.C. van der Westhuysen to Landdrost, IO Dec. 1798. 
16. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Landdrost to Dundas, no date (1798); to Veldcomet from Landdrost, 20 Dec. 1798; to J.C. 
van der Wcsthuyzen from Landdrost, 20 Dec. 1798; to J.C. van der Wcsthuyzen from Landdrost, 24 Dec. 1798; to 
G.A. Smit from Landdrosl, 31 Dec. 1798. There is some confusion surrounding the titles veldcomet and 
veldwagtmeester but many of the correspondents in this period used both tcnns quite indiscriminately. Van dcr 
Wcsthuyzen was senior lo Craaij but his area of authority was, strictly speaking, the Groene River whereas Craaij's 
was the Kamiesberg. 
17. Sec note above. 
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punish every act of unwarranted violence that either party may have conunitted, and 
in the first instance, am to desire, that you will apprehend the veld comet (sic) 
Andries Craaij, and all his accomplices, taking regular depositions of the facts, that 
a criminal prosecution may be conunenced against him or any of them. IS 
By 4 January 1799 Van der Westhuysen, who was still in a state of considerable agitation, 
reported on the situation. The non-appearance of reinforcements and veldwagtmeesters from 
other districts was not reassuring.19 In response to his overtures of peace a group of more than 
fifty men, anned with at least fifteen guns, had arrived to parley. They had kept a cautious 
distance, agreeing to discuss matters only with Van der Westhuysen·and Jan Engelbrecht. Van 
der Westhuysen's proposals had had some effect since three of the Oorlams - Witteboij Kan1ijs, 
his brother Kupido Kanunijs, and Klaas Knoega20- agreed to meet him in eight days time at the 
Komberg in order to return the stolen guns and livestock. Part of the deal was that Knoegen and 
the Kamijs brothers should be allowed to keep three guns for self defence against the San. But 
Barend Goejeman - who had allegedly killed Hendrik Hiewers - and other "oorlamse bosjemans" 
would not hear of peace. After eight days, at the appointed place, the Kanunijses, Klaas Knoega, 
Links Namib, Gerrit Kwankwa and various others arrived. They handed over five guns, six of the 
worst horses, fourteen cattle and the same number of sheep, claiming that the rest of the livestock 
had got lost. Van der Westhuysen, however, had heard rumours to the contrary. He had also 
heard that there was a plot to kill a certain Esterhuysen, a plot to overrun the fanns and a plot to 
drive away Jan van der Heever. Rumours also had it that the Oorlams who had kept the 
rendezvous were plruming to leave because of the opposition of the others and because they had 
killed Barend Goejeman, the principle ringleader. Though this last rumour was not worth 
counting on, there were reports that the trouble makers were just biding their time, waiting until 
Cornelius Kok ru1d his people had gone before making the next move.21 
18. CA, 1/STB 10/9, Dundas to Landdrost and Heemraden, 22 Dec. 1798. 
19. CA, 1/STB 10/151, VanderWesthuysentoLanddrost,4Jan.1799. 
20. Heese states (on what authority he does not say) that the Oorlams who made conunon cause with the San in 
1799 were the Witboois. (Heese, "Nmnakwaland", p.27.) Whether he is basing this judgement on the name of the 
Oorlam leader -Wittebooij Kanunijs - or on the fact that in the nineteenth century the Wittebooijs claimed to have 
lived between the Orange River and the Kami es berg, is not clear. According to Heese (pp. 74-75) towards the end 
of the eighteenth century the Witboois were under the leadership of Cupido Witbooi between Steinkop and Pella. 
As Van der Westhuysen's letter explains there was a Cupido who was Wittebooij's brother but, in 1799, he was 
called Cupido Kanunijs and not Cupido (or Kido) Wittebooij. Nienaber explains (Stamname, pp. 630-639; 909-
912) that the Khoikhoi name for the Witboo~j's was Khowesen or Khobesen (which does not throw light on the 
problem) and that the tenn "Witbooij" was lirsl used in 1828. 
21. CA, I/STI3 I 0/151, Van <ler Weslhuysen lo Lan<l<lrosl, 4 Jan. 1799. 
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Cornelius Kok, it seems, had convinced the Oorlam rebels to listen to Van der Westhuysen. He 
had been, acknowledged the veldwagtmeester, "een groote hulp" .22 Those Khoikhoi or Oorlams 
who had been persuaded to negotiate had had their complaints written down and a copy of their 
statement was enclosed by Van der Westhuysen in his letter. The document is worth quoting in 
full since it reveals a great deal about the situation in Little Namaqualand at the end of the 
eighteenth century. 
1. That they fled because their names were being recorded. 
2. Pict Krabeeb said that Andries Craaij's wife had said that the Englislunen would come and 
force them to make roads from one fann to another. 
3. Gerrit Kwankwap said that Craaij had said that when Jan van der Westhuysen returned he 
would remove the Hottentots from beneath [ van onder moet op brenge] to under the 
mountain l tot onder de berg]. 
4. Jacob's brother Klaas conunanded both great and small to register their nan1es but Craaij 
had lured him into this. But the baptised bastaard Jan Kloete arrived to warn the Hottentots 
not to go and register their names and Klaas said that those who did not would be killed. 
5. Adriaan Nieukerk23 said to Jantjie Namapij, "You are my slave," to which Nan1apij 
answered, "I will not be a slave but will be obedient to the Dutch." 
6. Adriaan Nieukerk asked Jan Engelbrecht and his wife, in the presence of Engelbrecht's 
Hottentots: "Do you still pay your people?" Engelbrecht answered: "Yes." Whereupon 
Nieukerk said "I am not paying my people again and their time is not their own." 
7. Adam Kok said that Andries Craaij gave him a message to give to Cornelius Kok, that he 
should leave the Great River or else he would come with 500 men from the Castle. If 
Cornelius did not come then Craaij would write to Jacobus Gideon Louw and other 
veldwagtmeesters of the Piketberg telling them to come [na onder] with powder and lead.24 
Behind these statements (which, when set down in writing, look scarcely credible) one may once 
again detect the influence of rumour. Rumour did not cause the Namaqualand rebellion but, just 
as in the Roggeveld rebellion of 1772, it did act as a trigger and mobiliser. It was the necessary 
ingredient in transforming widespread resentments against colonial authority into active 
insurgency. We should remember that Van der Wcsthuysen's account of the rebels' complaints 
22. Ibid. 
23. Adriaan van Niekerk, who lived fi.tr to the north of the majority of colonists in Little Namaqualand, vehemently 
denied these accusations, slating that J. van der Westhuysen had lied to the lcmddrost, falsely accusing him (Van 
Niekerk) of being a cause oflhe uprising. CA, l/ST13 10/152, l' van Niekerk lo Landdrosl, 3 Sept. 1799. 
24. CA, I/STU I0/151, Van der Westhuysen lo Landdrost, 4 Jan. 1799. 
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was a written one and thus lacking in the inunediacy and flexibility which were, no doubt, 
enjoyed by the rumours as they circulated in their original, oral fonn. 
Despite the inadequacies of written representation it may be concluded from the above statements 
that, in 1799, both the white fanners and the Khoikhoi inhabitants of Little Namaqualand were 
feeling extremely insecure. If the boasting, threatening statements of Craaij and Nieukerk were 
aimed at convincing the local Khoikhoi that they were, in future, to be treated as slaves, then they 
succeeded in a spectacular fashion. The Khoikhoi found it all too easy to believe that they were 
about to be enslaved and the knowledge that there were new masters at the Cape, the English, 
increased the atmosphere of unpleasant expectation. The Khoikhoi fear of an impending 
deterioration in their status was obviously rooted in a present and perceptible reality. The 
trekboers, made nervous by the significant numbers of anned and independent Oorlams (of whom 
the Afrikaner gang was the most notorious but by no means the only example) were attempting to 
tighten up control over all Oorlam or Khoikhoi groups within the frontier zone. The fact that such 
measures stenuned from insecurity rather than strength is self evident, even without the bullying 
stupidity of Nieukerk and Craaij. Van der Westhuysen had good reason to hope that Cornelius 
Kok had not taken offence at Craaij's ill-considered attempts to intimidate him. If Kok had chosen 
to join the rebellion the position of whites in Namaqualand would have been untenable. As it was, 
Kok's presence had a calming influence on events and put the colonists in his debt. 
On 19 February 1799 the conunando which had been promised by the authorities arrived in the 
Kamiesberg.25 It consisted of the veldwagtmeesters Gideon van Zijl, Gerrit Smit and Ernst 
Wolfaardt. With them they had eighteen whites, two "Bastaards" and one Khoikhoi. When joined 
to Van der Westhuisen's force of nineteen whites, eighteen "Bastaards" and seven Khoikhoi they 
constituted a conunando of sixty-eight men, not counting the attendant cattle drivers. On 24 
February contact was made with a group of San who had joined the Namaqua and Oorlam rebels. 
Two were shot as they fled to the fann of Jasper Cloete. The rest were tailed to a kloof at the 
Coussie or Buffcls River where on 25 February it was apparent, a large gang was holed up. At 
this stage a man called Gerrit Owies the elder, stepped forward and asked Van der Westhuysen if 
he could approach the resisters and attempt to make peace.26 
25. 111c veldwagtmeeslers o[ the Pikclberg and Olifants River regions made all mmmcr of excuses before they 
reluctanlly rode off lo help their brelheren in lhc Kanuniesberg. One of lhc excuses was that Craaij was not a 
veldwagtmeester. Sec CA, 1/STB I 0/152, G. Smil lo Land<lrost, 29 Dec. 1798; J.H. Lubbc Land<lrosl, 4 Jan. 
1799; CA I/ST13 20/30, Lan<l<lrosl lo Lubbc, 9 Jan. 1799; Lan<l<lrost lo Van <lcr Wcslhuyzcn, 16 Feb. 1799. 
26. CA, 1/STB I 0/151, J.C. van <lcr Wcslshuylcn lo Lan<l<lrosl, 7 March, 1799; G. van Zijl lo Land<lrosl, 20 
March 1799; G. Smits lo Lan<l<lrosl (undated, probably 20 March 1799). Gcrril Owics or Owissic was most likely 
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Van der Westhuysen was the nominal leader of the commando, because the action was taking 
place within his district, but neither Van Zijl nor Smit regarded him very highly. The latter 
thought Van der Westhuysen to be incapable of command, never having led a commando before, 
whilst the fonner believed him to have been as responsible as Craaij had been in provoking unrest 
in Namaqualand.27 Despite these misgivings the two veldwagtmeesters let Van der Westhuysen 
decide what to do. He had grave reservations concerning Owies' request saying that if the robbers 
had simply been Namaqua, he replied, then he himself would have approached them but, since 
there were many San amongst them, it was too dangerous. Owies, however, was insistent, 
arguing that if only he could speak to the girl Fytje he was certain that he could at least persuade 
the Namaqua to come out. This suggestion was at first refused but in the afternoon Owies was 
allowed to try. He took three or four "Bastaards" with him into the kloof but asked them to wait 
with the horses whilst he went ahead. One of the men was Klaas Bastard and he followed Owies 
quite closely to see what happened. Owies was busy putting his proposals to Fytje when some of 
the San began to appear from behind the rocks. One stabbed Owies in his back with an assegai, 
the point entered above the hip and came out of the navel. Klaas Bastard, without a gun, was 
forced to run back to the horses. Owies somehow managed to follow and the men retreated to the 
rest of the conunando. Owies lingered painfully all day on 26 February and, according to Van der 
Westhuysen, died a really Christian death on the morning of the 27th. He forgave his murderer, 
pitied his poor wife and children and acknowledged, that, though he had not been conunanded to 
do so, he had sought peace. "What must be must be. My time has come. "28 
The peace initiative did not cease with Owies· death however. Another messenger was sent, a 
Khoikhoi, who shouted out the proposals from a safe distance. The terms were, basically, that the 
stolen guns and livestock should be surrendered and that the Khoikhoi rebels should return to 
their usual abodes. Some of the rebels accepted these conditions and a trickle of stolen booty was 
handed over to the veldwagtmeesters. Others, including the Kamrnijs brothers, Knoega and "een 
vennaarde schelm Bosjeman Kaymap" fled, with their followers and stolen guns to the Orange 
to have been a baptized "Bastaard" since his surname is one which Heese ("Namakwaland", p.84) classifies as such. 
On 10 Dec. 1798 Van der Westhuyzen had written a letter in support of Owies whose fann "Lowies Fonteyn 
geliegen in de Klipfontyn", was too poorly provided with water and grazing for Owies to manage. TI1e request was 
for access to be given to "de Klipfontyn en Varse Fonlyn". CA, 1/STB 10/152, Van der Westhuyscn to Van der 
Riel, 10 Dec. 1798. It is possible that Gerrit Owics was the same man as 'the "bastert hottentot Gerrit Ovic" who, 
in 1772, warned his master of an uprising of slaves and Khoikhoi labourers in the Swartland. See CA, CJ 403, 
pp.147-302. 
27. CA, 1/STB 10/151, G. van Zijl to Landdrost, 20 March 1799; G. Smit to Landdrost, (undated, probably 20 
March 1799). Others in Namaqualand shared this low opinion of Van dcr Westhuiscn, sec CA,1/STB 10/152, P. 
van Nickcrk to Landdrost, 3 Sept. 1799 
28. CA, l/STI3 10/151, Yan dcr Wcsthuyscn to Landdrost, 7 March 1799. 
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River. It was not possible to pursue these fugitives because of the scarcity of grazing and water. 
The horses were, moreover, exhausted after the long ride to Namaqualand from the south through 
an enviromnent desiccated by the summer months. Those rebels who had agreed to keep the peace 
returned to their fanns. To the eyes of Van der Westhuysen they seemed to be trustworthy as they 
were Namaqua from the Kamiesberg where Captain Wildschut lived. The "schelme" on the other 
hand, were "een vermenge Natie met de bosjemans en andere oorlamse".29 
Van Zijl's account of the conunando was substantially the same as Van der Westhuysen's but in 
his investigation into the causes of the uprising he found Van der Westhuysen's brother, Willem, 
to bear equal responsibility with Craaij. When a Khoikhoi by the name of Links had heard from 
Craaij and his wife that the Namaqua were to be enslaved he went to Van der Westhuysen to seek 
clarification. The veldwagtmeester was not there but his brother informed him that even if he 
were to walk a path to Jan van der Westhuysen he would not get his rights. This confirn1ation of 
Craaij's story helped to provoke the uprising. Van Zijl also discovered that Esterhuysen had not 
been murdered by Barent Goejeman. What had happened was that he had been threatened with 
death and had fled. His livestock was stolen and shared out amongst the robbers who felt justified 
in their actions since Esterhuysen had stolen the stock from the Herero in the first place.30 
Further, evidence that the whites had not been blameless in causmg widespread discontent 
amongst the Namaqua came from the Great Namaqua. They complained to Van Zijl that they 
were being prevented from using the water in their own grazing land. Van Zijl suggested that they 
complain to the veldwagtmeesters but this idea they rejected with contempt since the 
veldwagtmeester did nothing to help. Van Zijl promised to return in the winter and divide the veld 
between the claimants. It is unlikely that this measure, even if implemented, would have pleased 
the Great Namaqua who naturally would have preferred exclusive rights to their own land and 
resources.31 The episode reveals how extensive trekboer penetration of Great Namaqualand must 
have been by 1799 and how inadequate a barrier the Orange River was between the colonists and 
the Khoikhoi. 
The rebellion in Namaqualand now seemed to be over and the situation of the white inhabitants 
more secure than before. Barrow visited the area in April 1799 and remarked that the Namaqua 
nation would probably be in a state of complete servitude within the space of a dozen years or so. 
29. Ibid. 
30. CA, I /STl3 I 0/l 5 I, G. van Zij I to Landdrost, 20 March 1799. 
31. Ibid. 
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The colonists of the Kamiesberg, however, did not seem to be as infamous as he had expected and 
had the appearance of being "a ham1less and honest set of people" .32 Barrow did not allude to the 
recent rebellion in the district but did note that it was no longer possible for the Namaqua to find 
any game to hunt in the vicinity and that fear of the San prevented them from venturing further 
afield. He also noted the destructive addiction of the Namaqua to brandy, stating that they were 
willing to exchange a sheep for a bottle of the "noxious liquor" .33 
Despite this picture of subservient dependence there were further outbreaks of violence in the area 
before the year's end. In August 1799 Landdrost Van der Riet was informed that another uprising 
of the Namaqua had occurred, "in so much that the Fieldcomet Van der Westhuizen has been 
obliged to march against them with a party of anned Burghers, who, after having killed some of 
them, to the number he states often, in a battle, have re-established peace".34 Unfortunately there 
are no further details concerning this incident so we do not know why there had been a renewal of 
violence. We do know, however, that in June a number of Namaqua had been attacked by groups 
of San who had stolen their cattle. The Nan1aqua had taken refuge with the outlying fanner 
Adriaan van Niekerk and were according to him, in dire need.35 
Certain colonists had also suffered greatly from the upheavals in Namaqualand. In the peace 
negotiations following the revolt it had been stipulated that some of the Namaqua should pay 
cattle compensation to those fanners who had been impoverished by theft. Jasper Cloete and the 
widow Van der Westhuysen were amongst those who were mentioned as being destitute by 1800 
but the guilty Khoikhoi had either fled or consumed any stolen cattle that they might have had, 
making it impossible to collect compensation.36 Jasper Cloete never recovered his fonner status 
and his downward mobility was to have abiding repercussions. 
In 1809 a govenunent expedition to the mouth of the Orange River passed through Namaqualand 
and noted that there was a very old and poor settler by the name of Jasper Cloete living at 
32. Barrow, Travels, Vol. I, p.388. 
33. Ibid., p.388, 392. 
34. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Landdrost to Fraser, l O Aug 1799. J.G. Louw of the Bokkeveld had been instructed to 
present in Namaqualand in August with a commando in order to march against "the murderer Africaaner". Perhaps 
this commando was used against the Namaqua instead. CA, 1/STB I0/152, JG. Louw to J.C. Van der Westhuysen, 
13 July 1799. 
35. CA, l/STI3 10/152, P. van Nickcrk to Landdrost, 3 Sept. 1799. 
36. CA, I/STU 10/150, J.C. van dcr Wcsthuyscn to Landdrost, 28 Feb. 1800. Sec also undated, unsigned letter in 
same volume (but from J.C. van dcr Wcsthuyscn - late 1800). Other colonists who ha<l lost a great deal were 
Willcm l3chrcns, the widow Aggcnbach and Adriaan van Nicuwkerk. 
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Komaggas.37 Cloete, the expedition journalist observed, had once been extremely well off but had 
lost all he had due to " de voonnalige roovery der hottentots". He now dwelt in a mat hut, without 
any help from Christians, in the company of "Bastaards" .38 Cloete, in fact, had sired many 
children with a "Bastaart hottentoten" and asked the landdrost of Tulbagh (who was part of the 
expedition) whether he and his "Bastaard" family could have pennission to graze their livestock 
to the westwards, as far as was necessary, and within the limits of the Koussies River.39 This 
pennission was granted and Cloete's family thus became the founders of the present day 
community of Komaggas. 
It is interesting to contrast this account of the fonnation of the Komaggas community with the 
traditions which the people of Komaggas came to believe in the twentieth century. The folk 
memory of the event, though different from the account recorded above, nonetheless points to a 
reality which the "Bastaard" descendants of Jasper Cloete came to experience at about the san1e 
time as Cloete's irreversible descent into non-white society: an irreversible decline in status. G. 
Meyer, a missionary who worked amongst the Steinkopf community at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, recorded a tradition that the original Khoikhoi chief of the Komaggas district 
had been a certain Captain Kurib (meaning "one who hides himself'). The founding father of the 
present Komaggas community, however, was Jasper Cloete who, according to Meyer's 
inforn1ants, was the son of a white fanner of the Kamiesberg and a Namaqua woman. This Jasper 
Cloete was probably a son of the Jasper Cloete of the historical record. Tradition has it that 
Jasper junior had three white half-brothers who despised him on account of his mixed descent and 
banished him from the Kamiesberg sometime in the 1790s. Jasper junior, who was married to a 
follower of Captain Kurib, had seven sons. He obtained pennission from Kurib to settle at 
Komaggas and began to attract a number of Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" followers. In time he would 
become remembered as "ryk" (or "rich") Jasper Cloete.40 
37. The district of Komaggas derives its name from the Komaggas River, a tributary of the Buffels River. In the 
Nama language the most likely meaning of "Komaggas" is "a place of many wild olive trees". Nienaber and Raper, 
Toponymica Hottentolica, A**, pp.748-749. 
38. CA, Miscellaneous Documents (henceforth M) 76, Aanteekening der reise gehouden door de Caroo naar 't 
Klein Namakwaland, 7 Sept. 180?. This document is unsigned and undated but internal evidence suggests that it is 
a journal kept by someone in the party of the Lcmddrosl of Tulbagh between IO August 1809 and 30 September 
1809. See chapter fourteen, p.473 below for more details. 
39. Ibid. By 1809 the Koussies, or I3u1Tcls River was the northern boundary of the colony. 
40. Meyer's account is quoted in E. Slrassberger, 71,e Rhenish Afissio11 Society in South Aji-ica: 1830-1950 (Cape 
Town, 1969), p.64. 
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Whatever else this story illustrates (and the reversals, additions and omissions of this account are 
most telling when compared to the account of the landdrost of Tulbagh) it suggests that after the 
1790s "Bastaards" and Oorlams lost their birthright and were forced, by whites, from the better 
watered Kamiesberg region into the more marginal trekveld between Komaggas and the sea. The 
fact that such land was already occupied by Khoikhoi, such as Captain Kusib, made it necessary 
(at least in popular memory) for the new intruders to legitimate their appropriation of the land by 
gaining the permission of the indigenous owners - hence the reference, in Meyer's account, to 
Jasper Cloete junior marrying into the clan of Kusib. The importance of legitimisation of land 
claims is also apparent in the archival account where white Jasper Cloete senior obviously 
realised that he would have to gain colonial approval for his family's occupancy of Komaggas if 
they were to survive. After Cloete's death his "Bastaard" descendants would have to battle long 
and hard to protect their claims to Komaggas in an environment where "Bastaard" rights to land 
were not readily acknowledged.41 It is not, perhaps, surprising that in the process they would 
come to forget that they had once had a white forefather whose status had been little better than 
their own and who had been reduced to the direst poverty by the rebellion of 1798-1799 .42 
The events of the rebellion had been a clear indication of the extent to which Khoikhoi, San and 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" were capable of making a conunon cause against the Dutch colonists. It is 
tempting to look for connections between the rebellion in Namaqualand and the Khoikhoi 
rebellion which broke out in the eastern Cape at roughly the same time. Although inforn1ation and 
rumours doubtless passed from one area to another it would seem as though the two events were 
not otherwise connected. The Khoikhoi rebellion of the eastern Cape began in February-April 
1799, some four months after the begi1ming of the uprising in Nan1aqualand. Whilst the 
Namaqualand revolt was quite clearly provoked because of fears of enslavement and the 
tactlessness of Craaij, the eastern Cape rebellion began as a response to the despatch of British 
and Khoikhoi troops to Graaff-Reinet. The troops had been sent in order to quell a Boer rebellion 
but the Khoikhoi of the eastern Cape saw this as an opportunity to rise against their hated 
masters.43 There does not, therefore, appear to be a much in common between the two rebellions 
- apart from the fact that they occurred in a general context of Khoikhoi misery and in a climate 
of expectation that the advent of British govenunent signified some sort of change, for better or 
for worse. 
41. Sec N.G. Penn, "Land Rights of the People or Konunaggas: An Historical Survey", (unpublished report for 
ESKOM, June 1993), pp.1-8. 
42. For further details sec Penn, "Land Rights or the People or Konunagas". 




The second and much smaller Namaqualand rebellion, of August 1799, should be seen in the 
context of the aftennath of the first rebellion. Part of this context was that San attacks, against 
both Khoikhoi and colonial farmers (and which had been a feature of Little Namaqualand for 
some time) began to intensify as the Namaqua trespassed into their territory. The disruption of 
the rebellion had caused a considerable displacement of rebels into San territory and the San 
responded by attacking Khoikhoi livestock. Veldcornet Van der Westhuysen only responded to 
Van Niekerk's request for a commando in July 1799 - a month after the San attacks which he had 
reported took place44 - so it is not difficult to appreciate that many of the Little Namaqua would 
have been dangerously discontent around this time. Perhaps, therefore, it was a combination of 
San raiding, Khoikhoi hardship and indiscriminate conunando activity which led to the uprising 
reported in August 1799.45 
MASTERS OF THE MIDDLE ORANGE: THE AFRIKANERS, 1797-1802 
With the situation in Namaqualand seemingly under control the focus of attention shifted once 
more to the Afrikaner gang. The prospects of a successful Oorlan1 rebellion within the colony 
seemed slight, but would it be possible for anti-colonial Oorlams to live the life of their choice 
outside of the colony? The fate of the Afrikaners was no doubt of considerable interest to both 
colonists and colonial drosters, for if the Afrikaner gang managed to secure its independence 
there would be many anxious either to join them or to follow their example. In order to achieve a 
significant following, however, they had to establish their anti-colonial credentials and make the 
transition from banditry to social banditry. Though the Afrikaners certainly succeeded in 
demonstrating their hostility to colonial authority they never quite became a movement of social 
banditry. Instead of supporting, and enjoying the support of, the oppressed societies of the 
frontier zone in their struggle against colonial oppression, they became bandits pure and simple, 
terrorising and antagonising would-be supporters by their indiscriminate attacks on all and 
sundry. Eventually, it was wiser and kinder groups (like the Koks and Barends) who attracted 
large followings and the Afrikaners were forced to retreat to the barren wastes of southern 
Namibia, weaker and worse off than they had ever been. 
For the time being, however, they were undisputed masters of the Middle Orange and their power 
ascendant. On 11 May 1799 they had begun a series of raids on farms in the Hantam with the 
44. CA, 1/STB I0/152, Van Nickcrk to Lan<l<lrost, 3 Sept. 1799. 
45. San attacks on Dutch an<l Klwikhoi in Namaqualan<l conlinuc<l. Sec CA, I /STB 10/150, J.C. van <lcr 
Wcsthuyscn to Lan<l<lrost, 17 Nov. 1799. 
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intention of obtaining guns, powder, shot, livestock and provisions. Their first victims were 
Jacobus Engelbrecht and his servant, the "Bastaard" Jan Tieltias. They were murdered and their 
muskets and two wagons, twelve hundred sheep and three hundred cattle were stolen. On 14 May 
the Afrikaners killed a Khoikhoi servant of Gert du Toit, stealing several wagons and the 
livestock of the widow of Pieter Theron. These numbered 2500 sheep and goats, 146 cattle and 3 
horses. The fan1ily of Johannes Botha was also attacked and robbed whilst they were travelling 
on wagons with all their stock and possessions. They lost everything except their lives and the 
clothes they had on. According to eye witnesses the Afrikaner gang was 100 strong, and included 
some San. The commando that Johannes van Wyk mounted to pursue the robbers on 17 May 
failed to catch up with them due to the fatigue of the horses and the great unwillingness of the 
conunando members. The Afrikaners returned to the Orange River with a rich booty (2 wagons, 
3 700 sheep and goats, 46 cattle, 8 horses, 13 guns) and all that Van Wyk could do was appeal 
for reinforcements from all of the veldwagtmeesters of the western Cape as well as for large 
quantities of powder and shot.46 
Landdrost Van der Riet - who described Afrikaner as the "alom bekende Schurk en 
moordenaar. .. die beryds lange over zyne verschyde bedreevene misdaade die dood verdiend 
heefe"47- began to make plans for a commando against the Afrikaner gang and Governor Dundas 
recommended putting a price on Afrikaner's head. He added, no doubt with the events of 1793 in 
mind, that he hoped "the facts are properly ascertained; and that these complaints from that 
distant country do not originate with any view of conunitting predatory hostility against the 
Hottentots or Bosclunen".48 A huge commando of 137 men attempted to reckon with the 
Afrikaners in August and September 1799, but could not cross Buslunanland, owing to the 
drought. It contented itself with attacking various San kraals and then disbanded.49 
It cannot be stated with any certainty whether the Afrikaners' attacks on the Hantam had had a 
direct influence on events in Namaqualand but certain evidence that the uprisings of colonial 
46. CA, 1/STB 10/151, J. van Wijk to Land<lrost, 4 June 1799; CA, 1/STB 10/150, J. J. Bota to Landdrost, 26 
Feb. 1800; CA, LM 48, (Vol. BO 22 ), No. 68, 16 June 1799, No. 69, 21 June 1799, No. 70, 11 May 1799, No. 71, 
no <late; G.M. Thea!, Reconls of the Cape Colony Vol. 2, 1796-1799, pp.423-438. 
47. "The widely known scoundrel an<l murderer ... who has long <leserve<l <leath for the various crimes he has 
conunitte<l". CA, 1/STB 20/30, Land<lrost to Dundas, 21 June 1799. 
48. CA, BO 153, Letter Book, Dundas to Van <ler Riel, 22 June 1799; CA, 1/STB 20/30, Lan<ldrost to Dundas, 
21 June 1799. 
49. CA, l/STl3 I 0/152, L.J. Erasmus an<l others to Lan<l<lrost, 28 July, 1799; List of men on conunando against 
Afrikaner, 2 Aug. 1799; Conunan<lo Journal of G.A. Van Wijk; Commando Journal of J.G. Louw; E. Wolfaart 
to Lan<l<lrost, I Sept. l 799; A. Mouton to Lan<l<lrosl I Sept. 1799; A Commando Journal from Pikctbcrg. 
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Khoikhoi were inspired by Afrikaner's example was provided by Veldcornet J.G. Louw of the 
Onder Bokkeveld. Louw informed Van der Riet in July 1799 that he had discovered a conspiracy 
an1ongst the local Khoikhoi to murder all the whites in the Bokkeveld, steal the horses and 
muskets, and depart with all of the Khoikhoi to join Afrikaner. Louw had been informed of the 
plot by his slave (since all the slaves had been invited to join in) "whereupon the said vagabonds 
had endeavoured to save themselves by flight", but Louw "pursued and properly killed all of them 
as they refused to surrender and defended themselves to the last extremity" .50 
There was indeed a real danger that the longer Afrikaner remained unchecked, the stronger his 
band would become as various malcontents, attracted by his success, made their way to him. This 
does not mean that all of the disparate groups who felt at home along or about the Orange River 
welcomed the Afrikaners as saviours. On the contrary, a number of groups perceived the 
Afrikaners to be either dangerous predators or dangerous rivals and a proportion of the 
Afrikaners' time was therefore occupied in dealing with them. 
One such group was that which adhered to the Xhosa leader Zonie or Danster.51 They had left 
the lands beyond the Fish River in the Eastern Cape around 1795 and, some time after this, 
crossed beyond the Sneeuberg to settle along the banks of the Orange River. By 1797 Dauster 
had entered the service of white colonists in the Roggeveld district, driven to this by a 
combination of the severity of natural conditions on the Orange River, and the continuous attacks 
from strong San clans in the area. It would be interesting to know whether Danster's arrival in the 
Roggeveld had anything to do with the arrival of "300 Hottentot Coraanes" looking for work in 
May 1797.52 The first recorded mention of Danster's name was in October 1797 when Gerrit 
Maritz of the Roggeveld complained that Floris Visser, the veldwagtmeester had shot "de Kaffers 
Capitijns", Danstcr, with grape-shot rather than allowing him to return to his "woon platsen". 
Dauster had been working for Visser in the winter but Visser was reluctant to release him from 
service. Maritz thought that such behaviour was guaranteed to bring down the vengeance of "der 
Kaffers want het is cen wrckcnde naasic" and two of Danster's followers, "Swarte Booij" and 
"April" had already sworn as much if Dauster dicd.53 
50. CA, 1/STB 10/152, J.G. Louw to Landdrost, 13 July 1799; W.A. Ne! and J.P. Carsten to Landdrost, 13 July 
1799; Thea!, Reconfs, Vol. 2, p.46. 
51. For Xhosa groups in the Orange River frontier zone sec P. Kallaway "Danstcr and lhc Xhosa or the Gariep: 
Towards a Political Economy oflhc Cape Frontier 1790-1820", African Studies, 41, I (1982), pp.143-60 and E. 
Anderson, A I-listmy of the Xhosas of the Northem Cape 1795-1879 (Cape Town, 1985). 
52. Sec p.399 below. 
53. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Maritz lo Landdrosl, 16 Ocl. 1797. 
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Visser claimed that he had been obliged to fire in order to defend himself from Danster and his 
followers, from whom he wished to take a gun. On orders from the Landdrost Visser released 
Danster who returned to the Orange River, "a part of the country which was become an asylum 
for all the rabble that were for any reason outcasts from the colony" .54 Here he fell in with 
Afrikaner.55 According to Lichtenstein who encountered Danster with "a numerous horde of 
Caffirs" at the Orange River in 1803: 
with this man, Danster by degrees entered into so strong a friendship, that a plan 
was in agitation to unite their two hordes; when suddenly, in the absence of most of 
the Caffers, the few who remained were slaughtered by Africaner's band, and the 
women and children were carried away. Danster, too weak to avenge himself sought 
at last to set the prisoners at liberty, in which he succeeded one dark night, when the 
robbers were asleep, after having celebrated a festival for some new victory, with 
dancing and brandy. He stole to the place, and got the women again into his power, 
but was betrayed too soon, before he was able to put Africaner, with his 
companions, to death as they slept; he was even obliged to leave the children in the 
power of this terrible Hottentot.56 
That the Afrikaners had murdered most of Danster's followers is confirmed by a reference in a 
letter from Floris Visser in September 1799.57 From the same letter we learn that Danster sought 
refuge for a time with "een troep Groote Riviers Basterds en Hottentotten op behoorende onder 
Cornelis Kok".58 By the time of his encounter with Lichtenstein, Danster was leader of a large 
group of Xhosa who had emigrated, at an earlier period, to the Orange River. This group, over a 
hundred strong, eked out an existence as hunters, stock raisers and raiders. Their life was 
punctuated by perpetual conflicts with the San and Korana and Danster's accounts of "the 
murderous deeds which he had conunitted" among these people, and the "many more which he 
projected" chilled Lichtenstein with horror.59 By 1799 Danster had, however, ceased to be a 
threat to the Afrikaners and they were at liberty to terrorise other habitues of the river. 
Amongst sm,h people were the followers of the Barend brothers, Klaas and Pict. There had 
obviously been a parting of the ways between the Barends and the Afrikaners since the days when 
they had both stayed with Petrus Pienaar. On one occasion the Barends had succoured a survivor 
54. CA, l/STI3 10/165, Visser to Lan<l<lrosl, 17 Nov. 1797. Quotation from Lichlenslein, Travels, Vol. II, p.283. 
55. CA, 1/STB I 0/152, J. Kmger lo Lan<l<lrost, 27 Aug. 1799: "<lat <le Capileyn Danser met syn kraal agter legt, 
en een gedeel<le van deese kraal is afgebrooken, en sijn naar de Moordenaarkraal gegaan ( <lit is de Kraal die 
Pienaar vennoor<l heefi ). 
56. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. ll p.284. 
57. CA, I/STJ3 10/151, Visser to Lan<l<lrosl, 28 Sept. 1799. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Lichlenstein, Travels, Vol. ll p.285. 
377 
Chapter Ten 
of one of Afrikaner's attacks and for some time the brothers had identified themselves rather more 
closely with the colonial order than the Afrikaners. In October 1799 Floris Visser of the 
Roggeveld was visited by Piet and Klaas who had ridden from the Orange River with a group of 
"Kraane [Korana] hottentotte en als ook eenige oor lamsche hottentotten en twee kaffers".60 They 
requested Visser to give them help against Afrikaner and his kraal since Afrikaner had already 
attacked them twice and stolen their livestock. Afrikaner had said to the Barends that he would 
continue to attack them until they joined with him for the purpose of extenninating the Christians. 
It was by similar threats that Afrikaner had managed to attract a large following to himself and 
unless he was resisted it would not be long before it was impossible to retain either "vee of volk". 
The Afrikaners had already killed some of the Barends' followers, as well as many of the blacks, 
and taken all of their livestock. The Barends' cautioned that any commando which might be sent 
to deal with the Afrikaners - and Visser earnestly requested immediate help - would have to 
employ artillery because they had surrounded their kraal with stones.61 The Barends also advised 
that if a conunando were despatched it should approach the Afrikaners using the route which the 
Barends had used. If it went the other way (presumably to the west) it would have to go past two 
San kraals, about three days journey from the Afrikaner kraal, which had joined Afrikaner; this 
would not be advisable. Afrikaner had also threatened to visit the Middle Roggeveld with a 
conunando towards the end of sununer.62 
Here was evidence that the Afrikaners were being actively assisted by San auxiliaries who shared 
a hatred for the colonists. This was a far cry from the days when the Afrikaners had killed 113 on 
one commando. We should note, without being unduly cynical, that since the San had no 
possessions there was little incentive for the Afrikaners to attack them. The govermnent was no 
longer about to reward the Afrikaners for slaughtering San and would not even replace the 
anununition which would be expended in the process. If their allegiance could be cheaply bought 
the San were far more valuable as friends than as foes. 
60. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Visser to Landdrost, 27 Oct. 1799. A. Smith, Dia,y, Vol. II, p.258-261, records a tradition 
that the Barends were approached by some colonists who offered them twenty guns, fitly pounds of powder and two 
hundred weight of lead if they would attack Afrikaner. I have not come across archival evidence to support this but 
Smith's descriptions of epic struggles between Titus Afrikaner and Klaas (or Nicolas) Barend make exciting 
reading. 
61. I would suggest that this fortified kraal could not be the one at Schaus Vlakte in the Karasburg district of 
Namibia - a theory favoured by K. Dierks, "//K.hanxa!nas-Schans Vlakte: Oldest Urban Settement in Namibia", /II 
F'ormatio11, 1987/1988, Vol. 1, pp.5-32. At this slage of their career the Afrikaners were operating along the 
middle Orange - as all the available evidence suggests - and the Barends were hardly likely to flee to a Roggeveld 
veldwaglmeester if they wanted a commando launched against a Karasburg kraal, nearly 600 kilometres from the 
Roggevcld as the crow 11ies. Nmnaqualand was half Lhis distance from Schaus Vlakle. 
62. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Visser lo Landdrosl, 27 Ocl. 1799. 
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The presence of a large group of San, known as the "Groot Kraal", was of some concern to 
Visser. They lived along the river to the north of the Roggeveld district. In September 1799 these 
San had attacked Cornelius Kok's following in an "unearthly" manner, killing some of them and 
stealing their possessions. The Koks had fled to the newly-established mission station of 
Blydvooruitsigt where they had fortunately encountered the object of their quest, namely Floris 
Visser. Surprisingly enough it was Dauster (who at that stage was a fugitive amongst the Koks), 
who had recommended that they approach Visser for help. Perhaps his earlier treatment at 
Visser's hands had convinced Danster that here was a fit man to deal with the Afrikaners; or 
perhaps it was simply the fact that Floris Visser was the nearest veldwagtmeester to the eastern 
section of the Middle Orange River. At any rate Visser, who had a strong interest in the 
Blydvooruitsight mission, was convinced that the "Groot Kraal" constituted a significant threat to 
the peaceful propagation of evangelical Christianity in the African interior.63 These fears were 
reinforced after the missionaries had received three warnings, between September and December 
1799, that the "Groot Kraal" was going to murder them. Even more disturbing was news from the 
Koks and from more friendly San that the "Groot Kraal" itself was in cahoots with Afrikaner.64 
Visser had tried to raise a conm1ando against the Afrikaners in December but had been defeated 
in his intentions by the opposition of Gerrit Maritz, veldcornet of the Middle Roggeveld. Maritz 
and his men expressed the strongest unwillingness to go on conunando in December, just when 
the harvest had to be reaped. They also pointed out that they were weak whilst Afrikaner was 
strong. Should they provoke him - who had never attacked their district - he would simply 
retaliate and ravage the district. Visser, in the meantime, received news from the Barend brothers 
that Afrikaner had received further reinforcements of guns and men. They also told him that 
Afrikaner was sending a Khoikhoi by the name of Cobus Booij to the Cape in order to buy 
powder and shot.65 
Cobus Booij had been one of Visagie's followers. He had, in fact, set out on his mission weeks 
before Visser received his infonnation and reached Namaqualand by 17 November 1799. He was, 
ostensibly, making his way to Stellenbosch to sue for peace for Afrikaner. His ungentle escort 
was Cornelius Kok, who was on his way to Stellenbosch with five wagons, eighty elephant tusks 
and fifty-three followers, both male and female. One of these was a member of the Barends' 
63. CA, l/STI3 10/151, Visser to Landdrost, 28 Sept. 1799; Visser to Landdrost, 4 Dec. 1799; see chapter 11 
above and Penn, "The /Xam and the Colony". 
64. CJ\, 1/STB I 0/151, Visser to Landdrost, 4 Dec. 1799. 
65. CJ\, I/STU I 0/151, Maritz to Landdrost, 26 Nov. 1799; Visser to Landdrost, 4 Dec. 1799. 
379 
Chapter Ten 
conununity, Cupido Joseph, who was desirous of seeking pardon (for some unspecified crime) 
from the landdrost. The landdrost of Stellenbosch was satisfied that Booij had not lived in the 
kraal of Afrikaner but that he had been ordered to take a message to Cape Town when Afrikaner 
had heard that he was making a journey there. 66 
Governor Younge was, not surprisingly, most suspicious of Afrikaner's motives for peace. He 
was, in fact, advised by the landdrost of Stellenbosch not to pardon Afrikaner but attempt to 
capture him by cunning. Kok, too, secretly offered to help capture him, dead or alive, provided he 
was given some gunpowder, and the landdrost was prepared to countenance this request "as the 
said Kok is a well disposed Hottentot".67 
Kobus Booij was sent northwards in January with orders to instruct Afrikaner that he would be 
given safe conduct if he came to the Cape to face the charges against him. This offer was 
conditional on responding within six months of the receipt of the inforn1ation. The bait which was 
dangled before him was, however, scarcely tempting, for it amounted to no more than a promise 
that his request for pardon would be considered as favourably as possible.68 Booij delivered the 
message to Afrikaner and it is likely that he returned to the Cape in November 1800 with a 
favourable response, for on the 12th of that month the offer of safe conduct was reiterated. In 
addition, Cobus Booij, in recognition, perhaps, of his services as a go-between, was given 
pennission to occupy a place called "Klipfontein" in the Namaqua's country.69 
In the meantime, Floris Visser had reported to Landdrost Van der Riet that he had received news 
from some of the "Groot Riviers bastaarde" that Afrikaner was still lying low. Despite this 
reassuring lack of incident, the "Bastaards" felt constrained to ask Visser that "geen oorlam se 
hottentot na de groot rivier mogt gaan wand dat de sulks daar geen goed doet". They also 
reminded the authorities that they had not yet recovered the stock which Afrikaner had stolen 
from them, and that this fact should be borne in mind if Afrikaner was ever involved in peace 
negotiations.70 It is of some interest to note that the respectable "Groot Riviers bastaarde" made a 
clear distinction between themselves and the "oorlam se hottentot", a reminder that we should not 
66. CA, 1/STB 10/150, J.C. van der Westhuyzen to Landdrost, 17 Nov. 1799, CA, BO 55, No. 119, Van der Riet 
lo Barnard, 28 Dec. 1799; CA 1/STB I 0/150, Maree lo Landdrosl, 24 Dec. I 799. 
67. CA, BO 55, No.119, Van der Riet to Barnard, 28 Dec. 1799; Thea), Records Vol. 5, p.66. 
68. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Landdrost to[?], 14 Jan. 1800, two letters; Barnard lo Landdrost, undated. 
69. CA, BO 162, 12 Nov. 1800. 
70. CJ\, 1/STB 10/150, Visser lo Landdrosl, 11 March 1800. 
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use the tenn Oorlam indiscriminately and that "Bastaards" considered themselves to be superior 
to Oorlams. 
Prospects of a truce diminished even further when, after the theft of stock in the Onder Bokkeveld 
in April 1800, the spoor of horses and wagons was discovered. Since Veldwagtmeester J.G. 
Louw was confident that no San had horses he was convinced that the Afrikaner gang was 
abroad. Khoikhoi informants claimed to have seen Afrikaner at the Vis River whilst the insecurity 
of the district was greatly increased by the absence of Cornelius Kok. Louw attempted to follow 
the Afrikaners to the Orange River but since he could muster only eight men, due to the 
unwillingness of others to serve, he felt it pointless to go beyond the Hartebeest River. Louw 
explained to the landdrost that it would have been impossible to rely on Khoikhoi commando 
members if the commando had in fact reached the Orange River and that to proceed would have 
been to court disaster.71 
It is doubtful whether Afrikaner ever felt seriously tempted to throw himself on the mercy of the 
colonial governor and it is far more likely that he was using Booij (with his guarantee of safe 
conduct) as his agent within the colony. One of the most vital functions that such an agent could 
fulfil was, as the government had suspected from the first, the procurement of gun powder and 
Booij was, in fact, caught red-handed trying to smuggle some out of the colony in April 1802. 
Veldcornet Gideon Roussouw, acting on the orders of the landdrost of Stellenbosch (who had, in 
tum, been tipped off about Booij's real mission) detained Booij, together with his seven children 
and some followers, behind the Piketberg. On Booij's ox-drawn cart was a bag of rice, and, 
hidden within it, a smaller bag containing four pounds of gunpowder, destined, no doubt, for "the 
vagabond Africaander". Booij seems to have been able to convince Veldcornet Roussouw to 
release him though it is not clear whether the authorities believed him to be on a peace mission 
nearly a year after the deadline for negotiations had lapsed.72 
The Afrikaners had not, in the meantime, been inactive. Whilst the severe drought of 1800 
provided arid protection from commandos from the south it also obliged the Afrikaners to confine 
their raiding activities to the vicinity of the Orange River. There could be no quick forays across 
Buslunanland in order to seize colonial cattle if there was no water along the way. The official 
expedition which the Cape government sent to the Tlhaping in 1800-180 l, in order to attempt to 
71. CA, 1/STB 10/150, J. G. Louw to Landdrost, 26 April 1800; J. van Wijk to Landdrost, 5 May 1800; J.G. 
Louw to Landdrost, 3 l May l 800. 
72. CJ\, 130 60, Van dcr Riel to Dundas, 13 May 1802; CJ\, BO 162, 28 April 1802. 
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barter cattle from the Tswana, did not only encounter considerable difficulties in finding water for 
its purposes, it also encountered so much evidence of recent atrocities, conunitted by Afrikaners 
along the river, that it decided, as part of its broader mission, "that everything should be done that 
was possible for the good of the colony", to attack the bandits.73 
According to William Somerville, who, along with Truter, was one of the leaders of the 
government expedition, the Afrikaners had, by late 1800, become masters of the Middle Orange, 
keeping "the whole extent of the Garipe for 500 miles in terror". They had swept large numbers 
of "Bastaards", Einiqua and Korana as far east as present day Prieska whilst to the west the 
Great Namaqua continued to suffer periodic raids. "A Corporal of Kocks Kraal ... informed us 
that the head of the bandit formerly mentioned, Africaander, had just come home from a 
plundering expedition having robbed some Hordes ofNamaquas."74 
On its return from the Tswana in February the Truter-Somerville expedition found a number of 
Afrikaner's surviving victims willing to join in a concerted attack on the robber band. These 
included Danster's remaining followers, who had been encountered at the ford called Kheis, as 
well as diverse groups of Korana and Namaqua who had suffered at his hands. Also "A party of 
bastards from Reed fountain all of whom had been plundered by Africaner and some of their 
relations murdered, joined us ... with joy and gratitude offered any assistance in catching him". 
According to Somerville: 
No Kora who had anything has escaped. The numerous tribes of the Namaqua are 
reduced to misery and those who saved their lives have fled far beyond these limits 
for safety. The murders conunitted by him are many - he cut his first wife's throat -
trampled the second to death - shot his master and his family. His gang of Sons and 
adherents have cut off the noses of the Namaqua Women - and suffered them to 
bleed to death - fastened infants upon ant hills to be devoured alive by these 
insects.75 
Further willing recruits were found amongst the followers of Cornelius Kok who, at this stage, 
were living on the south side of the river some eight to ten days downstream from Aakop or 
Rietfontcin. 
The Koks were under the temporary conunand of Cornelius's son, Adam Kok II, because 
Cornelius was away on business. Although the Koks had not themselves been attacked by the 
73. E. an<l F. Bra<llow, ( c<ls. ), William Somen,ille's narrative of his journeys to the East em Cape Frontier and lo 
Lallakoe 1799-1802, (Cape Town, 1979) p.170. 
74. E. an<l F. Bra<llow, Somerville, pp.97, 176. 
75. lbi<l., pp.176-178. 
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Afrikaners they were anxious to put an end to the miserable state of apprehension they were 
under of being murdered or robbed by their neighbour at his earliest convenience. They had, 
indeed, a lot to lose for it is estimated that their flock of sheep numbered 25 000 at this time. 
Cornelius Kok had, to an extent thus far, benefited from the excesses of the Afrikaners. He had 
been able to employ poverty-stricken refugees as shepherds, giving them half the natural increase 
of those of his flocks which they were tending, thereby winning their affection and insuring 
himself "against any theft from them who otherwise might have been forced, through poverty, to 
steal his sheep" ,76 
It may thus be seen that the Afrikaners' policy of indiscriminate attack and unselective robbery 
had succeeded in uniting a powerful and diverse alliance against them. When information was 
received that the Afrikaners were camped a mere two days journey downstream from the Koks' 
kraal a large party of over forty men set out to surprise them. During the night of I February an 
attack was launched on the robbers. It would seem that the major objective of the participants 
was not so much to endanger their lives or those of the Afrikaners, but to recapture some cattle. 
Thirty or forty cattle were, in fact, retrieved (some of which had previously belonged to members 
of the attacking force). The next day, inspired with new zeal, the colonial party continued its 
pursuit of the Afrikaners. They were rewarded by capturing over 300 head of cattle and a few 
sheep. The Afrikaners, however, had been able to take refuge on an island in the middle of the 
river in the vicinity of the Augrabies falls. Here, thanks to a rising water level, they become 
inaccessible to their pursuers but the hotness of the chase may be gauged by the fact that, in 
addition to losing so much cattle, they had also lost two muskets.77 It was the worst set back the 
Afrikaners had suffered since their clash with the Visagies in 1793. Their defeat was also a sign 
that the balance of power along the Orange River was gradually shifting. 
Part of the reason for this ignominious retreat, as we have already mentioned, was that the 
Afrikaners had failed to win any local supporters. Instead of a system of defensive alliances with 
other powerful neighbouring groups the Afrikaners had chosen to antagonise everyone. Their 
defeat may also be attributed to the fact that the Afrikaners had been reduced to firing copper 
bullets (having run out of lead) with feeble charges (having run short of gunpowder). This was an 
indication that raiding and robbery had not been an adequate solution to the problem of keeping 
76. lbi<l., p.216, I 77. 
77. lbi<l., p.216; Thea!, Hecurds, Vol. 4 p.408. 
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the gang supplied with the most crucial of all colonial conunodities - anununition.78 The Koks 
and the Barends, on the other hand, seemed to have been well-supplied with guns and ammunition 
and the Afrikaners must have asked themselves, as bullets whistled about them, how they had 
achieved this happy state of affairs. It is evident that Jager Afrikaner had some idea that the good 
fortune of the Koks and Barends arose from their acceptance of Christianity and their association 
with missionaries for at the height of the battle he had called out, with terrible curses and threats: 
"I know very well that the Koks and Bastards plot together, and were great sinners in attacking 
him, as he was instructed and had repented, and that they would be sure they would not pass 
another quiet night with their families". 79 
The interesting point about the above outburst is not so much its contradictory mixture of piety 
and revenge but the fact that it indicates that not even the Afrikaners had remained inunune to the 
evangelical influences which were beginning to penetrate the frontier zone. The presence of 
missionaries had begun to make itself felt even along the Orange River and those societies which 
had accepted their message, like the Koks and Barends, seemed (to a si1mer like Afrikaner), to 
have derived inm1easurable benefits, both spiritual and material, from their submission. It is time 
to consider the missionary influence on the northern Cape frontier zone more carefully. 
78. There was, according to Veldcomet Van der Westhnysen of Namaqualand, a substantial trade in fireanns 
taking place, illegally, in his district. In August 180 I he specifically complained about a man called David Kooker 
who was selling tireanns to the Namaqua. There were, however, other nameless traders whom he mentioned as 
bringing wagon loads of tireanns into Namaqualand, as well as many Namaqua who returned from the south with 
their own guns and anununition. CA, l/STI3 I 0/153, Van dcr Wcsthuyscn to Landdrost, 27 Aug. 1801. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Peace Proposals and Pacification, 1790-1799 
THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH POLICY TOW ARDS THE SAN 
In September 1795 the Cape authorities surrendered to a British arn1y of occupation. This change 
of government was to have inevitable repercussions on the colony's frontiers, however distant or 
unamenable to administrative interference the societies of these regions may have been. Despite 
Britain's reluctance to become involved in embroilments within the Cape interior there were 
certain developments which could not be ignored by a sovereign power. The new government 
soon exerted an influence on the Cape's frontier zones which far surpassed the feeble 
interventions of the senescent VOC. Indeed, the British invasion relieved the Company officials 
from having to cope with a situation which was becoming, if it was not already, quite 
unmanageable. I The British arrival coincided with burgher rebellions in Swellendam and Graaff-
Reinet, rebellions which were, inter alia, caused by the colonists' dissatisfaction with the 
Company's inability to engineer conclusive defeats of the San and the Xhosa. Though the British 
commander, General Craig, was able to bring the rebels to obedience by the simple expedient of 
stopping their supply of ammunition, the causes of frontier insecurity remained. Because of the 
economic importance of the administrative district of Graaff-Reinet to the rest of the colony - it 
was the principal supplier of meat - the British were obliged to expend more and more energy in 
an attempt to bring peace and stability to the eastern frontier. Before the time came for their 
temporary departure in 1803 they had had to exert a considerable amount of arn1ed force, to 
check the ascendancy of the frontier Xhosa, crush a Khoikhoi uprising and, once more, quell a 
burgher rebellion.2 
The dramatic events on the colony's eastern frontier during the period of the first British 
occupation have served (just as they did then) to divert attention from the less dramatic and, 
economically, Jess important northern frontier. The complex relationships between Xhosa, 
Khoikhoi and colonists (which exploded in the tumultuous events of the 1799 frontier war) have 
also served to diminish the significance of the pere1mial struggle between the colonists and the 
I. See M. Boucher and N. Pe1m, (eds.), Britain at the Cape, 1795 to 1803, (Johannesburg, 1992), pp.125-133 for 
details of the crisis facing the voe. 
2. For the British policy on the Eastern Frontier during the period of the First British Occupation see H. Giliomee, 
Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind, (Cape Town, 1975) and his chapler, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812" 
in R. El phi ck and H. Giliomee, (eds), The Shaping of South Aji-ica11 Society, 1652-1840, (Cape Town, 1989). 
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San.3 A partial exception to this is to be found in the importance which both contemporary 
authorities and present historians have attached to that region of the eastern frontier where intense 
San resistance was encountered; the north-eastern districts of the Sneeuberg, Tarka and 
Bamboesberg.4 By 1795 the constant hostilities in these parts were affecting the security of the 
entire eastern frontier since the colonists of the Sneeuberg were never able to come to the 
assistance of their hard pressed brethren to the south. In fact, so critical had the struggle become 
by 1798, that large numbers of colonists were abandoning their farms in the north-east to join the 
growing numbers of those retreating before the Xhosa in the south.5 
The colony's entire eastern frontier was thus in a state of violent crisis and dangerous instability, 
a situation which had to be rectified if Britain wished to consolidate her power at the Cape. As far 
as the British rulers were concerned the colonists' relationships with the San were significant, 
primarily in so far as they concerned the security of the eastern frontier. Events on the northern 
frontier did not, in contrast, seem to necessitate direct govenunent intervention. It is for these 
reasons that the origins of British policy concerning the colonists and the San are to be sought on 
the eastern frontier. 
Nobody had a greater influence in shaping this policy than John Barrow, the private secretary of 
the governor, Earl Macartney.6 Barrow was specifically sent to the eastern borders of the colony 
in 1797 in an endeavour to ascertain the causes of unrest and to promote peace. An important aim 
of his mission was to attempt to establish contact with the San to the north-east of Graaff-Reinet 
"to bring about a conversation with some of the chiefs of this people; to try if, by presents and 
persuasion, they could be prevailed upon to quit their present wild and marauding way of life. "7 
Since the San, because of their egalitarian social structures, did not, as a rule, have "chiefs" (in 
the sense understood by their European contemporaries) this objective, although it was not 
3. On the Khoikhoi rebellion and the Third Frontier War of 1799-1803 see S. Newton-King and V.C. Malherbe, 
The Khoiklwi Rebellio11 /11 The Eastem Cape . 
4. P.J. van der Merwe's Noordwaartse Beweging, never underestimates the San of the north-eastern frontier. See 
also S. Newton-King, "Khoisan Resistance to Colonial Expansion 1700-1828", in T. Cameron and S.B. Spies, 
(eds.), An Illustrated History of South Africa, (Johmmesburg, 1986) mid R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, (eds.), The 
Shapi11g of South Africa11 Society. S. Newton-King's doctoral thesis, "The Enemy Within" is also much concerned 
with the San of this region. 
5. Van der Merwe, Noordwaartse Beweging, pp.10-24; Giliomee, Britse Bewi11d, pp.23, 264-6; J.S. Marais, 
May11ier, pp.61, 67. 
6. J. Barrow, Travels; C. Lloyd, Mr Barrow of the Admiralty: A Life of Sir Jo/111 Barrow 1764-1848 (London, 
1970). See also Boucher and Pe1m, Britain at the Cape, pp.91-170 for an assessment of Barrow's contribution to 
the first British occupation. 
7. Barrow, Travels, Vol. I, p.237. 
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unprecedented, was doomed to failure.& There was, however, a more fundamental impediment to 
the establishment of peace between the San and the colonists, namely, the uncompromising 
attitude of the latter. As early as January, 1797, General Craig had written to the Landdrost and 
Heemraden of Graaff-Reinet to suggest to them that it was impractical to attempt to exterminate 
the San and that they would be better advised to treat the San more kindly, in particular, by 
allowing captives to return to their fellows. The response to this was that it had been found that 
humanitarian treatment was wasted on the San. Captives who were well treated simply ran away 
and became an even greater menace to the colonists than before, especially if they had stolen 
firearms with them. This point was reiterated in June 1797 when Bresler, the newly appointed 
landdrost to Graaff-Reinet, advised Macartney that, in his opinion, the San were a nation of 
thieves who were unlikely to respond to overtures of peace and who could only be dealt with 
through the agency of commandos.9 
Notwithstanding Bresler's pess1m1sm Barrow accompanied him to Graaff-Reinet in order to 
initiate negotiations with the San of the neighbouring mountains. The pro-British Fiscal, W.S. 
van Ryneveld, had meanwhile persuaded Macartney that the San's territory was beyond the 
Seekoei River, and that if they could not be encouraged to remove themselves thither by peaceful 
means, they should be forced to do so.IO From Graaff-Reinet Barrow, along with some local 
fanners, toured the troubled regions of the Sneeuberg, the Tarka and Bruintjieshoogte. He also 
journeyed up the Seekoei River as far as the Orange but in all this country the only San who were 
encountered were a group who had to be stalked and surprised using typical commando tactics. I I 
Barrow's account of this episode is not only one of the most informative descriptions of a 
conunando in action but it is also one of the most moving passages in all of his Travels. The 
attack obviously made a great impression on him, an impression which he conveyed to 
Macartney, and which coloured British perceptions about Boer brutality towards the San for a 
8. See AB. Smith, "On Becoming a Herder", for a discussion of the social relations of hunting societies. TI1e 
example of Ve/dkorporaal Jacob de Clerq who, in 1776, succeeded in making temporary peace with the San of the 
Koup, is instmctive. He had requested that the govenuuent send him a staff of office so that he could give it to a 
'chier appointed by him: CA, C 655, Dag Register Van Stellenbosch en Drakenstein, 1771-1779, 5 March 1776. 
But the trouble with such arrangements was that it marked the recipient of the honour as a collaborator and invited 
the wrath of other, unpacified San. See chapter 6, p.226 above. 
9. Giliomee, Britse Bewi11d, p.264. 
10. Ibid., p.264. 
11. There are many similarities between Barrow's trip to the Sneeubcrg an<l the Seekoei River and the trip made by 
Gordon in 1779. Gonion too was in search of the San, with the intention of negotiating a peace with them, but he 
was even less successful than Barrow in establishing contact. Sec chapter 6, pp.242-3 above. 
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loi1g time thereafter.12 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that British policy towards the San, 
on both the eastern and northern frontiers, was shaped by Barrow's experiences on this occasion. 
Even though Barrow had insisted, beforehand, that every possible care should be taken to avoid 
banning the San, and that guns should only be used if they were absolutely necessary for self 
defence, blood was spilt: 
By the faint light I could only discover a few straw mats, bent each between two 
sticks, into a semi-circular form; but my ears were stunned with a horrid scream like 
the war whoop of savages; the shrieking of women and the cries of children 
proceeded from every side. I rode up with the commandant and another farmer, both 
of whom fired on the kraal. I inunediately expressed to the former my very great 
surprise that he, of all others, should have been the first to break a condition which 
he had solenmly promised to observe, and that I had expected from him a very 
different kind of conduct. "Good God!" he exclaimed, "have you not seen a shower 
of arrows falling among us?" I certainly had seen neither arrows nor people, but had 
heard enough to pierce the hardest heart; and I peremptorily insisted that neither he 
nor any of his party should fire another shot. In justification of their conduct they 
began to search on the ground for the arrows, a search in which they were 
encouraged to continue, in order to give the poor wretches a little time to scramble 
away an10ng the detached fragments of rocks and the shrubbery that stood on the 
side of the heights. On their promises I could place no sort of dependence, knowing 
that, like true sportsmen when game was sprung, they could not withhold their fire. 
Of this I was presently convinced by the report of a musquet on the opposite side of 
12. Mary Louise Pratt analyses Barrow's tendency towards "Othering" the San in her chapter "Scratches on the 
Face of the Country; or, What Mr. Barrow Saw in the Land of the Buslunen" in H.L. Gates, (ed.), "Race", Writing 
and Difference (Chicago, 1985). Although it is fairly easy to accuse Barrow of portraying the San as the "Other" 
the insights of Pratt's chapter are somewhat weakened by her failure to place Barrow in the context of other, earlier, 
discourses on the Khoisan or, for that matter, in the context of his official mission. See N. Pe1m, "Mapping the 
Cape: Jolm Barrow and the First British Occupation of the Colony, 1795-1803", Pretexts, Vol. 4, no.2, 1993, 
pp.20-43. Within this context Barrow's sympathy and originality become more evident. 1l1e most remarkable 
feature of Barrow's accmmt is not, perhaps, his portrayal of the San but his portrayal of the "Boor"; that is, the 
Dutch colonist. Barrow's influence in shaping British attitudes towards the Afrikaner have been conunented on by 
Michael Streak, Tl,e Afi'ikaner as Viewed by tl,e Eng/isl,, 1795-1854 (Cape Town, 1974 ), pp.1-22. 
Since Pratt does not draw attention to those aspects of Barrow's discourse which were most obviously mmoying to 
his near contemporaries it will not be out of place to rectify this omission by allowing one of Barrow's critics a 
voice. In 1809 Colonel Collins, who in 1808 had been employed by the British administration to undertake a 
mission very similar to Barrow's, conunente<l: "But I am much distressed to believe that the accounts given of them 
are exaggerated (i.e. acts of cruelty by colonists); as they have been principally received from a late traveller, who, 
from some unaccountable cause, seems to have exerted all his ingenuity to exhibit the Africa fanners in the most 
unfavourable point of view, and whose representations of their treatment of the aborigines, having been conveyed 
through the medium of eloquent declamation and specious philanthropy, seem to have been implicitly received and 
regarded as incontrovertible, although his statements respecting them arc extremely incorrect, as I have known from 
many particulars that have fallen under my observation". R. Collins, "Report on the Bosjesmen", in Moodie, Tl,e 
Record, Part V, p.34. 
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the hill; and, on riding round the point, I perceived a poor Bosjesman lying dead 
upon the ground. It appeared that as one of our party, who could speak their 
language, was endeavouring to prevail on the savages to come down from the 
heights, this Bosjesman had stolen close to him behind a rock, and was taking 
deliberate aim with his drawn bow, which another of the colonists perceiving, 
levelled his musquet and shot him dead. It had been hoped the affair would happily 
have been accomplished without the shedding of human blood, and that the views of 
the expedition would have met with no interruption from an accident of such a 
nature.13 
It was only with the greatest of difficulty that the terrified San could be induced to draw near. 
Barrow's impression of them, though by no means flattering, was that they were "mild and 
manageable in the highest degree". In his opinion they were far more sinned against than sinning, 
forced to retaliate as best they could against "the brutality and gross depravity of the boors" who 
habitually enslaved their women and children whilst ceaselessly trying to drive them from their 
land. Though Barrow acknowledged that the loose political structures of the San made it difficult 
to negotiate a far reaching peace he became convinced that the prime cause of the hostilities 
existing between them and the colonists was the conunando systcm.14 On his return to Cape 
Town he argued strongly that further conunandos against the San should be prohibited, since they 
were guaranteed to increase, rather than diminish, bitterness along the frontier. He also urged that 
the colonists should be prevented from making incursions into territory occupied by other groups 
since this was bound to lead to conflict.15 
lt was this latter point, in particular, which impressed Macartney, for he caimot have failed to 
observe that the northern boundaries of the colony were so vague as to be virtually non-existent. 
It was, doubtless, with the intention of being better infonned about the nature and extent of 
colonial settlement in the north-west that Barrow was despatched, in April 1798, to these 
regions.16 Even before his departure, however, the governor had received welcome intelligence 
from the landdrost of Stellenbosch that the veldwagtmeester of the Roggeveld, Floris Visser, 
believed it was possible to make peace with the San of his district. Why was such an initiative 
forthcoming from the Roggeveld but not from the Sneeuberg? In order to answer this question a 
brief survey will have to be made of the state of affairs concerning relations between colonists 
13. Barrow, Travels, Vol. 1, pp.272-273. 
14. Barrow, Travels, Vol. l, pp.273-293. Of the San's political strnctures Barrow remarked (p.274): "We had 
wished to speak with the captain or chief of the horde, but they assured us U1ere was no such person; Umt everyone 
was master of his own family, and acted entirely without control, being at liberty to remain with, or quit, the society 
as it best suited them." 
15. Barrow, Travels, Vol. I, p.290-292. 
16. Penn, "Mapping the Cape", pp.32. 
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and Khoisan in that much neglected area of the colony - the northern frontier zone - around the 
beginning of the 1790s. 
COLONISTS AND KHOISAN RESISTANCE IN THE ROGGEVELD AND 
NIEUWEVELD, 1790-1795 
As far as the colonists of the northern frontier zone were concerned the situation in their part of 
the world was as critical as that faced by the Sneeubergers in the 1790s. In September 17 and 
October 1790 there had been considerable stock theft in the Roggeveld, so much so that 
Veldwagtmeester Gcrrit Maritz wrote to the landdrost to complain that the San were in the 
process of gaining the upper hand, and that their constant "murder and robbery" was going to 
result in the abandomucnt of the Roggeveld. Groups of Khoikhoi had also been see roaming the 
district arn1ed with muskets and in numbers which were more than a match for a small 
conunando.18 In fact, during a commando which Maritz and forty other men had undertaken in 
August and September there had been a most disturbing incident. The commando had been 
scouring the countryside on the way to the Kareeberg and had successfully killed or captured a 
number of San. In the mountains themselves - a range whose "desert wilderness" and "frightful 
solitude" filled a later traveller with "silent melancholy and repugnance" 19 - was a height known 
as "de Bossimans berg" which was occupied by a kraal of San.20 The conunando attacked early 
in the morning but, by four in the afternoon, was forced to retreat as the defenders had muskets as 
well as bows and arrows. The longer the fight continued, the more reinforcements can1e from 
other kraals to defend the mountain. Herc was undeniable evidence that, thanks to an increasing 
ability to acquire fireanns21 (either through theft or from Khoikhoi drosters), the unconquered 
Khoisan of the Kareeberg were capable of beating off a conunando.22 
17. In September 1790 J.A. Ne! reported to the la11ddrost that 500 sheep and 69 oxen had been stolen from his 
district. Two shepherds and a slave were killed during the robberies. A conunando killed seventeen of the thieves 
and captured four children. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Nel - Landdrost, 25 Sept 1790. 
18. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz- Landdrost, 15 Oct. 1790. 
19. H. Lichtenstein, Travels /11 So11them Africa /11 the Years 1803, 1804, 1805 and 1806, 2 Vols. Van Riebeeck 
Society Reprint (Cape Town, 1930), Vol. 2, pp.260-261. 
20. A distinguishing feature of the Kareeberg (whose name means 'dry' or 'bare') is that the sununits of the range 
are flattened, "each having a level of some hours at the top". G.S. Nienaber and P.E. Raper, Toponymica 
Hotte11totica A** (Pretoria, 1977) p.651; Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 11, p.258. 
21. In December 1791 Maritz reported how a group of Khoikhoi servants had deserted their masters and attempted 
to join the San, taking stolen fireanns with them. A conunando gave chase and captured the drosters afier an 
exchange of fire in which one of the Khoikhoi was wounded. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz - Landdrost, 26 Dec. 1791 
22. On this occasion Marilz's commando killed fourteen and captured four people. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz -
Landdrost, 18 Sept. 1790. 
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At about the same time the districts of the Nieuweveld and Kaup were almost completely 
abandoned by the colonists. In the Koup, according to the 1809 report of Colonel Collins, about 
l 000 San entered the region in 1791 and inaugurated a most uncomfortable period for the 
trekboers which lasted until the end of the century.23 Though the number of San (in "two 
hordes") might have been exaggerated there is every likelihood that the group Collins was told 
about was the same one reported by Gerrit Maritz on 14 October 1791: "in de Koup onder de 
nuwevelts berg een groote craal bossimans moordenaars legt mit 18 snapaans".24 A commando of 
fifty-two men, which he led against them in December, was unable to find them as they had 
fled.25 By January 1792 this group seems to have returned to the Koup, basing itself beneath the 
Tafelberg, and necessitating the despatch of another commando, which attempted to recapture 
stolen sheep and avenge the murder of three shepherds. This commando was shocked to discover 
that the kraal of robbers had been reinforced by a number of Khoikhoi who used their muskets to 
such effect that the colonists were forced to fly for their lives. The Khoikhoi in question were 
known to have grown up with the colonists and they were skilled in handling fireanns. By the 
time Maritz raised another, more powerful, commando the kraal had disappeared but their lurking 
presence, along with conditions of severe drought, caused nearly all the trekboers to abandon the 
district.26 
The situation in the Hantam at this time has already been described27 and we may conclude that, 
during the early 1790s, the fam1ers of the northern frontier zone were as hard pressed as those in 
the Sneeuberg. Nor can it be said that the situation improved between 1792 and 1795. It was in 
1792 that the Council of Policy approved of the resolution passed by the Landdrost and 
Heemraden of Graaff-Reinet in 1791, namely, to offer a reward for captive Khoisan resistors. 
Ostensibly, this resolution was passed in order to keep sight of the fact that: "de creaturen teegens 
welke dezelve komen ingcrigt te warden, hoe woest en wreed ook egter behoorende onder de 
classe des menschdoms, men gcvolglijk dezelver levens zo veel mogelijk diend tc spaaren".28 The 
only person who seemed to take this proposal seriously was, as we have seen, Petrus Pienaar, and 
23. Collins' Report on the Bosjesmen in D. Moodie, The Record, Part V, p.34; Van der Merwe, Noordwaardste 
Bewegi11g, p.20. 
24. "In the Koup beneatl1 the Nieuwevekl Mountain lies a great kraal of buslunen murderers with 18 musketts", 
CA, 1/STB 10/162,Maritz-Landdrost, 140ct. 1791. 
25. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz- Landdrost, 22 Dec. 1791. 
26. CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz - Landdrost, IO Jan. 1792. 
27. Sec previous chapter. 
28. "The creatures against whom these measures have been passed, wild and savage though they are, belong to the 
class of humanity and one is therefore obliged to spare their lives as much as possible." Van der Mcrwe, 
Noordwaardste Bewegi11g, pp.45-6. 
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his interpretation of the instructions alarmed rather than reassured his superiors.29 For the most 
part, for time honoured reasons, Boer commandos continued to capture women and children 
whilst killing the men. 
In March and September 1792 Gerrit Maritz led two unsuccessful commandos in the Roggeveld. 
On returning from the first of these he suffered the agonising frustration of finding that four of his 
servants had been murdered and nearly all of his livestock killed or stolen. Two guns and all his 
trek oxen were also missing.30 
These events were, however, overshadowed by those which occurred in the vicinity of the Koup 
in June that year. At Leeu Rivier (the present day Leeu Garnka) two butchers of the Van Reenen 
brothers (in whose hands lay the Company's meat pagt) and nine of their assistants were attacked 
whilst they were busy driving a large quantity of livestock, purchased in the east, towards the 
Cape Town market. Their assailants numbered about 300 and were described as being San, many 
of whom were anned with muskets. Of the 12 000 sheep and 368 cattle, 6 000 and 253 were 
stolen respectively.31 It is probable that the thieves were the same group of well-armed Khoisan 
which had been terrorising the district for the past year. On this occasion their target was ill 
chosen and their success unfortunate because the government, prompted no doubt by the 
influential Van Reenens, took the most rigorous steps to crush the threat to the Company's meat 
supply. in July two exceptionally well-provisioned and powerful commandos were organised to 
clear the Nieuweveld of robbers. These operations seem to have been orchestrated from the 
drostdy of Graaff-Reinet and to have been commanded by proven leaders of that district, namely, 
N. Smit and Johannes van der Walt.32 
Smit's conunando was the first to strike and a1mihilatcd the kraal of one of the principal resistors, 
a certain Vlamink. An estimated 300 Khoisan were killed and 15 captured in an action which can 
only be described as a massacre. 860 sheep and 30 cattle were recovered. Vlamink's partner, a 
man by the name of Courage, had had the good fortune to argue with his friend four days before 
the conunando's attack. He had, therefore, timeously removed himself, his followers and his booty 
29. Sec chapter 9, pp.340-341 above. 
30. CA, 1/STB 10/163, 6 March 1792; CA, 1/STB 10/162, Maritz - Landdrost, [18?] Sept 1792. Gcrrit Olivier -
Lan<l<lrost, 20 Aug. 1792. 
31. G. Waggcnaar, "Johannes Gysbcrtus Van Rccncn - Sy Aandccl In Die Kaapsc Gcskrcdcnis tot 1806" (M.A. 
thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976 ), pp.106-107; Van <lcr Mcrwc, Noordwaardste Beweging, p.50. Van dcr 
Mcrwc says I I 000 sheep instead of 12 000. 
32. Van <lcr Mcrwc, Noordwaardste 1Jewegi11g, pp.49-50. 
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from the place of death. Unfortunately, his reprieve was only temporary. Though the horses of 
Smit's conunando were exhausted, those of Van der Walt's were fresh. Following instructions to 
proceed beyond the Koup to the Sak River he caught up with Courage's kraal and destroyed it. A 
further three kraals were discovered and wiped out: 23 l Khoisan were killed or captured whilst 
325 sheep and 15 cattle were recovered.33 
With between 500 and 600 of the Nieuweveld marauders slaughtered it might be assumed that 
this sector of the frontier was once again safe for Boer occupation but this was not, in fact, the 
case. The drought-stricken heights of the Nieuweveld and the parched plains of the Koup beneath 
did not permit the colonists to establish themselves there in anything like sufficient numbers, or 
for the necessary duration of time, to expel all the clusters of hostile Khoisan. For the moment, 
however, the authorities persuaded themselves that the best way to repopulate the region with 
stock farmers was to allow Johannes van der Walt to tum it into his own personal fieldom. In 
February 1793 he was authorised to settle in the Nieuweveld where, he proclain1ed, with the help 
of his family he anticipated destroying and uprooting the robbers completely. The two fanns 
which he requested for himself were granted, rent free, by the government. He was also given 
almost total power, as kommandant of the region, to order veldwagtmeesters, korporaals and 
burghers out on conuuando as he saw fit, the only proviso being that he should infom1 the distant 
landdrost of his plans.34 
This arrangement does not, however, seem to have been an unqualified success. The usual 
guerrilla warfare continued. In April 1793 the San stole over 300 sheep from Petrus Theron and 
killed his shepherd. In the same month a group of about forty men made off with nearly 300 of 
Jacobus Nel's sheep. Nel, a veldwagtmeester in the Roggeveld, was unable to launch a 
commando because of the prevailing horse sickness. He had further trouble with the San in May 
and July.35 Maritz, at Van der Walt's request, wrote to ask for a large quantity of ammunition in 
order to provision a commando for August. In fact, Van der Walt proposed the mobilisation of no 
fewer than four c01muandos at once, and his response seems to have caused the authorities to 
have second thoughts about his competency. Whether the govcnuuent found his proposals too 
33. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Van der Walt- Governor, 23 Nov. 1792. Resolutions of the Cow1cil of Policy, Resol. 12 
Feb. 1793, in Papers Relative, p.21; Van der Merwe, Noordwaardste Bewegi11g, pp.50-51. Van der Merwe says 
321 instead of 231 Khoisan. 
34. Van der Merwe, Noordwaardste Beweging, p.52. 
35. CA, 1/STB 10/167, Nel - Landdrost, 18 April 1793; CA, I/SIB 10/162, Nel - Landdrost, 12 Aug. 1793. In 
May the San attacked Nel's fann and shot at him. He wounded one and they retreated. In July, whilst out hunting 
in the Agler Roggevcld, Ncl stumbled across a group of nine San. He killed one and the others escaped but they 
had already broken into an empty fannhouse and wrecked it. 
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expensive or excessive cannot be stated, but the landdrost balked at the suggestion and withheld 
his sanction.36 A commando did take place in August and September but it was a smaller affair 
than envisaged (twenty-four Europeans, thirteen Khoikhoi and one "Bastaard") and under the 
direct command of Gerrit Maritz. 
This commando campaigned in the Kareeberg. On 12 September, at the Brak River, a San kraal 
was discovered and taken by surprise in a dawn attack. Twenty were killed and sixteen children 
captured. Twelve days later, behind the Kareeberg, another kraal was attacked. This time nine 
were killed and seven children captured. It was surely no coincidence that exactly one child was 
taken for each colonist. (There should have been twenty-four captives but one of them had died 
"naturally" on the way back). On the 2 October, preparatory to disbanding the commando, Maritz 
divided the children amongst the Europeans in an unusual ceremony at "Wilgebooms Vonbijn", 
one of the many abandoned fanns in the Nieuweveld. He obliged the men to sign an extraordinary 
statement in which they promised not to mishandle the children who were, so Maritz had them 
acknowledge, i1mocent of any of their parents' deeds. They also had to agree to appear before the 
govenm1ent, with the child, should the veldwagtmeester ever come to hear of any complaints 
concerning their treatment of their captives. Finally, they also had to witness that Maritz had led 
the commando in an irreproachable fashion. All signcd.37 
Maritz's precautionary measures suggest that there had been some official discomfort about the 
conduct of recent conunandos, and about the maltreatment of Khoisan servants. The resolutions 
of the Council of Policy for 23 October 1793 contain criticisms of the cruel treatment of 
Khoikhoi by the colonists and it was doubtless feared that San captives were also mistreated. 
Since 1776 San children who had been captured by conunandos were supposed to have been 
registered, like "Bastaard-Hottentots", with the local landdrost, and their owners were required to 
provide them with food, clothing and shelter. This practice had lapsed (if, indeed, it had ever been 
36. CA, 1/STB 10/163, 4th June 1793; CA, I/SIB 10/162, Maritz - Landdrost, 9 May 1793. Following Van der 
Walt's conunand Maritz also wrote to Veldwagtmeester Frans Lubbe of the Bie<louw asking him to muster all 
suitable men from his district, "Christians" as well as "Hottentots" and "Bastaards", at Van der Westhuizen's fann 
in the Roggeveld, by I August. CA, 1/STB 10/167, Maritz - Lubbe, 2 April 1793. Lubbe was also ordered to 
supply waggons, provisions and livestock for the trek into the Nieuwevcld. He was extremely reluctant to do so, 
pointing out that there were only five Christians in his district who had wagons and that they were all very poor 
men. During the course of the trek into regions where no roads existed a wagon was bound to be smashed up and 
would have to be lea lying in the veld. CA, 1/STB 10/167, Lubbe - Landdrost, 26 May 1793. 
37. CA, 1/STB 10/164, Journal of Commando by G. Maritz, 20 Aug. 1793; Maritz-Landdrost, 2 Oct. 1793. 
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seriously observed) and Maritz's gesture, whilst in no way inaugurating an era of reform, was a 
sop to the government's ineffectual qualms.38 
In the meantime prospects of peace looked as remote as ever within the frontier zone. Rumours of 
a general uprising of the Khoikhoi, which swept through the outlying districts in September, had 
a most unsettling effect.39 So too did the attempts of Veldwagtmeesters Willem Burger and 
Jacobus Ne! to arrest Afrikaners.40 In October Maritz reported that the country was in a state of 
uproar, with danger to be feared from both "wilde en make hottentots", and a number of his men 
out on commando.41 A year later there was still considerable agitation amongst the Khoikhoi of 
the Bokkeveld42 and this widespread state of fear contributed to an increasing number of 
incidents of brutality, on the part of the colonists of the northern frontier, towards their Khoikhoi 
servants.43 1794 was a particularly bad year as far as the maltreatment of labour was concerned 
with each act of cruel oppression increasing, rather than diminishing, Khoikhoi discontent.44 In 
the Roggeveld, San raiders continued to steal livestock and, despite their frequent practice of 
murdering shepherds in order to acquire their fireanns, were increasingly attracting deserting 
Khoikhoi labourers to their ranks. This development was conunented on by Veldwagtmeester 
Johannes Karstens in August 1795 when he wrote to the landdrost to report that: 
ik dagelijks nog hoort van samerotting der Bastaats hottentotten en bossimans om 
kwaaad te doen ... ook heb ik gehoord dat [ik e] elf mit gewccrs al van Roggeveld 
weg geloope is.45 
On the eve of the first British occupation there was thus little to indicate that conditions in the 
Roggeveld were conducive to peace negotiations between the trekboers and the San. Neither side 
appeared to be defeated though it is possible that both had come to realise that there was no 
military solution to their conflict. Behind the unvanquished defiance of the San there were, 
38. Sec chapter 6, pp.222-230 above for a discussion. Also CA, l/STI3 18/196, Lyst der Sodanige Pcrsonen 
dewelke volgcns pcnnissie va de Heere Landdrost hmme bti hint woonagtig - Bosjesmans Hottentotten van sekere 
bcpaalde jaarcn in liaar dienst mogen houden; Resol., 23 Oct. 1793, in Papers Relative pp.21-22; P.J. Venter, "Die 
Inboek stelsel", Die H11isge11oot, l June 1934. 
39. CA, 1/STB 10/162, letters from Piel Joubert and Bemardus Bilion, 7 Sept. 1793; Bcmardus Bilion, 10 Sept. 
1793; Pieter Jacobs, 15 Sept. 1793; Johmmes Lubbe, 16 Sept. 1793. See chapter 7, p.275; chapter 9, pp.349-351. 
40. Sec chapter nine above. 
41. "Wild and tame Hottentots". CA, 1/STB I 0/162, Maritz - Landdrost, 16 Oct. 1793. 
42. CA, 1/STB 10/163, Pieter Jacobs - Landdrost, 20 Oct. 1794. 
43. Sec chapter nine above. Also N. Pcllll, "Labour, land and livestock in the Western Cape", pp.13-19. 
44. Sec chapter seven above. 
45. "Daily I continue lo hear of the gathering together of Bastard Hottentots and bushmen to make trouble ... I've 




however, processes at work which were gradually undermining their ability to survive. 
Buslunanland had always been an enviromnentally marginal area, subject to periodic droughts, 
and out of which it was seasonally necessary to move, either in search of water or in pursuit of 
the migrating herds of gan1e as they sought fresh grazing. The /Xam of Bushmanland were, 
however, running out of territory into which they could temporarily escape when they needed to 
replenish themselves. In the west the colonists had effectively closed Namaqualand to them and 
the way to the south was also barred. In the north the Orange river had become an area of 
insecurity whilst to the east lay the unenticing battle zone of the Sneeuberg. Even within the 
shrinking confines of their territory the /Xam were experiencing the deterioration of their 
envirollll1ent. The trekboers' custom of driving their flocks and herds into the area after the rains 
caused serious damage to the vegetation46 whilst, at the same time, it denied grazing and water 
resources to the wild animals. Colonial hunting parties slaughtered vast quantities of game. 
Bi/tong had become a staple of frontier life and fanners, whenever possible, preferred to save 
their stock by eating venison. The great herds of eland favoured for the production of bi/tong 
(and symbolically central to San culture)47 were, by the 1790s, only to be found beyond the Sak 
River. Wagon-loads of dried meat were taken from Buslunanland and the San's resources were 
correspondingly depleted.48 In these circumstances it was, perhaps, not surprising that the San 
would give serious attention to any proposal which promised to guarantee them exclusive rights 
to their land. Such a proposal was, incredibly, forthcoming from the colonists, and the initiative 
was associated with a new name amongst the Roggevelders: Floris Visser. 
46. See J.P.H. Acocks, "TI1e Flora that matched the Fauna", Bothalia, 12, 4 ,1979, pp.673-709 for a discussion of 
the desertification of the Karoo. 
47. See chapter six, pp.233-4 above. 
48. Lichtenstein describes the return of an eland hunting party in the Roggeveld in November 1803. 
"111e compm1y had gone five days northwards, beyond the boundaries of the colony, and besides all the smaller 
game they had killed, which served as their daily food, they brought home seventeen elands. TI1ese animals 
weighed from seven to eight hundred pounds a-piece, so that the portion of each of the hw1ters was about four 
thousand pounds of pure, excellent flesh. This was cut to pieces upon the spot, salted and packed in the skins, and 
thus brought home in a wagon they had taken with them. Here it was to be smoked, and would then be a plentiful 
supply of cheap and wholesome food. 
The great muscle of the thigh, smoked, is more particularly esteemed. These are cut out at their whole length, and 
from the resemblance they then bear to bullock's tongues, arc called thigh-tongues. 'Illey are ofien sent as presents, 
or for sale, to Cape Town, and arc there eaten raw, and cut into very thin slices, with bread and butter. Thus 
prepared, they arc esteemed an excellent go11rma11dise." Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 1, pp.120-121. 
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FLORIS VISSER AND THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF 1798 
Visser first came to prominence on 26 May 1797 when he arrived at the drostdy at Stellenbosch 
to report that a group of Korana, numbering about 300 strong, had entered the Roggeveld. The 
invasion of a group who normally lived over the Orange River, sixty hours journey to the north-
east of the Roggeveld, was sufficiently alarming for the recently appointed veldwagtmeester to 
ride forty hours to the south-west to report the matter. Although the intruders seemed peaceful, 
stating that they wished to "dwell with the Christians", there were certain features about the 
group which disturbed Visser. In the first place their numbers included several Xhosa and San, 
neither of which people were extremely popular within the colony. In the second place none of the 
refugees (for this is what they undoubtedly were) had any cattle, a circumstance which caused 
Visser to suspect that "they might have formed a plan to plunder the inhabitants of his district". 
Visser wished to be instructed in how to deal with the situation but his own suggestion was that 
peaceful persuasion should be used in an endeavour to get the Korana to return to their own 
country. If this failed, force should be used. This course of action won Governor Macartney's 
approval for he was particularly concerned to avoid recourse to arms.49 
We must assume that "peaceful persuasion" was successful for there was no outbreak of violence 
and some, at least, of the Kora.na and Xhosa were penuitted to enter the service of the Roggeveld 
farmers. For his part Visser won himself the reputation of being a skilful negotiator, and one who 
was able to exert a pacific influence amongst the diverse groups of the frontier zone. The few 
recorded details which illuminate his career before 1797 indicate that he was in the forefront of 
the Roggevcld frontier from 1787 onwards. In that year he registered the fann "Drupfontein", 
over the Vis River in the Roggeveld which he had taken over from his brother, Johannes 
Hendrik.SO In 1791 Floris, aged thirty-three, registered "de Bastards Craal", a Middle Roggeveld 
farm described as being "the last farn1 in the Karoo" and first registered in 1776 by Gerrit 
Coetzee.51 He participated in the conunando of September 1793 under Maritz's leadership and, 
49. CA, BO 149, Ross - Landdrost, 29 May 1797; CA, LM 48, No. 139, 19 May 1797. 
50. CA, RLR 35, 14 Aug. 1787, p.148. Visser was born in 1758, the son of Gerrit Visser and Maria Margaretha 
Maritz. De Villiers and Pama, Geslagsregisters, Vol. 2, p.1065. Johmmes Visser had taken "Drnpfontein" over 
from Hendrik Korf in 1779 (CA, RLR 26, 8 Feb. 1779, p.31) but had been forced to abandon it in March 1781 
because of the drought. 
51. CA, RLR 37, 14 Feb. 1791, p.3; CA, RLR 24, 23 Jan. 1776, p.72. It was the missionary Kicherer (see below, 




when the latter resigned as veldwagtmeester in June 1795, experienced at first hand the perils of 
frontier farming.52 
In October 1795 an incident took place on Visser's farm which served as a reminder that the San 
were not the only dangerous neighbours in the Roggeveld. Whilst Visser was away his 
farmhouse was visited by the knecht of a certain Van Elzer, a man by the name of Wenner. With 
him were two Khoikhoi servants and another colonist called Van de Arondt. These men demanded 
food from Visser's servants but there was none to be had. We1mer's servants, at his bidding, then 
seized Visser's servant Jager Bossieman, beat him and held his head in the fire, thereby burning 
his scalp most severely. They also beat an elderly Khoikhoi nan1ed Vigilent so hard that the 
wounds on his head were still visible thirteen days later.53 Against a background of frequent 
robberies and conunandos Visser lost seventy-six cattle in 1796 whilst, in two separate incidents, 
a slave and a Khoikhoi servant of his were also killed.54 
It was in these trying circumstances that Visser, some time before May 1797, replaced Jasper 
Cloete, Maritz's successor, as veldwagtmeester of the Roggeveld. His elevation to this office was 
fiercely resented by ex-Veldwagtmeester Maritz who, for reasons which are not entirely clear, 
seems to have hated Visser. Perhaps Maritz regretted his loss of influence and was jealous of 
Visser's new authority. Whatever the reason may have been, however, Maritz did not hesitate to 
express an embittered criticism of Visser's conduct in virtually every letter which he wrote to the 
authorities from 1797 onwards.55 The antagonism was reciprocated. The first inkling of this feud 
is contained in a letter Maritz wrote to the landdrost of Stellenbosch in September 1797. Here he 
complained that he understood that Visser had laid a charge against him. The charge - that he had 
refused to supply a Khoikhoi for service on conunando - was, according to Maritz, ridiculous, 
because he had ridden to Visser himself to explain that the man in question had been lying sick 
for two weeks. At the time Visser had seemed to be satisfied and if he was now seeking to portray 
him as an unwilling burgher (Maritz continued), the reason was probably to be found in the 
52. Maritz resigned temporarily in June 1795. His successor as veldwagtmeester was Jasper Cloete. CA, 1/STB 
I 0/163, 2 June 1795. 
53. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Petrus Jacobus Theron and Petrus van dcr Wcsthuysen - Landdrost, 22 Oct. 1795. 
54. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Casper Cloete - Landdrost, 9 Sept. 1796. Visser was not the only Roggeveld fanner to be 
hard hit at this time for his fellow colonists Abraham Bollua, Michie! Hauk and Cornelius Carstens were also 
robbed. 
55. De Villiers and Pama give Maritz's baptism date as 9.9.1779. If this is correct, and close to his date of birth, 
Maritz was an incredibly young veldwagtmeester in 1790 - eleven years old! (Vol. I, p.537). I suspect that Maritz 
was older Uian this and that there is an error somewhere in the Maritz genealogy. According to De Villiers and 
Pama his parents married in 1776. 
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difference of opinion which they had had in January. In that month, according to Maritz, Visser 
had caused an uproar in the district by declaring that there was about to be a Khoikhoi uprising. 
Maritz had refused to lend credence to these rumours and had advised Visser not to trouble the 
government with his apprehensions.56 
A further opportunity to complain about Visser's conduct presented itself in October of the same 
year. Maritz was visited by two Xhosa who complained that Visser had shot and wounded their 
chief, "Caapiteyn Danser", with small-shot. These Xhosa were presumably part of the group who 
had entered the colony in May along with the Kora refugees. They had been working with Danser 
at Visser's farm since the veldwagtmeester had hired them for the winter. According to Maritz it 
now seemed as if Visser, instead of allowing the Xhosa to return to their own country, was intent 
on provoking them to rebellion, just as he had provoked the local Khoikhoi in January, by putting 
them in chains and sending them before the landdrost as murderers. 
Such conduct was bound to place the Roggevcld fam1ers in the greatest peril, not just from the 
San or Khoi, but from the "Kaffers" as well who were "een wrekende naasie". Danser's two 
emissaries, Swaartebooij and April, had, in fact, already threatened the direst consequences in the 
event of their leader's death.57 
Visser's response to this was that he had been busy investigating a report from Jochem Scholtz 
concerning a runaway slave of the latter.58 Scholtz believed the slave to be hiding with a Xhosa 
captain called Brooddis. Since Brooddis had a musket (which he falsely declared he had obtained 
from the governor) Scholtz was unwilling to press his investigations without backing, particularly 
since Brooddis, refusing to surrender the gun, had joined Danser on Visser's fanu. When Visser 
went to confront the Xhosa the situation rapidly became violent. Visser struck Danser and Danser 
tried to retaliate by using his knobkierrie. Visser then reached for his musket and Danser for a 
knife. According to Visser he then fired a warning shot into the ground in front of Danser and 
some of the small-shot peppered his legs. Had Danser not backed off he would have fired again, 
this time directly at his legs. Visser then ordered Danser, in the name of the /anddrost, to return 
56. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Maritz- Landdrost, 23 Sept. 1797. Sec CA, LM 48, No.162, 18 Sept. 1797 and 26 Sept. 
1797 for requests for ammunition for commandos in the Roggevcld. 
57. "A vengeful nation". CA, 1/STB 10/165, Maritz - Landdrost, 23 Sept. 1797. For Danser see previous chapter. 
Sec also P. Kallaway, "Danser and the Xhosa of the Gariep", Africa11 Studies Jouma/, 41, No.I, 1982; E. 
Anderson, "A History of the Xhosa of the Northern Cape 1795-1879", (M A., University of Cape Town, 1985 ). 
58. For the pcrc1mial problem which Schollz had with runaways, and the general phenomenon of droster gangs in 
the region see N. Penn, "Droster Gangs", pp.15-40 and chapter 7, pp.270-72 above. 
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to his own country. He concluded his letter by asking for advice on how to deal with the two 
problems which seem to have been the root cause of the above incident, namely, that of firearms 
finding their way into hands which were not sufficiently servile; and that of the presence of 
groups of Xhosa within his district.59 
With regards to the first issue the government's policy was quite clear: "that no arms or 
ammunition should be sold or bartered to the natives; ... and that natives found in possession of 
am1s should be detained as vagabonds and delivered up to the fiscal (or landdrosts)".60 As for 
the second issue, the proclamation of 27 June 1797 seemed to be appropriate: "Caffres were 
forbidden to enter the colony without proper passes, and those residing with inhabitants were 
desired to leave it within 12 months".61 In reality both of these resolutions were impossible to 
enforce and, despite Danser's removal to the Orange River, groups of Xhosa, some armed with 
guns, continued to cause anxiety amongst the inhabitants of the Roggeveld and Nieuweveld.62 
Thus far there had been very little in the actions of Visser to suggest that the veldwagtmeester 
was of a pacific tcmperan1ent. On the contrary, if there was any truth in Maritz's interpretation of 
events, Visser was more likely to provoke trouble than to prevent it. Yet it was this man who, in 
59. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Visser-Landdrost, 17Nov. 1797. 
60. Resolution and Plakkaat of 23 October, 1793, in Papers Relative, pp.21, 22. 
61. Plakkaat of 27 June, 1797, in Papers Relative, p.22. 
62. See chapter 10, pp.376-7 above. In 1805 Lichtenstein encountered a group of Xhosa in the Roggeveld and 
recorded the following observations: 
Exceedingly amazed to see a party of these people at such a distance from the eastern border of the colony, we 
hastened up to them, and learnt that they belonged to an emigrant horde, who had now for several years, lived at the 
sources of the Chamka. Their chief had taken the name of Hendrik, and was in the habit of sending some of his 
people hither almost every year to beg live cattle, and any other kind of food they could procure.... Though they had 
now been for a long time separated from their countrymen, they had not lost that very distinctive characteristic of 
the catTres, - their importunate solicitation for whatever they saw. They begged, if not obstinately, yet unceasingly, 
for some contributions to their already tolerably large flocks of sheep, as well as for several utensils of different 
kinds, which they saw in our wagons, or in the house of the colonist. 
Some of the people complained grievously to the landdrost of these importunate visits of the Caffres, whom they did 
not dare to drive away by force, lest they should raise themselves up a new enemy. On this our worthy magistrate 
desired that the Urree men might be called, when he ordered them to tell their chief, that U1e government were 
exceedingly displeased with the frequent visits made by them to the Roggeveld; that they were particularly angry at 
their coming this year, when the Clrristians themselves, being very much in want, it was not to be expected that 
they could have any thing to give the CatTres. If they (the Caffres) were not in a situation to maintain themselves, 
in U1e place U1ey then inhabited, by means of U1eir cattle, and other objects of industry, tl1ey had better hire 
themselves to the colonists as servants. Idle people, he said, were not to be endured in the colony, much less 
swanns of them roving about together; and he therefore gave them warning, either to quit the country directly, and 
return among their own people, or to expect that they would be compelled to support themselves by their industry, 
and that they would be made useful to the state at the expense of their liberty. Travels, Vol. 2, pp.219-221. 
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the first half of 1798, visited Stellenbosch in order to outline a series of measures whose 
widespread adoption would, he believed, result in peace with the San. So impressed was the 
landdrost that he urged the governor to grant Visser an audience so as to hear at first hand what 
his plans were.63 What were these remarkable measures? 
There were three essential components to Visser's scheme: the gift of livestock to the San; the 
acknowledgement that the San had exclusive and uncontested right to certain tracts of land; and 
the appointment of mutually acceptable captains to the San, just as had been done with the 
Khoikhoi. It cannot be said that the second and third of these proposals were entirely original. 
The instructions given to the General Commando of 1774 mention the desirability of leaving land 
to those San who wished to live in peace and the appointment of captains from amongst their 
numbers.64 Nor was the giving of gifts to the San something new: it had long been used as a 
customary procedure to ensure peace and goodwill.65 Visser's proposals differed, however, in 
that livestock, instead of trinkets and tobacco, was to be given. Furthermore, these donations were 
to be contributed by the colonists with a view to establishing the San as pastoralists. In Visser's 
words they should have the right: "om met uitsondering na andere met dat verkreege vhee te 
moggen leggen en wyde aan de Carre en Paarde Cloofs bergen binne de Limite deezer colonie 
leggende". 66 
Visser's suggestions were received by the governor with the greatest enthusiasm. In certain 
respects the proposals coincided with ideas which the British administration, briefed by Barrow, 
were anxious to implement. What had been lacking, until Visser's appearance at the Cape, was 
evidence, on the part of both the frontier fam1crs and the San, of a desire to co-operate together 
for peace. But Visser declared that he had already distributed livestock to, and discussed his 
proposals with, some of the San who were, apparently, favourably impressed. On 24 July, 1798, 
63. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Landdrost - Governor, no date but probably early 1798. 
64. CA, C 655, Dag Register van Stellenbosch, 1771-1779, 19 April 1774. 
65. On 5 January 1779 Gordon made peace with the "Bushmen Captains" Gronjam and Doroep (or Groinam and 
Doeroep) near the Camdeni (or Camdini) River, a branch of the Krom River to the west of Loeriesfontein. His 
illustration of this event, in Raper and Boucher, (eds.), Gordon, Vol. I, p.215, clearly shows the essential ceremony 
of gift giving and "vrede slagten" (or the slaughter of the gil1 of an ox). His own caption to the illustration is a 
better guide to the event then the editors', for the latter, unjustifiably, have: "Gordon presenting gifts to Khoi near 
the Kamdanic River, north-west of the Hantamsbcrg." It is evident from the text of his journal (see pp.214-216) 
that the peace-makers are San. Also, sec pp.242-3 above. 111e likely meaning of the name "Camdini" is "Place of 
the brown honey-cakes", see Nienaber and Raper, Toponymica A*, pp.269-270. 
66. " ... to the exclusion of others with the livestock which they have obtained to settle and graze at the Carre and 
Paarde Cloofs within the limits of this colony." CA, I/STU 20/30, Lan<l<lrost - Governor, no date. It is likely that 
the Paar<lc Cloof mountains were part of the north-western Kareeberg since the fanns "Groot Paardcklool" and 
"Klein Paardekloo!" arc to be found in that vicinity. 
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therefore, Macartney issued a proclamation which, whilst based on Visser's proposals, went far 
beyond them in that it elaborated the govenunent's general policy concerning the "unsettled state 
of the frontier between the Farmers and the Bushmen". The extent of the government's ambitions 
is revealed in the first article of the proclamation: 
It appears that one of the first steps towards civilising and conciliating the 
Bosheesmen, would be to impress them with a sense of the benefits arising from 
pennanent property, preferably to casual and predatory supplies, and to make a free 
gift to them of such a quantity of Cattle, as may be sufficient for their immediate 
subsistence, and for a provision by the natural increase of the same, to relieve their 
future wants.67 
From this statement it may be seen that, in the eyes of the government, peace was contingent on 
"civilising" the San, "civilising" here being synonymous with the inculcation of an appreciation of 
"the benefits arising from pern1anent property". Such a change - from a form of primitive 
communism to a forn1 of private property - had revolutionary implications for San society and, if 
implemented, would have meant the extinction of hunter-gatherer social forn1ations. Nor was this 
simply a question of transforn1ing the San into Khoikhoi (even if this was a social, cultural, 
political and economic possibility within the space of a few generations - which is doubtful) by 
turning them into independent pastoralists for, by 1798, it was impossible even for Khoikhoi to 
exist as independent pastoralists, and there is no reason to suppose that, in some of the most arid 
country in southern Africa, the San would have fared any better. Given the almost total 
ownership of the means of production by the colonists (and the unviability of independent 
Khoikhoi pastoralist social fonnations) the proposal to wean the San from their "casual and 
predatory supplies" was but a prelude to their wholesale incorporation into the colonial economy 
as labourers - the likelihood of which the authorities could not have been unaware.68 
We do not know whether the San realised that, with the gifts of livestock they received, they were 
expected to become pastoralists. Perhaps they saw the payment as a fonn of tribute, a guarantee 
of peace or, simply, as a token of goodwill. It soon became obvious, however, from their later 
67. CA, BO 174, Original Placaal Book, 24 July, 1798, pp.80-82. 
68. Consider the opinion of Fiscal Willem van Rynevcld, one of the principal and most influential Dutch 
collaborators with the British government, whose views cannot have been unknown: "In respect to the Hottentots. 
These for the most part cmmot at present but be servants lo the fanners. They neither possess cattle nor have other 
means of subsistence, and become dangerous subjects lo society when suffered to wm1der about, without being 
servants, or having a livelihood - they skulk in the woods, and, if they can, steal the cattle of the fanners, upon 
which they live." W.S. van Rynevcld, "A Plan for amending the interior Police in the Colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope", 31 Oct. 1801, in G.M. Thea!, Records of !he Cape Colony, Vol. IV, May 1801 to Febmary 1803, (London, 
1899), p.90. 
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conduct, that they had neither the ability nor inclination to surrender their "way of life 
perfected",69 (except under the direst compulsion), in order to become pastoral proletarians. The 
second article of the proclamation was concerned with details pertaining to the distribution of 
livestock to the San but it did not deal with the problem of installing a new set of values in the 
minds of the recipients. Instead it was stipulated that the quantities donated, the names of the 
donors and the names of the recipients should be recorded. The act of distribution was to be made 
by a veldwagtmeester in the presence of two witnesses, all three of whom were to sign a report of 
the proceedings which was then to be forwarded to the governor. 
Article three stressed the importance of appointing chiefs or captains amongst the San, who were 
to be distinguished by their possession of metal-headed canes and brass gorgets, "in the same 
manner as the chiefs and captains of the other Hottentot tribes, dependent on the Government". 
Indeed, the San were to be persuaded "to consider themselves as under the protection and 
authority of the English Government," a state of mind which, incidentally, it was difficult enough 
to instil in the Dutch frontiersmen.70 
The San were to be given "a sufficient District beyond the Sak River towards the Kareeberg" 
which was to be acknowledged as theirs. They were also to be "left in possession of their just 
rights and habitations, and (were) not to be molested, nor their Children taken from them or made 
slaves or servants of, on any pretence whatsoever". The Government clearly perceived that the 
San had been unjustly harried for it explicitly prohibited veldwagtmeesters from launching 
conunandos, or any other act of violence against them, except in self defence. 
Some of the "principal Buslunen" were to be encouraged to journey to Cape Town to "wait upon 
the Governor" and "received marks of kindness and approbation from him, and presents for their 
wives and children". Every effort was to be made to impress upon "these poor creatures, the 
advantages they will derive from the present system, adopted solely for their benefit, by a mild 
and humane Government". Peace with the San was not, of course, solely for their benefit, in fact 
partially acknowledged in the wording of the lofty sentiments of article ten: "the reclaiming of 
these Boshiesmen from their present savage and deplorable state, is not only of the greatest 
69. The phrase is R. lnskeep's, in 11,e Peopling of Sou them Afi-ica, (Cape Town, 1978), Chapter 4. 
70. It is inslmctive lo contrast the government's attitude towards the San with the instmctions issued to Governor 
Yonge in 1800 concerning the colonists of the interior: "Consider them rather as distant Tribes dependent upon His 
Majesty's Government rather than as Subjects necessarily amenable to all the laws and regulations." Quoted by 
Giliomee, Britse Bewi11d, p.347. 
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importance to this colony, but highly interesting to humanity".71 Though the benefits which 
"humanity" would derive from the reclamation of the San were not elaborated upon it was clear 
that the colonists, at least, would be free from attack. The philanthropic tone of the proclamation, 
whilst in keeping with the contemporary climate of British public opinion, reveals, more 
specifically, the influence of Barrow, who had undoubtedly played a large part in drafting the 
proposals.72 
This was all very well on paper but, on the ground, the government was dependent on the co-
operation of the veldwagtmeesters. A noteworthy feature of the Proclamation of 24 July is that 
Veldwagtmeester Jacobus Gideon Louw of the Hantam was named as a co-sponsor of the 
proposals, along with Floris Visser. It was obviously essential that the colonists and San of the 
district immediately adjacent to the Roggeveld should be included in the scheme and it was for 
this reason that Louw's participation was necessary. There was, however, another reason why 
Louw's contribution was invaluable. When Barrow visited part of Louw's district - the Onder 
Bokkeveld - in 1798 he remarked that there had been a state of peace between the colonists and 
San of the region for the last fifteen years. It is probable that this peace had developed from the 
agreement Gordon had reached with the San at Camdeni in January 1779 .73 Barrow regarded 
these San as traitors to their own kind, since they had assisted the colonists on commandos. 74 But 
whatever the nature of their involvement was it was evident that Louw, as the local 
veldwagtmeester, would have had extensive dealings with them and this experience made him a 
key negotiator. 
The proclanmtion was also contingent on the introduction of a more clearly defined boundary 
between the San and the colonists. For this reason it has to be seen in the context of an earlier 
proclamation, that of 14 July 1798, which, for the first time, declared the northern boundaries of 
the colony.75 They were to run from the Koussie, or Buffalo River in north-western Klein 
Namaqualand, along the northern edge of the Kamiesberg, the Langeberg, Kubiskou and the 
Spionenberg to the Roggeveld. From here the boundary would run along the Riet and Vis Rivers 
to the Nieuweveldberg, and from the Nicuweveld in a north-easterly line to Plettenberg's Beacon 
on the Seekoei River. Herc the boundary would wind irregularly south-eastwards to fonu the 
71. CA, BO 174, Original Placaat Book, 24 July, 1798, pp.80-88. 
72. Macart.ney's role should not, however, be underestimated. For a discussion of the Macartney administration at 
the Cape see Boucher and Penn, Britain at the Cape, pp.171-183. 
73. Sec foot.note 60. 
74. Barrow, Travels, Vol. I, pp.378-380. 
15. KaapsePlakkaatboek, Vol. 5(1795-1803), 14July 1798,pp.138-139,(CapcTown, 1950). 
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eastern frontier, encompassing the Suurberg, the Bamboesberg, the Tarka, the Kagaberg and the 
Fish River. The explicit objective in attempting to fix these boundaries, beyond which no colonist 
was to hunt, settle or graze livestock, was to protect the "Caffres and the Bosjesman". As the 
proclamation admitted, the previous absence of fixed limits had led to several colonists "injuring 
the peaceful possessors of those countries, ... (reducing) the wretched natives to misery and want 
which at length compels them to the cruel necessity, of having recourse to robbing and various 
other irregularities in order to support life" ,76 Here too the details and sentiments of this 
proclamation owed a great deal to Barrow, whom the government had sent, specifically, to 
ascertain the limits of colonial settlement and to draw a reliable map of the colony.77 Taken 
together the two proclamations were a powerful warning that the government intended to exercise 
far greater control over the colonists of the frontier regions, restricting their movements so as to 
protect the interests of the aboriginal inhabitants beyond the borders. Unfortunately, the newly 
declared boundary tended to include only those areas of the colony in which permanent settlement 
occurred. As such, in the north-west, it ran approximately along the dividing line between the 
winter and summer rainfall areas. No allowance was made for the essential seasonal movement of 
the trekboers and their stock into the sununer rainfall areas. Furthern10re, the stipulation that 
hunters wishing to cross the boundary should be in possession of a pass, was an irksome 
requirement, unlikely to be observed by frontiersmen, who would be loath to travel hundreds of 
miles to Cape Town in order to obtain it from the governor. 
In fact, the local veldwagtmeesters were the only means of enforcing the proclamation of the 14 
and 24 July. How successful they would be remained to be seen. For the moment, however, the 
veldwagtmeesters of the Roggeveld and Hantan1 seemed willing to implement the proposed peace 
with the San. The process began on 8 October 1798 with the departure of Visser and fourteen 
other Roggevelders to explain the terms of peace to the San.78 A second group of men followed 
on 27 October, bringing a contribution of sheep with them.79 In the Hantam the distribution of 
sheep went ahead despite the caution of the neighbouring San (only seventy-three of whom dared 
accept the gifts) and the fact that robberies continued to occur in the district. A conm1ando was 
called out in December and, not surprisingly, several farmers were unwilling to sponsor the 
peace.SO This did not, however, halt the peace initiative. Even the colonists of Graaff-Reinet 
76. Ibid. 
77. Penn, "Mapping the Cape", pp.26-7 .. 
78. CA, 1/STB 10/165, Jacobus Krnger - Landdrost, 12 Oct. 1798. 
79. CA, I /STB 10/152, Jacobus Kruger - Landdrosl, 8 Nov. 1798. 
80. CA, I /STI3 I 0/152, Jacobus Louw - Landdrost, 4 Dec. 1798. 
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adopted the experiment of giving sheep to the San at this time, 81 evidence of a widespread 
concerted effort to break the continuous cycle of violence. 
In January 1799 Visser was able to report from the Roggeveld that his efforts were bearing fruit. 
A certain San "captain" by the name ofVigiland had agreed to the peace terms and had persuaded 
another San leader, Danser, to journey to Visser's farm for the same purpose. Visser appointed 
Danser as captain and the latter, apparently, accepted the peace with "groot blydschap". The two 
San captains infonned Visser of two other captains of tl1e Kareeberg who were anxious to make 
peace; Captain Orlam and Captain Ruijter.82 Thus encouraged, Visser, accompanied by a group 
of colonists, trekked northwards to the Kareesberg in February. On their way they stopped to 
parley with Captains Vigilant and Orlam at the Sak River as well as a certain Captain Goedhard 
at Brak River. At Schietfontein in the Kareeberg Captain Ruijter and his people were visited and 
at Leeufontein another San captain, Platje, was persuaded to join his fellows in a large gathering 
at "Paardegraskloof'. Here, between the Groot and Klein Sak Rivers, livestock and gifts of beads, 
knives, tobacco, mirrors, flints and tinder-boxes were distributed. The commodities were, no 
doubt, chosen so as to "impress them with a sense of the benefits arising from permanent 
property". The livestock was dispensed in quantities which differed according to the size of a 
Captain's following and included cattle as well as sheep and goats. Visser took care to count tl1e 
numbers of the peace-makers and reported that there was a total of 4 71, made up of 284 women 
and children and 187 men.83 
Not all the San of Bushmanland were present at the treaty. There was, apparently, a great kraal 
of San tl1ree days' journey to the north of Schietfontein whose members did not wish to make 
peace. According to the other San they had "veel volk en veel geweers en veel vee"84 and had 
threatened to destroy the colonists. Although the existence of this kraal was menacing the peace 
ceremony was not thereby postponed. If we are to credit an account of this event, written two 
81. See E. Mossop, "Lives Of The Earlier Krugers Told In A Revised Genealogical Table", Archives Year Book 
for So11th Af,-ica11 History, 1947, (Cape Town, 1947), p.249. wnie burghers of Agler Sneeubcrg joined in collecting 
cattle and sheep for presentation to such of the savages as professed willingness to ease tl1eir raids and become 
pastoralists. On 18.l l.1798, 283 sheep, given by burghers, were collected at Grootfontein and on 17.12.1798 most 
of these were distributed among 118 Bushmen by Nicolaas v. der Walt, Jacob Venter, Gerrit Kruger and G. 
Meyburg." 
82. CA, l/STB 10/152, Visser - Land<lrost, 10 Jan. 1799. 
83. CA, l/STB 10/152 Visser, Ockert Coetzee, Gerrit Snyman - Land<lrost, no date; Visser, Ockert Coetzee, 
Comelis Snyman - Lan<ldrost, 27 Feb. 1799; Ditto; Visser, Ockert Coetzee, Snyman - Journal of expedition to the 
peaceful Bushmen, no <late. 
84. "many people and many guns and much livestock". CA, l/S113 10/152, Visser - Lan<l<lrost, 7 April 1799. 
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months later, by the newly arrived London Missionary Society missionary, Dr. J. van der Kemp, 
then: 
this being brought to conclusion he (Visser) kneeled down with his men on a field, 
and engaged in prayer and singing of hymns. The Boschemen asked with surprise 
the meaning of this solemnity and having received for answer that it was 
thanksgiving to God, and a demonstration of joy on account of the peace with the 
Boshemen, they bewailed their ignorance of that God, and begged that instructors 
might be sent to them, to teach them the Christian religion, that they with united 
hearts might serve the same God with them.85 
Though it is doubtful whether the San would have expressed themselves in quite these terms it is 
not unlikely that they were indeed intrigued by Visser's behaviour on this occasion. Hymn singing 
was a fairly comn10n communal recreation an10ngst the frontier farmers - it took place 
(accompanied by brandy drinking) before commando attacks86 and also during the course of 
services of devotion87 - but Visser was an unusually "pious colonist"88 for his time and place. 
Despite the fact that there is little in his conduct before this date to suggest it, we should not 
discount the fact that Christian sentiments may have motivated him to work towards peace with 
the San. The growing influence of evangelical Christianity within the colony ( discussed in the 
following section) had probably moved Floris Visser. Similarly, the increasing receptivity to the 
Christian gospel of numbers of Khoikhoi and "Bastaards", had generated an atmosphere of 
expectancy amongst these groups which, more than likely, they had communicated to the San. 
This is not to suggest that it was the prospect of Christianity that had brought the San to parley. 
Visser reported that some of them, about eighty-five in number, were keen to work for the Dutch 
because they were unable to obtain food for themselves. One group, under the leadership of 
Captain Platje, was prepared to work for Visser himself The veldwagtmeester realised that the 
San's inability to find food was a direct consequence of groups of Roggevelders trekking deep 
into Bushmanland with wagons in order to shoot game. These hunting parties, as well as the 
custom of driving stock into the area, caused the utmost damage to the San. The major culprits, 
according to Visser, were the colonists of the Onder Roggevcld and Visser suggested that, in 
future, they be prohibited from going beyond the Renoster River.89 In the meantime, Visser was 
85. Extracts from the lo11do11 Missionary Society, Vol. I, Van Der Kemp at the Cape, 28 April 1799, pp.366-367. 
86. l3arrow, Travels, p.270. 
87. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.447. 
88. Van der Kemp's words, Lo11do11 Afissio11C11)' Society, Vol. I, 28 April 1799, p.366. 
89. This detail is an indication of the rivalry which existed bclween the trekboers of the Agler Roggeveld (like 
Visser) and the Onder Roggevcld (like Maritz) for the resources of Buslunanland. 
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agreeable to allowing destitute San to work for the colonists provided that they received the same 
wages as "de orlamrne bijwoorde hottentotten" and that neither they nor their wives and children 
should be mistreated in any way. A further proviso was that they should, with Visser's approval, 
be free to remove themselves to another employer or return to their own country. This would, of 
course, be conditional on their having fulfilled their contractual agreement, details of which would 
be recorded by Visser who hoped, thereby, to maintain "order and accord" .90 
On 7 April, in accordance with the governor's wishes, Visser despatched three of the San captains 
to the Cape. The three in question - Vigiland, Orlam and Platje - went voluntarily, and Visser was 
able to report that, in his district, the peace was being observed. This was not the case in the 
Hantam where, in February, Veldwagtmeester Van Wijk reported that since the San had been 
given livestock they had been stealing more than ever. The outlying farmers went in constant fear 
of their lives and Van Wijk could think of no better remedy than raising a conunando.91 This 
regional setback was not, however, allowed to jeopardise the promising developments elsewhere 
and the fortuitous arrival of missionaries of the London Missionary Society at Cape Town, 
coinciding with the visit of the three captains of Buslunanland, introduced new prospects for the 
"civilisation" of the San. 
90. CA, 1/STB 10/152, Visser, Ockert Coetzee, Gerrit Snyman - Landdrost, no date; Visser - Landdrost, 7 April 
1799. 
91. CA, 1/STB 10/152, Visser- Landdrost, 7 April 1799; Johanes van Wijk- Landdrost, 18 Feb. 1799. 
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The Sak River Mission, 1799-1801 
THE COMING OF THE MISSIONARIES 
On the last day of March, 1799, four brethren of the London Missionary Society (LMS) 
disembarked at Cape Town in order to conunence missionary work in the Colony. Under the 
leadership of the Dutchman, Dr. J. van der Kemp, the group was determined to spread the 
Christian gospel an10ngst the heathen of the interior. So vast was the missionary field before them 
that a division of forces was deemed to be necessary. Van der Kemp and Edmond, one of his 
English colleagues, resolved to go beyond the Colony's eastern frontier to minister to the Xhosa. 
The two other missionaries, Kicherer, a Dutchman, and Edwards, an Englishman, planned to 
journey to Klein Namaqualand. On learning of the state of tunnoil existing in that region (see 
chapter ten above) they were, however, obliged to make other plans. At this moment Providence 
(for thus it seemed to them) showed them the path they should take by arranging for the arrival of 
the three San captains whom Visser had sent, who "expressed their earnest desire that proper 
persons might come and reside among them, who would afford them those valuable instructions 
which would enable them to become as rich and happy as their neighbours" .1 
It is noteworthy that, right from the start, a connection was made (by Kicherer, if not the San) 
between Christianity and a more prosperous life-style. Van der Kemp, reflecting the perceived 
opinion of his day, speculated that the "Boschemcn" nation was "perhaps the most savage and 
cruel in the whole earth". Despite this negative assessment, he was suitably impressed by "their 
ardent desire to leave off all acts of criminal violence for ever and to be instructed in the 
knowledge and service of the God of the Christians" _2 It was therefore resolved to establish a 
mission amongst the San. William Edwards was keen to answer the call and Johannes Kicherer, 
an ordained minister of the Dutch Refonncd Church, after appealing to "the lot" in order to 
establish the Lord's will, was chosen to join him. The three San captains, meanwhile, attached 
I. J. Kicherer, "The Rev. Mr. Kichcrcr's Narrative of his Mission To 1l1e Hottentots", in Tra11sactio11s of tl,e 
Missionary Society, No.I, Vol. 11, (Lon<lon, 1804) p.2; Van <ler Kemp, LMS, Vol. I, May 13 1799, p.368; J. Du 
Plessis, A History of Cl,rislia11 Missions In Sou ti, Africa, (London, 1911) pp. IO 1-2. For the most recent study on 
Van dcr Kemp sec I.II. Enklaar, Life And Work of Dr. J. Tl,. Van Der Kemp, 1747-1811, (Cape Town, 1989). 
Details concerning Van <lcr Kemp, as well as the other missionaries, are to be foun<l in the LMS Regis/er of 
Afissio11aries, 1796-1928. For a recent account of LMS mission activity amongst the Khoikhoi of the eastern Cape 
sec Elizabeth Elbournc, "To Colonize The Min<l: Evangelical Missionaries in Uritain and the Eastern Cape 1790-
1837", (D.l'hiL, Oxford, 1991). 
2. Van dcr Kemp, L\IS., p.368. 
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themselves to the missionaries, staying with them at their lodgings, and adhering so closely that 
Van der Kemp remarked: "we find it difficult to separate ourselves from them."3 
One of the San, Orlam, was, in fact, a Kora and, as his name suggests, he had already been 
exposed to a measure of European culture. The other two are named in the documents as 
"Vigilant" and "Slapann". Whether Slaparm was the san1e individual as Platje, the man named in 
Visser's letter of 7 April, is not clear but his name suggests that he too had departed from the 
traditional values of his society.4 The three captains eventually left Cape Town on 13 April, 
bound for Floris Visser and bearing a letter from the fiscal which instructed the veldwagtmeester 
to send a wagon to Roodezand so as to provide the transportation necessary for the missionaries' 
conveyance to Bushmanland. The government was, therefore, putting its assistance behind the 
missionaries, and its interest in the project also emerges in Van der Kemp's disclosure that 
Edwards was "not only to take their spiritual concerns at heart, but also to correspond about their 
political concerns with Governor Dundas at the particular request of his excellency". 5 It is clear 
that the administration planned to use the missionaries as political agents who would assist in the 
implementation of the govenunent's frontier policy and, for this reason, the local 
veldwagtmeesters and colonists were instructed to render every possible assistance to the men of 
God. 
All four of the missionaries left Cape Town together on 22 May, travelling northwards to visit the 
Rev. M.C. Vos at Roodczand and making an excursion to the Moravian mission at Baviaans 
Kloof.6 By doing so they were making a pilgrimage to the sources of local evangelical missionary 
endeavour, which had predated their arrival in the colony, and which had had a considerable 
influence in creating a favourable climate for the LMS initiative. It is important to stress that the 
spirit of religious enthusiasm was already moving within the colony and, before considering the 
LMS mission to the San, it will be necessary to provide a brief assessment of the impact of earlier 
evangelical work. 
3. Ibid; Kichcrcr, "Narrative", pp.1-2. 
4. Van der Kemp, p.368, has the name "Orclam" but this, when compared to Visser's letter, is obviously a misprint 
of "Ori am" or "Oorlam". Sec CA, 1/STB 10/152, Visser - Landdrost, 7 April 1799. 111e name "Slapann" can 
mean, literally, "Weak ann" or "Lame ann" but the /Xam also used it to describe someone who did not share out 
meat equally. A k"wake11 llk,mg ( decayed ann), was someone who was ungenerous about food. See Hewitt, 
Stmcture, meaning and ritual i11 the narratives of the soutliem San, p. l 09. 
5. Van dcr Kemp, LMS, p.368. 
6. Kichcrcr, "Narrative", pp.2-3. 
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M. C. Vos, the minister of the church at Roodezand from 1794, was one of a small group of men 
within the Dutch Reformed Church who saw it as part of their Christian duty to spread the gospel 
to the heathens.7 The practice of baptising children (and, indeed, adults) of "Bastaard-Hottentot" 
or slave parentage had been taking place, on a limited scale, at the Roodezand church since 
1774.8 Such baptisms had doubtless been taking place long before this date - but "invisibly".9 It 
was the new emphasis on classification, coinciding with the General Commando and the 
institution of the "inboek" system, which encouraged officials to note the racial pedigree of their 
congregation more closely.IO 
Though the numbers of such Christians must have been few they were able to join in the 
devotions of the Roodezand congregation thanks, largely, to the approbation of a series of 
ministers who were either Dutch born, Dutch educated, or both. It is true that the initiator of these 
developments, the Reverend Remmerus Harders, was forced into early retirement, due to mental 
illness, 11 soon after the inauguration of these seemingly liberal policies. But that his example was 
no mental aberration is proved by the conduct of his successor, Johannes Kuys, who continued to 
baptise adults and children of mixed parentage until replaced by M.C. Vos in 1794.12 
Vos, who was himself partially of slave descent, 13 had been born at the Cape in 1759. As a 
teenager he became convinced that he should become a minister and preach the gospel within his 
own land. He claims to have been especially concerned with the souls of the slaves and, after 
7. M.C. Vos, Aierkwaardig verhaal aangaande het /even en de lotgevallen van Alichiel Christiaan Vos, 
(Amsterdam, 1824); Du Plessis, Christian Alissions, pp.67-9, 76-79; P.S de Jongh, "Sendingwerk In Die 
Lan<ldrosdistrikte Stellenbosch En Tulbagh (Se<lert 1822 Worcester) 1799-1830", (MA, Stellenbosch, 1968) pp.5-
10; Gedenksc/1rijten Van het Nederlandsc/1 Zendeling-Genootschap, Eerst Deel, (Rotterdam, 1801 ), Extracts from 
M.C. Vos's letters, pp.100-111; A. Boeseken and M. Cairns, Secluded Valley, chapter 10. 
8. Boeseken and Cairns, Secluded Valley, p. l 02. 
9. On the issue of the baptism of slaves, people of slave descent, and people of mixed descent see H.F. Heese, 
Groep Sander Giense, (Bellville, 1984) pp.31-35; R. Elphick and R. Shell, "Intergroup relations: Khoikhoi, 
settlers, slaves and free blacks, 1652-1795" in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, The Shaping of South Aji-ican Society, 
1652-1840, (Cape Town, 1989) pp.185-191. I <lo not mean to suggest that baptism of people of "non-European" 
descent was always "invisible", i.e. not recorded, before 1774. Though infrequent, clearly, it occurred (particularly 
in Cape Town). My point is that it was not always considered necessary to stigmatise "non-white" Christians 
(particularly if they were the marriage partners of those of European descent or children of a European parent) in 
the baptism records. 
10. Sec chapter seven alxive for the inf1ucncc of the General Commando on fonnalising racial categorisation in the 
colony. 
11. Boeseken and Cairns, Secluded Valley, p.10 I. By a resolution of 23 June 1792 slaves professing the Christian 
religion were declared admissible to the conununion of the church. Papers Relative, p.21. Du Plessis, Christian 
Missions, p.65. 
12. I3oeseken and Cairns, Secluded iralley, pp.102-103. 
13. A fact stressed by 11.F. llcese but overlooked by other commentators. Sec II.F. lleese, Groep, p.32. 
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overcoming considerable hardships, qualified as a minister in Utrecht before returning to the 
Cape to take up his post at Roodezand. The drift of his thoughts was clearly indicated by the 
choice of the text for his inaugural sennon - Mark 16, 15-16: "And he said unto them, Go ye into 
all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be 
saved." Fitting his actions to these words Vos instituted evening classes for the instruction of 
slaves and Khoikhoi in the benefits of Christianity. He also produced a catechism for "slaves and 
other heathens", copies of which were distributed as far as twenty days journey from Roodezand. 
In addition he undertook extensive pastoral journeys, as far afield as the Roggeveld and Graaff-
Reinet, in order to minister to the colonists.14 It is more than likely that it was during the course 
of these excursions that Floris Visser heard, and responded to, the message of the peripatetic 
minister. 
Vos's wam1 endorsement of the credo of evangelism was the consequence of his exposure, whilst 
in Holland, to an awakening spirit of missionary endeavour which was taking place throughout 
Western Europe. He was not the first Dutch Refonned minister at the Cape to be inspired by 
these developments for, in 1786, a young Hollander called Helperus Ritzema van Lier was 
appointed as minister to the Cape Town congregation. In a sern10n he delivered in May, 1789 he 
too stressed that the gospel should be proclaimed "to every human being, however savage, 
ignorant, degraded or sinful he be".15 Van Lier had the Khoikhoi and slaves in mind, and, had he 
not gone to an early grave in 1793, would doubtless have done much to propagate the gospel 
amongst the heathen. As it was he had done enough to establish a small circle of mission friends 
amongst the colonists who would later lend much support to the LMS and act as founder 
members of the South African Missionary Society.16 
The first of these mission societies was established in London in 1795 along inter-denominational 
lines. Apart from the inspiration which it drew from the broader currents of the religious revival 
present in England at that time - currents which flowed most strongly in Methodism, the new 
14. Du Plessis, Christian Missions, pp.67-69; Boeseken and Cairns, Secluded Valley, pp. I 03-108; De Jongh, 
"Sendingwcrk", pp.8-10. 
15. Du Plessis, Christian A1issions, p.63. For Van Lier see T.N. 1-Ianekom, I-lelperns Ritzema Van lier: Die 
lewensbeeld Van '11 Kaapse Predikant Uit die 18de Eeu (Cape Town, 1959). 
16. Du Plessis, Christian Missions, pp.61-65; 13. Kriger, The Pear Tree Blossoms, pp.47-48. Van Lier also had 
a strong, though indirect, influence on Kicherer. The latter man was responsible for publishing the mystical 
Christian meditations of Van Lier's sister, Catharina Al<legon<la, to whom he was engaged before she <lied on 22 
September 1801. Sec Hanekom, Van lier, pp.299-300. Mention should be made of such members as Van Zulch, 
Jacobus Vos, C.P. Slotsboo and Mathilde Smith. Van Zulch (or Van Sulk) had about 300 Khoi under his tuition al 
the Tygerberg in 1799 of whom, he hoped, "between thirty and forty had truly received from our Saviour grace lo be 
faithful". Transactions, No. I, Vol. 11, p.325; Du Plessis, Christian Missions, pp.64-65. 
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Dissent and, in its parent movement, the Evangelicals - the LMS was specifically inspired by the 
vision of one of its founding members, Thomas Haweis. I 7 It was he who preached the first 
sermon to the Missionary Society on 22 September 1795 and who chose to expatiate on the moral 
and spiritual degradation of those societies of the South Seas (particularly Tahiti) which the 
voyages of Captain Cook (amongst others) had revealed to the West. Despite the idyllic 
circumstances in which these people lived they were occupants of an Eden after the Fall. "Yet 
untutored offspring of fallen nature!" Haweis exclaimed, "how are you to be pitied." There was 
thus, from the outset, a rejection of the ideas of "noble savagism" and "sentimental primitivism" 
by the members of the LMS. As Bernard Smith explains, the evangelists "had no doubts about 
the superiority of Christian civilisation over other forms of society" I 8 and considered it a pressing 
obligation upon Christians to make the gospel known, not only in the South Seas but in all other 
areas of the globe where benighted heathen were to be found. 
News of the LMS reached Van der Kemp in Holland and he forthwith offered the society his 
services. His spiritual credentials, as well as the fact that he was a Scots-trained medical doctor 
and a Dutch speaker, made him seem ideally suited to lead a mission to the recently acquired 
British colony at the Cape. Before his departure he was instrumental in establishing a sister 
society - the Netherlands Missionary Society - in his native country and ties between the two 
organisations were close. I 9 On his arrival in South Africa in 1 799 he delivered a letter of 
exhortation, addressed to the Christians of the colony, from the brethren of the LMS. The letter 
was read to the congregations of Cape Town and Roodezand by their respective ministers in April 
and was greeted with much enthusiasm. It was nothing less than a call to establish a local 
missionary society, similar to the Netherlands Missionary Society, in the Cape. Thanks to the 
pre-existing receptivity to such an idea, the active support of the Reverend Vos, and the generous 
donations of a number of local Christians, the South African Missionary Society was established 
on 22 April 1799. The first article of its constitution proclaimed: "The object of this Society shall 
be to promote, by all means which lie within its power, the extension of Christ's Kingdom among 
the unenlightened in this Colony, and among the heathen both within and without its bounds."20 
This hearteningly rapid and enthusiastic response by significant sections of the Cape's Christian 
17. R. Lovell, 71ie llistory of the Lo11do11 Missionary Society, 1795-1895, Vol. I, (Lon<lon, 1899); E. Halevy, A 
Hist01y Of The English People 111 1815 (Lon<lon, I 924; reprint I 987) pp.389-90. See also J. an<l J. Comaroff, Of 
Revelatio11 and Revolution: Christianity, Colo11ialism, and Consciousness i11 South Africa (Chicago, I 99 I), pp.43-
85, an<l Elboume, "To Colonize the Min<l" for a discussion of the constituent parts of the consciousness of LMS 
missionaries at the en<l of the eighteenth century. 
18. U. Smith, European Vision And 71,e South Pacific 1768-1850 (Oxfor<l, 1960), pp. I 06-107. 
19. Enklaar, 1 ·a11 der Kemp, pp.1-68. 
20. Du Plessis, Christian Missions, pp. 92-93. 
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conununity is evidence that a religious revival was sinm1ering under the surface of colonial life. 
Nowhere was this more evident than amongst one of the groups comprising the intended 
beneficiaries of the evangelical mission: the Khoikhoi. And no institution had done more to raise 
their expectations than the Moravian mission at Baviaans Kloof. 
The Moravians had been the first to establish a mission to the Khoikhoi.21 Between 1737 and 
1743 Georg Sclunidt had laboured against loneliness, depression and the hostility of the official 
church to establish a c01mnunity of Christian Khoikhoi at Baviaans Kloof.22 Worn out by his 
efforts he returned to Europe and it was not until 1792 that circumstances pennitted the return of 
the Moravians. One of their Bishops, Reichel, had visited Cape Town in 1787 and met Van Lier. 
The young minister's enthusiasm for missionary enterprise encouraged Reichel to renew the 
mission to the Khoikhoi and, once permission had been obtained from the Heren XVII in the 
Netherlands, three brethren were appointed to take up the task. As soon as the three - Marsveld, 
Schwiilll and Kulmel - began to give lessons in 1793 it became apparent that there was a much 
greater hunger for instruction on the part of the Khoikhoi than had been the case during Sclunidt's 
mission. The millenarian unrest amongst the Khoikhoi of the Swellendam district and 
Riviersonderend in 1788 was an indication that at least some of the teachings of Christianity had 
been absorbed and transfonned by the local Khoikhoi to meet their own needs and that there was 
a strong spirit of yearning for religious revelation.23 It is surely no coincidence that this 
movement occurred in the area where Georg Sclunidt had first preached the gospel to the 
Khoikhoi. We may assume that his words had not been entirely forgotten by those who had heard 
them, and that they had communicated the message of salvation to others who had little but hope 
to sustain them.24 
Despite the active hostility of the surrounding colonists, who sought to "debar the migration of 
the Hottentots to Baviaans Kloof and to keep them on their fanns, illiterate and dependent", the 
21. In fact, when the eighteenth century opened, and for many years lo come, the Moravian brethren were the only 
Protestant missionaries in the entire world. 
22. See Kriger, Pear Tree, pp.1-39; H.C. Bredekamp, "Die Verhouding Tussen Africa Christian En Georg 
Sclunidt, 1737-1743 ", paper presented at lnslituut Vir Historicse navorsing, University of the Western Cape, Oct. 
1987; 1-I.C. I3redekamp and J.L. llattingh, (eds.), Das Tagebuch 1111d die Briefe van Georg Schmidt dem erste11 
Alissio11ar ill Sudafrika (17 3 7-17 44)/ Dagboek ell briewe van Georg Schmidt eerste se11delillg i11 Suid Afrika (17 37-
17 44) (I3ellville, 1981 ). 
23. Sec p.273-75 above. 
24. Christian ideas had no doubt circulated amongst the Khoikhoi from the earliest years of colonial contact. 
Valentyn, for instance, recorded that he had had a conversation with a Khoikhoi who had been trained by a Dutch 
clergyman, Van Kalden, and that the Khoikhoi was well infonne<l about the Christian religion. In Theophilus 
I !aim, Ts1111i -1/Goam. The Supreme Being of the Kl10i-Kl10i (London, 1881 ), p.39. 
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m1ss10n grew dramatically.25 By 1796 Baviaans Kloof was, after Cape Town, the largest 
settlement in the colony and, by 1799, the more benevolent attitude of the British authorities had 
encouraged its development into a large village where I 234 people lived in 228 dwellings. British 
visitors to Baviaans Kloof, such as Barrow and the influential Lady Anne Barnard, were most 
impressed by the order and industry of the settlement. The devotional gatherings, in particular, 
impressed observers, who conunented favourably on the advances which Christianity was making 
amongst the Khoikhoi congregation. "Bastaards", slaves and even the neighbouring colonists also 
attended divine services at the institution so that, by 1799, its reputation stood very high with the 
authorities .26 
In fact, in December 1798, before the arrival of the LMS missionaries, Governor Dundas had 
requested the Moravian brethren to send one of their number northwards, at the government's 
expense, to negotiate with the San. The San had, apparently, asked for a mission station like 
Baviaans Kloof to be established in their midst. Although the Moravians were keen to respond to 
this challenge the sudden recall of one of their members to Gcrn1any prevented them from 
preceding the LMS as missionaries in Buslunanland. The incident does, however, suggest that the 
fame of Baviaans Kloof had spread beyond the colony's northern borders and raised interest 
amongst the San. It also indicates that the government was proposing to utilise missionaries to 
implement its frontier policies even before the arrival of Van der Kemp and his colleagucs.27 
When the LMS missionaries visited Vos's church and Baviaans Kloof in May 1799 they were, 
therefore, paying their respects to the pioneers in the field. They also received invaluable practical 
infonnation as to what had been and what could be achieved. Thus instructed, and once Edmond 
and Edwards had been ordained by Vos, the missionaries were ready to go their separate ways; 
Van dcr Kemp and Edmond to the cast, and Kichcrer and Edwards to the north. The latter pair set 
25. Kriger, Pear Tree, pp.47-75; Du Plessis, Christia11 Missio11s, pp.77, 79. For a more detailed consideration of 
relationships between colonists and the Khoikhoi of Baviaans Kloof see Russel S. Viljoen, "Moravian Missionaries, 
Khoikhoi Labour and the Overberg Colonists at the end of the VOC era: 1792-1796", (Paper presented at I. H. R 
conference on the History of Christianity in South Africa, University of the Western Cape, 1992 ). 
26. Kriger, Pear Tree, pp.75-85; Du Plessis, Christia11 Missio11s, pp.79-90; Barrow, Travels, pp.351-355; AM. 
Lewin Robinson, (ed)., 11,e lelters ofla,(v A1111e Bamcmi To Hemy Dundas, (Cape Town, 1973) pp.118-125. See 
also A.M.L. Robinson, "The Baviaans Kloof Mission al the time of the Capture of the Cape in 1795", Qrwrter(v 
B111/eti11 of the So11th Afi"iccm Librwy, Vol. 8, no.2, Dec. 1953. 
27. Kriger, pp.82-83. This was not, as a matter of interest, the first suggestion of a mission to the San. Early in 
1794, at a time when one of the neighbouring fonners coveted the land on which the settlement of 13aviaans Kloof 
stood, the lcmddrost of Stellenbosch suggested, by way of resolving lhe dispute, that the Moravians should move to 
the San, where they would be more usdul (Kriger, Pear Tree, p.66). In 1795 a commando of antagonistic 
Swellendam burghers, under Louis Pisani, sought lo drive the missionaries away. Pisani suggested that the 
Moravians "should go to tame the Bushmen" (Kriger, pp.70-71 ). 
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out on 25 June for Visser's fann in the Roggeveld, provided, by helpful colonists, with a wagon 
and oxen. During the fortnight it took them to reach Visser, fanners came from far and near to 
listen to the gospel. At Visser's farm itself, where they lingered two or three weeks, there were 
further signs of religious enthusiasm for their Sunday services attracted twenty-two wagon loads 
of people "besides many on horseback, some of whom came four days journey to hear the word of 
God".28 
On 5 July Kicherer and Edwards left for Bushmanland. They were accompanied by a not 
inconsiderable group of fifty men, six wagons full of provisions, sixty oxen and two hundred 
sheep. Visser, who was a member of the party, planned to proceed further northwards to the 
Groot Kraal in an attempt to make peace with its still hostile adherents.29 Also part of the escort 
was Jacob Kruger, the veldcornet of the Klein Roggeveld, who led a group of twelve men and 
brought with him the contributions of his district.30 The first San were encountered after a week's 
journey from Visser's fann. On 6 August, one day's journey north of the Sak River, a promising 
spot for a settlement was found. There were two fine springs of water and a stretch of ground 
which seemed suitable for cultivation. Encouraged by a visit from a group of about twenty San 
the missionaries decided to call the place Blyde Vooruitzichtfontein (or, simply, Blyde 
Vooruitzicht), and with the help of the accompanying colonists, began to build a mission 
station)! 
Despite the gifts of labour and livestock, and despite the hunger for the word of God, it should 
not be thought that all the Roggevelders were in complete hannony with the objectives of either 
their government or the missionaries. Jacob Kruger reported that, although he had ordered eight 
of his burghers to be present, only six had arrived; and whereas he had ordered twenty oxen, only 
ten had been given. Most uncharitable of all was Martinus Coort who proclaimed: 
<lat hy tot de bevrcdigte bossimans niets wit docn en ook voor de sendelinge maar 
wel dat die sendelinge mogte dood geslage worde en dat aide Bossimans dood 
waar.32 
28. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.3-5. 
29 .. CA, 1/STB 10/152. Visser-Landdrost, 23 July 1799; Kicherer, "Narrative", p.5. 
30. CA, 1/STB 10/152. Krnger-Lan<l<lrost, Joumaal van de uijttogt met de Sendelinge om <lie Luy<le le bringe tot 
!war beschey<le Plaats waa - die luyde haar verblcyf soude neme, 24 July-15 Aug. 1799. 
31. Kichercr, "Narrative", pp.5-6. 
32. "That he would do nothing for the peaceful bushmen nor Lhe missionaries but (wished) lhat the missionaries 
would be killed an<l lhat all the Buslunen were dead." CA, I/STU 10/152, Kruger- Land<lrost, 24 Aug. 1799. 
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There were also those colonists who, like those opposed to the Baviaans Kloof mission, feared 
that the spread of literacy would undennine their authority .33 
Undeterred by such animosity the missionaries presided over the preparation of a vegetable 
garden and the construction of a reed hut for their habitation. The latter structure fell far short of 
their ideals and, in fact, fell down completely at a later date when they unwisely tried to give it a 
clay covering. The decision to grow vegetables was partly detem1ined by a desire to achieve self-
sufficiency and partly by the idea of teaching the San the benefits of agriculture, just as the 
Khoikhoi at Baviaans Kloof had responded to the example of the Moravians.34 Unfortunately, as 
the London missionaries would soon discover, Bushmanland was like the stony ground of the 
parable where seed, whether spiritual or botanical, would struggle to take root. 
THE FIRST MISSION TO THE SAN 
On 12 August the colonists departed leaving Kicherer and Edwards to fend for themselves. 1l1ey 
were not, however, completely abandoned for Visser's son, Gerrit,35 remained with them, as well 
as a colonist by the name of Comelis Kramer. This latter individual had been appointed as a 
teacher to the Roodezand district in June and had been given pcm1ission to join the LMS 
missionaries as an assistant by his sponsors, the South African Missionary Society.36 Numbers 
33. A footnote to Kicherer's "Narrative", p.42, reads as follows: "Mr. K. infonns us, that the Dutch Colonists 
differ much in their moral character, and in their disposition to the Missionary cause. The more moral and serious', 
said he, 'gave me every assistance in their power, and I can never be sufficiently thankful for it. Those who opposed 
us were generally uncivilized and ungodly men, who were led astray by our enemies, and pretended to suspect me 
of political views. The better sort of the Settlers instruct their Hottentots and their Slaves, and through their 
instrumentality, some have been savingly converted. But those Fanners who are notoriously wicked are afraid that 
the heathen will become too wise by instruction, and so reprove them for their wicked works."' In 1795 the 
revolting burghers of Swellendam had complained. "We will not pcnnit any Moravians to live here and instmct the 
Hottentots, for as there arc many Christians who receive no instruction, it is not proper that the Hottentots should 
be made wiser than the Christians, but they must remain what they were fonnerly." A.M.L. Robinson, "Baviaans 
Kloor', p.57. 
34. The insistent equation between Christianity, civilisation and cultivation was to become a finnly entrenched 
idea of nineteenth century missionaries to southern Africa. Needless to say the San were even less likely to make a 
smooth transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural production then they were to pastoralism. In 1817, for 
instance the LMS missionary James Read declared: "We take a plough with us. Let it be remembered that in Africa 
the Bible and the plough go together." Later, speaking of the establislunent of a miss10n to the San at the White 
Kei river in 1839, Read wrote: "The first thing thought of, atler the Bible and Missionaries, was a plough; the 
Bible in one hand, and the plough in the other." As Miklos Szalay says: "Der Pflug war fur die Missionare ein 
Sumbol der 'Zivilization"'. Quotations from M. Szalay, Et/1110/ogie 11nd Gesc/1ichte: Z11r Gmnd/eg1111g einer 
et/1110/ogischen Geschichtsschreib1111g A,fit Beispielen a11s der Geschichte dcr K/10i-Sw1 in S11idcifi·ika (Berlin, 1983 ), 
footnote 113, p.218. 
35. Ci\, 1/ST!l I Oil 52, Kriger - Landdrost, Journal 24 .Tuly-15 Aug. 1799 
36. Du l'lcssis, Christian A/issions, p. 96; De Jongh, "Sendingwerk", p.229; LMS, Register of Missionaries, p.69. 
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of San now began to approach, attracted more by handouts of the "irresistible herb" tobacco (as 
Kicherer frankly admitted) than by the magnetism of the Christian message. The missionaries' 
mutton supplies were a further enticement and so too were the "little presents" which were 
distributed in order to "excite a spirit of industry in them". Initially, there were about thirty San at 
the mission, but progress in "conveying the first instruction to their untutored minds" (as Kicherer 
put it) was slow.37 
Kicherer's account of his mission contains one of the earliest and fullest descriptions of San 
culture through the eyes of a European and for this reason bears quoting at some length. As a 
Christian evangelist he necessarily believed that he was dealing with "ignoble" rather than "noble 
savages"38 and his description of their culture is therefore extremely unsympathetic. It should, 
however, be acknowledged that he, unlike many of the colonists, saw the San as being potentially 
capable of receiving the "distinguished trophies" of God's almighty grace. The absence of these 
"trophies" was, for the meantime, clearly signalled by their manner of life which was "wretched 
and disgusting". 
They delight to smear their bodies with the fat of animals, mingled with a powder 
which makes it shinc.39 They are utter strangers to cleanliness, as they never wash 
their bodies, but suffer the dirt to accumulate, so that it will hang a considerable 
length from their elbows. Their huts are fom1ed by digging a hole in the earth about 
three feet deep, and then making a roof of reeds, which is however insufficient to 
keep off the rains. Here they lie close together like pigs in a sty. They arc extremely 
lazy, so that nothing will rouse them to action, but excessive hunger. They will 
continue several days together without food, rather than be at pains to procure it. 
When constrained to sally forth for prey, they are dexterous in destroying the 
various beasts which abound in the country; but when they cannot procure these, 
they make shift to live upon snakes, mice, and the most detestable creatures they can 
find. There arc some spontaneous productions of the earth of the bulbous kind 
which they also eat.. .. ; There are also some little berries which are eatable, and 
which the women go out to gather, but the men are too idle to do this.40 
37. Kichcrcr, "Narrative", p.6. 
38. For the <lcvelopmcut au<l transfonnation of the i<lca of the "noble savage" to the idea of the "ignoble savage" 
sec E<lwar<l Dudley an<l Maximilian Novak, (c<ls.), The Wild Man Within: An Image in Westem Thought from the 
Renaissance lo Romanticism, (Pittsburgh, 1972). Sec also Hayden White's articles, "The Fonns of Wildness: 
Archaeology of an !<lea" an<l "The Noble Savage Theme as Fetish", in his book Tropics of Discourse: Essays In 
Cultural Criticism, (Baltimore, 1978). Bernard Smith's European Vision And the South Pacific 1768-/850 is 
excellent on this subject. 
39. Probably a form ofspccularitc. In Afrikaans known as "blink loodklip" and in Tswana as "scbilo". This item 
was an important item of tra<lc and exchange in the northern frontier zone an<l was use<l by African societies as an 
a<lonunenL The Thlaping controlled a large deposit of the mineral at a place called 13linkklip (Tsantsabane ). 
Legassick, "The Griqna", p. 253. 
40. Kichcrer, "Narrative", p.7. 
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Here are all the distinguishing features of a people who inhabit a post-Lapsarian world, who have 
"no idea whatever of the Supreme Being" and who "practice no kind of worship". The 
environment of Buslunanland did not enable its inhabitants to enjoy a languid ease similar to that 
of the Pacific islanders yet, despite this, the San contrived to be as indolent as possible, feasting, 
(as if in debased parody of the Tahitians with their "fragrant groves which cover them from the 
sultry beams of day, (and) afford them food and clothing; whilst the sea offers continual plenty of 
its inexhaustible stores; and the day passes in ease and affluence, and the night in music and 
dancing"4 l) on the foulest productions of nature. Nor was there much to admire in the family life 
of the San. 
They are total strangers to domestic happiness. The men have several wives, but 
conjugal affection is little known. They take no great care of their children, and 
never correct them except in a fit of rage, when they almost kill them by severe 
usage. In a quarrel between father and mother, or the several wives of a husband, the 
defeated party wreaks his or her revenge on the child of the conqueror, which in 
general loses its life. Tame Hottentots seldom destroy their offspring, except in a fit 
of passion, but the Boschemen will kill their children without remorse on various 
occasions, as when they are ill shaped, when they are in want of food, when the 
father of a child has forsaken its mother, or when obliged to flee from the Fanners or 
others: in which case they will strangle them, smother them, chase them away in the 
desert, or bury them alive. There are instances of parents throwing their tender 
offspring to the hungry Lion, who stands roaring before their cavern, refusing to 
depart until some peace-offering be made to him. In general their children cease to 
be the objects of a mother's care, as soon as they are able to crawl about in the field. 
They go out every morning, and when they return in the evening, an old sheep's skin 
to lie upon, and a little milk or a piece of meat, if they have it, is all they have to 
expect. In some few instances, however, you, meet with a spark of natural affection, 
which places them on a level with the brute creation. 
The Boschemen frequently forsake their aged relations, when removing from place 
to place for the sake of hunting. In this case they leave the old person with a piece of 
meat and an ostrich egg-shell full of water; as soon as this little stock is exhausted, 
the poor deserted creature must perish by hunger, or become the prey of the wild 
beasts. Many of these wild Hottentots live by plunder and murder, and are guilty of 
the most horrid and atrocious actions.42 
The above description, a heartless distortion of certain practices which, doubtless, occurred 
occasionally within the hard pressed hunter-gatherer communities,43 does little to illuminate the 
41. From Thomas Hawcrs's lirst scnnon to the LMS., 22 Sept 1795. Quoted by B. Smith, European Vision, 
pp. I 06-107. 
42. Kicherer, "Narrative", p.8. 
43. Gordon, travelling up the west coast in December 1785, noteJ that in the vicinity or Jakhals Vici: "Josias 
Engclbregt showeJ me a little bush where the Ilottcnlols at one time had put into a wooden byre anJ fcnccJ in a 
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crucial centrality of kin-ordered structures within San society; or the essential role loyalty and 
affection played in maintaining these structures. It is possible that when Kicherer wrote these 
lines, which were addressed to the Directors of the LMS, he was, in a sense, pandering to their 
expectations of "savage" societies. Haweis and his fellows had been horrified by the accounts 
they had heard of sexual promiscuity, human sacrifice and infanticide amongst the Pacific 
Islanders.44 No doubt Kicherer, his mind full of their exhortations, was predisposed to discover 
the same sins in the San. 
There was obviously an urgent need to deliver these people from the darkness of ignorance. 
Kicherer and Edwards therefore instituted a daily routine of prayer, scripture reading, hynm 
singing and, for the children, instruction in the Dutch language. A large part of each day was also 
set aside for manual work - building or gardening - and, in the evenings, the missionaries 
struggled as best they could to conuuunicate their knowledge of divine things. Language was the 
first obstacle to be sunuounted for the missionaries could not speak /Xam and there were few, if 
any, of the San who spoke Dutch. In fact, Edwards himself spoke very little Dutch and, before 
too long, "wishing to teach the Hottentots his native English, left us to go a little further into the 
country".45 Kicherer does not explain how it was that instruction was effected before the eventual 
arrival of a good interpreter. It is likely that there were some Khoikhoi shepherds, 
unacknowledged in his account, who could conuuunicate with the San. But Gerrit Visser, also 
unacknowledged in the account, may have helped in this regard for we know from another source 
that he, even more than his father, was completely fluent in the /Xam language.46 It was, 
very old woman - who had no friends or children - with an ostrich eggshell of waler and some food, lo let her die 
there and tlms be rid of her. Josias, coming past there witl1 one of these Hottentots ( or) Strand Bosjemans, named 
'Covrasi', had been shown tl1is by him. He had found the woman dead. He had known her. Her name was 
'Kwabees' and he had thought she was more than a hundred years old." Raper and Boucher, Gordon, Vol. 2, 23 
Dec. 1785, pp.402-403. 
44. "But amidst these enchanting scenes, savage nature still feasts on the flesh of its prisoners - appeases its Gods 
with human sacrifices - whole societies of men and women live promiscuously, and murder every infant born 
amongst them." Hawers, in B. Smith, European Vision, p.107. 
45. "For some months brother Edwards continued with us, aller which he settled himself a few miles distance from 
us, with his Boscheman people, notwithstanding which we keep a continual communication with each other. TI1is 
he thought was most advisable, as that place was larger and more fruitful than ours; and as it would be more easy 
lo inslmcl the people in the English language, when they were separated from those who taught the Dutch. ·n1is 
went on very well; the only diflicully was, that he had no interpreter with him, but to facilitate his design, we sent 
him occasionally ours." Tra11sactio11s, No.I, Vol. II, p.331; Kichercr, "Narrative", p.ll. Edwards had a 
predilection for wandering off on his own for, on the journey to Buslunanland, on 5 August 1799, he had got lost for 
an uncomfortable number of hours, Transactions, No. I, Vol. II, p.327. It is also quite probable that Edwards did 
not like Kicherer. Sec note 59 ahead. 
46. CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan. l 805 - 7 .Ian. 1805, pp.50-56. Lichenstein, on his trip to the Tswana in 1805, 
was joined by Gerrit Visser, whom he described as: "a youth or only eighteen years or age, whose father had in the 
course or his life, carried on frequent negotiations with the Bosjesmans, and had succeeded, in the year 1796 (sic), 
422 
The Sak River Mission, 1799-180 l 
however, with the arrival of Willem Fortuin, a Khoikhoi, and his wife (unnamed), a San, that 
progress began to be made. Both spoke Dutch and both "were rather more civilised than the 
people in general". Willem helped with the garden whilst his wife, as well as acting as Kicherer's 
housekeeper, became the principal interpreter.47 The missionaries did not, themselves, make an 
attempt to learn /Xam since "their language is so very difficult to learn that no-one can spell or 
write the same". 48 
As the number of San attending the mission increased Kicherer found it necessary, "for the sake 
of distinguishing one from another, to give them names, which I wrote with chalk on their backs; 
accordingly when any one of them approached me, the first thing he did was to show me his 
shoulders".49 What the San thought of this strange custom is not recorded but Kicherer does give 
some indication of their reception of Christianity. Alongside their predictable amazement were, he 
argued, tokens of the workings of grace on their hearts. Some began to pray to God, losing sleep 
for sorrow on account of their sins or prostrating themselves on the ground in an excess of 
unworthiness. Kicherer, given the "natural inconstancy" of his people, remained sceptical, and 
admitted that: 
we had reason to doubt the sincerity of some of them, as there was no suitable 
alteration in their lives, but much pharisaical ostentation, mechanical profession and, 
we feared, interested views; for some of them seemed to pray, with no other design 
than to obtain a piece of Tobacco from us.50 
So long as the supplies of tobacco and livestock remained Kicherer was assured of a docile 
audience. But, despite the progress made on the vegetable garden, the mission was far from being 
self-sufficient. In any event, the San proved to be "no great admirers of vegetables", even when 
in establishing a peace between them and the inhabitants of the Roggcveld. From him our young man had learnt the 
language of these savages: he had always been his father's companion in his journeys". 
47. In a letter of 18 March 1800 Kicherer wrote: "By a kind direction of Providence, we have in our service two 
interpreters, who are a bastard Hottentot and his wife. They are natives of the Boschcmcn's land; but have served 
under Christians, and have learned the Dutch language. The wife's mother we found amongst these wild people, 
who now also serves for livelihood." Tra11sactio11s, No. I, Vol. II, p.333; also "Rcizcn En Vcrrichtingcn Van Den 
Zeudeling J.J. Kichcrer", in Gede11kschrijie11 van het Nederla11dscl1 Ze11dei11g-Ge11ootsscl1ap, Twecdc Deel 
(Rotterdam, 1805), pp.231-232. "Willem Pclrns Fortuiu, 47, and his wife Catharina Dorothea, and llrrce children 
under 7 were all baptised al Sak Ri vcr towards the cud of 1802 (Doopboek dcr gcmccutc Jcsu Christi aan de 
Zakrivier, NGK Archives)." Personal communication from Karel Schoeman. 
48. Tra11sactio11s, No. I, Vol. 11, p.333. Instead, once Jacobus Scholtz joined the mission, Kichcrcr spent his spare 
time instrncling him in Lalin' "Rcizen En Verrichtingen Van Den Zendcliug LT. Kicherer", Gede11kscl1rijie11 Va11 
/,et Nederla11dscl1 le11deli11g-Ge11ootsclwp, Twcede Deel (Rotterdam, 1805) p.239. 




Kicherer saved them the trouble of cooking them and brought them to the huts ready to eat. For 
supplies of meat the mission was dependent on donations from well-disposed colonists who, 
fortunately, were forthcoming. In October, for instance, as stocks ran dangerously low, 
Blydevooruitzigt was visited by the Roggeveld farmer Frans Maritz who gave the mission a bull, 
thirty sheep, flour, salt and other provisions. Even Maritz's Khoikhoi servants donated some of 
their sheep, evidence of the support which they, at least, wished to lend to the propagation of the 
gospel. And, at Christmas time, more gifts were given by a number of farmers who visited the 
mission in order to participate in holy conununion.51 
Further to the north the San of the Groote Kraal were not as well disposed to the mission. Visser's 
attempt to make peace with them had obviously failed for in September, and then again in 
November and December, he warned the landdrost of Stellenbosch that he had received 
intelligence that the Groote Kraal was pla1U1ing to attack Blydevooruitzigt.52 Fortunately for the 
missionaries, the attack failed to materialise but the constant threat from the Groote Kraal, as 
well as the menace of the more distant Afrikaner gang,53 may have had something to do with the 
strategic withdrawal of the mission station to the Sak River in March 1800. 
Another reason for the retreat was that relations with the San captain, Vigiland, had become 
extremely tense. Vigiland, who was regarded by Visser as being one of the principal captains by 
virtue of the influence which he exerted over the other San, had been a key figure in the peace 
negotiations. His kraal was in the vicinity of the Sak River and his continued support was crucial 
for the mission's well-being.54 Unfortunately, whilst Kicherer was away visiting Cape Town, 
between January and March 1800, ("for the purpose of procuring the necessary supplies for my 
people, particularly Clothes"), Vigiland's conduct became rather menacing. It would seem that 
even before Kichercr's departure Vigiland's behaviour had taken a turn for the worse. He had 
killed his fellow captain, Orlam, with a knife thrust, and he began to incite the other San against 
the missionaries. Kichcrer had asked Visser to detain Vigiland at his farm. This the veldcornet 
had done but once Kicherer had left Visser permitted Vigiland to return to the mission station. 
Vigiland had then instructed one of the attendant Khoikhoi to bring him a sheep from the 
missionaries' kraal but Cornclis Kramer, who had been left in charge of Blydcvooruitzigt, 
51. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.11-13. Frans Maritz was Gerrit Maritz's brother. See De Villiers an<l Pama, Vol. I, 
p.537; CA, 1/STB 10/151, Maritz- Lan<l<lrost, 20 Sept. 1797. 
52. CA, 1/STB 10/151, Visser - Lan<l<lrost, 28 Sept. 1799; Visser - Lan<l<lrost, 4 Dec. 1799; Kicherer, 
"Narrative", p.12. 
53. Sec chapter ten above. 
54. CJ\, I/STU 10/152, Visser- Lan<l<lrost, 7 April 1799. 
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opposed this too free interpretation of Christian charity. Not to be denied Vigiland stabbed the 
sheep and would have stabbed Kramer too had not a girl interposed her kaross between the 
adversaries. Vigiland was then "seized by Brother Kran1er, who the Lord, on this occasion, 
endowed with unusual strength and intrepidity", and conveyed Vigiland to Floris Visser.55 
Unfortunately for the peace of the mission, Vigiland did not stay captive for long. Perhaps Visser 
was reluctant to antagonise Vigiland and thereby jeopardise the trust which he enjoyed amongst 
the San. Whatever his reasons were, however, Visser seemed unable or unwilling to keep 
Vigiland a prisoner and, by 20 March, he was back causing trouble around Blydevooruitzigt. 
Kicherer thereupon sent an urgent appeal to Visser's rival, Gerrit Maritz, who had recently been 
appointed as veldcornet of the Middle Roggeveld, asking him to send a conunando to deal 
forcibly with Vigiland. Maritz acted as discretely as possible, not wishing to break the fragile 
truce in Buslunanland, and succeeded in capturing the San captain. But, as Vigiland was being 
taken to Stellenbosch under the escort of two colonists, he once again managed to escape.56 
According to Kicherer, Vigiland was "foaming with rage, and calling upon his numerous horde to 
assist him in revenging the affront". Maritz gave a more sober account of the cause of Vigiland's 
wrath: 
toen ik hun vrag om wat oorsaaken hy sulks deet hecft hy my geantwoort wat af de 
sendelingen in syn !ant maakt waarom dat sullij niet byde aanderc duys volk blief dat 
hy hct et kon verdragen dat de duys volk in syn !ant woon.57 
We can only speculate what lay behind this succinct statement of Vigiland's gnevances for 
further details arc lacking. Kicherer's belief, that Vigiland \Vas "very friendly to us, but is 
embittered against our great Sendcr",58 seems a less than thorough analysis of the cause of 
Vigiland's antagonism. It would seem that the missionaries were perceived by the San captain as 
posing a fundamental threat to the way of life of his people and, like all colonists, they were to be 
kept out of his territory. 
55. CA, I/STI3 10/150, Cornelis Kramer - Visser, 3 March 1800; Maritz - Landdrost, 19 March 1800; Kicherer, 
"Narrative", pp.15-16. 
56. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Kichcrcr - Maritz, 20 March 1800; Maritz - Landdrost, 23 March 1800; Maritz -
Landdrost, 30 March 1800. 
57. "When I asked him why he did this he answered what arc the missionaries doing in his country why don't they 
stay with the other Dutch people that he could not endure the Dutch living in his country." CA, I 0/150, Maritz -
Landdrost, 30 March 1800; Kichcrcr, "Narrative", p.16. 
58. 1'ra11saclio11s, p.340. 
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Fortunately for the missionaries they were saved from Vigiland's unbridled hostility by the timely 
arrival of reinforcements in the fonn of a certain colonist by the name of Jacobus Scholtz -
another colonist who had felt moved to become a missionary - and a visiting farmer with his 
attendant servants. Further security was provided by those San who were unconvinced by 
Vigiland's expostulations and who decided to support the missionaries. The mission was, 
however, removed forthwith, southwards to the Sak River, whilst Kramer and Edwards, whether 
from prudence or the guidance of Providence, discovered callings at the Hex River and Cape 
Town respectively.59 
In April Maritz led a commando to the Sak River where Kicherer urged him to recapture 
Vigiland. Maritz would not, however, take the risk of antagonising the San. Vigiland had fled to 
the scattered kraals of Bushmanland and it was certain that there would be considerable 
resistance if an attempt was made to arrest him. The San of the mission station were emphatic 
that, should Vigiland be shot, his followers would be sure to take revenge on the missionaries. For 
the time being, therefore, Kicherer was obliged to leave Vigiland unpunished whilst, with 
Scholtz's help, he attempted to consolidate the mission at its new site on the Sak River.60 
The trouble with Vigiland had brought home to the n11ss10nanes the unpalatable fact that, 
ultimately, they were dependent on the government and its functionaries for their protection. One 
of the reasons Kicherer had visited Cape Town in the begim1ing of 1800 was that he wished to 
received renewed government support for his endeavours. This was forthcoming in the fonn of a 
set of instructions, issued by the landdrost of Stellenbosch in February, for the veldcornets of the 
northern frontier. In effect these instructions were a reiteration of Macartney's proclamation of 24 
July 1798 but they placed a new and heavy stress on the role of missionaries as administrators of 
the government's peace policies. They also took up Floris Visser's suggestions of April 1799, 
namely, that the colonists should not be allowed unconditional access to Buslm1anland. If any 
59. Kicherer, "Narrative", p.16. Kramer returned to misstonary labour on the northern frontier when he 
accompanied the LMS missionary William Anderson beyond the Orange River to Rietfontein in 1801. Edwards 
went to join Van der Kemp at the eastern frontier (Tra11sactio11s, 331) but was in Cape Town at the bcgi1ming of 
1801 in order to lodge a serious complaint against Kicherer. He accused Kicherer of unchastity with the wife of J. 
de Prccz and with the widow OI i vier. According lo De Jongh ("Sendingwerk", p.261) these allegations "het 
blykbaar berus op die onverantwoordelike uitlating van 'n besope man en 'n Hottentot vrou wat teen Kicherer 
bevooroordeeld was". TI1e South African Missionary Society did not find Kicherer ·guilty and Edwards, 
accompanied by his wife, the Capclonian Miss M. Schonberg, lcfi to minister lo the Tswana. (De Jongh, 
"Sendingwerk", pp.261-262; Du Plessis, Cliristia11 Missions, pp. I 06-107). The LMS Register of Missionaries 
claims that his connection with the society ceased on 11 September 1800 bul De Jongh gives lhe date, more 
reasonably, as November 1802. (De Jongh, "Sendingwerk", p.262). 
60. Cl\, I/STI3 I 0/153, Marilz - Landdrosl, 18 /\pril 1800. 
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colonists were found grazing their livestock over the Sak River the missionaries were to report 
them to the nearest ve/dcornet. Likewise, the missionaries were empowered to keep a watchful 
eye over the area which had been set aside for the San, making sure that no colonists did anything 
to interfere with their free and unhindered enjoyment of the resources. Game could only be hunted 
by colonists if they had a licence from the missionaries whilst the farmers were, once again, urged 
to make generous donations of livestock to the mission station so that the San would be provided 
with sustenance and weaned from their predatory rovings by exposure to Christian instruction. 
The veldcornets were conunanded to give all the necessary support to the missionaries who were, 
by the above instructions, made chief overseers of the San's welfare.61 
This combination of measures was to cause considerable resentment amongst colonial 
frontiersmen and, in time, led to the large-scale evasion or abuse of the regulations.62 However 
necessary such steps might have been for the protection of the San, the virtual closure of 
Bushmanland, with its resources of game and grazing, placed severe constraints on the trekboers 
who had long been accustomed to making seasonal incursions into the region. Matters were not 
improved by the fact that the years around the tum of the century were years of drought, stock 
loss and, particularly in the Roggeveld, crop failure.63 Another source of contention in the 
February instructions was that they seemed designed to undem1ine the authority of the 
veldcornets relative to the authority of the missionaries. That this, in fact, did not transpire was 
due to the fact that, no sooner had Kicherer gained these concessions, then the Vigiland affair 
took place. The missionaries' recourse to requesting the despatch of conunandos was a rude 
reminder that, in their vulnerable position, they needed temporal protection. The strangely passive 
role that Visser played in dealing with the crisis has to be examined and is partially explicable in 
the context of his rivalry with Maritz. 
In September 1799 the govenm1ent had been obliged to make an administrative reform in the 
Roggeveld where the animosity between Floris Visser and Gerrit Maritz was threatening to 
interfere with the implementation of its policies. Realising that Maritz's support was essential the 
govenm1ent had decided to divide the Middle Roggeveld into two, appointing Visser as ve/dcornet 
61. CA, 1/STB 20/30, Lan<l<lrost - [?], 11 F cb 1800. 
62. The worst olfon<ler in this, as in so many other things, was Jochcm Scholtz. In February 180 I Maritz \\TOte to 
the authorities to complain that whilst Scholtz complained of others who had been eland hunting he was himself the 
most guilty. Maritz ha<l been tol<l by Scholtz's "volk" (who ha<l been threatened with violence from their master if 
they betrayed him) that Scholtz ha<l shot five clan<l, his son two, his slave one and his "Bastaar<l-1 lottcntot" another. 
CA, I/STU 10/153, Maritz- Lan<l<lrost, 6 Feb. 1801; Scholtz- Maritz, 31 Jan. 1801. 




of the "agterste omtrek van het middelste Roggeveld" and Maritz as veldcornet of the "voorste 
omtrek" .64 Visser, not surprisingly, took umbrage, and requested to be released from his post as 
"peace maker to the bossimans" since, he argued, he would be shamed by such a diminishment of 
his powers and lose his authority over the San. The missionaries, he claimed, supported him in 
this, for by reducing his power the peace itself was threatened. The proposed division uf the 
Roggeveld, Visser argued, favoured Maritz excessively, particularly since the latter individual 
was telling all the inhabitants that they were at liberty to remove themselves from his, Visser's, 
jurisdiction and place themselves under his own. If the division followed the lines drawn by 
Maritz, Visser concluded, he would have far too few men and would lose everything.65 
From Maritz's vantage point it seemed as if Visser was using his title of "peace maker" to claim 
the right to conunand throughout the Roggeveld. Maritz took pains to portray Visser as someone 
who thought that the govenunent had no right to act without his consent; who caused division in 
the district; who threatened those who were in favour of the division of power; and who had the 
arrogance to sneer at Maritz because he did not have a farn1 of his own.66 
It is not known how the ruffled feelings of both men were soothed but the administration could 
not afford to have its veldcornets resigning just then. The San of the Groote Kraal seemed poised 
to attack at any moment, whilst the activities of the Afrikaner gang were necessitating the 
mobilisation of commandos throughout the northern frontier zone.67 Perhaps Visser was mollified 
by Maritz's offer to place the men of the "voorste omtrek" under the conunand of the veldcornet 
of the "agterste omtrek" should the occasion arise. If this was the case, however, the concession 
proved to be a hollow one for, the first time that Visser asked Maritz for men, he was denied.68 
Though Visser did not resign at this stage he does seem to have neglected his responsibilities as 
veldcornet, partly to make things more difficult for Maritz and partly because his reputation as 
"peace maker" to the San enabled him to c1tjoy many of the fruits of power without having to 
64. The "outer district of the Middle Roggevcld" and the "inner district". 
65. CA, 1/STB 10/152, Visser - Landdrost, 20 Sept. 1797. The undated list drawn up by Gerrit Maritz is in CA, 
1/STB 10/151, afier Maritz's lcller or 20 Sept. 1797. 
66. CA, 1/STB I 0/151, Maritz - Landdrost, 20 Sept. 1799. Maritz lived on one of the fanns of his brother, Frans 
Maritz. Frans loaned "de Ezelsjacjht" and "de Vytfontein" in the Roggevcld (RLR 36, 28 Dec. 1790, pp.262-263). 
The fanns were three-quarters of an hour from each other and Frans lived on the one not occupied by his brother. 
Gerrit explained that Frans had freely granted him the fann, so long as they both lived and so long as he paid the 
recognition money. Both limns retain the same names today and arc about ten kilometres west of Sutherland. 
67. Sec chapter ten above. 
68. CA, l/ST13 10/151, Maritz - Landdrost, 26 Nov. 1799. 
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shoulder any of the commensurate onerous duties. Indeed, the landdrost's instructions of 
February 1800 benefited no one as much as Floris Visser for he was able to use his reputation, 
with both the missionaries and the San, to tum Bushmanland into what was virtually his own 
private game reserve. Not only was Visser the ve/dcornet closest to the mission (both 
geographically and spiritually), but he was also the colonist with the greatest influence over the 
San. Even his enemies were obliged to admit that Visser: 
zedert het jaar 1798 veel invloed by de bosjesmans Hottentotten heeft gehad, en door 
<lien 2yn zoon Gerrit derselven taal volkomen magtig is, hy een meerdervertrowe by 
die volke heeft verkreege.69 
Contributing towards the creation of this influence were the fact that he maintained a large group 
of San on his fann; the fact that he played the leading role in rounding up donations of livestock 
for the San; and the fact that he became the principal supplier of game to the San. It was the last 
of these activities that increasingly caused resentment amongst his fellow Roggevelders for, 
whilst they were barred from hunting beyond the Sak River, Visser and his followers (and this 
was an important source of patronage in his hands) could roam where they pleased.70 
It may, therefore, be appreciated that Visser had very little to gain by arresting Vigiland and 
stirring up a hornet's nest in Bushmanland. His inactivity in this matter was also a protest, both 
against the government's attempt to limit his domain and against Maritz. The latter individual had 
learnt, through his fruitless conunando to catch Vigiland in April 1800, that he could not achieve 
anything in Bushmanland without Visser. The missionaries and the colonists were also grudgingly 
forced to concede that Visser's influence was an essential factor in keeping the San pacific.71 
Slightly more disillusioned than before, Kicherer concentrated on picking up the threads of his 
mission at its new location on the Sak River and, with Scholtz's help, the work began anew. 
69. "Since the year 1798 [he] has had great in11uence over the Buslunen-Hottentots, and since his son Gerrit is 
perfectly 11uent in their language he has become greatly trusted by them." CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.-7 Jan. 
1805. 
70. A number of these grievances came to light in the petition which some of the inhabitants of the Middle 
Roggeveld sent to the Conunisaris for Tulbagh, HJ,. Blcttennan, on 22 Sept 1804. ·111e contents of this petition are 
to be found in CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.-7 Jan. 1805. Evidence that Visser was neglecting his duties is to be 
found in all of Maritz's letters and, more convincingly, in Visser's letter of 20 Jan. 180 l when he asks the la11ddrost 
not be angry with him for not being present at the appointed time in order to submit his opgaaf. CA, l/STB 
l Oil 53, Visser - Landdrost, 20 Jan. 180 l. 
71. CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.-7 Jan. 1805. 
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Vigiland's hostility had been a sad indication that the honeymoon period between the missionaries 
and their "savages" was over. True, not all of the San had deserted Kicherer, but it was apparent 
that the readiest, sincerest Christian converts were not to be found amongst the San but amongst 
the Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots". Revealingly, Kicherer hinted that the San 
had, initially, regarded him as "beggarly fellow, who had come among them merely to obtain a 
livelihood" .72 This unfavourable impression had, Kicherer trusted, been overcome by a 
combination of exposure to the truth and by the impact of a visit to Cape Town, undertaken by 
nine San who accompanied Kicherer thither in January 1800.73 Despite this, from April onwards, 
the mission became more and more directed towards people other than the San. Ultimately, it was 
this gradual change of focus which spelt the end of the Bushmanland mission for, if it was not 
ministering to the San, what was the point of situating it in their territory? 
The unreceptivity of the San to Christianity needs some elaboration. Elboume has suggested that 
Khoikhoi acceptance of Christianity was partly due to the fact that certain religious concepts 
were held in conunon; the belief, for instance, in a supreme being or God, and the belief in an evil 
trickster or devil figure. The Khoikhoi, she argues, were able to add Christian beliefs to their own 
without necessarily abandoning existing beliefs. 74 Other studies of the reception of Christianity 
amongst African societies have also stressed the highly syncretic forms of belief amongst African 
converts and drawn attention to the creative transfonnation which Christianity undergoes when it 
is adopted as an African religion.75 Given the many similarities which existed between Khoikhoi 
and San religious beliefs might one not have expected the San to have embraced Christianity as 
fervently as the Khoikhoi?76 
72. Kicherer, "Narrative", p.14. "Mr Kichcrer, when in London, mentioned to a friend that such were the 
suspicions the Boschemen entertained of the Missionaries at first (wicked men having told them that they would be 
ensnared and killed) that they would not venture to eat with him." Narrative", p.13, note. 
73. The San were introduced (or exhibited) to the governor and other dignitaries to whom they made a speech in 
which they, allegedly, thanked the governor "for pennitting Missionaries to come and teach them, no man before 
having cared for their souls". Kicherer notes how they compared the "genteel auditory" at the Calvinist Church to a 
nest of ants; and the sound of the organ to the noise of a swanning bee-hive. But surely their abiding impression 
must have been of "Some of the first objects which presented themselves to their affrighted view", namely, "several 
men hung in chains for atrocious crimes, and many of the I3oschemen were conscious of having deserved the same 
punishment. Their terror was soon increased by beholding in a few days the public execution of another 
malefactor." Kichercr went on to explain to them "the nature and excellence of European Justice, as an ordinance 
of God" but his conclusion smacks of self-delusion. "This pacified them: they allowed the propriety of it, and said 
it would be happy for our settlement in the wilderness, if a similar order of things could be established there." 
"Namitive", pp.14-15. 
74. Elbournc, "To Colonize The Mind", pp.122-132. 
75. Robin llorton, "African Conversion", Aji-ica, 41 (2), 1971, pp.85-108. Sec also J. Comaroff, Of Revelatio11 
and Revol11tio11. 
76. For these similarities sec/\. Barnard, /l1111/et:5 and llerders, p.252. 
430 
The Sak River Mission, 1799-180 I 
As it happens, the San have always proved to be resistant to Christian conversion and this is only 
partly due to the political context of missionisation. Alan Barnard has noted that "Only a very 
small fraction of Bushmen have in any sense been converted to Christianity, and I doubt whether 
many of these, except at one or two permanent mission settlements in north-eastern Namibia, 
have displayed even the pretence of giving up their traditional beliefs". 77 The problem is certainly 
not one of receptivity but, if anything, an over-receptivity to myths and stories. As Barnard 
explains: 
It is characteristic of Bushman mythology, and of Buslunan culture generally, that 
ideas can pass fr'.Jm one group to another, from one system to another, without any 
indigenous acknowledgement of the potential for transformation of such a system. 
Ideas and stories are easily assimilated without threat to the belief system as a 
whole.78 
A possible explanation for this is that such flexibility and fluidity is to be expected in hunter-
gatherer societies where group structures and social relationships are equally fluid and flexible. 
For the San, religion is an integral part of the specific ecosystem in which they operate, and the 
natural, the social and the spiritual are all closely intertwined.79 "Like the fluidity in patterns of 
settlement and seasonal migration, fluidity in belief supplements such frameworks and allows 
them to persist. "80 There is also, however, a fundamental inflexibility at the heart of this easy 
acceptance of other people's stories. No belief is allowed to interfere with the traditional 
flexibility which is so necessary if hunter-gatherers are to continue to exist as hunters and 
gatherers. Thus, those aspects of the Christian message which encouraged a sedentary life; or a 
life devoted to the production or exchange of commodities; or a life of service as a bondsman in 
someone else's employment; or even the adoption of a pastoralist life-style, were rejected as 
inappropriate. 
Amongst the Khoikhoi, on the other hand, both political structures and religious beliefs were less 
flexible. More accurately, perhaps, they were flexible enough to be altered but not, like a reed in 
the wind, flexible enough to bend whilst retaining their fonn. The incorporation of the K110ikhoi 
into colonial structures was far more profound than that which was experienced by the San who 
were, as we have seen, not so much included within as excluded by colonial society. The wind 
77. lbid,pp.261-2. 
78. Ibid., p.2G I. 
79. Ibid., pp.2G 1-2. Sec also A Barnard, "Structure and 11uidity in Khoisan religious ideas", Jo11111al of Religion 
i11 Aji-ica, 18, 1988, pp.21 G-236. Sec also Mathias Guenther, "Bushman religion and the (non)sense of 
antluopological theory of religion", SocioloKIIS, 29, 1979, pp.102-32. 
80. Barnard, 111111/ers and Ilerders, p.262. 
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would eventually blow the San away completely, but they died unconverted. The Kl10ikhoi, for 
their part, adopted the Christian message along with the social, economic and political processes 
of transformation which they were undergoing. In this they were no doubt encouraged by some 
comforting similarities. There was, after all, a great deal of common ground between the ideas of 
pastoral theology and pastoral production. The Israelites had been nomadic pastoralists and 
Christ was the Good Shepherd. But there were other reasons why the non-European pastoralists 
of the colony were ready, in ways the San were not, for conversion to Christianity. 
The slight southward shift of the mission towards the colony's border facilitated the access of 
groups of Kl1oikhoi, "Bastaards" and "Baastard-Hottentots" to Christian instruction.81 Decades 
of exposure to colonial culture meant that they could understand Dutch and were not unfamiliar 
with the values of colonial society. They could perceive the close correlation which existed 
between church membership and the rights of citizenship, where Christianity seemed to be the 
necessary, if not the sufficient, precondition to status enhancement.82 Quite apart from the 
spiritual consolations which Christianity offered the rootless, broken and marginal peoples of the 
frontier zone were these social compensations. But the key to entry into the Christian community 
was education and its hallmark, literacy. That there was a great hunger for literacy may be 
gauged from the request of a group of "Groot Riviers bastaards en hottentots" who visited Floris 
Visser in February 1800. Visser had erected a school house on his fan1183 and the visitors, aware 
of developments in the south, asked him whether he could send them a missionary or a school 
master. Visser was able to provide them with reading primers since one of their number, Dauwijs 
Mijner, was already literate. There were, Visser wrote, several "Bastaards" who knew their 
A.B.C. and he provided them with what books he could.84 
This information was, doubtless, transmitted to Kicherer on his return from Cape Town in March 
1800. 85 Further reminders of the vast numbers of potential converts amongst the communities of 
the Orange River - seemingly so much more appreciative than the San - came in the fom1 of a 
Korana woman called Trey and a man by the name of Goeiman. Both of these people, natives of 
the Great River, became model converts. Even more enticing were the repeated visits of several 
81. Kicherer, ("Narrative", pp.16-19) remarked that a number of "lame Hottentots" joined the mission al this lime 
and that dramatic conversions took place among "Bastaards". 
82. M. Leggassick, "The Northern Frontier", p.337. 
83. CA, 1/STB 10/153, Maritz - Landdrost, Aug. 1801. 
84. CA, 1/STB 10/150, Visser - Landdrosl, l l March 1800. 
85. Literacy was also an important cultural marker for the LMS missionaries. Elbourne speaks of the "melonymic 
identification between literacy and freedom" which was transported lo South Africa with the LMS missionaries. 
Elboume, "To Colonize The Mind", p.75. 
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Kora, requesting Kicherer to "preach the word of life among them".86 An attempt by a group of 
San to shoot Kicherer with arrows was, perhaps, a further incentive to move to a new field of 
endeavour.87 
Thus it was that, in May 1801, Kicherer, his assistants Anderson88 (who had joined him early in 
February 1801), Kramer (returned from the Hex River) and Scholtz, together with their faithful 
flock, decided to journey to the river. Before this new missionary terrain was opened, however, 
Kicherer had a brush with a man who was to exert a powerful influence on the societies of the 
Orange River and who, in a perverse way, acted as a voice crying in the wilderness, preparing the 
way for Christian ministry along and beyond the banks of the Orange. 
86. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.20-23; Tra11sactio11s, p.341. On reading an earlier <lratl of this chapter Karel 
Schoeman made the following conunents: "Goeiman's name was Petrus; the spelling 'Goeyman' seems to have been 
that generally used at the time. 111e fact that the family of Cornelius Goeyman was prominent at Sak River and 
remained so in the aimals of the LMS for a quarter of a century (Jan Goeyman established Philippolis and worked 
there 1822-5), leads me to believe that the station at Sak River was caught up in the network of c01mections and 
conununications existing between the Basters of the Cedarberg, Kamiesberg and Orai1ge River, and that this 
actually gave the impetus for the move to the latter location: that the initiative should have come from the Korana, 
as stated by Kicherer, rather than the Basters, who were well aware of the advantage of co1mections with the 
Colony and its white establislunent, has always seemed rather unconvincing to me." 
87. "In the evening of a day which was unconunonly sultry, I was sitting near an open window, when a concealed 
party of Boschemen were just about to discharge a volley of poisoned arrows at me; but, by the same girl who 
saved the life of Brother Kramer from U1e dagger of Vigiland, they were detected and made off in haste." Kicherer, 
"Narrative" p.21. One of Kicherer's converts, Karolus, a "13astaard-Hotlentot" who acted as an interpreter to the 
San, \\Tote in a letter to the LMS that: "He (Kicherer) is afraid of nothing. Here are wicked Boschemen, they say 
our teacher is a Devil to them, because of the things he will learn them, therefore they will shoot him wiU1 the 
arrow. Some Hottentots told us, that they who arc present in the mountains, will come at a time that my goo<l 
teacher gives us instruction, Uiat they will plunder the house and steal the sheep. I was afraid they should come, 
but my good teacher slept without a door, there being no woo<l to make one. He tells me not to be afraid, for that 
the Lord Jesus will preserve us." Tra11sactio11s, p.343. It should, perhaps, be mentioned that the missionaries were 
not without guns. Tra11sactio11s, p.340. 
88. In September l 800 a second group of LMS missionaries mrived at the Cape. These included William 
Anderson, James Read, 13astiaan Tromp and /\art van der Lingen. LMS Register, p.4; Du Plessis, Christian 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MISSIONARY PRESENCE AT THE ORANGE RIVER 
Shortly before the departure of the missionaries for the Orange, the Sak River station was visited 
by a certain Stephanos, a Greek by birth who, unbeknown to Kicherer, was under sentence of 
death in Cape Town for making counterfeit coins.I Kicherer was, temporarily, without the 
company of Kramer and Scholtz, for these two men were busy trekking the wilds of 
Bushmanland, dispensing gifts of tobacco in the hope of attracting more San to the mission.2 
According to Kicherer, Stephanos had an extremely religious demeanour and expressed himself 
willing to assist in the building of a chapel so, despite some suspicions, Kicherer allowed him to 
stay the night. The missionary went to bed but awoke later in a fit of terror, crying out in fright to 
see Stephanos standing by his bed preparatory (he was convinced) to murdering him. Kicherer's 
fears may well have been justified for though Stephanos was dissuaded from his murderous 
intention he did steal Kicherer's gun and depart with some of the more impressionable San 
neophytes who were, he assured them, in inuninent danger of vengeful attack by the colonists. 
Next morning Kicherer's faithful Khoikhoi pursued the fugitives and, no doubt by virtue of their 
superior strength, persuaded Stephanos to surrender both the gun and his San followers. 
Stephanos was allowed to escape but, unfortunately for Kicherer's peace of mind, crossed paths 
with Kramer and Scholtz who were returning from their mission to Bushmanland. The two 
colonial brethren were in no doubt as to Stephanos's identity and arrested him, compelling the 
forger to return with them to Sak River. Kicherer was far from pleased to see Stephanos again 
and felt tom between his duties as a loyal subject of the government and his Christian charity. 
Eventually he decided to enable Stephanos to escape again, pointing him in a northerly direction 
and equipping him with advice, some provisions and a Bible. It was the last of these items that 
was to prove most valuable to Stephanos, but in a way undreamed of by the missionaries) 
On 25 March 1801 Anderson set off for the Orange River. He had left Cape Town on 10 
February, in Kicherer's company, and was now to press on beyond the Sak River as the vanguard 
I. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.22-23; "Reizen", pp.242-244; W.J. Burchell, Tmvels I,, The b,terior of Southem 
Africa (London, 1822-1824 ), 2 Vols., reprinted 1953, p.252; E. and F. I3radlow, Somerville, pp. 97-98; J. 
Campbell, Tmve/s I,, South Aji'ica London, 1815 ), reprinted 1974, pp.377-378. Burchell refers to Stephanos as "a 
native ofCourland", p.252. 
2. Kichcrcr, "Rcizcn", p.242. 
3. Kichcrer, "Narrative", pp.22-23; "Reizen", p.242-244. 
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of the missionaries. With him went a part of the luggage and an escort of "Bastaards". Kicherer, 
Kramer and Scholtz were to follow later. Anderson reached the river on 5 April without incident 
although the San had followed the progress of his party closely. Gifts of sheep and game served 
to keep these people friendly and, having crossed over the river, Anderson awaited the arrival of 
his friends. On July 6 they duly arrived and the missionaries began to establish themselves at a 
place called Rietfontein, about three day's journey north of the river.4 
During the course of the trek to the river Kicherer had found the country to be far more populous 
than he had supposed and, amongst the societies of the Orange, the missionaries found "a great 
hunger for the bread of life". Initially it was thought that the Korana and "Bastaard-Hottentots" 
would be the people to whom the mission would be directed but it soon became apparent that 
recent events had prepared a far wider and far more receptive audience than could have been 
imagined. The depredations of the Afrikaner gang5 had caused crowds of Korana, Namaqua, 
Einiqua, "Bastaard-Hottentots", "Bastaards" and San to seek collective security and Rietfontein 
seemed to offer itself as an ideal nucleus around which to gather. Numerous flocks and herds 
accompanied these people although not all of them had any livestock. Kicherer noted that the 
Korana and Namaqua had been particularly hard hit by robbery, a condition which obliged them 
to work as virtual slaves for the more prosperous "Bastaards".6 
In these circumstances the reception of the gospel message was truly dramatic. The radical 
disruption which many of the people at Rietfontein had recently suffered was not only 
accompanied by material loss and physical insecurity. The social fabric of entire societies had 
been tom apart, resulting in attendant cultural and psychic trauma for individual members. Such 
terrain was fertile ground for Christianity, especially when its spiritual securities were coupled 
with prospects of a more stable political order. 7 Even Kicherer was somewhat surprised and 
embarrassed by the enthusiasm of his disciples: 
4. Anderson, Letters to LMS, 24 March 1801, 6 Dec. 1801, in Tra11sactio11s, pp.344-348; Kicherer, "Narrative", 
pp.23-26. The Kora name for Rietfontein was "Aakaap" which means "Reed fountain". E. and F. Bradlow, 
Somerville, p.165. Nienaber and Raper, Topo11ymica Hottentotica A*, pp.153-154. 
5. Somerville noted, when he visited Rietfontein in November 180 I: "The bastards Connerly resided lower down 
the river on the other side near Namaqualand, which they have been forced to abandon on account of the 
depredations conunitted by a Hottentot of the name of Africaner who has put himself at the head of a horde of 
Bosjiesmen, who rob everyone within their reach. A few of the Bastards here have lost above 700 cattle by him." 
E. and F. I3radlow, S0me111i/le, p. 97. 
6. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.23, 27·, "Reizcn", p.252. 
7. A recent study of the impact of missionaries on the societies of southern Namibia in the early nineteenth century 
has recorded a similar lcrvent response to the Christian gospel. Sec T. Dcdcring, "Southern Namibia c.1780-
c. l 840: Khoikhoi, Missionaries And The Advancing Frontier", pp.173-182. 
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What I am about to relate will probably appear to some readers perfectly ridiculous, 
but it is a fact that we were always obliged to have a bottle of vinegar on the table, 
for the relief of those who actually fainted under alarms of conscience and powerful 
convictions. Certain it is that the tears which were shed at the period among these 
poor people cannot be numbered, and though we could not say that these strong 
impressions always issued in sound conversion, yet we have reason to believe they 
did so in many happy instances.8 
The material base from which this spiritual exuberance would have to be sustained was not as 
promising as the missionaries believed. Rietfontein was situated on a dry and sandy plain where 
cultivation was dependent on irrigation. The vast numbers of people (about 400) and livestock 
(about 5 or 6 000 head of cattle, sheep and goats) gathered about the place by November 1801 
meant that the surroundings rapidly became overgrazed and unable to support so many. 
Furthennore, the missionaries, ever quick to establish a vegetable garden,9 were left to attend to 
its cultivation themselves, since none of their charges showed the least inclination to join them in 
their labours under the scorching sun. In these circumstances it was eventually proposed that the 
missionaries should, perhaps, follow their pastoralist acolytes and their animals from place to 
place in search of grazing. But, in the meantime, reed buildings were built so as to provide 
habitations for the teachers and places of worship and instruction for the knowledge-hungry 
herdsmen prior to their inevitable dispersal. IO 
Hard on the heels of these pioneer missionaries came both other men of God and government 
conunissioners. The first arrival was a man called Jan Matthys Kok. Lichtenstein, in some 
unpublished notes, described him as "de zoon van een Europeaan en een Hottentotsmeid, <loch 
8. Kichercr, "Narrative", p.28. Anderson endorsed Kicherer's statement: "Respecting the work of the Lord here, at 
times it appears peculiarly encouraging, as if the Lord by his spirit was powerfully shaking among the dry bones, 
yes, to such a degree that I doubt if in latter time there is one example of the like. While the precious word is 
making known, numbers hear with tears in their eyes, others are so distressed, that after sitting for some time 
apparently in great agony, they faint away, and arc carried out as dead, and so distressing is the place at times, that 
it is impossible to proceed in the divine service." Anderson, Letter to LMS, 6 Dec. 180 I, Tra11sactio11s, p.347. 
Robert Ross has noted the uneasy attitude of John Philip when confronted with the strong emotions of recent 
Khoikhoi converts during Christian worship. "When [observers] make their caustic and sneering remarks upon the 
exclamations and groans of an uncivilised congregation, they forget that there is scarcely any medium in such 
circumstances between not feeling at all, and giving full vent to the expression of their feelings. Human beings 
emerging from a savage state arc like children much agitated; they can neither suppress nor control their passions 
under any extraordinary excitement." Quoted by Ross in, "The Etiquette of Race", in R. Ross, Beyond The Pale, 
pp.114-7. 
9. One of the crops that the missionaries wished to grow was that indispensable evangelical aid: tobacco. 
Anderson, Letter to LMS, 24 March 180 I, in Tra11sactio11s, p.345. 
l 0. Anderson, Letter to LMS, 6 Dec. l 80 I; Tra11sactio11s, p.345-348; Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.26-29; E. and F. 
Ura<llow, Somen•ille, pp. 97-100. 
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door zyn vader geligitcmeerd en we! opgcvocd" .11 Burchell, who had himself never met Kok, and 
who wrote of him nearly three years after his death, referred to him as a "Half-Hottentot".12 
Other conunentators do nothing to suggest that he was of mixed ancestry.13 Kok had been 
inspired by the preaching of M.C. Vos and had evangelised energetically in the Olifants River and 
Cedarberg districts around the years 1799 and 1800 .14 He was a member of the South Africa 
Missionary Society and had asked for pennission to join the LMS mission to the San. This 
pennission was, at first, refused by the fiscal, on the grounds that no one was to proceed beyond 
the boundaries of the colony. According to Lichtenstein, Jan Kok was keen to leave the colony 
because of the prejudice and poverty from which he suffered, but his Christian conviction was 
nonetheless sincere. IS Eventually Kok was allowed to precede Edwards to the north where the 
two men resolved to preach and live amongst the Tswana.16 In this enterprise Edwards was 
assisted by the almost simultaneous departure of a govenunent expedition to the Tswana, let by 
Somerville and Truter, whose purpose was to try to barter cattle from the virtually unknown 
societies beyond the Orange.17 Kok had already established himself four hours' journey from 
Rietfontein by the time the govcnunent expedition reached him in November 1801. Herc, at a 
place called the T'kaaraap pass, Kok instructed a group of about one hundred Korana and 
Einiqua whilst tending his substantial flocks and herds.18 Both Kok and Edwards would later 
attract criticism for trading in ivory but, as Lichtenstein explained, such trade was essential if 
they were to survive in their isolated mission.19 
11. "The son of a European and a Hottentot woman, though legitimated and well educated by his father". I am 
grateful to Karel Schoeman for sending me a copy of Lichtenstein's notes "Over de Zendelingen onder de heidenen 
benoorden de groote Rivier" from the J.W. Janssens Collection in the Alg. Rijksarchief. In Lichtenstein's Travels, 
Vol. 2, p.295 he refers to him as "African born", which simply means "born in the Cape". 
12. Burchell, Travels, Vol. I, p.298. 
13. Lichtenstein, Tral'els, Vol. 2, p.295. See also De Villiers and Pama, Ges/agsregisters, Vol. I, p.408, where 
Jan Matthys, baptised 1763, is registered as the son of Jan Matthys from Brandenburg and Elisabeth Maria Sas. 
J.T. du Bruyn gives a reliable account of Jan Kok's background in "Die Aanvangsjare van die Christelike Sending 
under die Tlhaping, 1800-1825", Archives Year Book for South Afi"ica11 llisto,y, 1989, 11, p.24. 
14. De Jongh, "Sendingwerk", pp.10, 231-232; Du Bruyn, "Sending under die Thlaping", p.24. 
15. Lichtenstein, Janssens Collection. 
16. Du Plessis, Christian Missions, pp.95, 11., 96, l 06-107; Du 13ruyn, "Sending under die Tlhaping", pp.24-44. 
17. E. and F. Bradlow, Somerville; "Journal of l'.J. Truter and W. Somerville", in G.M. Thea!, Records of the 
Cape Colony, May 1801-Febmary 1803, Vol. IV (Cape Town, 1899), pp.359-436; PB Borcherds, An 
Autobiographical Afemoir (Cape Town, 1861 ). 
18. E. and F. Bradlow, Somerville, p. 97. 
19. Lichtenstein, Jansscns Collection. Du Bruyn has the best discussion or the missionary (and other) labours of 
Edwards and Kok in "Sending under die Tlhaping", pp.24-44. Sec pp.482-3 below for further details or missionary 
involvement in the ivorv trade. 
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After the govenunent expedition pressed on, taking Edwards (later to be joined by Kok) with 
them, Kicherer was obliged to deal with an alarming threat to the propagation of the true gospel 
along the banks of the Orange. Stephanos the Forger had managed to walk from the Sak to the 
Orange River - no small achievement for an unanned man in a hostile environment20 - and, 
equipped only with a Bible, gained a remarkable influence over the gospel-starved Oorlan1s of the 
regions. Stephanos, as Kicherer related: 
after leaving our Settlement at Zak River, had gone to a horde of Bastard-
Hottentots, commonly called Cornelius Kok's Kraal, had there set up for a 
missionary and a Prophet, establishing his authority on the basis of superstition so 
firmly, that his will had become the law of every individual in the horde, and the 
most atrocious crimes were conunitted by him with impunity. Whoever ventured to 
murmur against his abominable acts of rapine or lust, was sure to be put into the 
stocks, or to be beaten urunercifully. Stephanos had erected a temple, resting on 
pillars, with an Altar within, on which sacrifices were offered. He had a number of 
select disciples, who, like himself, feigned trances, in which they lay for many hours, 
and out of which they pretended to awake with messages which they had brought 
from the angel Gabriel, or from God himself. Did the impostor wish to gratify his 
lust, his covetousness, or his revenge? an answer from heaven authorised him to 
effect his purpose. Should any dissatisfaction or luke-warnmess appear among his 
followers? in1111ediately the judgements of God, yea, the conflagration of the whole 
world were inunediately threatened. Cornelius Kok himself, the Chief, who 
possessed a vast property, was completely devoted to the will of this wretch. He 
would preach against us also, and we were apprehensive that his doctrine, like that 
of Mahomet, might widely diffuse its baneful influences among the neighbouring 
heathen.21 
Stephanos had obviously been able to capitalise on the expectation of the Orange River Oorlams 
that missionaries were about to come amongst them. Cornelius Kok was not entirely ignorant of 
the principle of Christianity for he had previously hired Andries Craaij, the illegal and 
incompetent veldwagtmeester of Klein Namaqualand,22 to teach him the catechism and to read 
and write.23 But nor was Stcphanos an uneducated man and, with the Bible which had been 
given at Sak River, he gained an ascendancy over the minds of the kraal such as, the missionaries 
have confessed, "they have never been able to gain" .24 Since his religion was composed of 
clements of "the Jewish, Mahomedan and Roman Catholic",25 and since it was presented in his 
20. A point ma<lc by Burchell, Travels, Vol. I, p.252. 
21. Kichcrcr, Narrative, p.30. 
22. For Cornelius Kok an<l Andries Craaij sec chapter ten 
23. De Jongh, "Scn<lingwcrk", p.12. 
24. Burchell, Travels, Vol. I, p.252. 
25. E. an<l F. 13ra<llow, Some,,.ille, p. 98. 
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church, "built in a superior style ... with much imposing formality and ceremony" ,26 it proved to 
be particularly hard for the inhabitants of Kok's Kraal to resist it, even though its principal 
purpose seemed to be the gratification of Stephanos' "villainy and debauchery the recital of which 
would even be disgraceful".27 
There was also, if we arc to believe Somerville, a more political content to some of his preaching 
for he: 
had taken pains to explain to the natives that they ought to drive the Christians from 
a colony that did not belong to them but to the Hottentots, and that God Almighty 
had sent him to indicate their rights and to instruct them in Religion - the making of 
gunpowder etc.28 
Such sentiments were probably less attractive to the Koks than they were to the Afrikaners but it 
must have taken considerable courage for Kicherer, escorted though he was, by "all our am1ed 
men", to confront Stephanos at Kok's Kraal - which is what he proceeded to do. The two 
missionaries, the true and the false, debated for four hours, Bibles in hand, under a tree in the 
wilderness. 
Their followers meanwhile listened to a theological dispute which was, in all likelihood, quite 
beyond their comprehension. Kicherer was supremely confident that his arguments were superior 
but: 
Stephanos and his deluded followers were unconvinced; and becoming more and 
more enraged, they seemed disposed to do me violence. . . . The Impostor himself 
conveyed to my mind a striking idea of the Chief of Hell. His eyes rolled and 
flashed; his tongue moved with incessant volubility, and he strove to vindicate all his 
atrocities by examples derived from the Scripturcs.29 
Seeing how unlikely it would be to overcome Stephanos by persuasive reasoning alone Kicherer 
ordered his followers to seize "the Impostor" on the grounds that he was a criminal wanted at the 
Cape. This action was effected and the crest-fallen Stcphanos pleaded to be set at liberty, 
promising, in exchange, to leave the country. Kicherer required him to make a full confession of 
the error of his ways in the presence of his disillusioned supporters and Stephanos, "in a crying 
tone of voice", acknowledged that Kichcrcr was a teacher of the truth. 
26. 13urchcll, Travels, Vol. I, p.253. 
27. E. an<l F. 13ra<llow, Somerville, p.98. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Kichcrcr, "Narrative", p.31. 
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Magnanimous in victory and bolstered by the immediate adherence of the Koks, Kicherer once 
more enabled him to escape, encouraging him to head downstream to Namaqualand. The 
consequences were, once more, to be disastrous. As Stephanos made his way to the coast he 
encountered a burgher by the name of Engelbrecht who recognised him and attempted to arrest 
him. Stephanos promptly cut the man's throat with a razor, which he had concealed in his ever 
handy Bible, and continued on his way.JO Before too long he fell in with the Afrikaner gang and 
was doubtless able to convince them, just as he had convinced the Koks, that he was a messenger 
from God. It was probably due to Stephanos's teachings that Afrikaner felt aggrieved enough to 
cry out, when attacked by the Truter-Somerville expedition in February 1802, that he was 
instructed and had repented.31 Further proof that Stephanos had been with the Afrikaners was 
furnished by tl1e discovery of a very good jacket, found at the gang's hastily abandoned camp site 
after the attack of 14 February, and which Adam Kok II recalled as having been given to 
Stephanos when he first visited the Koks.32 
The subsequent career of Stephanos is obscure but Burchell tells us that he was finally murdered 
by some of the Great Namaqua.33 Despite the imperfections of his conduct and the perversity of 
his teachings Stephanos undoubtedly played a major role in preparing Jager Afrikaner for 
Christianity. In the following year, 1803, came the first of Jager Afrikaner's requests for a 
missionary34 and in 1805, as the first LMS missionaries made their way to establish mission 
stations in southern Namibia, they reported the following interesting encounter: 
We this day met with people called Africans, who were fonnerly at the heads of 
such who formerly did great mischief along the Great River by killing and 
plundering people's property. One of them had killed a white man on the West Coast 
of Africa, near the mouth of the great River, therefore was taken by order of the said 
African (who had made peace with government and the Christians) and brought 
before the officer to be examined concerning his crime. The said African and his 
followers not only made peace with the officer Van der Westhuysen 
( veldwagtmeester of Little Namaqualand) and faithfully promised not to hurt anyone 
in future, but were, as we heard, desirous to be taught the way to salvation which we 
heard from the people we met. This African fonnerly hied from an island in the great 
River, but at present lives in great Namaqualand.35 
30. Ibid , p.32. 
31. Sec previous chapter for details of this incident. 
32. Thea!, Records, Vol. IV, p.408. 
33. Burchell, Tmvels, Vol. I, p.253. 
34. De Bruyn, "The Oorlams J\fricancrs", p.11. 
35. Quoted by T. Dcdcring, "Southern Namibia", p. !04. 
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It may be seen from the above how widespread and intense the yearning for Christian instruction 
was amongst the Oorlam societies of the Orange River. The further development and significance 
of missionary activity in the area - as well as the later history of the various frontier societies -
shall be dealt with in the concluding chapter. But by the time that Kicherer departed from the 
Orange in March 1802 it was apparent that the missionary presence in the region had inaugurated 
a new era for the neighbouring societies. 
Anderson and Kramer remained to minister to the growing Christian community but Kicherer, for 
a variety of reasons, thought it best that he and Scholtz return to the Sak River. In the first place, 
after about ten months at the Orange, it became obvious that the produce of the land was 
insufficient for the support of the numerous flocks and herds of the missionaries' adherents.36 It 
was essential that the missionaries separated and, in fact, even the reduced settlement was obliged 
to move from Rietfontein to T'kaaraap pass, to Zand Kraal and, finally, to Klaarwater.37 A 
further reason encouraging Kicherer to leave was the longing of many of his followers to return to 
their familiar haunts near the Sak River,38 particularly since they were being harassed by a 
"Boschemen free-hooter of great fame, whose name is Courakakoup".39 It was also, of course, 
necessary to renew the Sak River mission to the San since its abandonment would have impressed 
neither the govenunent nor the LMS. Thus it was that in March 1802 Kicherer and Scholtz, 
together with their people, began their southwards trek. 
36. Kicherer, Narrative, p.31. Somerville was singularly unimpressed by what he saw at Rietfontein and 
conunented as follows: "I cannot help observing in this place that altho' the zeal and sincereity [sic] of the 
missionaries is not to be called in question, the prospect of fulfilling their objective is remote and doubtful, and at 
present is not without bad consequences. So great a multitude are collected together that there is scarcely a spot in 
this part of Africa capable of maintaining them and their flock ... the water is not super abundant, and however 
fertile the grass may be it is now so overstocked that every bit of grass is consmned. ·n1e milk which is almost the 
sole diet of the children becomes daily more scarce, the want of pasture has reduced the cattle of every sort to a 
miserable condition, even our <lrall oxen lost flesh <luring the few days we halted, instead of gaining from the rest 
they had." E. and F. Bradlow, Somerville, pp.99-100. 
37. Burchell, Travels, Vol. I, p.231. "Zand Kraal" was at the Orange River and its Khoikhoi name was Conaa 
Hiep 't Hijp", Kicherer, "Rcizcn", p.261. 
38. Kicherer, "Reizen", p.263. Mention should be made of the San captain, Ruiter Zakriver, who had attached 
himself lo the missionary Edwards at Uly<lc Vooruitzichl and who accompanied him to the Tswana. Ruiter, anxious 
to return to his place of abode, !ell Edwards on 23 December 180 I and joined the Trulcr-Somerville party. Ruiter 
Zakriver, possible the same Ruiter who had made peace with Visser in 1799, was granted pcnnission to settle, with 
his people, at the abandoned Cann of Hendrik Korf, "Mi<l<lclplaals", in Buslunanland. Thea!, Records, Vol. IV, 
pp.391 an<l 424. 
39. Kichercr, "Narrative", p.33. The Trnlcr-Somcrville expedition was approached by the San captain 
"Caricacoup" on 7 November 180 I al Mod<lcrfontein, just before the t'Kaaraap pass. Ile gave them some salt and 
they gave him some trinkets and tobacco. Sec pp458-59 below for the probable fate of Caricacoup. 
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THE SECOND PHASE OF THE SAK RIVER MISSION 
It caimot be said that the /Xam of Buslunanland were pleased at the prospect of the missionaries' 
return. Indeed, some of the Sak River /Xam who, according to Kicherer, had expressed "a great 
desire for our return", mischievously gave them false information that considerable rain had fallen 
in the wilderness. After three days without water this was discovered to be a lie and the large 
flocks and herds of the Christians were in distress. Nor was this all for, when the first spring was 
reached, it was found to have been poisoned with serpents' heads. After recourse to prayer the 
missionaries were rewarded with "showers of blessing" but, no sooner had their stock recovered 
than eighty of their oxen were stolen. Although Kicherer's Khoikhoi succeeded in recovering 
seventy-three of the stolen cattle from the San robbers it was more than apparent that there was 
scant welcome for the missionaries in Buslunanland.40 
The sojourn of the missionaries at the Orange River had, inevitably, disturbed the pattern of 
peaceful co-existence which their presence at the Sak River had been supposed to promote. 
Without their mission to act as a distribution centre for gifts of livestock and tobacco4 l within the 
Roggeveld/Buslunanland region the San had returned to their old ways with a vengeance. The 
severe drought of 1800, 1801 and 1802 created circumstances whereby the resumption of a 
nomadic lifestyle became imperative.42 Even the San at Visser's fann had abandoned him in 
August 1801 and trekked off over the Roggeveld. Before they did so, however, they broke into the 
school house which he had built and also into the grain shed of a neighbouring farmer. Visser was 
incensed enough to ask Maritz to send out a conunando - an indication that at some point between 
September 1799 and August 180 l he had resigned as veldcornet - but Maritz was no doubt 
delighted to be able to find good reasons to refuse this request from a person he characterised as a 
"Belials mannen".43 
There had been earlier indications that the San were no longer predisposed to keep the peace. In 
September 1800 a conunando was despatched to the vicinity of the Groot River in pursuit of San 
40. Kichercr, "Narrative", pp.33-35. 
41. The inhabitants of the Roggevel<l acknowlc<lged that whilst gills of livestock an<l game kept the San from 
committing acts of robbery, they preferred tobacco an<l dagga above all else. CA, I3R 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.- 7 Jan. 
1805. 
42. For evidence of the severe drought of these years sec CA, I/STU 10/153, Marilz - Landdrost, 9 Sept. 1800; 
CA, 1/STB 10/153, Maritz - Landdrost, 19 Oct. 1801·, CA, l/STI3 10/153, Maritz - Landdrost, 6 May 1801. See 
also Lichtenstein, Tral'els, Vol. 2, p.231. 
43. CA, 1/STB I0/153, Maritz - Landdrosl, Aug. 1801. It was possible that Visser was troubled by ill health at 
this lime. Ile had been expected lo accompany the Truler-Somerville expedition lo the Tswana in October 180 I but 
"was not able from indisposition lo accompany the commission", Thea!, Records, Vol. IV, p.362. 
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robbers who had chosen the cattle of Gerrit Visser, Floris's son, as their target. By May 180 I, the 
date when Kicherer and his followers departed for the Orange River, there was a perception that 
the peace with the San was now in tatters and would remain so for as long as the missionaries 
were away. Gerrit Maritz and Jacob Kruger (Jacob Kruger, Jacob's son, was the erstwhile 
currency forger and fugitive from justice - not the same man as Jacob Kruger the veldcornet of 
the Klein Roggeveld)44 wrote to the landdrost from the Roggeveld to suggest that the time had 
arrived for a new peace initiative, in which Kruger would supersede Visser as "peace maker" to 
the San. 
Jacob Kruger's credentials for this post were, so he claimed, that he had lived at peace amongst 
the San for thirteen years. These years would have fallen between his flight from the colony in 
1783 and the date of his letter, 1801.45 During this time he and his brother Carel had survived as 
elephant hunters, living with the Korana on both sides of the Orange River. Carel was trampled to 
death by a enraged wounded elephant near Kareeberg in 1791. According to Lichtenstein Carel's 
Korana companions, on discovering the mangled corpse of their leader, assumed that he had been 
killed by the San of the Kareeberg. They went in pursuit of these suspects and, with knobkierries 
and assegais, clubbed and stabbed them to death. On viewing his brother's corpse Jacob realised 
that the San had been innocent but it was, perhaps, this incident that somewhat soured his 
relations with the Karceberg San.46 
44. For details concerning Jacob Kruger and his brother Carel see E. Mossop, "Lives of the Earlier Krugers", 
pp.209-217, 225-227. Lichtenstein described Jacob Kruger, whom he met in 1805, as follows: "Guilt and 
repentance had made deep furrows on his countenance: he spoke little, and scarcely ever was his mouth distended 
into a smile. In his sunken eyes was an expression rather of contempt of danger, than of youthful courage. A large 
grey beard, thick eye-brows, and long hair hanging over his face gave him a wild and fonnidable appearance. He 
was anned with a short, thick elephant gun, which carried shot of a quarter of a pound weight." Travels, Vol. 2, 
p.253. 
45. Mossop was not aware of the existence of Jacob Kmgcr's letter of 1801 when he compiled his "Lives of the 
Earlier Krugers". The letter is to be found in CA, 1/STB 10/153, Jacob Kruger - Landdrost, 6 May 180 I. It is 
probably as well to clear up a misunderstanding derived from Barrow and repeated by E. and F. Bradlow in their 
edition of William Somerville's Narrative, (p. 71, n). The Kruger brothers did not escape from Robben Island in a 
boat made of dried skins. They were, however, joined by a Robben Island escapee, Jan Jurgen Meyer, in 1785. Sec 
Mossop, "Lives", pp.216-217. 
46. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.266-267; E. and F. Bradlow, Somerville, pp.71-72. Carel was buried under a 
pile of stones at a place known as Carel Kruger's Graf or Graffontcin (about thirty miles north of Camarvon). ·n1e 
grave was adorned with elephant bones and the skull of a hartebecst. In October 180 I a certain Jurgen Kok, 
returning from the Orange River, saw fit to saw off the hartcbccst horns and make tobacco pipes from them. (E. 
and F. Uradlow, Some111i/le, pp.71-72; Thea!, Records, Vol. IV, p.368). Jacob, who accompanied both the Trutcr-
Somcrvillc expedition in l 80 l and Lichtcnslcin's parly or l 805, was able to repair the grave 011 these occasions. 
(Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.267). Sec also Mossop, "Lives", p.217. 
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He admitted to the landdrost that he had only made peace with them the year before Visser's 
peace initiative, i.e., about 1797. He implied, however, that it was he who should receive credit 
for pacifying them a full year before Visser had approached them. Now that they were once more 
engaged in acts of robbery he, Jacob Kruger, out of a desire to promote the welfare of the land, 
was prepared to re-open negotiations with this "inconstant people". All he asked in exchange for 
this selfless offer was that he be allowed to shoot game, both for himself and the San, during the 
course of his undertaking. He also asked that he be re-granted his farms in the Nieuweveld, the 
payment for which had lapsed during his unavoidable absences from the region (due to drought 
and conunando duty) and which had resulted in the unwelcome occupancy of his property by 
Dawit Hom and Jan Bosch.47 
Maritz supported Kruger's suggestions most strongly, emphasising that "Jacob Kruger is de eerst 
vrede maake geweest lang voor Floris Visser aan de groote rivier in ook ande Care bergen toen 
Visser gaga.an is hat Kruger haar luij over gehadt to vreede". The San would be used to Kruger, 
argued Maritz, whereas if Hom was allowed to occupy his fanns he would stir up trouble 
amongst them. If Kruger was allowed to go to the Kareeberg he would help to restore the peace in 
the absence of Kicherer.48 We do not know whether Kruger was inunediately allowed to reoccupy 
his old fanns but it does not seem as though the authorities were willing to give him unconditional 
freedom of action.49 He was, instead, probably obliged to accompany the Truter-Somerville 
47. CA, 1/STB 10/153, Jacob Kmger - Landdrost, 6 May 1801; Maritz -Landdrost, 7 May 1801. TI1e fact that 
Jacob Kruger had registered the loan-fanns "Ratel Vontyn" and "Blom Vontyn" in the Nieuweveld (there is no 
record of this in the RLR records) before 180 I, as well as the fact that he had been sununoned to participate in 
conunandos in Graaff-Reinet in September 1800 and April 180 I, suggests that he had been pardoned before these 
dates. Lichtenstein (Travels, Vol. 2, p.253) states that he returned to the colony afier Card's death and obtained a 
pardon on condition that he furnished the govenunent with the infonnation he had obtained <luring his wanderings 
beyond the colony. Barrow's supposition - that he was brought a pardon by the Truter-Somerville expedition would 
seem to be incorrect, since the expedition post-dated Jacob's letter of May 180 I. (E. and F. Bra<llow, Some,ville, 
p. 71, n. 94 ). It is, however, clear that Jacob was expected to accompany and assist the expedition. Surprisingly, 
Mossop fails to realise that the Jacob Kruger who accompanied Truter-Somerville (and, later Lichtenstein), was the 
same Jacob Kruger who fled the colony in 1783. Burchell's statement - that Jacob was only allowed to return to the 
colony afier the second British occupation (Travels, Vol. I, p.144) is obviously incorrect. 
48. "Jacob Kmger was the first peace maker, long before Floris Visser went to the Great River or the kareeberg. 
When Visser went Kruger had already turned them to peace." CA, l /STB I 0/15 3, Maritz - Landdrost, 7 May 180 I. 
49. An interesting observation in Colonel Collins' report of 1809 throws some light on this matter. Commenting 
on the appropriateness of the situation of the Sak River mission station Collins remarked: "Should any objection 
arise to the re-occupancy of this spot, the Bloom or Raatel Fontein, al the distance or one or two days' journey east 
of it, might be chosen, and would perhaps be even preferable, as it is said to afford better water and pasturage. Mr 
Kicherer, at whose disposal it seems government had !ell a large tract, situated between the Riel and l.,ak Rivers, 
had pennitted an inhabitant named Krieger to take this spot as a temporarv residence, in consequence of his 
friendly disposition towards the Bosjesmen." Moodie, '/1,e Record, Vol. V, p.23. In 1806 it is recorded that 
Kruger was granted two adjoining frmns, "<le Bloemfontein and de Damsfo1itein between the Steenkampsberg and 
the boundary of the hindmost Nieuwevel<l." Mossop, "Lives", p.226. 
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expedition and, in any event, Visser did not lose his pre-eminent position as peace maker as a 
result of the intervention of Kruger and Maritz. 
In fact, in August 1801, Visser requested pennission to journey to the Orange River so as to join 
the missionaries and visit the San. Maritz was strongly opposed to this, maintaining that Kicherer 
had told him that the disturbances an10ngst the San, and their flight from his mission station, 
dated from Visser's last visit to them. Maritz urged that, should the landdrost nevertheless see fit 
to grant Visser his request, he should not be entrusted with the colonists' donations of livestock, 
nor be allowed to go with a group of people. Visser's custom of travelling with a large retinue of 
Khoikhoi and "Bastaards", claimed Maritz, worked against the interests of the San, since the 
colonial party shot so much game that there was nothing left for the supposed recipients of this 
largesse to hunt. They were, in consequence, obliged to steal, thereby nullifying the object of the 
exercise, whilst Maritz and his men were punctiliously collecting donations of livestock. Maritz 
concluded his protest by urging the landdrost not to allow Visser to undertake any initiative 
without his, Maritz's, fore-knowledge.50 
As it happened Visser was too ill to journey to the Orange at that time5 l but, d~spite Maritz's 
vilification's, he seems to have remained indispensable. In February 1802 a report came from 
Gerrit Snyman, of Riet River in the Roggeveld, that Visser had once again succeeded in making 
peace with some of the San. Since these people were now returning to visit the colonists there was 
a need to supply them with meat and Snyman therefore requested, in Visser's name, that the 
landdrost supply powder and shot for a hunting party.52 It is evident that Visser - called "Father" 
by the San - retained his authority until at least the end of 1804, supervising the distribution of 
livestock and game to the San and exerting an unrivalled influence over them.53 In September 
1803 Visser had been well enough to act as guide to the LMS missionary, Aart van der Lingen. 
The latter individual had joined his colleagues Edwards and Kok, far to the north of the Orange 
River, in their mission to the Tlhaping around Dithakong.54 The fact that the South African 
Missionary Society recommended Visser as Van der Lingen's guide is further testimony to the 
frontiersman's enduring reputation for both piety and pioneering prowess. 
50. CA, 1/STB I 0/153, Maritz - Lan<ldrost, Aug. 180 I. 
51. Sec note above. 
52. CA, 1/STB 10/153, Gerrit Snyman - Lan<l<lrost, 20 Feb. 1802. 
53. CA, BR 61, Rcsolusies, 3 Jan.- 7 Jan. 1805. Kichcrcr too was called "father" or "Ebo" by the San. Sec 
Narratil'e, p. lO. 
54. Du Bruyn, "Sending on<ler <lie Thlaping", pp. 34-35. 
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In March 1802, however, those missionaries who had returned from the Orange River found the 
situation around the Sak River to be far from settled. Any hopes that Kicherer's presence would 
have an instant calming effect were dashed following the hostile reception which his passage 
through Bushmanland had provoked. Though there was a strong case to be made for knuckling 
down to the task of fonning a "regular settlement" at the Sak River Kicherer decided to visit Cape 
Town first. After months spent in the wilderness the impulse behind this trip is understandable as 
Kicherer needed to restore himself and obtain replenishing supplies for the mission. The 
government's faith in the beneficial aspects of his endeavours were obviously undiminished since 
General Dundas, the governor, gave the missionary a gift of 100 pounds. A large part of the 
money was spent on clothing for future converts since Kicherer deemed such articles to be 
necessary adornments for Christians. Despite tempting and repeated offers to accept the vacant 
post at the Roodezand church (which Vos had vacated under a cloud of ill-deserved scandal)55 
Kicherer returned to the Sak River where, together with Scholtz, the great work began anew.56 
From the outset it was apparent that the focus of evangelical effort would now be the more 
receptive Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" of the vicinity. The majority of the 
San had displayed, in no uncertain terms, their indifference to the gospel and their rejection of the 
discipline of mission station life. But, according to Kicherer, large numbers of Khoikhoi flocked 
to the re-established mission, including "hundreds" from the Cedarberg in 1803.57 In time a 
church, a dwelling house, a vegetable garden and a cattle kraal were constructed. Eventually, too, 
the baptised converts built themselves "decent habitations, in the Farmer's style" whilst the 
unbaptised erected Khoikhoi huts behind the house. Since the church (about sixty feet by thirty) 
and dwelling house were built of stone a considerable expenditure of labour was required and 
Kicherer did not find the "naturally indolent" Khoikhoi keen to supply it. Only after threatening 
his flock with his departure to take up the living at Roodezand did Kicherer blackmail them into 
consenting to work for two hours a day.58 Sometimes, something more than moral persuasion 
was necessary59 and it was, perhaps, fortunate that the local fanners lent him two slaves - one a 
55. Vos had been accused of conuuitting adultery with various women in Roodezand and of fathering a child on 
his woman servant. Even though he confessed that "I have been married 21 years to a creature (0 God, deliver me 
from her!) who has no natural love for me and is foll of sulks and moodiness", he docs not seem to have acted as his 
enemies claimed. See Bocsckcn and Cairns, 1Jie Secluded Valley, pp. I 05-108 for details. 
56. Kichcrcr, Narrative, p.36; Reize11, p.266. 
57. Kicherer, Reize11, p.279. 
58. Kichcrcr, Narralive, pp.36-37. 
59. On I June 1802 Kichercr wrote to the lcmddrost requesting him to order Veldcomet Jacobus Ncl to capture a 
certain "Uastaard" by the name of Stollcl who had been at the mission. Stoffel was to be taken to Stellenbosch and 
punished because "deese Bastert heell zeer vecl Brutaliteiten en andere slegte dingen by mij begaan, dikwils heh ik 
horn in vriendclyke gewaar-schuurd, <lag alles vrugtcloos, zoo <lat ik my in de uittcrstc nood sakelykheid bcvind om 
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carpenter and the other a mason - for without their help the building work would have advanced 
extremely slowly.60 
Spiritually, sufficient progress had been made by 3 October 1802 to warrant the baptism of four 
Khoikhoi men and two women. The ceremony was witnessed by - amongst other colonists - Gerrit 
Maritz, and tremendous enthusiasm accompanied these conversions.61 Further baptisms followed 
and on Christmas Day, 1802, another four men and twelve women became converts. By the time 
Kichercr and Scholtz left Sak River on 17 January 1803 there were eight-three baptised heathen 
at the settlement out of a total of about six hundred people. 62 The large number of mission 
adherents is impressive testimony both to the appeal of the gospel and to the substantial amount 
of material support which was being donated. Without contributions from the ZAG and the 
colonial farmers it would have been impossible for such a multitude to sustain itself in a region 
normally lacking in natural abundance.63 
This was, however, the peak of missionary success at the Sak River. The departure of Kicherer 
and Scholtz in January 1803 was an undoubted dan1per on the recently kindled spirits of the 
neophytes and was, for this reason, ill advised. 64 But Kicherer was detennined to go to Europe 
and exhibit examples of converted Khoikhoi to interested or influential Christians. Partly, no 
doubt, this resolution was shaped by the laudable intention of obtaining greater encouragement 
and support (both spiritual and financial) for the South African missionary field. Kicherer's own 
explanation for his visit to Europe was that he was in poor health; that he had to attend to 
u wcl e<lde te versoeken my hier in le assistentie te vertrekken, op <lat sulks zo voor hom als voor andere 
kwaadwillige van mijn volk, tot een mi<ldel moegt vertrekken om niet !anger de goe<le behandeling welke onder 
hun plaats heell, te misbruiken, voor mij, geloof dat <le gevolgen van zeer veel vrugt sullen zijn." In a post script 
Kicherer a<l<le<l: "versoeke echter niet meerde straf als een goed pak slaagen." CA, 1/STB 10/153, Kicherer -
Lan<ldrost, I June 1802. 
60. Kicherer, "Narrative", pp.36-38. 
61. Kichcrer, "Reizc", pp.273-276; "Narrative", pp.40-44. Maritz was probably making a conscious effort to 
replace Visser as the friend of the missionaries. 
62. See CA, VC 658, Extract uit hel Dagboek der Gemecnte Jesu Christe aan de Zak Rivier, 1802-1805. 
63. It is probable that some of these people lived in small kraals scattered about the mission within a circuit of 
three to four miles. This, at least, was what Lichtenstein reported in 1805. "All these places were the habitations 
only of single families, and all had a like melancholy aspect. A little scanty spring, a hut of rushes, full of filth and 
vennin, a little cattle kraal, with a low fence round it, and, al the utmost, eight or ten meagre oxen, are the most 
striking objects by which such a spot, standing in the midst of a most naked and unfruitlhl district, is distinguished. 
The Ilollcntots who have selected such a place of residence belong to Kicherer's Institution; but have separated 
themselves from the rest, or being the richer part of the community, and not willing to share their wealth with their 
poorer brethren." Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.433-434. 
64. Kicherer's restlessness is one of the reasons Du Plessis believes the mission failed. Sec Christiw, Alissions, 
p.105. 
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important domestic concerns; and that he wished to consult with the Directors of the LMS on the 
best measures to be adopted in the future.65 Perhaps, though, Kicherer was not altogether 
unmoved by the agreeable knowledge that his "Hottentots" - a man and two women - would cause 
a sensation in Europe and that he would be feted wherever he went. 66 Though it seems churlish 
to begrudge Kicherer this small pleasure we should note that his detractors were loath to credit 
him with these conversions67 and it could well be asked whether it was advisable to test the 
steadfastness of those new converts who stayed behind by leaving them, so soon, without his 
guidance. The simultaneous departure of Scholtz, who sought to further his fonnal education, left 
the bereaved faithful under the guidance of a colonist by the name of Christiaan Botma. Though 
Botma had been with Kicherer, Kramer, Anderson and Scholtz at the Orange River,68 and though 
he was regarded by all who met him as worthy and pious, he seems to have lacked the charisma 
of Kicherer. 69 
Under Botma's supervision the number of adherents to the mission had fallen, by July 1804, to 
ninety-five, thirteen of whom could read and sixteen of whom could write.70 This was, however, 
by no means a stable population as membership fluctuated according to the supplies obtainable at 
the mission or the availability of natural resources elsewhere. There was, moreover, a change in 
the composition of the membership for when Lichtenstein visited the mission in May 1805 he 
observed that: 
Most of those that remained here were Bastard-Hottentots: several of them were 
entirely white; and the greater part had been baptised before they came hither: some 
65. Kicherer, "Narrative", p.46. 
66. Elsa Joubert, in her novel Missionaris, (based on the life of the LMS missionary Van der Lingen) pcrcipiently 
suggests that Kicherer was attempting to duplicate the excitement which greeted the arrival of Omai, a native of 
Huahine, in England in 1774. See Missionaris (Cape Town, 1989) pp.262-3. On Omai see B. Smith, European 
Vision, pp.58-60, 80, 101, 105, 107. On the reception of the "Hottentots" in England see Anonymous, "The 
Converted Hottentots" (London, 1804 ). See also Lichtenstein's caustic conunents in Travels, Vol. 2, p.231. 
67. Lichtenstein stated that the converts "had several years before been baptised at Cape Town by the preacher 
Fleck." Travels, Vol. 2, p.231. Kicherer took care to stress that all three had been baptised by him. The first, 
Martha Arcndse, was an elderly widow ofKhoikhoi parentage who had been born in Graaff-Reinct but who came to 
Kichercr from the vicinity of Cape Town in order to be his housekeeper. The second, Klaas van Rooij was a 
Khoikhoi and married to the third, Sara Fortuin. Sara was, on her mother's side, descended from the Khoikhoi but 
her father was a Bouganese slave. Both had come from the Koue Bokkeveld and Cedarberg to join Kichcrcr. 
"Reizen", p.281. 
68. Thea!, Records, Vol. IV, p.373. 
69. "Mr K. Jell the congregation under the care or Mr. Botma, a worthy pious man, a native, who had been a 
Fanner, but being delcnnined to devote himsclr lo the service or Christ and souls, he had sold all his good and 
become a preacher of the Gospel." Kicherer, "Nmrntive", p48, note. See also Lichtenstein's comments, Travels, 
Vol 2, pp.231-232. 
70. De Jongh, "Sendingwerk", p.273. 
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were even born of christian (sic) parents. Not one among them were pure absolute 
Hottentots: all of that description had forsaken the institution: those that remained 
were of the old original stock, the elect that Kichcrer had brought with him to fonn 
and instruct the others: these alone adhered steadily to their calling.71 
Thus, the mission which had been founded to minister to the San was, if we are to believe 
Lichtenstein, no longer ministering either to them or to the Khoikhoi. Nor was the quality of those 
who remained at the mission station much to enthuse over: 
they would have been much better employed in the service of the colonists, providing 
for their wants by industry, than pursuing, as they did here, lives wholly useless, and 
abandoned to sloth. Their indolence was indeed absolutely insupportable: instead of 
occupying themselves in husbandry, or at least in taking care of the few cattle 
remaining to them, they passed the whole day in their huts in complete idleness .. .The 
whole stock of sheep and cattle, which at first had been very large, was now reduced 
to about tl1ree hundred sheep and forty oxen. The kraals where they used to be 
inclosed at night were fallen into ruins, and no attempt was ever made to repair 
them; the cattle lay among the huts, or were left to run about at their pleasure; in 
consequence of this the little garden which the missionary once had was all trodden 
down, the springs were fouled, and other mischief was done by them. In short, such 
was the universal sloth and negligence, that no one could remain here, but with great 
reluctance, and from strong necessity. Botma had, indeed, made some efforts to 
correct these abuses, by setting a good example in his own person. He had enclosed 
a piece of land of about an acre and a half, with a hedge, which was destined for 
growing com, and vegetables for the kitchen; but more than once a whole side of the 
hedge had been carried away by his pupils to spare themselves the trouble of going 
further for firewood. 72 
The landdrost of the newly proclaimed district of Tulbagh, Henry van der Graaf, who was with 
Lichtenstein at the time, threatened to carry away these indolent loafers to labour at the public 
works if they did no exert themselves for their own maintenance. Botma, who had neither the 
means nor the inclination to enforce industry, could only hope that the return of Kicherer would 
see the conunencement of a more fortunate era in the institution's history.73 Alas, this was not to 
be. 
71. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol 2, p.233. 
72. Ibid, pp.233-234. 
73. Ibid, pp.234-235. 
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THE END OF THE SAK RIVER MISSION 
Kicherer's departure for Europe had coincided with the advent of a new Government at the Cape. 
From early 1803 to 1806 the short-lived Batavian Republic replaced the British as rulers. With 
few exceptions the Batavians were extremely ill-disposed towards missionaries and their 
activities.74 Since the San had displayed their hostility to both the civilising and evangelising 
efforts of the missionaries the new government was obliged to place far greater reliance on the 
temporal authorities of the frontier zone - a shift in emphasis which, in any case, it welcomed. 
Relations between trekboers and the San remained uneasy. Like their predecessors the Batavians 
felt obliged to address this problem and stamp government authority over the restless people of 
the frontier zone. One of the measures taken in order to achieve this end was an administrative 
reforn1 - the division of the colony into more districts or drostdies. Thus it was that the huge 
magisterial area of Stellenbosch was sub-divided in 1804, its northern hinterland detached to 
fonn the district of Tulbagh, and a new drostdy of that name being established at Roodezand. At 
the same time a slight northerly adjustment of the colonial boundary was made so that the limits 
of the colony were now deemed to run along the Sak rather than the Riet River.75 
A second step towards increasing govenunent authority within the frontier zone was for the new 
landdrost of Tulbagh, Henry van der Graaf, to undertake a journey to the north and enter into 
negotiations with the San. It was the government's policy, according to Lichtenstein: 
to regulate the relations between the colonists on the northern boundary, and the 
wandering Bosjesmans of that neighbourhood, and to ,,atch particularly over the 
behaviour of each party towards the other. It was the earnest wish of the govenunent 
to put an end to the robberies and plunderings of these savages by mild and kind 
treatment, and by tl1is means gradually to remove the ancient hatred borne them by 
the colonists of the Roggeveld, and the Lower Bokkeveld. 76 
Although these policies were by no means original the need for their implementation was brought 
home to the authorities most strongly in November l 804. In that month Van der Graaf was 
infonned, by Veldcommandant Jacob Kruger, of an incident which had taken place on 13 August. 
On that date Pieter Ollsen (or Oelsen), the knecht of a certain Leopold Hcuzen (alternatively 
74. TI1e most thorough analysis of the relationship between the Batavians and the missionaries is to be found in 
P.S. de Jongh's "Sendingwerk In Die Landdrosdistrikte Stellenbosch En Tulbagh". See also W.M. Freund, "TI1e 
Cape under the transitional governments, 1795-1814", in Elphick and Giliomee ( eds. ),71,e Shaping of South Ajifran 
Society, 1652-18./0 (Cape Town, 1989), pp.340-341. 
75. J.P. van der Meme, Die Kaap Under Die IJataafse Republiek 1803-1806. (Amsterdam, 1926),pp.127-139; 
J.S. Bergh and JC. Visag1e, 71,e Last Cape Frontier Zone 1660-1980 (Durban, 1985), pp.18-19. 
76. Lichtenstein, Trc/\'els, Vol. 2, p.189. 
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Huyser or Heuser),77 had killed four of the followers of the San Captain, Goedhart, in the vicinity 
of the Sak River. Gocdhart had threatened that, if he had not received satisfaction within the 
space of five months, he would take his own revcnge.78 
When this alanning intelligence reached Governor J.W. Janssens, he and his Council decided to 
restore peace between "the frontiersmen and the indigenes" as quickly as possible by despatching 
a "solemn commission" to investigate the matter on the spot. Van der Graaf was duly delegated to 
lead the conunission but, not surprisingly, by the time he arrived in the Roggeveld Pieter Ollsen 
was not to be found. The district was suffering from a terrible drought and the local fanners were 
in a state of continuous flux, moving their livestock from one place to another and certainly not 
remaining south of the Sak River. In these circumstances there was bound to be conflict between 
the San and the colonists. In fact, whilst Van der Graafs commission waited for Captain 
Gocdhart to respond to their invitation to negotiate, an incident occurred which was probably all 
too typical of the Sak River frontier. Two Khoisan servants of a local colonist, Jan Botma, were 
killed by a group of San under the authority of Dirk Pampier - a man known to Floris Visser 
(who was assisting the conunission) as a cattle thief. This news caused Goedhart, who was 
travelling south from Schietfontein in the Kareeberg, to turn back, since he feared he would be 
held responsible for the slayings by the colonists. Visser was quickly sent to assure him that this 
would not be the case and, on 16 December, Goedhart and his followers met to parley with the 
colonial commission.79 
Thanks to the linguistic skills of Visser's son, Gerrit, a peace settlement was achieved. Goedhart, 
who was accused of having been responsible for three different robberies, was promised a 
Captain's staff if he kept the peace. No doubt he was also promised that Ollsen would be brought 
to justice. Lichtenstein, who was not at the meeting, reported that: 
the negotiators succeeded so far as to obtain promises, on the part of the Bosjemans, 
that in consideration of the yearly tribute of cattle to be paid them, they would 
maintain a quiet and peaceable conduct and would deliver up to punishment any one 
who was guilty of violence or plunder. On the other hand, they were solemnly 
promised that no colonist should take into his own hands the right of punishing 
injuries received by him; and that they should not be pursued for past offences. It 
was alleged that the government should take upon itself the arrangement of all 
differences, and send, every year, proper conunissions to hear any complaints they 
might have to make, and to sec that justice was done them. This interview lasted a 
77. De Villiers and Pama, Vol. I, p.347, describes Johann Leopold Heuser as a "bekcndc skaap-en veeboer". 
78. CA, BR 57, Resolusics, 21 Nov.- 29 Nov. 1804, 23 Nov. 1804, pp.28-31. 
79. Ibid. 
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whole week, and was made the more agreeable to the savages, from their being 
entertained by the landdrost during the whole time that it continued, and from their 
being dismissed with a considerable present of live sheep. At parting, they were 
promised that within six months the landdrost would return, that the negotiation 
might be regularly and solenmly concluded, when he would bring them many 
presents.SO 
This arrangement, like all the others which had preceded it, suffered from major drawbacks. It 
had been concluded with only one group of the San and was therefore not binding to any other 
groups. Similarly, there was no effective way of enforcing the provisions of the agreement since a 
biannual visit from distant conunissioners - even if it took place, was hardly likely to keep the 
peace. Drought was the pressing necessity which drove rival groups to compete for scarce 
resources and, so long as it occurred, conflict was virtually inevitable. 
At the same time as Floris Visser was assisting Van der Graaf at the Sak River a petition, 
composed by the inhabitants of the Middle Roggevcld, reached Governor Janssen and the Council 
of Policy. This request, written in September 1804, took three months to reach the governor and 
amounted to a thorough indictment of Floris Visser. Though no signatures were appended to the 
copy received by the governor the provenance of the document, as well as its contents, make it 
more than likely that it was yet another broadside fired by Gerrit Maritz against his inveterate 
enemy. The authors of the petition were no doubt aware of the scepticism with which the 
Batavian authorities viewed the endeavours of the LMS missionaries for they took pains to link 
all that was, in their eyes, objectionable about the Sak River mission station to Visser's baleful 
influence. It was Visscr's insistence on education and fatherly love (they argued) that encouraged 
the continuation of such an unproductive community. Likewise, his role - as provider of livestock 
and game to the San, though it had contributed to the maintenance of peace, was a cloak to mask 
self-interest. Exaggerating his own authority Visser abused his position of "teacher" to the San in 
order to indulge in all sorts of dubious activities. For instance, (his detractors continued) a year 
ago he had made it known that he intended to journey to the Great River in order to placate a 
hostile group of San who had vowed to ravage the Roggevcld. This group had, apparently, been 
attacked by some Korana and swore that, unless they were recompensed, they would attack the 
colony. Although this all seemed very unlikely to the Roggevclders Visser had, none the less, 
journeyed northwards. But, far from concluding peace with the San of the Orange River (who 
had, in any event, been peaceful long before Visser arrived) Visser crossed over the river in 
80. Lichlcnslcin, Travels, Vol. 2, p.191. 
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January 1804 "en zelfs tot de Briquas is geryst, en waarschynlijk met een geheel ander oog merk 
metals met de Bosjemans vreede te maake".81 
Despite these insinuations the petitioners from the Middle Roggeveld did not suggest that Visser 
and his son Gerrit be stripped of their exclusive rights to hunt game over the Sak River. Instead, 
they acknowledged that the provision of game to the San was essential and implied that the 
Vissers were the best men for the job. They did, however, request that the Vissers be prohibited 
from going to the Orange River without pern1ission and that their supplies of ammunition be 
rationed. What caused them the greatest concern was the unprecedented destruction of game 
which had taken place in all of the districts of the northern frontier zone. Partly this was due to 
the colonists of these regions wishing to spare their own stock. But, ironically, the problem was 
also compounded by colonists who shot game for the San in order to buy their goodwill. The 
consequences of such excessive and unregulated hunting were ultimately disastrous, for the San, 
not being able to hunt for themselves, ended up stealing the colonists' stock anyway. Elands, 
quaggas, "wilde ezels" and buffaloes were especially scarce and the petitioners suggested that a 
fine of one hundred Rijksdaalders be levied on those found guilty of shooting them without 
permission.82 Thus the petition, which had started as an attack on Floris Visser, concluded with a 
plea for stricter control over hunters in Bushmanland. It was a sad indication that the 
extern1ination of game had already reached a magnitude which threatened the existence of the 
San. This, combined with the droughts, undermined all long-tenn prospects for peaceful co-
existence. 
The impossibility of achieving a lasting peace in these circumstances was brought home to those 
representatives of the Batavian government who, in 1805, sought to consolidate the negotiations 
of the previous year. In May 1805 Landdrost Van der Graaf, accompanied by Lichtenstein, left 
Tulbagh with the intention of journeying, via the Roggeveld and the Sak River, to the Tswana. 
That year a great many colonists had left the heights of the Roggeveld escarpment and come 
down to the still parched Tanqua Karoo a lot earlier than usual on account of the extreme 
drought, horse sickness and intensified San attacks. There had been attacks in February and, 
more recently, more than two hundred cattle and an even greater quantity of sheep had been 
stolen. Herdsmen and shepherds had been killed whilst the corpse of the landdrost's Khoikhoi 
81. CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.- 7 Jan. 1805, petition from the inhabitants of the Roggevel<l to the Commissaris 
for Tulbagh, H. L. Blettenuan, which he forwar<le<l to the Governor General, Janssen, and the Council of Policy, 11 
December 1804, pp.50-56. "And himself went to the 13riquas with, probably, completely different intentions than 
making peace with the 13ushmen." 
82. CA, BR 61, Resolusies, 3 Jan.- 7 Jan. 1805. 
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messenger was found riddled with arrows. From the Nieuweveld too came reports of substantial 
stock loss so that it seemed as if the entire northern frontier zone was in a renewed state of 
tunnoil. 83 
The government commissioners found that the mission station itself was not exempt from San 
attacks for, on visiting Sak River, they were told that the week before their arrival the flocks 
belonging to those in attendance at the mission had been driven away by the San. Though the 
stock was recovered, two of the "Bastaards" who gave pursuit were wounded by poisoned arrows 
- one fatally.84 
In the meantime, Captain Goedhart, on whom Van der Graaf had pinned so many hopes, proved 
to be a disappointment. According to some San infonnants at the Sak River: 
he was a thorough rascal, on whom no dependence was to be placed: he had begun 
to rob and plunder again inunediately after the landdrost's visit, and the treaty made 
with him: he was, they said, the instigator of all the depredations conunitted; and the 
inforn1ation that we were coming had therefore terrified him to such a degree, that 
he, with all his people, had fled into the Karee mountains. There, they added, we 
might very likely find him, with a herd of four hundred cattle, which he had collected 
by his robberies within the last few months.85 
Notwithstanding the possibly prejudiced source of this information it would seem that Goedhart 
had indeed broken his vows. When the Conunission passed through the Kareeberg on its way to 
the Orange River it found abundant evidence that the San were harbouring stolen cattle there - in 
order to consume them at their lcisure.86 Despite the efforts of the commissioners to re-establish 
peaceful negotiations with Goedhart he took care to avoid them and was still pursuing a 
83. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp. I 90, 208, 212-213; Jacobus Ncl - Landdrost of Tulbagh, 7 Feb. 1805, in 
Thea!, Records of the Cape Colony, Vol. XXXI, p.15. Also J.S. Olivier - Landdrost ofTulbagh, 18 Feb. 1805, in 
1l1eal, Reconis, Vol. XXXI, p.15. 
84. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.236-237. 
85. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.238. 
86. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.258-259. Lichtenstein's comments on the use the San made of livestock are 
important since they confinn that the San consmncd rather than fanned animals, i.e. they remained hunter-gatherers 
rather than pastoralists. "According to the quantity of tracks, our colonists estimated the cattle that they had with 
them at a hundred oxen, and three hundred sheep. With such a stock, the I3osjesmans become shy and full of fears, 
and are not likely to think of commencing an attack. They are not perfectly happy till all is eaten, and they are 
secure that their prey cannot be taken from them. Such a stock therefore docs not last for more than a few weeks, 
since all the I3osjesmans, far and near, when they hear of the fare that is to be had, hasten to partake of it, and the 
company docs not separate till every morsel is demolished." 
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successful career as a stock thief in October, at which date further reports of his robberies were 
received by Van der Graaf.87 
These, and other instances of San hostility,88 encouraged Lichtenstein and Van der Graaf to 
suggest a new method of "civilising" the San. They proposed to Governor Janssens that a force of 
soldiers be sent to assist the colonists. The incorrigible San should, if possible, be captured and 
imprisoned in a place close to Cape Town, Robben Island for instance, where they would be 
forced to work: 
It might then be hoped that, by degrees, though perhaps not till the second 
generation, they would be led to adopt more active and civilised lives. To this, the 
teaching them to have more than one want would essentially contribute, since now 
they had but one - that of food. A double good would in this way be attained; the 
borders would be free from a terrible evil, and these poor creatures would be excited 
to aim at a higher degree of cultivation. As a reward for good behaviour, the best 
might gradually be restored to liberty, and allowed to return home, where they might 
introduce something like civilisation among their countrymen.89 
Though Governor Janssens was unable to adopt this suggestion (partly because he did not have 
the forces available and partly because he and his government were expelled by the British the 
following year) it may be see that the authorities had moved a long way away from the principles 
of the proclamation of 1798 and a belief in the civilising virtues of voluntary Christian 
instruction. The best school was now deemed to be a prison and the best course a spell of hard 
labour. 
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Sak River mission became more and more 
redundant. Even though Kicherer returned to the mission on 8 October 1805, fortified with an 
87. On 8 October Veldcomet J.S. Olivier wrote to Van <ler Graaf to report that two San, Ruyter and Prins, had 
tracked a her<l of stolen cattle to Goedhart's kraal. Just as Olivier was setting out with a conunan<lo to deal with the 
kraal he heard that the San ha<l crossed the Sak River an<l mur<lere<l Christiaan Koopman in the most barbarous 
manner - "43 arrows were found in his bo<ly, together with some wounds from an assegai, and his head had been 
<lashed to pieces with a stone". Fearing that these San were now at loose in the Nieuweveld Olivier's conunando 
returned but were unable to fall in with the killers. Olivier planned to attack Goedhart as soon as he was given 
reinforcements. Letter in Thea!, Records, Vol. XXXl, p.16. 
88. In August 1805 Veldcomet Jacobus Ncl, who ha<l accompanied Van der Graaf an<l Lichtenstein to the 
Roggevel<l, reported to the la11ddrost that in his absence the San ha<l killed two of his father's Khoikhoi an<l stolen 
eight of Isaac Davcl's oxen. Ncl was unable to catch them. The San ha<l also robbed Christopher van Wyk and 
Pieter van Zyl - though two of them ha<l been shot <lca<l in the process. Ncl asked pennission lo organise a 
commando in September. Jacobus Ncl - Lan<l<lrosl of Tulbagh, 20 Aug. 1805, in Thea!, Records, Vol. XXXI, 
pp.15-16. 
89. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.240-241. 
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assistant, new ideas, renewed funding and the support of additional LMS missionaries in the 
southern African field,90 it was not enough. The mission collapsed less than a year later. 
Environmental reasons played a major part in this defeat. A prolonged and serious drought 
afflicted the region. Some indication of the intensity of the drought may be gauged from the fact 
that, by 1806, the Sak River had been entirely dry for six years.91 There was thus insufficient 
grazing for the mission's livestock. No crops could flourish and all the game trekked away. 
These environmental hardships were bad enough for experienced pastoralists like the Khoikhoi 
and "Bastaards" of the mission. For trainee pastoralists or agriculturalists (such as the San were 
supposed to be) they were disastrous, and the hunter-gatherer people had no option but to 
continue their time honoured way of life. The drought made conflict between the San and the 
trekboers inevitable whilst the increasing slaughter of game did little to promote the long-term 
welfare of the San. Colonists were becoming more reluctant to part with donations of livestock92 
and resentful that vast areas of Bushmanland were closed to them. Consequently neither the San 
nor the trekboers observed the prohibition against crossing the boundary of the Sak River and the 
level of violence rapidly escalated to pre-1798 levels. The death of Floris Visser, some time in 
1805, was a further blow to prospects of peace.93 
In November, shortly after Kichercr's return to the mission, there was a massive San raid on the 
Christian's property in which 200 sheep were stolen. These sheep had been purchased from a 
certain H. van Aswegen (proof that donations of livestock were beginning to dry up) and were in 
the process of being driven to the mission station by two "Bastaards" when the San launched a 
night attack, wounding the shepherds and stealing the stock. A conunando was despatched under 
the leadership of Veldcornet J.S. Olivier and, with the assistance of six "peacemaking Buclunen", 
the robbers were tracked beyond the Sak River. It was discovered that the San had also succeeded 
in stealing over a hundred oxen from somewhere else. The oxen were recovered but none of the 
90. Kicherer returned to Cape To\\11 in January with J.G. Ullbrichl, Christian and Abraham Albrecht, Arie Vos 
and J. Seidenfaden. Vos went lo help Kicherer at Sak River. Ullbricht joined Van der Kemp and Seidenfaden and 
the Albrecht brothers went to Namaqualand. LMS, Register of Missionaries, p.6; De Jongh, "Sendingwerk", 
pp.273-276. 
91. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.255. 
92. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.231. 
93. I have not found a direct mention of Visser's death but in December 1805 Veldcomet Snyman of the Middle 
Roggevcld wrote lo the la11ddrost ofTulbagh to report: "I beg to infonn you that the Bushmen have killed about 200 
sheep belonging lo the widow F. Visser, and her servants shot one of the party. I followed their footsteps with a 
conunamlo, but could not follow up the track in consequence of the stones and mountains over which they must 
have passed." Thea!, Hecords, Vol. XXXI, p.18. 
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sheep was left alive. Nine San were killed by the commando but this did nothing to promote the 
mission's viability. 94 
Apart from the hostility of both the environment and the San Kicherer himself must take some of 
the blame for the mission's failure. He had not been back at the Sak River very long before he 
accepted the government's proffered position of minister at Graaff-Reinet. Once more he deserted 
his fragile flock at a crucial time. Though he remained nominal head of the mission his removal to 
Graaff-Reinet was, effectively, the end of the experiment and, on 3 August 1806, the Sak River 
mission was abandoned. 95 Some of the converts trekked north to join the Christian conununity at 
Klaarwater or the new LMS mission at Steinkopf. Others decided to follow Kicherer to Graaff-
Reinet, placing themselves in the temporary employment of the colonists of that vicinity in the 
hope that, one day, the mission would be re-cstablished.96 
There is also evidence that Kicherer's mission aroused extraordinary fear and mistrust amongst 
certain colonial frontiersmen who clearly perceived it to be a device through which the 
govenunent intended to empower the Khoisan whilst imperilling the white fanners. Barrow quotes 
an extract from a letter written by O.A.S. Meyer of the Sneeuberg on 29 January 1803 to a 
certain Cornelis de Kok in Cape Town. The letter does more than "serve to shew ... of what 
deliberate and bloodthirsty ruffians the peasantry of the Cape are composed".97 It also shows 
how rumours circulated between the northern and eastern frontier zones, stirring deep rooted 
insecurities and precipitating acts of violent cruelty: 
I am going to infonn you of something that happened on the 6th of December 1802. About 
the evening three Bosjesmans came to the house of the Burger Cornelis Jansen, having with 
them three pack-oxen (draag-ossen); the said Jansen inunediately reported it to the 
conunandant (Veld-Cornet), who instantly sent an anned party (commando) to his house. 
On the following day, being the 7th, there came twelve more of them, having three guns 
and three pack-oxen; all the rest were well armed with bows, arrows, and hassagays. The 
conunandant Burger went himself to Jansen's in the morning to ask the reason of their 
coming there, when he discovered that eight of them were Koranas and seven Bosjesmans. 
Being asked by the party what they came to do, they said they were come to beg a little 
dacha (hemp) and tobacco. The conunandant had the same answer, but he understood the 
way to question them so closely, that he brought them to open confession (by horrid 
tortures no doubt), that they came to examine how their fanns (plaatzen) were to be 
attacked; and also to see if there was water enough to come with a great troop. Being asked 
94. Thea!, Records, Vol. XXXI, pp.17-18. 
95. De Jongh, "Sen<lingwerk", pp.276-278. 
96. De Jongh, "Sen<lingwerk", pp.278-281; Du Plessis, Christian Missions, p. l 05. 
97. Uarrow, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.53-54. 
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who had sent them, they answered Truter98 and the English missionary Kicherer, in order 
to spy the places, and return to the kraal where Kicherer and Truter would wait their 
return, to furnish them with musquets, powder and ball. On being asked how they were to 
execute it? they answered, by attacking the fann-houses by two and two at the same time, 
so that they could not assist one another. ALL THE FIFTEEN WE HA VE SHOT DEAD 
(doodgeschooten), HA YING FIRST EXTORTED THIS CONFESSION FROM THEM. 
The hat which Truter gave to the captain we have got; it is a black one with a silver band, 
and a cane with a brass head, on which is engraved "Captain Kauwinnoub".99 Mark now 
with what murderous intentions is this Truter inspired against us! To have us all massacred 
in our houses! 100 
This appalling episode, at the very least, reveals that popular opinion in the colony was capable 
of viewing Kicherer's mission with intense and irrational hostility. It is doubtful whether such 
misconceptions were restricted to the Sneeuberg and in all likelihood many colonists were 
powerfully opposed to the mission, thereby contributing to its failure. 
On a less extreme level of opposition, critical contemporaries, like Lichtenstein, caimot have been 
surprised by the mission's demise. "Such an institution bore in itself the germs of its downfall," 
he proclaimed in May 1805. "He [Kicherer] as well as Van der Kemp, seemed wholly to forget 
that mankind were destined to work as well as to pray."101 If, to the colonial mind, the Khoikhoi, 
"Bastaard-Hottentots" and "Bastaards" were so idle as to require prodding instead of prayers then 
the San were even more unlikely to become "civilised" by exposure to the gospel alone. Both 
Macartney and Barrow had known this and attempted to "impress them with a sense of the 
benefits arising from pennanent property"; but they did not, however, appreciate the obstacles 
towards realising this goal. The San were not pastoralists and they did not come from societies \ 
which were culturally receptive to concepts such as private property or animal husbandry. Nor 
did they occupy a region either environmentally or politically suitable for the trai1sition that was 
expected of them. The failure of the Sak River mission - and with it the failure of the 1798 peace 
proposals - was, with hindsight, pre-determined. 
98. The Tmter in question here is Petms Johannes Tmter, member of the Council of Justice and co-leader of the 
Tmter-Somerville expedition to the Tswana in 180 I. He was also 13arrow's father-in law for Barrow had married 
Anna Maria Tmter in 1799. It was, no doubt, from Tmter himself that Barrow had obtained a copy of Meyer's 
letter. Tmter's unpopularity with the frontier fanners probably stenuned from the fact that he had dismissed "eight 
or ten boors" who had accompanied the expedition "for their idle, disorderly, and thievish conduct". Barrow, 
Travels, Vol. 2, p.57; Boucher and Pe1m, Britain at the Cape, p. 97; Borcherds, Autobiographical Alemoir, p.40. 
99. "Captain Kauwi1moub" might well have been the "13ushman captain, called Caricoup" who brought the Tmter-
Somcrville expedition "a large piece of rock salt, and to him and a Kora chief named llapaim [ Slapann?] presents 
were made of two leather caps mounted with copper- plates, medallions, tobacco, &c.". Borcherds, 
Autobiographical Memoir, p.70. Sec also n.39 above. 
100. Uarrow, Travels, Vol. 2, pp.54-55. 
l O I. Lichtenstein, Travels, Vol. 2, p.230. 
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Perhaps the best contemporary analysis of the flaws in Macartney's proposals of 1798 is that 
which Colonel Collins wrote in 1809: 
I ca1mot help thinking that his Lordship's plan for the civilisation and pacification of 
the Bosjeman nation, must have been formed on a total misconception of the 
character of that people. It was not to be expected that such multitudes of savages of 
the fiercest disposition, dispersed through such a vast extent of country, in no part of 
which they have a settled residence, and from which they plunder their neighbours in 
every direction, without the idea of any law, divine, or human, without any 
connection among themselves, except such as arises from the ties of parental or 
conjugal affection, and even without the least knowledge of the manner of cultivating 
com, or rearing cattle, should at once become tractable, abandon their roving and 
predatory way of life, allow themselves to be confined between the Zak River and 
the Karee Mountains, acquire a knowledge of the art of agriculture or the 
precautions for preserving of pennanent establislunents and social intercourse, and 
consider themselves under the protection and authority of the British govenm1ent.I02 
The change of govcnunent at the Cape, in January 1806, came too late to save the mission. 
Indeed, it was the British Governor, Sir David Baird, who requested Kicherer to become minister 
at Graaff-Reinet. As we shall see in the next chapter, the new administration did not completely 
abandon the idea that mission stations, properly regulated, might play a vital role in stabilising 
the frontier and promoting peace between the trekboers and the San. But these proposed reforms 
should not mask the fact that, at the bcgi1ming of the second British occupation of the Cape, the 
colonists and the San were still at war with each other. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that in 
the years ahead the most promising missionary field lay amongst the Oorlam communities of the 
Orange River. The frontier, in effect, closed around the San of the northern Cape rather than 
sweeping over them and in the barren heart of Buslmmnland the long, unequal battle to preserve 
their favoured lifestyle continued until late into the nineteenth century. 
102. Moodie, The Record, !'rt. V, p.35. 
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The Closing of the Northern Cape Frontier Zone 
THE CALEDON CODE AND COLONEL COLLINS' REPORT 
On 21 May 1807 the Cape Colony received its new governor, the twenty-nine year old Irish peer, 
Du Pre Alexander, Second Earl of Calcdon. l Although his period of rule was to be of short 
duration ( 1807-1811) he was responsible for introducing an item of legislation which, in many 
respects, signalled the institutionalisation of the various processes of closure - social, political and 
economic - which, for some years, had been gathering momentum within the colony's frontier 
districts. 
The proclamation of the Caledon Code (also known as the Hottentot Code or Hottentot 
Proclamation) on 1 November 1809 marks a crucial event in the colony's history.2 The 
significance of the Code lies in the fact that it represents the first thorough attempt by the British, 
or indeed any government, to regulate relationships between the colonists and the Khoikhoi. 
Though the Khoikhoi were granted greater legal protection than they had previously had against 
the arbitrary cruelty of the colonial masters, in most other respects the Caledon Code served to 
confinn and entrench the de facto subjugation with de jure legislation) Article l of the Code 
stipulated that every Khoikhoi within the boundaries of the colony should have a fixed place of 
abode whose locality should be registered with the colonial authorities. Any Khoikhoi seeking to 
move from one locality to another had to be in possession of a valid pass, obtainable from either 
his or her master, or from the fiscal or local landdrost. Any colonist, on the other hand, who 
wished to employ a Khoikhoi labourer for a period in excess of a month had to appear, with the 
Khoikhoi, before a landdrost, veldcornet or the fiscal in order to complete a proper contract. The 
contract, which would be drafted in triplicate, would include the names of the contracting parties, 
the conditions of service, the details of the salary, the period of contract and any other pertinent 
details. Each of the contracting parties wou Id then keep a copy of the contract whilst the official 
would retain the third copy. Article 6 of the Code made provision for those Khoikhoi who had 
1. TI1e best account of Calc<lon's governorship, though somewhat <latc<l, is H.B. Giliomcc, "Die 
A<lministrasicty<lperk Van Lor<l Calc<lon 1807-1811 ", Arcl1iFes l"ear l3ookfor South Aji"ica11 Histoty, 29, Vol. 2, 
1965. 
2. TI1c text of the Cale<lon Co<lc is rcpro<lucc<l as an appcn<lix in John Philip, Researches i11 South Africa (Lo11<lo11, 
1828), Vol. 2. Sec also G. M. Thea!, Records of1/ie Cape Colony, Vol. Vll, pp.211-16. 
3. For a consi<lcration of the con<litions an<l i11volvcmc11l of Khoikhoi labourers in the economy or the eastern 
frontier <listricts on the eve or the Calc<lon Colic sec V.C Malhcrbe, "Diversification An<l Mobility Of Khoikhoi 
Labour In ·111e Eastern Districts or The Cape Colonv Prior To The Lalxmr Law or l November 1809", (M.A, 
University of Cape Town, 1978). 
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been mistreated to take their master before the Council of Justice or the Court of the Heemraden 
to face charges. If the master was found to be guilty as charged he could expect to be fined 
between ten and fifty Rijksdaalders or face further criminal charges before the Council of Justice. 
Other articles stipulated that any deductions made from a salary, such as for food or clothing, had 
to be brought before the notice of officials. Colonists could no longer withhold provisions from 
those of their labourers who became indebted to them, nor detain their labourers beyond the terms 
of their contract on the grounds of indebtedness. If a Khoikhoi labourer owed anything to his 
master at the end of the period of contract the master was to take the matter to court and not, in 
any circumstances, detain either the labourer or his wife and children. It was also stipulated that, 
in order for the regulations to become widely known, every veldcornet of every district should 
summons one Khoikhoi from each household to have the proclamation explained to him and 
thence to impart this knowledge to his fellows.4 
These provisions represented an undoubted improvement in the conditions of service under which 
the Khoikhoi were employed. As such they reflect the humane and reformist intentions of the 
Caledon Code, intentions which were no less real for being linked with conditions which served to 
confinn the Khoikhoi's inferior status. Sympathetic observers were to hail the Caledon Code as 
the "Magna Charta of the Hottentots" which "rescued the Hottentots from a system of hardship 
and cruelty practised by the Boors which would in the course of a short time have extinguished 
that race."5 Even J.S. Marais concedes: "There is some justification for Theal's view that 
Caledon's law of 1809 saved the Hottentots from 'utter destruction'. "6 
We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that the most important consequence of the 
Caledon Code was, in the words of Dr. John Philip of the LMS, that: "The Hottentots are 
condenmed to a perpetual state of servitude, nor have they the power, by any exertion, however 
great and praiseworthy, of liberating themselves from bondage".? The implication of this 
legislation was that those Khoikhoi who were not in colonial service, or resident at mission 
stations, would not be granted a pass and would therefore be regarded as vagrant and subject to 
punishment. The Khoikhoi, in other words, were being forced by the British government to enter 
service. 
4. Thcal,Records oftlte Cape Colony, Vol. VII, pp.211-16. 
5. W.W. Bir<l, 11,e Stale oftlte Cape of Good Hope in 1822 (London, 1823), p.6. 
6. Marais, Cape Coloured People, pp. l 2 l-2. 
7. Philip, Uesearcltes, Vol l, p. l 51. 
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The passmg of such legislation (and that of 1812 which allowed for the compulsory 
"apprenticeship" of Khoikhoi children between the ages of eight and eighteen) was a clear 
departure from the policy of the first British occupation, where Khoikhoi had been regarded by 
the government as a free people who did not need to carry passes.8 The question therefore arises 
as to why the Earl of Caledon so unambiguously condenmed the Khoikhoi to the status of unfree 
labourers. The Caledon Code has to be seen in the context of the colony as a whole. The 
challenge which faced the new (and alien) government was to effect a compromise between the 
diverse and conflicting interests of its subject population which did not, in tum, compromise the 
interests of the government itself. It was also necessary to take cognisance of British public 
opinion and the powerful parliamentary lobby of evangelists, abolitionists and humanitarians for 
no British government could afford to implement blatantly oppressive laws.9 Just as in the period 
of the first British occupation the watchwords were stability and economic progress. As far as the 
British were concerned the most dangerous threat to their rule was likely to emanate from the 
most powerful group within the colony - the white settlers. It was therefore more important to 
minimise settler grievances than to champion Khoikhoi liberties. It so happened that a major 
source of discontent amongst the colonists \Vas the perception that there was a labour crisis in the 
colony - a crisis that had been exacerbated by Britain having abolished the slave trade throughout 
its possessions in 1807 .10 Since a crisis in the labour supply threatened both political stability 
and economic progress simultaneously one of Caledon's most pressing tasks was to find a remedy 
to the problem. His solution was the Caledon Code. 
Yet, as J.S. Marais observed over half a century ago: "It is easy to make too much of the 
connection between the abolition of the slave trade and the law of 1809 - as if the govenunent's 
main motive was to substitute one species of forced labour for another. Hottentot labour did not 
suddenly become desirable in 1807. It had been desirable all along."! I Indeed, the govenunent 
was simply institutionalising and facilitating, albeit with some humanitarian restrictions, the 
established practice of binding Khoikhoi labourers to colonial masters. We should not, however, 
conclude that this represented a capitulation of state control. On the contrary. Those articles of 
8. For a discussion of the legislation of 1809-1812 see Marais, Cape Coloured People, pp.121-131; R. Elphick 
and V.C. Malhcrbe, "The Khoisan to 1828", in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), The Shaping of South African 
Society, 2nd ed., pp.35-43; Giliomee, "Lord Calcdon", pp.273-80. There is a need for more detailed case studies 
of the impact of the Caledon Code on the Khoikhoi in particular areas. 
9. Amongst the large literature on the influence of the anti-slavery movement on British public opinion see the 
essays in James Walvin, SlaFery And British Society 1776-18./6 (London, 1982). 
10. On this point sec S. Newlon-King, "The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828", in Marks and Atmore, 
Economy and Sociely. 
11. Marais, Cape Coloured l,eople, p.122. 
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the Caledon Code which authorised the govenunent to act against masters who might seek to 
abuse the tenns of officially sanctioned labour contracts were themselves reminders that the state 
intended to keep the colonists on a much tighter rein. The Caledon Code therefore not only 
entrenched the rights of white fanuers over Khoikhoi labourers but simultaneously advertised the 
power of the state over both. The exercise of this power was not, in the event, to be an empty 
threat. As far as the Khoikhoi were concerned the legislation did succeed in immobilising them in 
service, greatly reducing the "vagrancy" of which fanuers had complained or, in the words of 
Jolm Philip, "the whole Hottentot population are by this very proclamation placed in a state of the 
most wretched servitude, and entirely left at the disposal of the colonists" .12 On the other hand 
the Code also succeeded, in co1tjunction with the Circuit Courts instituted in 1811, in reducing the 
incidence of brutal abuse of Khoikhoi labourers by colonists. Though such abuses could not be 
completely eradicated the resentment which these laws of protection caused amongst frontier 
fanners ( the S lagtersnek Rebellion of 1815 is the most dramatic example of this) is a clear 
indication that British power was felt to be real. In this sense, therefore, the Caledon Code 
marked a new experience for both Khoikhoi and colonists, a period in which the govenuuent at 
the Cape clearly demonstrated that it had both the will and the way to stamp its authority on its 
subjects, no matter how far away from Cape Town they might be. The political closure of the 
frontier zone was accelerating. 
The Caledon Code was not the sole contribution which Caledon made to the closure of the Cape 
frontier. Nor was the relationship between the colonists and the Khoikhoi the only issue requiring 
clarification. In July 1807, only two months after his arrival at the Cape, Caledon received an 
alarming letter from Hendrik van der Graaf, landdrost of Tulbagh. The letter infonued His 
Excellency that in the first four months of 1807 the San had stolen 818 sheep, 200 goats, 93 
cattle and 20 horses from the Tulbagh district. Fourteen Khoikhoi and three whites had been 
killed by the San during the same period. Throughout the frontier districts, Van der Graaf 
explained, veldcornets were requesting anununition and the right to mount full scale punitive 
conunandos, chafing against government restrictions which stipulated that conunandos needed 
permission from the governor before they could pursue the robbers. 13 
Although Calcdon had only just arrived in the Cape he was not totally ignorant of the conflict 
between the colonists and the San. His response to Van dcr Graaf was to urge a policy of 
cautious restraint. In this he was no doubt guided by the precepts which had been laid down by 
12. Philip, Researches, Vol. l, p. l 49. 
13. Giliomcc, "Lord Calcdon", p.263. 
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Macartney and Barrow during the first British occupation. Caledon reminded Van der Graaf that 
whereas the burghers had an undoubted right to exercise self defence they could not wage war 
against their enemies either indiscriminately or independently of state control. If the landdrost 
thought that the situation was serious enough to warrant it the government would send a 
detachment of troops to help keep the peace in his district. 14 
Van der Graaf, somewhat aggrieved at having been misunderstood, wrote back to explain that he 
was not contemplating massive, indiscriminate retaliation. The hostile San comprised but small 
groups amongst a majority of peaceful ones and limited commandos, well-equipped witl1 
anununition, would take care of the problem.15 The governor, however, seems to have withheld 
both the official authorisation for a conunando and the necessary supplies of gunpowder. It is 
likely that he had already decided to make a thorough investigation into the causes of the conflict 
between the colonists and the San before taking further action. Just as Macartney apprised 
himself of the situation in the Cape interior by despatching a trusted observer - Barrow - to tour 
the frontier districts, so too did Caledon appoint his own agent. The man in question was Colonel 
Richard Collins of the 83rd Regiment. 
Collins set out on his journey, or series of journeys, in April 1808. In slightly more than a year 
his travels would take him from the northern to the north-eastern and eastern frontiers of the 
colony.16 His reports and rcconunendations were largely concerned with the nature of 
relationships which existed between colonists and the San on the one hand, and the colonists and 
the Xhosa on the other. There was, however, an important section of that part of his report which 
was tabled in August 1809 which presented reconunendations for the treatment of the colonial 
Khoikhoi. It is remarkable how similar many of these rcconunendations are to the regulations of 
the Caledon Code of November 1809 and it is pennissible to assume that Collins' advice was 
most closely followed by his noble superior.17 "I conceive that they all [the Khoikhoi] should be 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., pp.263-264. 
16. Collins' reports are contained in Moodie, The Record, Part V, pp.1-60. 
17. Philip had the following to say about the inl1uences behind the Cakdon Code: "All the enactions which 
emanated from the head and heart or Lord Caledon were characterized by wisdom and benevolence; but it is no 
relleelion on his lordship to say that he might be deceived, when he was under the necessity or submilling lo the 
judgement of others. The proclamation or 1809 was a case or this nature: the most important part of this 
proclamation was suggested lo Colonel Collins, his Majesty's Commissioner, mentioned above, by an individual 
well knO\vn lo have been deeply interested in oppressing the Hollenlols. 13y Colonel Collins these suggestions 
were handed over to another gentleman, who claimed to himsell~ in mv hearing, the whole merit or the 
proclamation, telling me that it was 'a child or his mm"'. Philip, Researches, Vol I, p 147. It is clear from other 
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sent to reside with the inhabitants, except such of them as are in the service of the government, or 
at the missionary or orphan institutions," wrote Collins.18 Further, " ... but the measure which I 
conceive of the first importance to the protection of the Hottentot and the improvement of his 
situation is a sacred observance of his annual engagement" .19 These, and other details, suggest 
that Collins exerted a powerful influence over Caledon's Khoikhoi policy. He was to exercise no 
less an influence over the governor's frontier policies and, like Barrow's report of 1798, Collins' 
report was to exert an influence over subsequent British policy makers for many years to come. 
For the purposes of our enquiry it will be sufficient to consider those aspects of Collins' report 
which had a particular bearing on colonial relations with the San or on the northern Cape frontier 
zone in general. Collins first travelled to the Hantam and Roggeveld for it was in these districts 
that the robberies which Van der Graaf had reported, in July the previous year, had taken place. 
It would seem as though Collins had specific instructions to conunence his investigations here 
although he was later to travel to the Agter Sneeuberg with the same task in mind. Caledon had 
asked him to ascertain: "The extent of the misunderstanding which prevails between the fanners 
and the Bosjesmen; the probable cause, or causes, which have occasioned it; and the line of 
conduct best suited to remedy the evil. "20 
With regards to the first issue Collins was able to report that, in general, throughout the frontier 
zone, relationships between colonists and San were better than he had been led to expect: 
Whatever blame may be attributed to the colonists or to the original cause of this 
unfortunate misunderstanding that exists between them and the Bosjesmen, I 
observed nothing in them that indicated that implacable hatred which they are so 
generally supposed to feel for that people. They have frequent intercourse with some 
of their kraals, whose inhabitants often come to their habitations, and receive from 
them presents of sheep and tobacco. Many of them have Bosjesmen in their service, 
who they treat humanely, and who serve them faithfully.21 
Collins proceeded to lament that Barrow had been guilty of spreading the most exaggerated 
accounts about the cruelty of the "African farmers". But there is a great deal of evidence, which 
Collins himself presented, which suggests that the peace policies initiated by Macartney had 
infonnation in Philip's book that the man who gave Collins his ideas was J.G. Cuyler, the la11ddrost of Uitenliage, 
and a great foe of the missionaries. Philip, Researches, Vol. 1, pp.124-7. 
18. Collins, in Moodie, The Record, Part V, p.21. 
19. Ibid., p.22. 
20. Ibid., p.33. 
21. Ibid., p.34. 
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indeed lowered the levels of frontier conflict in the decade since 1798. Wherever fanners had been 
able to establish a personal relationship with a group of San, and won their friendship with a 
donation of gifts of livestock or tobacco, peace seemed to prevail. Those guilty of robbing 
farmers were usually groups from far beyond the colonial frontier who had not, through constant 
contact with the colonists, been able to establish such a relationship. Alternatively, there were 
instances where groups of frontier San had spared their immediate neighbours but raided deep 
within the colony to rob more distant strangers. Collins ascribed such robberies not to "any 
particular animosity to the colonists" but to want and custom.22 The fact that the San had found 
that they could procure articles of subsistence by plundering the fanners was, in Collins' opinion, 
reason enough for them to do so. It was essential, therefore, that they continue to be convinced 
that their robberies and attacks would be punished and repelled. 
It was for this reason that Collins was not in favour of continuing the practice of giving gifts of 
livestock to the San, despite evidence that the policy of buying peace had had some success. It 
was his opinion that: "It tends to make them suppose that the colonists fear them; and besides, it 
would be impossible to supply all their nation with a sufficient number for its consumption, even 
were they careful of them, which they are not; and by giving them to those on the borders, such as 
are more distant arc induced to come nearer, and consequently increase the evil".23 For Collins 
the only measures that might put an end to the "depredations of the Bosjesmen" were those which 
would be directed to the root of the evil; "and that before any reliance can be placed on them, a 
change must be effected in their habits and maimers, which can only be the work of time, aided 
by the zealous and indefatigable exertions of some intelligent individuals, supported and 
encouraged by the bounty and guardian care of a benificent govenunent" .24 
The key, in short, to the pacification of the colony's northern frontier was the establislm1ent of 
well-regulated mission stations. In the course of his travels Collins had visited Van der Kemp and 
his mission at Bethelsdorp as well as the Moravians at Baviaanskloof. The latter institution was 
the one which had most impressed him though he had also heard very good reports of Anderson's 
mission on the other side of the Orange River. Most surprisingly Collins seems to have gained a 
favourable impression of Kicherer's efforts at the Sak River and stated that "the happiest effects 
were felt during the continuance of his institution, which was abandoned from no cause but 
22. lbiJ. 
23. lbiJ., p.37. 
24. lbiJ., p.35. 
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pecuniary difficulties".25 Collins' suggestion was that more missions should be established and 
that they should, in addition to their missionary staff, be superintended by "a couple of the most 
respectable and intelligent inhabitants of the division" who, in tum, would be subject to inspection 
and report by the landdrosts.26 To Collins' eyes the northern frontier zone seemed to "admit of 
three divisions": the first included the Kamiesberg, the Onder Bokkeveld, the Hantam and the 
Roggeveld; the second included the Nieuweveld and the Koup; and the third included the 
Renosterberg, Sneeuberg and the Tarka.27 Collins proposed that each of these divisions should 
have a mission station and made suggestions as to where these should be established and which of 
the locals would be best suited for closer involvement in this scheme. In the Hantam-Roggeveld 
district the old Sak River site was proposed, or, failing that, the Bloem or Ratel Fontein, one or 
two days to the east and enjoying better pasturage. It was here that Kruger had been granted 
temporary residence by Kicherer on account of his "friendly disposition towards the Bosjesmen" 
and the circumstances therefore seemed most promising.28 In the Tarka Collins reconm1ended a 
spot near a place called Schaap Kraal and in the Koup a fann called Slange Fontein, one of the 
sources of the Sak River. A further suggestion was that of Groot Fontein, close to the Orange 
River and to the west of the Seekoei River. As Collins remarked, in words which unconsciously 
paid tribute to the efficacy of the Macartney reforms: "This part of the colony, altogether the 
most distant from the capital, is in a more improving state than any that I visited. The tracts 
stated in Mr. Barrow's charts to have been deserted on account of the Bosjesmen Hottentots, arc 
now entirely filled up, and the country is inhabited as far as the limits" .29 Whether this was an 
improvement from the perspective of the San was, of course, debatable, but the significant thing 
about these colonial advances was that they had been achieved under the protection of goodwill 
rather than by the agency of the conmmndos. 
In Collins' opinion, however, such goodwill, purchased by the frontier fanners through gifts of 
slaughtered game, sheep, tobacco, dagga, knives and tinderboxes, was too fragile a basis for 
enduring peace. Not only was this means of conciliation costly (whether the costs were to be 
borne by the government, missionaries, frontier farmers or the inhabitants of the colony as a 
whole) but, as Collins had already noted, it could be misconstrued as a sign of weakness. It would 
be far better to convince the San that these gifts were rewards for services rendered and that in 
future they would only be obtainable from the mission stations. The gifts were, in fact, to be 
25. Ibid., p.23. 
26. Ibid., p.36. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., p.23. 
29. Ibid., pp.23-4. 
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regarded as commodities which could be exchanged at the mission stations for items which the 
San might be able to deliver, such as skins, mats, ostrich feathers or ivory. The San could also be 
taught "mechanical arts" at the missions and later be encouraged to work as labourers in the 
colony so that they could acquire further conunodities. The process of transforn1ing San societies 
into wage earning consumers would no doubt be a long one but Collins urged that the problem be 
given immediate attention. If it was not addressed with some urgency the colonists would grow 
tired of paying for their safety and the San would return to the mountains to recommence "their 
former predatory mode of life" .JO 
In the meantime, Collins concluded, the colonists should be granted sufficient anununition to 
enable them to repel any attacks from unpacified San up to the limits of the colony. Beyond this 
point, however, they should not be able to proceed without pern1ission from a source of authority 
which, in future, might well be vested in the superintendent of the mission stations. 
Collins' report on the northern frontier zone thus conveyed to the governor the impression that the 
best way to advance the cause of an enduring peace would be to encourage the establislunent of 
state-supervised mission stations which would see their task as being the transformation of the 
San into useful wage labourers. The mission stations would therefore play, essentially, the same 
role for the San as pass regulations would play for the Khoikhoi, that is they would direct vagrant 
souls into service acceptable to the state. It is clear that whilst Collins was in favour of missions 
to the San on the northern frontier he was not in favour of missions to the Khoikhoi on the eastern 
fronticr.31 He became a bitter critic of LMS efforts to attract Khoikhoi adherents to the mission 
stations, obviously regarding the Khoikhoi as sufficiently civilised to play their part as labourers 
on colonial fanns and perceiving their presence at mission stations as an indulgence in 
provocative idleness.32 
30. Ibid., p.24. 
31. Philip's remarks on these proposals are perceptive. "This ollicer's zeal for missions among the Buslunen, and 
the abolition of those in the colony, proceeds from the same principle, namely, what he conceives would be for the 
benetit of the fanners. The only reason he assigns for opposing missions within the limits is, that he thinks it 
better for the fanners that the hottentots should be among them, than that they should be at an institution; and he 
actually proposes that the Bushmen, aller being civilised at our institutions, should be distributed among the 
fanners in a similar manner." Researches, Vol. 2, p.19. 
32. Philip stated that Collins wished to abolish Bcthclsuorp anu Jisperse its people among the fanners, but that 
Calcdon and Crauock "had too much integrity or clwrncler, anu loo much benevolence lo allow them to listen lo 
such a proposition". Researches, Vol. I, p.xix. 
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This official suspicion of any missionary endeavour which was aimed at the Khoikhoi and based 
within the colony was something which the government had learnt from the colonists and was to 
sour relations between the government and the LMS for many years. It was also to affect the 
implementation of Collins' scheme, for it was not to be expected that missionaries would 
wholeheartedly participate in a government sponsored campaign of proselytisation amongst the 
San of the northern frontier zone when they were being obstructed in their ministries to the more 
tractable Khoikhoi within the colony itself. But there were other reasons why Collins' suggestions 
were not acted upon immediately. In the first place, Caledon's period of rule at the Cape was a 
short one. He resigned in July 1811 after a lengthy quarrel with Westminister and his military 
chief of staff, Major-General George Grey, as to who was in full command of the British arn1ed 
forces in the colony.33 In the second place, Caledon's governorship had been preoccupied with the 
problems of the eastern frontier where the major decision was whether or not to expel the Xhosa 
from the Zuurveld and thereby involve the colony in war. In the event, Caledon's successor, Sir 
John Cradock, made the fateful decision to launch the Fourth Frontier War shortly after 
Caledon's departure.34 In the third place, before empowering missionaries to establish mission 
stations in the frontier districts, Caledon had to take cognisance of the opinions of the colonists 
themselves and, on the whole, they were extremely hostile to the presence of missionaries 
amongst them. Finally, the desires of the missionaries themselves had to be considered. The LMS 
had not forgotten that the clearest lesson to emerge from the Sak River Mission had been that 
whereas Khoikhoi, "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottentots" were most receptive to the Christian 
gospel, the San represented one of the least rewarding fields of missionary endeavour in which to 
labour. 
The last two of these reasons - colonial hostility and missionary preferences - will require further 
elaboration if we are to understand why Collins' suggestions were not inunediatcly 
implemcntcd.35 Further unsuccessful attempts to establish a mission to the San were, in fact, 
made by the LMS in 1814 at Toornbcrg (present Colcsbcrg) and in 1816 in Hephziba (present 
Petrusville). By 1818 both had failed due to the opposition of the governor, Lord Charles 
Somerset; the hostility of local white farmers and divisions within the missionary society itse!f.36 
As far as the northern frontier was concerned the "Bastaards" and "Bastaard-Hottcntots" of the 
33. Giliomcc, "Lor<l Cale<lon", pp.227-36. 
34. Sec B. Maclcmian, A Proper Degree (~{ Terror (Johmmesburg, 1985) for an account of the Fourth Frontier 
War. 
35. Sec pp.474-84 below. 
36. Sec Karel Schoeman, "Die Lon<lense Se!lllinggenootskap en <lie San: Die Stasies Toombcrg en l lcphzibah, 
1814-1818", South African llistorical Journal, 28, 1993, pp.221-234. 
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north-west and Transorania remained the most promising missionary target. But despite the 
failure of Collins' proposals his report had indicated that processes of closure were already far 
advanced within the colony's northern frontier districts by 1809. Indeed, Collins' report was in 
itself an indication that state surveillance was on the increase and that the government was in the 
process of establishing a much greater degree of political control over the frontier zone - with or 
without missionary agents - than it had ever previously enjoyed. This fact is brought home by the 
sequel to the Collins' Report - a second official tour to the frontier districts of the northern Cape 
in 1809. 
VAN DER GRAAF'S TOUR 
In May 1809 Hendrik van der Graaf, the /anddrost of Tulbagh, wrote to Lord Caledon to infonn 
him of a proposed expedition to the northern borders of the colony.37 Van der Graaf had been 
appointed as first /anddrost of the new district of Tulbagh, proclaimed by the Batavian 
government in October 1804. He retained his post after the British conquest of I 806 and served 
under the incoming administration.38 Of an energetic and enquiring disposition he had already 
demonstrated his belief in acquiring knowledge at first hand when, together with Lichtenstein, he 
had travelled northwards to visit the Tswana in 1805 .39 During the course of this journey he had 
visited the Sak River mission and attempted to reinforce the precarious state of peace which 
existed between the colonists and the San of the northern frontier.40 By 1809, however, 
continuous reports of conflict and upheaval from the outlying regions of his area of 
administration convinced him of the need to undertake another personal tour of inspection to some 
of the district's most troublesome areas. 
Van der Graaf explained that he wished to investigate the nature of the frontier colonists, their 
means of support, the state of their fanns, the extent of their trade and their relationships with 
other groups, particularly Khoikhoi and other "rodzwerwende volken". The district of Klein 
Namaqualand, which the /anddrost had never previously visited, seemed to him to be particularly 
troubled by discord and division ("oneenigheeden") between Khoikhoi and colonists. For this 
reason alone he was anxious to journey to the most northerly regions of the colony. There were, 
however, other good reasons to visit the frontier districts. The drostdy was being inundated by an 
37. CA, Archives of the Magistrate, Worcester (hcrcallcr 1/WOC) 17/2, UitgaanJc Bricvcn 1808-1809, LanJJrost 
to Governor, 23 May 1809. 
38. CA, Inventory or the Archives orthc Magistrate, Worcester 2/7. 
39. Sec Lichtenstein, Tra1•cls, Vol. 2. 
40. Sec pp.451-SG above. 
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increasing number of requests and complaints concerning disputes over land and farms. 
Furthennore, many people were occupying government land and fanning it without having taken 
out the ground on loan or paying the due rental for it. The landdrost was therefore confident that 
a govenunent tour of inspection would be a highly desirable and necessary measure.41 
All of these concerns indicate that Van der Graaf, as a good administrator, was anxious to bring 
processes of political closure to bear on the northern frontiers of his district. It is also obvious 
that the economic and social closure of the frontier was manifesting itself in the increasing 
number of land disputes and in the discord which existed between the Khoikhoi and the colonists. 
But Van der Graaf was also aware of the fact that Colonel Collins had been touring his district 
with a view to advising the governor on how best to administer it. The landdrost's request to make 
his own tour of inspection may well have been an attempt to remind Caledon that the opinion of 
local officials should also be consulted and might, in fact, prove to be superior to that of an 
outsider. Van der Graaf had already had occasion to feel somewhat slighted by the governor, 
namely, when Caledon had responded so coolly to his requests for pennission to unleash well-
anned conunandos against the troublesome San. He was probably as concerned with impressing 
Caledon with his initiative· as he was with correcting some of the impressions which he feared 
Collins may have conveyed to the governor. He ca1mot have had unconditional confidence in 
Collins' report and was keen to stamp his authority on the northern Cape whilst providing 
Caledon with alternative suggestions for effective govenunent. 
Calcdon's enthusiastic response to Van der Graafs proposal must have taken the landdrost by 
surprise. On 5 August 1809 the Secretary's office wrote to assure Van der Graaf that the 
governor was "well aware of the anxiety which you feel, for the welfare of the Colony at large 
and for the particular interests in your Drostdy . . . and has directed me to request Your minute 
attention to those parts of the Country through which you shall travel" .42 Caledon was, in fact, 
delighted to think that he might benefit from a more detailed investigation into the issues which 
Collins' report had raised. It is clear from his instructions to Van der Graaf that he regarded the 
forthcoming trip as a chance to supplement Collins' report, ordering the landdrost to pay 
particular attention to the question of the influence which missionaries might have in securing 
peace with the San. Van der Graaf was to conunent on the best way to regulate mission stations 
and suggest which of the places mentioned by Collins would be most suitable for the 
41. CA, 1/WOC 17/2, Landdrost lo Governor, 23 May 1809. 
42. CA, 1/WOC 11/1, Inkomende Briewe van Koloniale Kanloor, June 1805-Dec. 1809, Secretary's Ollice to 
Landdrosl, 5 August 1809. 
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establislunent of such a mission station. The landdrost was, further, to investigate whether the 
San could be encouraged to produce useful items, such as bi/tong, which could be given to the 
frontier fanncrs in exchange for the "acts of Humanity" which they were, at present, receiving for 
nothing.43 
In these, as in other details, Caledon clearly revealed that he envisaged Van der Graaf's proposed 
expedition as a follow up to Collins' report. Landdrost van der Graaf, however, had very different 
ideas about his mission and the journal of his trip to Namaqualand reveals that he pursued a quite 
independent line of enquiry.44 A close inspection of this journal suggests that the /anddrost was 
far more interested in asserting govenm1ental authority over the colonists than he was in 
refonning the San. It is also clear that Van der Graaf shared in the typical colonial antipathy 
towards missionaries and that, far from promoting Caledon's vision of establishing missionary 
institutions as a means of civilising the San, he did his best to remove a missionary presence from 
the colony altogether.45 
Van der Graaf's expedition left the Tulbagh drostdy on 10 August 1809 and travelled to the 
Roggeveld via the Wann Bokkeveld, Karoopoort and the Tanqua Karoo. From the Roggeveld 
Van der Graaf went westwards, over the Pakhuis pass, to the Olifants River. The expedition then 
proceeded northwards, to the Kamiesbcrg and beyond, becoming only the second group of record-
leaving colonists to visit the mouth of the Orange River. After this event, achieved on 12 
September, the expedition returned, via the Olifants River, to Tulbagh, which it reached at the 
begi1ming of October. During the course of this journey a member of the landdrost's party kept a 
journal which recorded, in unprecedented detail, the state of affairs existing in the nonnally 
obscure northern districts of the colony.46 The recorded details arc of inestimable value in that 
they illuminate the major processes of closure which were taking place within the frontier zone at 
this crucial date in the colony's history: the eve of the introduction of the Calcdon Code. It may be 
supposed that many of Van dcr Graaf's observations confirmed Calcdon in his decision to 
43. Ibid. 
44. The Journal is both undated and unsigned but the contextual evidence of the letters cited above allows us to 
identify its provenance and date with some accuracy. Van dcr Graaf was not himself the writer of the Journal and 
it is possible that it was kept by his secretary, Johannes Hcnricus Fischer. The Journal has no year date but it is 
obviously a record of the 1809 expedition to the north. it is to be found in CA Miscellaneous (hcrcallcr M) 76, 
Journey to Namaqualand. 
45. Van dcr Ciraal's views on mission stations arc already present in his remarks on the Sak River mission which 
he visited with Lichtenstein in 1805. Sec pp.450 above. 
46. Sec note 44 above ror speculation as to the identity of the journal's author. 
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implement his Khoikhoi labour legislation whilst, at the same time, delaying the implementation 
of mission stations for the San. 
The value of Van der Graaf's report is also enhanced by the fact that it is the work of a well-
infonned colonist rather than (as is most often the case with travellers' accounts of the Cape 
interior in the eighteenth or nineteenth century) that of a visiting European observer. This does 
not, of course, make its observations or interests either more or less biased, but it does mean that 
the prejudices and preoccupations of the journalist reflect a colonial consciousness and thus 
provide us with a uniquely privileged glimpse into how members of the "Afrikaner" elite viewed 
the exercise of colonial power at this time. 
During the course of Van der Graaf's procession through the north-western frontier regions he 
had frequent occasion to listen to the complaints of both Khoikhoi labourers and their masters 
concerning each other. It is clear that Khoikhoi were still having their wages withheld from them 
and their freedom of movement restricted. It is also clear that the white colonists believed there to 
be a great shortage of labour, due to the impossibility of acquiring slaves and the desertion of 
Khoikhoi labourers to the mission stations. In the Roggeveld Gerrit Visser asked for stricter 
govenunent controls to be introduced so as to enforce colonial Khoikhoi, and those 
"overvloedige" (overflowing) numbers residing at mission stations, to work for the fanners.47 
Mission stations that served the needs of the Khoikhoi were thus perceived, by the colonists, as 
interfering with their labour supply. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Kamiesberg 
where the efforts of Johaimes Scidcnfaden to establish a mission in Little Namaquala11d met with 
detennined resistance from the white settlers. Seidenfaden was one of the six missionaries (the 
Albrecht brothers were amongst the others) who had arrived in South Africa with Kicherer when 
he returned in 1805. Scidcnfadcn and the Albrechts had been prohibited from establishing a 
mission within the colony (and the Kamicsberg was declared to fall within the colony) by the 
Batavian government and had been compelled to journey beyond the colony's northern boundary 
in order to preach the gospel.48 There they established a temporary mission at Stille Hoop, the 
junction of the Orange and Hartebeest Rivers, and in 1807, the station of Wann Bad in Great 
Namaqualand.49 By 1809, however, Seidcnfadcn was back in the Kamiesberg where, with 
47. CAM 76, 16 Aug. f 1809]. 
48. Du Plessis, Christian Alissio11s, pp.112-15. 
49. Sec pp.480-1 below. 
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Cornelius Kok's encouragement, he sought to conunence a mission amongst the Little Namaqua. 
He soon encountered difficulties. 
When Van der Graaf arrived in the Kamiesberg, in September 1809, Christiaan Albrecht, as well 
as Seidenfaden, were present. Albrecht was on a visit from Warm Bad and the colonists did not 
seem to have many complaints about him. They particularly disliked Seidenfaden, however, and 
were convinced that he had been inciting the local Namaqua to disobedience and robbery. 
Seidenfaden himself, it was argued, was engaged in cattle trading in Great Namaqualand and was 
using the Kamiesberg as a convenient place to pasture his herds. This inconvenienced local 
fanners but it also inconvenienced the Little Namaqua whose farn1s, Leliefontein and Langeklip, 
were the centre of the mission. These farms had been granted by Governor Tulbagh and the 
colonists claimed, piously, that Seidenfaden was attempting to dispossess the Namaqua of Chief 
Wildschut of their land. Seidenfaden's teaching only extended to the Khoikhoi and "Bastaards", 
many of whom had previously lived amongst the "Christenen" but who were now congregating at 
the mission station filled with pride and antagonism. Seidenfaden himself had threatened Petrus 
van der Heever with a beating, to be delivered by some of his followers, when Van der Heever 
had tried to remove the missionary and his livestock from his farn1. The landdrost was greatly 
concerned that even more Khoikhoi and "Bastaards", the missionaries' converts from the Orange 
River, would flock to Leliefontein, causing a grave security problem for the colonists. It was, 
furthennore, alleged that Seidenfaden had abrogated to himself the right to open and intercept 
government letters.SO 
Called to account by Van dcr Graaf, Scidenfaden explained that he had left the Orange River 
because the heat was affecting his health. It was also impossible to grow wheat or establish a 
settled community in the harsh environment beyond the limits of the colony. He had thus 
journeyed southwards to the Buffcls River and there accepted an invitation from the Khoikhoi 
captain, Links, to go to the Kamiesberg. He was certainly not appropriating Khoikhoi land since 
he was there at their request. He also had the support of Sebastiaan and Cornelius Kok. He had 
never threatened Petrus Van den Heever although the latter had tried to prevent him from crossing 
his fann with a wagon load of wheat from Sebastiaan Kok. The only cattle the missionaries had 
were cattle that belonged to their followers or were necessary for the support of the conununity. 
Nor was it true that he had claimed govcnuncntal powers for himsclf.51 




Van der Graaf was not impressed by these denials and was able to convince Captain Wildschut to 
state that he had never been consulted in the decision to allow missionaries to establish a mission 
at Liliesfontein. The decision had been Captain Links' alone.52 It is possible that there was a 
power struggle taking place amongst the Namaqua revolving around Cupido Links, Jantje 
Wildschut's uncle, and Jantje Wildschut himself.53 Links and the Koks were probably seen as 
being of the missionary party whilst Wildschut was seen as being more easily dominated by the 
white colonists. The earlier Chief Wildschut, of Governor Tulbagh's day, had recently died and 
the present Chief Wildschut, Jantje Wildschut, had only been confirmed in office on 9 May 
1809.54 
Van der Graaf insisted that the n11ss10nanes removed themselves from the Kamiesberg and 
confined their activities to situations beyond the limits of the colony, for which Christiaan 
Albrechts had already petitioned the government. The government would be quite happy to grant 
the requisite fanns outside the colony (in fact Van der Graaf brought news of this confinnation) 
but would not pennit the establishment of a missionary institution within the middle of an area of 
colonial settlement or one which was at the expense of the Khoikhoi. When Van der Graaf 
conveyed this judgement to Caledon the governor was somewhat surprised at his landdrost's 
interpretation of the law. Van der Graaf was claiming that no missions, apart from those already 
in existence, were pennitted inside the colony, whereas Caledon, who wished to establish new 
missions to the San, did not believe this prohibition to be in effect. He was happy to concede that 
Seidenfaden should not be allowed to establish a mission in the Kamiesberg but added that "since 
much public advantage might derive from missions please point out to Seidcnfadcn another place, 
either within or without the colony, for a mission" .55 
Van der Graaf was quick to defend his actions, claiming that he had supposed the law of 20 
February 1805 still to be in operation, a law which stated that missionaries should establish their 
institutions outside the boundaries of the colony. This excuse was rather lame coming from one 
whose task was to ascertain whether the establishment of new mission stations would help to 
promote peace within the colony, and could not mask the fact that, like many of the colonists, he 
was deeply suspicious of missions to the colonial Khoikhoi. What would the effect be, he asked, 
if Seidenfaden's 400 Khoikhoi from the Orange River followed him into the colony?56 
52. Ibid., 4 Sept. [1809]. 
53. Ibid., 20 Sept. [1809]. 
54. CA, 1/WOC 17/2, Landdrost to Governor, 9 May 1809. 
55. CA 1/WOC t 1/1, Secretary's Ollice to Land<lrosl, 31 Ocl. 1809. 
56. CA 1/WOC 17/2,Lan<l<lrosttoGovemor, JONov.1809. 
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It caimot be said, however, that his enthusiasm for missions to the San was any stronger or, if it 
was, he certainly failed to support this suggestion with any favourable evidence. Those colonists 
whom he canvassed on the subject regarded missions to the San as a waste of time. In the 
Roggeveld, Abraham Botma, whose brother, Christiaan, had worked as a missionary, declared 
that he thought the San to be beyond the reach of instruction and that missionaries would be far 
better employed preaching to the "Bastaard-Hottentots" who could at least tell right from 
wrong.57 
Van der Graafs report was not, therefore, one from which Caledon could draw much support for 
Collins' scheme of converting the San. In other respects, however, the two reports were very 
similar. Both men regarded missions to the Khoikhoi as undesirable and both suggested greater 
control over Khoikhoi labourers. Despite Van der Graafs typically colonial views he seems to 
have secured the land rights of at least one small group of Khoikhoi. His report mentioned that 
there was a small kraal of Khoikhoi, under a Captain Louis, at Doornkraal near the mouth of the 
Olifants River, whose land was likely to fall victim to the rival land claims of some local fanners. 
Van der Graaf succeeded in confinning the Khoikhoi in their property upon his return.58 He 
mentioned another Khoikhoi kraal, at Klipheuwcl on the Olifants River, but it was clear that there 
were very few independent Khoikhoi kraals left within the colony and those that there were were 
under threat from land- hungry colonists.59 
Even "Bastaard" land holders like Cornelius Kok were under threat by 1809 and it is clear that 
the Koks' days in the Kamiesberg were numbered. Van der Graaf records that Kok had bought 
two Kamiesberg farms, or the opstals on them, for 400 Rijksdaalders from Veldcornet Nieukerk. 
It then transpired that the fanns, "Groote Valley" and "Een Riet'' had never been properly 
registered and could thus not be transferred. Nieukerk, meanwhile, had spent the money. Though 
Kok was led to expect repayment with interest it was probably no coincidence that his attempt to 
acquire legal title to colonial land had come to naught.60 One wonders whether white farmers 
experienced similar difficulties when they attempted to register the equally vague loan-fann 
57. CAM 76, 15 Aug. (1809]. 
58. CAM 76, 25 Aug. [ 1809]; CA 1/WOC 17/2, Landdrost to Governor, 21 Oct. 1809. 
59. CAM 76, 26 Sept. [1809]. There is an interesting rclcrence to a "very industrious Hottentot" at the Piketberg 
by the name or Lucas who, in about 180 l, had produced 80 muids of wheat. The authorities wished to know 
whether there were any other such Khoikhoi - an indication thal they were mosl unconun011. CA l /WOC l l /l, 
Secretary's Ollice to Landdrost, 5 Aug. 1809. 
60. Ibid., l Sept. [1809]. 
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claims which they had acquired from other white fanners. The indications are that the Koks were 
being squeezed out of the colony, their old usefulness as allies forgotten. 
The frontier was closing rapidly with widespread land hunger in the north and a deterioration in 
the status of Khoikhoi and "Bastaards" alike. Van der Graaf proposed that the Orange River 
should be declared the colony's northern boundary since the colonists were hard pressed to 
survive within their present limits and would not disadvantage anyone by extending their 
domain.61 This suggestion was not acted upon but, truth to tell, the river was already the 
unofficial frontier of the colony. After the proclamation of the Caledon Code more and more 
colonial Khoikhoi joined the "Bastaards", and "Bastaard-Hottentots" of the Orange River's 
Oorlam groups.62 The fact that missionaries were allowed to instruct such groups was an even 
greater incentive to go northwards. 
OORLAMS AND MISSIONARIES AT THE ORANGE RIVER, 1805-1815 
Missionary influence on the Oorlam societies of the Orange River prior to 1805 was considerable 
and has already received some consideration.63 By this date even the Afrikaner gang had 
recognised that the key to their continued existence depended on establishing close connections 
with the missionaries since without such contacts they would suffer both spiritual and material 
disadvantages relative to other Oorlam groups. Thus, in October 1805, as the Albrecht brothers 
and Seidenfaden made their way northwards to conuncnce their mission at the Orange River they 
reported that they had met with the Afrikaner gang and that the latter were "desirous to be taught 
the way of salvation".64 As well as feeling the need for a missionary, the Afrikaners were also 
seriously attempting to improve their relationship with the colonial authorities. They had been 
obliged to shift the base of their operations from the Middle Orange to Great Namaqualand. After 
their unpleasant experience at the hands of the Koks and Barends, the Afrikaners were no longer 
powerful enough to contest the supremacy of the river to the cast of the Augrabics falls, 
particularly since the rival Oorlam groups were now fortified by colonial assistance - thanks to 
the missionaries. It is doubtful whether this loss of supremacy of the Middle Orange River was 
61 Ibid., 7 Sept. [1809]. 
62. Although there were already significant numbers of Oorlams north of the river before 1809 it is quite clear 
that Oorlam migration from the colony increased afier that date. When LMS missionary Sclunelen arrived in 
Klipfontcin ( or Bethany) in southern Namibia in 1814 he took with him 120 Oorlams from the Komagas district. 
Kobus Booi (see pp.379-80 above) had been there since about 1804. Other Oorlam groups began to emerge 
between c. l 810-1840. Sec B. Lau, Namibia in Jonker Aji·ikaner'.5 Time, pp.19-40. 
63. Sec pp.435-442 above. 
64. Sec p.44 l above. 
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accompanied by a lack of access to the southern Tswana. The evidence suggests that about this 
time (1805) the Afrikaners raided the Tlhaping and were involved in fireanns trade to the Tlharo 
near the Langeberg.65 But whatever the nature of the Afrikaners' involvement in Transorania, 
they were now forced to develop trading links with the Cape colony to the west of Bushmanland. 
It was for this reason that they welcomed the arrival of missionaries in Great Namaqualand and 
allowed them to establish mission stations in the territory at the beginning of 1806. 
By this date it was apparent that the missionary presence at the Orange River was so influential 
as to signify the dawning of a new era for the societies of the region. This was particularly true of 
the Middle Orange River. When Kichcrcr left the Orange River in March 1802 Anderson and 
Kramer had remained behind and continued to minister to a growing community.66 The large 
numbers of people (which averaged 784 souls in 1809) with their livestock (more than 3 000 
cattle with even more sheep and goats and 80 to 90 horscs)67 proved, as Somerville had fearcd,68 
to be too much for the natural resources of the area and the settlement was obliged to move from 
Rictfontcin (or Aakaap) to the Kloof and, finally to Klaarwater.69 Herc the extended families of 
the Koks and the Barends united, retaining however, the separate identities under their respective 
leaders, Adam Kok and Barcnd Barends. Adam Kok, was reckoned the richest man among them 
and possessed a thousand sheep, eight hundred goats and three teams of oxen, besides a number 
of cows and calves.70 If danger threatened the combined groups could, by 1811, call on a 
fonnidable force of more that two hundred men armed with muskets. The necessary military 
strength and political authority to protect the economic base of this nascent statelet - the future 
Griquatown, capital of the Griqua (as its inhabitants were encouraged to call themselves, by John 
Campbell, after 1813)71 - was thus in existence. 
In addition to the extensive flocks and herds of the conununity crops were planted at a number of 
springs in the vicinity whilst, after 1805, houses began to be built out of stone. The other 
65. Legassick, "The Griqua, Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries", pp.257 and 260. 
66. See p.442 above. 
67. Burchell, Travels, pp.253-4. 
68. E. and F. I3radlow, (eds.), Somen•ille, pp. 99-100. 
69. At the time they took possession of Klaarwatcr it was a San kraal. Burchell, Travels, p.252. 
70. Burchell, Travels, p.254. 
71. Campbell, Travels, p.252. "The people in this part, being a mixed race, went by the name of Bastards; but 
having represented to the principal persons the olknsivcncss of the word to an English or Dutch car, thcv resolved 
to assume some other name. On consulting among themselves, they found the majority were descended from a 
person of the name of Griqua, and they resolved hereatler to be called Griquas." 
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economic activities which underpinned the society were trading, and, despite the new Christian 
faith of some members, raiding. 
The fonner activity dealt principally with ivory and cattle, traded from the Tlhaping and Rolong. 
So important was this trade that it quickly became institutionalised and played a large part in 
stabilising relationships between the "Bastaards" and the Tswana. As Legassick points out, the 
Tswana were less easily raided than the Khoisan conununities whilst they also enjoyed closer 
access to the diminishing and retreating herds of elephant.72 It was not only "Bastaards" who 
grasped the opportunities offered by the trade with the Tswana but some of the missionaries too. 
The participation of missionaries in this trade undoubtedly facilitated "Bastaard" access to the 
colonial market and the acquisition of guns and gunpowder. Missionary agents were clearly 
preferable to frontier fanners because, in the eyes of both the govenunent and the "Bastaards", 
they were perceived to be trustworthy individuals about legitimate business. Both Jan Matthys 
Kok and William Edwards, out of necessity, became ivory traders for there was no other means 
to support themselves far beyond the reach of supplies and assistance during their mission to the 
Tswana. Kok played a most energetic role in trading ivory from the Tlhaping and Baralong. The 
latter group offered the favourable exchange rate of one tusk per sheep, which enabled Kok to 
send wagon loads of ivory to the south. It is estimated that by 1806 Kok had made 3 000 
Rijksdaalders from the ivory trade and Edwards 3 200 Rijksdaalders, a sum which enabled him to 
buy a wine fann near Tulbagh and abandon the hardships of the missionary calling. In 1807 
William Anderson discovered that he could obtain 269 Rijksdaalders worth of ivory for only 20 
Rijksdaalders worth of bcads.73 Such conunerce was not without danger. In 1805 one of Kok's 
wagons was attacked by San and the Khoikhoi guards killed. In November 1806 Kok himself was 
murdered by two Tlhaping men who were clearly motivated by greed rather than hostility to the 
Christian mcssage.74 
The advantages (and disadvantages) of missionary involvement in linking the "Bastaards" to the 
Cape trading network arc well-illustrated by the case of Jager Afrikaner and the LMS missionary, 
Seidenfaden, at Pella in 18 l O. Scidenfaden and the Albrcchts had established a mission at the 
Orange River near Louis Fontein/Stille Hoop (present day Kakamas) in January 1805. Shortly 
72. Legassick, "The Northern Frontier", in Elphick an<l Giliomee (e<ls.), S'1api11g, 2n<l e<l., p.371. 
73. Legassick, "The Griqua, Sotho-Tswana an<l the Missionaries", pp.235-6; Lcgassick, "The Northern Frontier", 
in Elphick an<l Giliomcc ( c<ls. ), S'1api11g, 2n<l c<l., pp.371-72. 
74. Du Bruyn, "Sending On<lcr <lie Tlhaping", pp. 38-41. 
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after this they explored the possibility of commencing a mission in Great Namaqualand (or 
southern Namibia) and by 1807 had founded the Wann Bad station in this harsh environment.75 
The decision to begin mission activities in Great Namaqualand had, significantly, come from 
Cornelius Kok, who retained extensive interests in both Little and Great Namaqualand as well as 
the Middle Orange.76 The missionaries, Abraham and Christiaan Albrecht, based themselves at 
Wann Bad whilst Johannes Seidenfaden moved to Heirachabis, eighty kilometres east of present 
day Karasberg. Even before this, however, they had been obliged to come to tenns with Jager 
Afrikaner. He, for his part, seemed to welcome their presence, sending his children to the mission 
school.77 Afrikaner was not the only presence in the area, for it was inhabited by other Oorlam, 
Nama and refugee Einiqua groups. At Heirachabis were the tKharakhoen (Fransmanne)78 and at 
Wann Bad the Gan1inus or (Bondelswarts)79 who were in conflict with the Ogeis (Groot 
Doode).80 All of these groups were Great Namaqua. The captain of the Bondelswarts sought to 
use the missionaries, their following and their fireanns (actual or anticipated) against the Groot 
Doode whilst there was considerable conflict between the Nama and the Oorlams.81 The 
missionaries had, somehow, to keep the peace between these mutually antagonistic groups at 
Wann Bad whilst propagating the gospel.82 By 1807, despite these political challenges, they 
presided over a community of 300 Bondelswarts, 200 Oorlams and some Einiqua.83 The station 
at Heirachabis was, however, abandoned due to its unrewarding ecological envir01m1ent and 
Seidenfaden attempted to move within the boundaries of the colony to establish a mission in the 
Kamiesberg. The ill-fate of this venture has already been discussed and, following his eviction 
from Leliefontein, Seidenfaden settled at Pella, just south of the Orange River, in October 1809. 
It was here that Seidenfaden began to play much the same role to the Afrikaners as Edwards had 
been playing at Klaarwater. But, unfortunately for the missionaries, the consequences were not as 
profitable. At the end of 1810 the Afrikaner returned to their old ways and began to attack the 
75. Although the carrying capacity of the veld was much better in the early eighteenth century than it is today it 
was still poor. The present desert-like conditions of southern Namibia arc largely a result of overgrazing. Sec B. 
Lau, "Konunando Politics", pp.32-4. 
76. Dcdcring, "Southern Namibia", pp.148-9. 
77. Ibid., p.149. 
78. Sec Nienaber, Stanmame, pp.576-81. 
79. Nienaber, Stan111a111e, pp.333-343. 
80. Ibid., pp.786-9. 
81. The Albrcchts noted in their journal in 1809: "One of our difficulties with the Namaquas is their prejudice 
against foreigners, particularly against the Hottentots, some of whom we arc obliged to hire in our services as they 
arc for better acquainted with agriculture and the building of houses." By "I lottcntots" the J\lbrcchts meant colonial 
Khoikhoi or Oorlams. Quoted by 13. Lau, "Kommando Politics", p.63. 
82. Dcdcring, "Southern Namibia", p.150. 
83. Ibid , p. l 54. 
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Nama of the lower Orange River, stealing supplies, fireanns and anununition. They also 
plundered Seidenfaden's station at Pella, wrecking the absent missionary's possessions and 
causing damage estimated at 4 000 Rijksdaalders.84 According to Van der Kemp, "Afrikaner 
demolished some things belonging to Br Seidenfaden, against whom he had took (sic) some 
claims, arising from elephants teeth, which he had sold to Brother Seidenfaden".85 This was not 
the only cause of Afrikaner's frustration for he had sent some cattle to the colony under the care 
of a servant, Hans Drayer, with the intention of exchanging them for a wagon. Wagons were, of 
course, of crucial importance in the transportation of ivory to the colony. These cattle were 
confiscated from Drayer by a colonist, who claimed that he owed him money. Drayer sought 
shelter from Afrikaner's wrath amongst the missionaries, but this merely served to implicate them 
further in the eyes of the aggrieved outlaw. It certainly did Drayer no good for Afrikaner traced 
him to Pella and put the unfortunate man to death. 86 
The missionaries at Warm Bad felt sufficiently threatened by this resurgence of violence on the 
part of the Afrikaners to withdraw from their station and to request the intervention of a 
conunando from the colony. About 1 500 Nama followed them, under the military protection of 
the Khoikhoi Captain Vlennuis, a convert from the Heirachabis mission. After some indecisive 
wandering the missionaries retreated to Pella whilst Vlemmis' forces skinnished vigorously with 
the Afrikaners without, however, being able to prevent the destruction of Wann Bad. By 
September 1811 the colonial co1m11ando had failed, like others before it, to make contact with the 
Afrikaners and the missionaries, realising that their request for a conunando had compromised 
them and that their position remained extremely vulnerable, abandoned the north-western frontier 
to recoup in Cape Town.87 
The expulsion of the missionaries from Wann Bad and Pella was a notable setback for the 
proponents of Christian civilisation but it was, however, a temporary one. Indeed, the incident is 
more symptomatic of the success achieved by Christiaan Albrecht and his following than it is of 
their failures. Afrikaner's attack was prompted by the inability of the missionaries to ensure safe, 
regular and economic contact for him with the Cape colony. It was also a frustrated admission 
that this objective was impossible without them. Significantly Afrikaner directed his attacks on 
the property and not the persons of the missionaries. The note of petulance in the threat which he 
84. Ibid., pp. l 93-96. 
85. Quoted by Dcdcring, "Soulhcm Namibia", p.228, n.17. 
86. Dc<lcriug, "Southern Namibia", p. l 93. 
87. Ibid., pp. l 93-8. Sec also Campbell's account of this incident in his Travels, pp.376-377. 
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mouthed during the destruction on Pella - dat als het hem gelukt, al de buiten-menschen naar de 
Caap te verjagen, dat dan de Gouverneur zelve voor hem en voetval moet doen, en om frede 
smeken88 - is an indication that he was behaving as he was from a sense of outraged injury rather 
than congenital depravity. His was the cruel disappointment of betrayed expectations - the 
missionaries had not played their part. 
Afrikaner was not the only one to express dissatisfaction with the conduct of LMS missionaries 
in great Namaqualand. Van der Kemp was fiercely critical of Seidenfaden's involvement in the 
ivory trade whilst Christiaan Albrecht's conduct was not beyond reproach either. His readiness in 
summoning colonial conunando and his reliance of Vlennuis' protection had involved him in 
military and political issues which compromised the mission. In Cape Town Albrechts had 
persuaded the governor to grant him "two hundred pounds of weight of gunpowder, four hundred 
of lead and twenty firelocks".89 Van der Kemp could not help but speculate that: 
the wandering hordes of Br. Albrecht, abusing his pliable character, have sent him to 
the Cape as a tool to obtain by his instrumentality as much powder and fireanns as 
possible to commit more depredations as Afrikaner ever is said to be guilty of, and 
that upon this reason they ly fake or exaggerate representations of ( ... ) dangers, 
drove my amiable( ... ) Br. to the Caroo ( ... )90 
The principal beneficiaries of the Afrikaners' attack on the mission stations were indeed Vlennuis 
and his followers who now enjoyed all the advantages that Afrikaner had failed to achieve: access 
to fiream1s, ammunition and the Cape market through legitimate mission approved chaimels. 
Thus bolstered Vlennuis was able to guarantee the presence of a large, grateful and dependent 
conununity in the vicinity of Great Namaqualand which would act as both a defence and a field of 
labour for the missionaries. Albrechts hastened to return to Pella in 1812 reinforced by the 
missionaries Ebner, Sass, Helm and Schmelen. 91 By 1813 the mission at Pella was composed of 
more than 600 people, including Captains Vlermuis and the Bondelswart. Because of the 
barrenness of the region, large segments of the group were periodically obliged to wander 
nomadically in search of pasture and water for their livestock. In these wanderings they were 
accompanied by some of the missionaries. All concerned felt considerable unease at this dividing 
their numbers and presenting the malcontent Afrikaners with a vulnerable target.92 When John 
88. "Thal if he felt like it he could drive all the outlying people lo the Cape and the Governor himself would have 
lo approach him in order lo make peace." Quoted in Dedering, "Southern Namibia", p.197. 
89. Dedering, "Southern Namibia", p.194. 
90. Quoted in Dedering, "Southern Namibia", p.228, n.27. 
91. Du Plessis, Christian Alissio11s, pp.117-8. 
92. Campell, Travels, pp.300-6. 
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Campbell, the inspector of LMS m1ss10ns, visited Pella in 1813 he reported that: "111e 
missionaries say that the Namaquas are naturally a timid people. For a long time after they had 
fled across the Great River, from a dread of Afrikaner, the least rising of dust or sand excited 
great consternation; they were sure it was Afrikaner coming against them. "93 For this reason it 
was imperative to make peace with Jager Afrikaner and Campbell set himself this task. He sent 
Jager Afrikaner a conciliatory letter and in April 1814 the response from the Afrikaners was that 
they desired a missionary, Bibles and hymn books.94 In May 1815, Christiaan Albrecht travelled 
to Afrikaner's kraal. Johan Ebner and his wife followed him in June and in July of that san1e year 
it fell to Ebner to baptise Jager Afrikaner.95 
There are several reasons why the baptism of Jager Afrikaner is an appropriate event with which 
to close this account of the northern Cape frontier zone and the Orange River. Although the 
various processes of closure - political, economic and social - were by 1815 far from complete, 
there is a symbolic significance in Jager Afrikaner's baptism that transcends its religious function. 
By accepting Christianity Jager and his gang, the erstwhile terrors of the northern frontier, were 
accepting, however feeble its constraints might be, the distant authority of the colonial 
govermnent mediated through the agency of missionaries. 96 In this respect they were falling into 
line with the Oorlam societies of Transorania to the east. 
Much of the subsequent history of these societies during the nineteenth century is concerned with 
the shifting balance of power and the changing relationships between them, their missionary 
mentors and the colonial govermnent. Though colonial control or political closure of the frontier 
zone by the colonial government seemed, at times, non-existent, this should not blind us to the 
fact that, after 1815, the idiom of government both within and between political units, was that 
93. Ibid., pp.305-6. 
94. Dedering, "Southern Namibia", p.198. 
95. Ibid. 
96. When John Philip asked Afrikaner, some years later, what he thought of the British government's suggestion 
that missionaries and their followers should be removed to within the boundaries of the colony, he replied: "I have 
no objection to be under the British govenunent, ifl am to be treated as a freeman; but I can never consent to Ii vc 
in the neighbourhood of the fanners. Let govenunent point out to me a situation where I can live, with my people, 
al a distance from the boors, and I shall accompany you to that spoL I and my people are willing lo serve the 
English govenuncnl, but we arc not willing to be slaves. Namaqualand is a desert country; it is hard living in 
Namaqualand; but I would rather bear any kind of hardship, in the wilderness, from the hand of God, than be 
subject to the continual and degrading vexations I should have reason lo apprehend from the tyrmmy and injustice 
of man." Philip, Researches, Vol. 2, p.322. 
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which the m1ss1onanes had encouraged. The rules and fonns, the values and structures of 
political life were coloured by colonial Christianity.97 
This implies that social closure was accompanymg political closure. As Christianity gained 
ground amongst the Oorlams it became an important cultural reference point. Literacy and 
baptism became pre-requisites for membership of the societies' elites - a development that did not 
always have the uncontested approval of the less acculturated. Cultural conflicts within Oorlam 
societies were often accompanied by opposition to the missionaries' attempts to impose a cultural 
hegemony from above. In this, as in political affairs generally, the Oorlam societies did not forget 
to guard their independence and processes of closure were by no means straightforward. 98 
In 1819 Jager Afrikaner achieved a long standing ambition when he travelled with the missionary 
Robert Moffat (who had replaced Ebner in January 1818) to Cape Town. In its relief to see the 
scourge of the north tamed the government granted Afrikaner an ox-wagon and a passport, then 
ensuring him legal access to the colony and facilitating the transportation of conunodities.99 This 
was a notable political success for the LMS, encouraging the govenunent to place greater 
confidence in missionaries as agents of control. It was also a sign that Jager's conversion, with its 
implicit submission to LMS authority, had bound the Afrikaners more tightly to the nexus of the 
colonial market. This state of affairs allowed the Afrikaners, like other Oorlam or "Bastaard" 
societies to the east, to consolidate peaceful trade relations between the Sotho-Tswana in the 
north and the colony in the south. In this way the magnetic influence of the Cape Town market 
was felt more strongly within the frontier zone but it should not be forgotten that this zone itself 
was constantly expanding. The extreme fragility of the local environment caused the new Oorlam 
polities, whose economic base remained essentially a pastoral one, to reach far beyond the river. 
The efforts of the missionaries to create sedentary societies, rooted in one spot by their interest in 
agricultural activities, failed. The familiar dynamics of trekboer expansion were perpetuated by 
the increasingly well-armed Oorlam societies on the edge of the frontier as they were drawn 
97. Sec Legassick, "The Griqua, Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries" and Ross, .--!dam Kok's Griquas for the 
inl1ucnce of missionaries in the subsequent history of the Griqua. I3. Lau, Namibia i11 Jonker Aji·ikcmer's Time and 
T. Dcdcring, "Southern Namibia", consider the missionary in!1ucnce on the Oorlam and Khoikhoi groups of 
southern Namibia. 
98. For an account of political strnggles and tensions within the early Griqua polity sec Margaret Kinsman, 
"Populists and Patriarchs: The Transfonnation of the Captaincy at Griqua To\\11, 1804-1822", in Alan Malm1, ( ed ), 
Orga11izatio11 and lfro110111ic Change (Johannesburg, 1989), pp. l-20. 
99. Dedcring, "Southern Namibia", p.206. 
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deeper into the interior in their quest for ivory, cattle and unfree labour.100 Years of raids and 
commando activity against the Herero to the north west and Sotho-Tswana to the north-east of 
the river were to follow. 
In this respect it is possible to regard the Oorlam societies as pioneers of the Cape colonial 
frontier, a frontier that, by 1815, had reached far beyond the northern bank of the Orange River. 
It is, however, important to realise that though the Oorlam groups were very similar to the 
trekboers of the colony they were, in certain respects, not the same at all. Politically they 
remained distinct from the trekboers, retaining a degree of independence and self government that 
marked them off from societies south of the Orange River. The most obvious point of all - the 
fact that the majority of their members were racially or somatically distinct from the trekboers of 
the colony - should not be considered a negligible distinction simply because the societies had so 
much in conunon at the technical or economic levels. By the begi1ming of the nineteenth century 
their inferior social and political status and their distinct racial identity were closely inter-related. 
The lands along the Orange River remained marginal and their possession by Oorlam societies 
was in a way an indication of the marginality of these societies themselves. They had avoided 
becoming the exploited underclass of the trekboers by a combination of resistance and retreat and 
it is the remoteness of the Orange River from the centre of colonial power that both shared and 
preserved their distinctiveness. The fact that the Oorlam groups had, albeit temporarily, escaped 
the suppression experienced by the "Bastaards", "Bastaard-Hottentots" and Khoisan within the 
colony did not prevent them from seeking to subjugate less powerful people in their vicinity. Not 
all the survivors of the era of insecurity had attached themselves voluntarily to Oorlam groups -
as many Korana, Einiqua, Namaqua and San had done. Some began as oppressed clients, 
servants or semi-slaves, gradually losing their inferior status and merging into the groups' multi-
ethnic identity. Others achieved a precarious existence outside of Oorlam societies though 
frequently subject to raids or harassment from them. Notable examples were the Korana groups 
of the Orange River islands (which included many non-Korana members) who survived to be a 
thorn in the flesh of the colony until the 1870s.lOI The Orange River, therefore, especially in its 
western parts, remained a frontier deep into the nineteenth century and the societies of its 
inunediate hinterland remained frontier societies. 
I 00. For the growing interest in slave raiding across the Cape frontier sparked by the Cobbing hypothesis sec 
Elizabeth Eldredge, "Slave Raiding Across the Cape Frontier", in Eldredge and Morton, Slave,y 111 South Aji'ica, 
pp.93-126. 
IO I. Sec T. Strauss, /Var A/011g 71,e Orange, and R. Ross, "The 'Korn Wars". 
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When, in the 1830s, the trekboers finally launched themselves across the Orange River in 
significant numbers - the Great Trek - it was in the environmentally superior eastern regions of 
Transorania that this advance occurred and only after the San of the Sneeuberg had been 
pacified. This pacification had been achieved by a combination of continuous commando activity, 
but also by the more subtle and insidious practice of gift-giving. Even though missions to the San 
had been a failure, San resistance had been fatally undermined by the infiltration of seemingly 
peaceful colonists into their territory. Once the colonists had established themselves beyond the 
Sneeuberg the San were unable to prevent the destruction of their societies. They suffered 
increasing persecution from their pastoralist neighbours, witnessing the alienation of their land to 
stock-fam1ers and the inexorable erosion of their independence.102 Those who were not killed or 
captured retreated deep within inhospitable Bushmanland in an attempt to survive or to avoid 
virtual enslavement on colonial fanns. 
In Bushmanland their numbers dwindled towards extinction as they were hunted down by Boer or 
"Bastaard" conunandos which were detennined to tum the Cape thirstland into an area of San-
free trekveld. For the first time Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" pastoralists, driven by intolerable 
pressure from the white colonists, began to take up an almost permanent residence within 
Buslunanland. In the 1840s a mission station was established at Amandelboom in the western 
Kareeberg and another in the eastern Kareeberg. The targets of these enterprises were the 
Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" settlers who now dwelt there. In December 1847 the entire north-
western Cape, as far as the Orange River, was annexed as part of the colony. Buslunanland was 
declared a conununal grazing area (or trekvelden) in which white, Khoikhoi and "Bastaard" 
fanncrs had equal rights. The rights of the San were not considered. 
As the numbers of these intruders grew the govenunent recognised the need for new magistracies 
in the north-western Cape. These were established in Calvinia, Namaqualand and Fraserburg in 
the 1850s. The world of the independent San had now shrunk to the most arid areas of 
Buslunanland but, even here, they were not safe. In 1861 the magistrate of Namaqualand, Louis 
Anthing, received a complaint from a certain Jaco Fluik, a San, that his people were being killed 
by mixed conunandos of whites, "Bastaards" and Khoikhoi. Anthing received permission from his 
superiors to investigate these charges and subsequently heard many sickening accounts from 
witnesses of massacres of the San in the last decade preceding his visit. These crimes were no 
l 02. The forthcoming work of the archaeologist Garth Sampson will do much to illuminate the interactions which 




doubt very similar to those which the colonists had been perpetrating on the San since the 
beginning of the eighteenth century but to Anthing they were unacceptable. He estimated that 
there were only 500 San left alive and that many of the dead had not been shot, but starved to 
death.103 
Anthing believed that to protect the San a magistrate should be established at Kenhardt and land 
should be set aside for the San. The first of these suggestions was approved by the government, 
but the expenses involved in implementing the proposals caused the plan to be shelved. With 
considerable emotion Anthing attempted to champion the cause of the doomed people, but his 
energies and sympathies were an aimoyance to the authorities. As a result he was transferred to 
Cradock and, once his salary was stopped, he was forced to resign. Nothing further was done to 
protect the San; no magistracy was established, no land was put aside for them, no food was 
given to them and none of the perpetrators of the crimes against them were arrested. I 04 
Literally starving, the San were forced to steal livestock in order to stay alive. If caught, they 
were either murdered by the local farmers or sent to Cape Town as convicts to work as labourers 
on the Breakwater. Upon their release few survived for long since their families had been 
destroyed and their land taken. Some joined the Korana uprising of 1868 but there was no place 
left for them on earth. Dia!kwain, one of the /Xam who, before they disappeared completely, 
passed on his people's stories to Bicek and Lloyd, explained what happened after death. 
The wind when we die, our own wind blows. 
For we, the /Xain people, each of us has his wind; 
each one has a cloud that comes out when he dies. 
Therefore the wind when we die, the wind blows dust 
covering the tracks, the footprints we made 
when walking about living, with nothing the matter, 
when we still knew nothing of sickness and death. 
If not for this wind, our spoor would still show, 
our spoor would still show us as if we still livcd. !05 
103. For details sec Deborah Findlay, "The San of the Cape Thirstland and L. Anthing's 'Special Mission"', 
(Honours Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1977). Sec also N. Penn "The /Xam am! the Colony, 1740-1870", in 
P. Skotncs, ( ed.), Sound From T!te 711i11ki11g Siring (Cape Town, 1991 ), pp.22-49. 
104. Ibid. 
105. This poclic rendering of Dia!kwain's cxplanalion was made from lhc translation of Bleck and Lloyd by 
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